25 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Marc Schier	06ae192084	Fix CI failures tracked by #4299 (#4308) ... ## Summary - stabilize the History, authentication lockout, Robotics, redundancy, and DI tests reported in #4301-#4305 - fix the closed-transport buffered-write completion deadlock that hung `ConnectMultipleSessionsAsync` - add macOS crash diagnostics for #4306 and retain evidence for root-cause analysis - run macOS tests and NativeAOT in GitHub Actions pull requests, using supported Intel and ARM64 runners, while keeping every Azure macOS definition disabled by default - move all remaining source-level `InternalsVisibleTo` declarations into project files so signed OpenUSD builds receive the repository public key ## Local validation - MCP PubSub: 29 passed - History focused tests: 3 passed - Sessions lockout: 3 passed - Sessions multiple-session regression: 3 passed - deterministic binary client channel tests: 22 passed - Robotics runtime: 34 passed - Redundancy focused tests: 4 passed - OpenUSD net10.0: 914 passed - affected OpenUSD projects build on net10.0 and net48 Refs #4299, #4300, #4306 Fixes #4301 Fixes #4302 Fixes #4303 Fixes #4304 Fixes #4305 --------- Copilot-Session: 7cb486de-8b4c-43c5-a900-e7d2e0ad04a8	2026-08-22 19:30:19 +00:00
Marc Schier	aad8350bc1	Pluggable symmetric cryptography, an awaitable asymmetric path, registrable security policies, and PubSub crypto offboarding (#4206, #4207, #4208, #4210) (#4232) ... # Description Closes the three crypto-offboarding follow-ups split out of #4192. Each was recorded there as knowingly *not* done, with the reason and what would justify revisiting it. Those conditions are met, and where one of them turned out to be unachievable that is written down rather than worked around. The safety property throughout: **every seam is opt-in and null-checked, and in the default software configuration the added code is observably inert.** No interface dispatch on the per-message path, and the asynchronous paths complete synchronously — so channel locking order, buffer ownership and error sequencing are unchanged for a deployment that configures nothing. ## #4207 — symmetric, key-derivation and RNG provider seams `ISymmetricCryptoProvider`, `IKeyDerivationProvider` and `ISecureRandomSource`, added on the terms #4207 set: only once a concrete requirement arrived (a validated module that must perform *every* operation, not just the asymmetric ones), behind a fast path, with `SymmetricChannelCryptoBenchmarks` as the gate. They are **facets discovered by type test**, not members of `ICryptoProvider`, so providers written against the shipped interface still compile. `PlatformCryptoProvider` implements all three, which answers the "an interface nothing implements" objection recorded in the issue. `CryptoProviderFacets` returns `null` both when no registry is configured *and* when resolution lands on the platform, because the platform facets are the inline code. Resolution happens once, in `CalculateSymmetricKeySizes`, and is held for the life of the channel. `CryptoCompliance.GetUnservedOperationPurposes` closes the failure the seam would otherwise introduce: a provider bound to `ChannelSymmetric` without implementing the facet is silently replaced by the platform, so a deployment could believe its validated module performed the per-message cryptography while the platform did. Under `FipsOnly` that now refuses to start. ## #4208 — the asymmetric path is awaitable `RSA` and `ECDsa` are .NET's contracts and cannot be replaced without making every ready-made hardware and cloud implementation unusable. Instead an implementation may **also** declare `IAsyncRsaKey` / `IAsyncEcdsaKey`, which the stack finds by type test. Now asynchronous: the secure channel open and renew path, user identity token signing and decryption, and session activation. A software key declares neither facet, so those paths complete synchronously and nothing about their ordering changes. `ReadAsymmetricMessage` is refactored into shared helpers rather than duplicated — adding an `await` was not worth two hundred cloned lines of signature, padding and endpoint-selection logic. `AsymmetricMessage` / `AsymmetricWriteResult` exist because an asynchronous method cannot have `out` parameters. The channel no longer serialises its state on a monitor. A monitor cannot be held across an `await`, and a plain `SemaphoreSlim` was not an option at the time: the code relied on re-entrancy in eight places (`HandleIncomingMessage` holds the lock and calls `ForceChannelFault`, which takes it again; `ForceReconnect` and `Shutdown` do the same). `ChannelGate` replaces it at 32 sites and `DataLock` is `[Obsolete]`. That reliance has since been removed as well — see [Removing the gate's re-entrancy](#removing-the-gates-re-entrancy) below. ### Defects this surfaced, all fixed and regression-tested **Detached work started inline.** Writes were started with `_ = WriteBuffersAsync(...)`. An async method runs its prologue on the caller's stack, so `LeaveInheritedContext` — which exists to stop *detached* work inheriting the right to re-enter the gate — was stripping the **caller's own** entitlement; when the send then completed synchronously, the completion blocked on a gate that very thread was holding. The client sent its OpenSecureChannel request and never processed the response. Writes are now queued. **A synchronous gate handle held across an `await`.** `Enter()` records the acquiring thread so an inline completion callback can re-enter — `ChannelAsyncOperation` invokes its callback both inline and detached. That record is only sound while the holder is synchronously on that thread; the token renewal path held it across an await, so a reused pool thread was recognised as the holder. **`SignAsync` rejected the policy that signs nothing.** It validated the certificate before the algorithm, so `SecurityPolicies.None` — which carries no certificate — threw where the synchronous `Sign` returns `null`. **`EnterAsync` lost the holder when contended** *(found in review)*. The `AsyncLocal` recording ownership was written inside the awaiting method, and .NET restores the caller's execution context when an async method completes, so the write was discarded. The caller returned owning the semaphore while `IsHeldByCurrentContext` reported `false` — and any nested `Enter()` then blocked forever on a gate its own context held. Reachable remotely: `HandleIncomingMessageAsync` → error path → `ForceChannelFault`. The holder is now published from the caller's frame before the wait, and only its depth is raised in the continuation. **Queued writes lost their order** *(found in review)*. Sequence numbers are assigned under the gate, but independently queued work items reach the transport's FIFO send lock in arbitrary order, so a peer could reject a chunk with `BadSequenceNumberInvalid`. Writes are now appended to a chain: still off the caller's stack, but a write cannot start before its predecessor finishes. ### Four more this surfaced in CI, on paths only the integration suites reach Queuing the writes to fix the deadlock above turned out to have moved three implicit guarantees, and the gate had one more liveness bug. Each was reproduced locally against a clean baseline before it was changed. **A faulting channel's error message never reached the peer.** A listener channel sends a UASC `Error` describing why it faulted and closes the transport as its next statement. That worked only because the write started on the caller's stack, so the bytes reached the socket first; queued, the close discarded them and the client saw `BadConnectionClosed` instead of the certificate status it was told to expect. Nine `SecurityCertValidationTests` cases assert exactly that status. The terminal error is written inline again, on a path that touches the gate only to disclaim what it inherited and reports nothing — a channel that is already faulted is owed nothing beyond its buffer. **The certificate of a rejected sender leaked.** An asynchronous method cannot have `out` parameters, so the asymmetric read returns a record instead. That silently dropped an ownership guarantee: an `out` parameter reaches the caller even when the method goes on to throw, so the caller's `catch` disposed the sender certificate and reported it to the audit. A return value does not — nine leaked certificates, one per rejection case, which the leak detector fails the run on. The parsed certificate is now handed to the caller before anything that can reject the message, restoring both the disposal and the audit. **The gate could strand its own permit.** It released only when the holder's depth returned to zero, but that depth lives in an `AsyncLocal` and is therefore shared with every context forked from the owner's — a timer callback whose timer was created inside the region, for instance. Such a context entering the gate raised the shared depth, so the owner's own exit saw a non-zero depth and returned without releasing, and nothing afterwards could: the nested exit is not the owner. Every later entry on that channel blocked forever. `Opc.Ua.Features.Tests` hung after its tests had finished, with a receive loop waiting on the gate and the server unable to stop. The owner now releases when it leaves; depth still gates re-entrancy, but liveness no longer depends on a count another context can move. **Write completion throttled the writer.** Reporting a completed write sat inside the ordering chain, and the client channel implements that callback by entering the gate — so every write queued behind a gate the receive loop contends for on each incoming chunk. A session with fifty subscriptions publishing continuously had its publish requests throttled enough that the client kept topping them up past its own limit, which `Subscriptions.Classic` asserts against. Completion is now reported off the chain, which covers only what ordering actually requires. ### Still synchronous, and why Certificate, certificate request and revocation list signing cannot be made asynchronous at all: `X509SignatureGenerator.SignData` is invoked by .NET's own builders. Service faults and the `Reconnect` override are reached from synchronous call sites (`SendServiceFault` alone has eight) and are left as they are behind scoped, commented suppressions. All three are documented rather than left to be rediscovered. ## #4210 — PubSub This one produced a finding rather than the API the issue asked for, and the finding is the point: > **With a standard Security Key Service the key necessarily exists in process memory.** `GetSecurityKeys` (Part 14 §8.3.2) returns raw key bytes over the wire, so the "key never leaves the device" property #4192 achieved for client and server **cannot** be achieved for PubSub through the SKS pull profile. That is a property of the specification, not of this stack. A wrapped-key envelope would change what is on the wire and break interoperability with third-party key services and publishers, so it was rejected rather than built. What is achievable is delivered: the per-message AES-CTR and HMAC route through `ISymmetricCryptoProvider`, so a validated module performs them. `IPubSubSecurityPolicy` is **not** modified — new members would break every implementation of it; the provider is supplied through the policy constructor. `PlatformSymmetricCryptoProvider` gained AES counter mode, which the seam should have covered anyway since the algorithm enum names it. Key lifetime is also tightened: unpacking an SKS response copied key material into intermediates that `ByteString.Create` then copied again, leaving plain keys in the heap for the lifetime of the process. Those are now zeroed. ### Two wiring gaps this depended on, both found in review The registrations above were **inert**, so this section originally claimed more than the code did: - `CryptoProviderConfiguration` was applied nowhere outside tests, so `AddCryptoProvider(configure)` never reached the registry in a real host. The registry now applies every registered configuration when it is first resolved — which also affects #4207's DI story. - `PubSubSecurityWrapperResolver` selected `PubSubAes256CtrPolicy.Instance`, the provider-less static singleton, ignoring the provider-backed bundles registered for it. A `FipsOnly` deployment therefore certified while the platform did the work. The resolver now selects from the registered policies; the container and `PubSubApplicationBuilder` both supply theirs. A third, smaller one: `CryptoProviderBuilder.Use` published a **policy-scoped** random source as the process-wide nonce source, so `.For(purpose, policyUri).Use(hsm)` redirected nonce generation for every other policy too. Only an unscoped binding does that now. ## #4206 — a provider can contribute a security policy Added in review: the policy set was fixed at compile time, so a provider could contribute key custody but not a *profile*. It is now table-driven and open, and the blockers #4206 listed are gone. ```csharp using IDisposable registration = SecurityPolicies.Register( new SecurityPolicyInfo("urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile", "CustomProfile") { PlatformSupport = () => true, SupportedCertificateTypes = [ObjectTypeIds.RsaSha256ApplicationCertificateType], IsDefault = true }); services.AddOpcUa() .AddCryptoProvider(crypto => crypto .For(CryptoPurpose.ChannelSymmetric, "urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile").Use(module)) .AddSecurityPolicy(customPolicy); ``` - **The reflection is gone.** Four lookup tables were built by reflecting over the fields of `SecurityPolicies` and `SecurityPolicyInfo`. They are one explicit table now, which removes the **last reflection in `Security/Constants`** — so this is a trimming and Native AOT improvement as much as a feature. - **`SecurityPolicyInfo` is constructible from another assembly** and carries the metadata the helpers need, so `IsPlatformSupportedName`, `GetDefaultUris`, `MapSecurityPolicyToCertificateTypes` and `GetCurveFromCertificateTypeId` read that table instead of each being hand-written. Adding a policy is one entry rather than five edits. - **The dead `#if CURVE25519` conditional is deleted** from `Security/Constants`. - Registration is copy-on-write, so the read path stays lock-free. Shadowing a built-in policy requires `replaceExisting: true` and is reversible by disposing the registration. `RegisterLightsUpCurvePoliciesFromOutsideCore` is the acceptance test the issue asked for: it registers `ECC_curve25519` and `ECC_curve448` from the test project and asserts they become discoverable through the public API. **Registering a policy makes it advertised and resolvable; it does not supply the cryptography behind it.** For those two curve profiles the in-tree key agreement is still behind a compile symbol no project defines plus a BouncyCastle dependency, so a deployment lighting them up provides the operations through a provider. That division is the point: the policy set says *what* is offered, the provider says *who* performs it. ## Removing the gate's re-entrancy Folded in from #4242, which was merged into this branch. `ChannelGate` was re-entrant, and that forced the design behind most of the defects above. A holder that awaits releases its thread, so ownership could not be tracked by thread identity — it had to live in an `AsyncLocal<Holder?>`. A logical context is *inherited*, so anything started while the gate was held inherited the right to re-enter and ran inside the guarded region alongside whatever started it, unless it opted out by hand via `LeaveInheritedContext()` at each of eight sites, enforced by review alone. Five of the defects listed above trace to that mechanism, including both CI hangs. So the *requirement* was removed rather than the mechanism, and the `AsyncLocal` then deleted itself. Every path that re-entered now calls a lock-free `Core` method (`ForceChannelFaultCore`, `ShutdownCore`, `ForceReconnectCore`, `CompleteConnectCore`), and three regions stopped running foreign code under the lock: the `RequestReceived` dispatch is deferred until the gate is released, `OnTransportError` no longer wraps the `HandleSocketError` virtual, and the callback setters and `EndpointDescription` publish a single reference with a volatile write instead of locking — the last is load-bearing, because `AsyncResultBase.OperationCompleted` invokes the reverse-hello callback inline while the gate is held. `ChannelGate` is now a `SemaphoreSlim(1,1)` behind a `Releaser`; `Holder`, the thread-identity fallback, `LeaveInheritedContext`, `IsHeldByCurrentContext` and all eight disclaimer calls are gone, with the call shape at all 32 sites unchanged. `SaveIntermediateChunk`, `GetSavedChunks` and `DoMessageLimitsExceeded` gained a `gateHeld` argument, because the client reaches them both with and without the gate and must pick the matching teardown — without it an oversized `OpenSecureChannel` response deadlocked the receive loop against itself. The remaining paths were not found by reading the code, since that is what missed them originally. A temporary strict mode made every re-entrant acquisition throw with its stack, the suite was run under it until clean, and it was deleted with the re-entrancy it measured. It caught two sites review had missed: the `EndpointDescription` **property getter** taking the gate, and the `RequestReceived` dispatch to application code happening inside the guarded region. Two deliberate residuals are documented for reviewers: `Dispose` no longer takes the gate (unavoidable — it is reached from `ChannelFaulted` with the gate held, where the old re-entrant acquisition excluded nothing anyway), and the deferred request dispatch builds `SecureChannelContext` just after gate release rather than under it. ## Testing New: the three seams and their platform implementations, facet discovery and resolution precedence, `FipsOnly` refusing a provider that cannot serve what it was bound to, AES counter mode (including a non-block-aligned round trip and a check that the counter carries, since one that did not would silently reuse key stream), `ChannelGate` (exclusion, re-entrancy across an await, re-entrancy on a reused thread, and the deadlocks above), the asynchronous channel paths, and the PubSub policy provider. Each review finding got a test that fails without its fix: - `ContendedEntryStillRecordsTheHolderAsync` — established contention deterministically, then re-entered; failed on the pre-fix gate. Removed with the re-entrancy it covered; `ChannelGateTests` now asserts the non-re-entrant contract instead. - `SecureClientAndTcpListenerKeepChunkOrderUnderConcurrentRequestsAsync` — 60 concurrent multi-chunk `SignAndEncrypt` requests over a real loopback listener; failed 3 runs out of 3 with the previous dispatch, passes 3 out of 3 with the chain. - `DependencyInjectionRoutesPubSubCryptoThroughTheRegisteredProviderAsync` — builds a container, registers a counting provider, wraps a message and asserts the provider actually performed the encryption and the signature. This is the assertion the PubSub claim above now rests on. - `PolicyScopedRandomBindingDoesNotEscapeItsPolicy`. Two further assertions are the ones that would catch a silent defect: a provider and the platform must produce **byte-identical** output — a validated module that disagreed could not interoperate — and with a software key the returned `ValueTask` must report `IsCompletedSuccessfully`, which is what makes "ordering is unchanged" checkable rather than merely asserted. `SymmetricChannelCryptoBenchmarks` gains a provider-registered variant beside the existing baseline, so the cost of the indirection is measured rather than assumed. Verified locally, every suite at or above its recorded baseline: `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` **0 warnings, 0 errors on all six target frameworks**; Core **4413** (net10.0); Core.Security **617**, with its certificate-leak detector clean; PubSub **1350** plus PubSub.Diagnostics **54** and PubSub.Udp **233**; Features **156**; Subscriptions.Classic **32**; Server integration **4053**; Client integration **2123**; MigrationAnalyzer **151** and MigrationAnalyzer.Core **13**. Zero failures in each. Core moved from 4388 to 4381 when the gate change landed — eight re-entrancy tests were removed along with the behaviour they covered, and one deadlock regression test added — and has since grown to 4413 with the registry isolation, provider-output and security-review tests. `ChannelGateTests` was rewritten around the new contract — exclusion across both entry modes, an uncontended asynchronous entry not suspending, re-entry blocking by contract, and the property that used to be the hazard: work started while the gate is held is excluded without having to opt out. Every CI failure this PR produced was reproduced locally, diagnosed against a clean `origin/master` baseline in a second worktree, and fixed at the source. Two hangs were found from `--blame-hang-timeout` dumps read with `dotnet-dump`. One failure that looked like a candidate was confirmed **not** to be: an intermittent `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` connect failure, pre-existing on `origin/master` (5 of 8 baseline runs failed, versus 3 of 14 here). ### The publish request overshoot `Subscriptions.Classic.PublishRequestCountAsync` failed on the Windows net10.0 leg with **207** outstanding publish requests against a cap of `max(maxServerPublishRequest, subscriptions)` = 50. It failed in 2 of 6 pipeline builds on this branch, never on `master` in 13 sampled builds, and never locally in 12 attempts including under deliberate CPU contention. The mechanism is a genuine race. `ClassicSubscriptionEngine.QueueBeginPublish` was a **check-then-act**: it read `GoodPublishRequestCount`, compared it against `GetDesiredPublishRequestCount(false)`, and issued a publish if it was below. It runs on every publish completion, so *n* completions that overlap each read the same value, each conclude they are below the cap, and each issue — overshooting by up to *n* per round. The read also *lags*: a request only becomes visible to `GoodPublishRequestCount` once `AsyncRequestStarted` has recorded it, which happens after the request has already been sent. That code is pre-existing and was untouched by this PR. What this PR changed is how hard the race is hit: the server used to hold the channel gate across request processing, which serialised every request on a channel, so publish completions arrived one at a time. Dispatching `RequestReceived` outside the gate — an intended improvement, since a channel should not serialise on application request-processing time — lets them complete concurrently. Rather than change the publish pipeline blind, the race was first made reproducible. `ConcurrentPublishReEvaluationDoesNotExceedDesiredRequestCount` drives 64 barrier-released completions against a mocked context whose count lags the send exactly the way the session's does. It issued **64 requests where 5 were desired** — the same defect the CI leg hit, now deterministic and running in milliseconds. The engine now tracks the requests it has in flight and reserves a slot with a compare-exchange before sending, so the decision and the send are one atomic step. The reservation is released when the request completes, when the send is declined, or when it throws. The repro test then issues at most the desired count. `StartPublishing` is deliberately left **uncapped**. It is the recovery valve that refills a pipeline whose requests are outstanding but no longer expected to return, so gating it on the in-flight count would remove the only path out of a stalled pipeline. An earlier revision of this fix did gate it, and that is the one change here that could not be justified on the evidence — it was reverted. The assertion was **not** loosened, retried away, or marked flaky: it caught a real throttling regression earlier in this PR and is worth keeping sharp. Validated: the repro test red before the fix and green after; `Subscriptions.Classic` 32/32 **five** consecutive runs on net10.0 and once on net48; `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` 2124 on net10.0 across four consecutive runs and 2127 on net48; `Opc.Ua.Subscriptions.Tests` 604 passed with this fix in place. ### The SSH.NET advisory that turned CI red repo-wide Partway through this work every build job began failing with `NU1903: Package 'SSH.NET' 2025.1.0 has a known high severity vulnerability` ([GHSA-q939-rpr3-3284](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q939-rpr3-3284), `<= 2025.1.0` affected, first patched `2026.0.0`). Nothing in the dependency graph changed — the advisory was published. Build 17026 failed on it where build 17000, two hours earlier on an identical graph, had passed every build job. SSH.NET is not referenced anywhere in the repository; it arrives transitively through `Testcontainers.Kafka`. `master` landed the remediation independently while this was being investigated (a central transitive pin to `2026.0.0`, which `CentralPackageTransitivePinningEnabled` exists for). This branch briefly carried its own identical pin, which made the merge commit hold **two** `PackageVersion` entries for SSH.NET and fail restore with `NU1506`. The duplicate is removed and `master` is merged, so the pin now comes from one place only. The audit was **not** suppressed: `NuGetAudit` stays enabled and `NU1903` stays an error. Verified after the merge — `dotnet restore UA.slnx` reports neither NU1903 nor NU1506, and `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` is **0 warnings, 0 errors** with the audit live. The remaining red check in build 17026 was not from this change either. `aot-ubuntu-latest` is the intermittent `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` failure already noted above — `ReconnectSessionAsync` timed out at 30s with 135 of 136 passing. It remains below the `origin/master` baseline rate (4 of 15 sampled here against 5 of 8 on the baseline), and the managed reconnect paths are green throughout: `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` 2124 across four consecutive runs and `Opc.Ua.Subscriptions.Tests` 604. ## Documentation `docs/CryptoProvider.md` gains sections on substituting the symmetric primitives, using a key served over a network, and PubSub — including what cannot be claimed and why, the scope rule for a random-source binding, and how to supply a provider-backed policy outside the container. `docs/MigrationGuide.md` covers the `[Obsolete]` channel virtuals and `DataLock`, and the non-re-entrant gate's contract for channel subclasses. `docs/WhatsNewIn2.0.md` is updated. `plans/cryptooffboard.md` is deleted now that the work it planned has landed. ## Note for reviewers This touches the secure channel handshake, which is the most security-critical code in the stack. Nine distinct concurrency and lifetime defects were found and fixed in it during this work — three during development, two in review, four from CI — so `ChannelGate`, the write path and the certificate ownership across the new suspension points deserve the closest reading. Five of those nine traced to the gate's `AsyncLocal`, which is why the re-entrancy was subsequently removed and the `AsyncLocal` deleted. The wrapper/`Core` split and the two documented residuals in that section are the parts most worth a second reading. The #4206 work removes the last reflection from `Security/Constants` and rewrites the policy lookup tables, so `SecurityConfiguration.SupportedSecurityPolicies` and the endpoint set it feeds are worth a second look: an earlier revision of it changed that set and broke six server tests, which is now covered by `SecurityConfigurationBuildsExpectedSupportedPolicySet`. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4206 - Fixes #4207 - Fixes #4208 - Fixes #4210 - Follow-up #4250 — this PR makes the security policy set injectable, but nothing in the stack resolves `ISecurityPolicyRegistry` from DI yet, so every production path still lands on the `Default` fallback. #4250 tracks threading it through `Session` and `UaSCBinaryChannel`, which is what makes the injection points already added here load-bearing. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [x] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 7a68ca72-83e8-496c-b2f5-3df4c718320b Copilot-Session: 3f5ab76a-c0ba-4f47-87ac-54d1f4182c6b	2026-08-15 05:23:20 -07:00
romanett	8d2d363d04	Add MultiState Discrete write validation (#4255) ... ## Summary Adds hand-written partial state classes that enforce OPC UA Part 8 §5.3.3 write validation for the `DiscreteItemType` subtypes, plus tests. ## Details - **`MultiStateDiscreteState`** — a written value is treated as an index into `EnumStrings`. Returns `BadOutOfRange` when the index is outside `[0, len)`. - **`MultiStateValueDiscreteState`** — a written value is matched against the sparse `EnumValues` set. Returns `BadOutOfRange` when no entry matches. On a good write, `ValueAsText` is refreshed from the matching entry's display name. - **`DiscreteItemState`** — provides the shared `TryGetIntegerValue` helper that normalizes any scalar integer built-in type to `long` (the exact-type `Variant` accessors return `default` on a built-in-type mismatch, so a `BuiltInType` switch is required). - **`TwoStateDiscreteType`** intentionally has no hand-written class. These 3 classes are `public partial class` extending the source-generated DataAccess partials already present on `master`. They read via the typed properties (`EnumStrings`, `EnumValues`, `ValueAsText`) rather than `FindChild`, because `BaseDataVariableState.FindChild` special-cases the `EnumStrings` BrowseName and never falls through to the `AddChild`'d children. ## Testing - `dotnet build src\Opc.Ua.Core.Types\Opc.Ua.Core.Types.csproj -c Release -f net10.0` → 0 warnings, 0 errors. - 13 tests across `MultiStateDiscreteStateTests` and `MultiStateValueDiscreteStateTests` pass (13 passed, 0 failed). --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-14 08:24:45 -07:00
romanett	aef86ba9dc	Add SelectionListType write validation (#4254) ... ## Summary Adds write-validation for the standard OPC UA `SelectionListType` VariableType via the handwritten `SelectionListState` partial, plus unit tests. Split out of #4220 into its own PR against `master`. ## The feature `SelectionListState` overrides `WriteValueAttribute` to enforce **OPC UA Part 5 section 7.18**: when the optional `RestrictToList` property is present and `true`, a written value must be one of the entries in the mandatory `Selections` property. Behavior contract: - Validation **gates on `RestrictToList`** — only enforced when the property is present and true. Otherwise the base-class behavior applies unchanged. - **Empty `Selections` rejects all** values (nothing is a valid member). - Membership is **data-type independent** — determined via `Variant` equality rather than any specific built-in type. - **Mismatched built-in types defer to the base class** for its normal type validation. The generated `SelectionListState` partial (base `BaseDataVariableState`, typed `Selections`/`SelectionDescriptions`/`RestrictToList` properties) is produced by the source generator from the core address space; this handwritten partial supplies only the write-validation override, using a single clean generic helper. ## Validation - Build `Opc.Ua.Core.Types` (net10.0, Release): **0 warnings, 0 errors**. - `SelectionListStateTests` (net10.0, Release): **14 passed, 0 failed**. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-14 08:24:34 -07:00
Marc Schier	a7c776e8d4	Align the WoT implementation with spec: type binding, removed vocabulary, Alarms and Conditions (#4225) ... # Description Aligns the WoT implementation with the normative changes in the OPC UA WoT specification drafts that the stack had not picked up, and fixes the defects that alignment surfaced. The driving artifact is [OPCF-Members/spec-drafts#19](https://github.com/OPCF-Members/spec-drafts/pull/19), *"bind a projected node to an already-loaded type, by name or by NodeId"*, which landed on the spec `main` after this repository last tracked it. ## 1. Bind a projected node to an existing type (Binding §5.2.1) §5.2.1 lets a document state that the node it projects is an instance of a type that **already exists** — one a companion model defines and the Server has loaded, or one a sibling document of the same conversion defines — so a converter binds to that type instead of defining a second type of the same shape. The converter hardcoded `HasTypeDefinition` to `BaseObjectType`, so a document that named its type projected an **untyped** node: a client browsing for the companion type would not find it, and nothing said why. Both forms are now implemented, resolved against the §5.1.5 **local context** — the other documents being converted together first, a loaded AddressSpace as the fallback. `IWotNodeResolver` supplies that context (is a namespace held; what does a qualified BrowseName match; what does an ExpandedNodeId identify), `WotCompositeNodeResolver` composes implementations in the specified order, and `NullWotNodeResolver` is the default that holds nothing. The converter needed no new async surface: the binding is resolved in a pre-resolve pass, exactly as Thing references already are, and the synchronous core consumes the result. The §5.2.1 table is honoured: a unique name binds; the link settles an ambiguous name; a name that resolves to nothing while the link resolves is **invalid** (that is a mistake in the name, not a shorthand for the identifier); two forms resolving to different Nodes are invalid; a resolved type of the wrong NodeClass is invalid. A binding naming a type the local context does not hold **fails** rather than falling back to `BaseObjectType` — a silently mistyped node is worse than a reported failure. A compact name is told from ordinary `@type` annotation **by namespace**, not by whether the lookup succeeds, so `saref:TemperatureSensor` on a Server that has never heard of SAREF stays the annotation it always was. The definitive form — a `ua:HasTypeDefinition` link whose `href` is the ExpandedNodeId of the type. An ExpandedNodeId matches exactly one Node or none, so it needs no lookup. A Node has exactly one `HasTypeDefinition`, so: - two such links → `AmbiguousTypeBinding` (6019), and the root keeps the default rather than being bound to a guess; - a link with no usable identifier → `InvalidTypeBinding` (6020); - no binding at all → the `BaseObjectType` default is unchanged. ## 2. Drop the six vocabulary terms `#19` removed `#19` deleted `uav:capability`, `uav:componentModel`, `uav:reference`, `uav:congruentType`, `uav:congruentTypeName` and `uav:nameNamespace` from the context, the JSON Schema and the ontology. A link now names its ReferenceType directly in `rel`, so the three link relations become `ua:HasInterface`, `ua:HasComponent` and `ua:NonHierarchicalReferences`, and the congruent-type pair is superseded by the §5.2.1 type binding. Their validation and mapping are removed; they are now ordinary residue like any other unrecognised term. ### A real gap this uncovered The converter knew **eight** ReferenceTypes by name and had neither `NonHierarchicalReferences` (`i=32`) nor `HasInterface` (`i=17603`) — so the two relations that *replace* `uav:reference` and `uav:capability` could not resolve at all. That includes example 02, which this repository vendors as a golden asset and which `#19` rewrote to use them. Both are now in the map. `uav:congruentType` was also the only term that redirected one reference to another while resolving a link target, so `ResolveTargetNodeIdAsync` no longer needs a loop. It resolves once and reports an unresolved target; the resolution context is still entered and the bytes still counted, so the per-conversion document, depth and byte bounds are unchanged. ## 3. Reject an out-of-range event severity instead of clamping it `uav:severity` had grown in this implementation without being a specification term. Rather than drop it, it is proposed upstream in [OPCF-Members/spec-drafts#21](https://github.com/OPCF-Members/spec-drafts/pull/21), which defines it with an explicit rule: the value **shall** be in the OPC 10000-5 range 1..1000, and a consumer **shall not** silently clamp it. The implementation clamped, so a document asking for severity 5000 was accepted and published as 1000 — the mistake was hidden while what the author asked for was changed. An affordance carrying an out-of-range severity is now skipped, with the reason logged, and its half-built event type and `GeneratesEvent` reference are removed. ### Defect found while making that change The occurrence-time path read `ValidateSeverity(severity) ?? tag.Severity`. Because `ValidateSeverity(null)` returns the 500 default, it **never** fell back to the affordance's authored severity: an occurrence reported without a severity published 500 rather than the authored 900. Build-time validation and the occurrence-time choice are now separate methods. ## 4. Vendored examples and honest coverage claims Examples 21 and 22 were missing from the vendored golden assets. Converting example 22 is now the end-to-end check for §5.2.1 — the specification's own example rather than a fixture written to match the implementation. `docs/WotBindings.md` claimed ten of the eleven conformance units and silently omitted **WoT-ConditionMapping**, and said "twenty worked examples". The count is corrected, and WoT-ConditionMapping is now **covered** — see §5 below. ## 5. Alarms and Conditions (Binding §13) The last unclaimed conformance unit. A projected Condition event now derives from the ConditionType it names rather than from `BaseEventType`; falling back would lose the Condition state model entirely, leaving a Client unable to tell an alarm from an ordinary event. The two forms follow the hint-plus-pin pattern of §5.3: `uav:conditionTypeId` is definitive and wins, `uav:conditionType` is a readable hint resolved for the four ConditionTypes §13.1 scopes. An unpinned name outside that set is reported rather than guessed. Four conformance rules are enforced, each because breaking it yields a document a consumer can read but cannot act on: | Rule | Section | Diagnostic | | --- | --- | --- | | A Condition event declares `EventId` in its `data` | 13.3 | `ConditionEventIdMissing` | | `uav:conditionAction` is inside its closed set | 13.2 | `InvalidConditionAction` | | `uav:actsOn` names a Condition event in the same document | 13.4 | `InvalidConditionTarget` | | `Acknowledge`/`Confirm`/`AddComment` declare an `EventId` input | 13.4 | `ConditionActionInputMissing` | `Enable` and `Disable` act on the Condition instance rather than one occurrence and are deliberately exempt from the last rule, pinned by a negative test. Shelving, suppression, dialog conditions and `ConditionRefresh` stay out of scope, as §13.1 scopes the mapping. ## 6. The sibling half of the §5.1.5 local context `SnapshotWotNodeResolver` indexes the registry snapshot a conversion runs over and is wired into `WotNodeSetDocumentConverter`, so a document naming a type another document in the same registry projects resolves with no AddressSpace at all. Only Thing Models are indexed: a Thing Model projects a `UAObjectType` and is a valid target, a Thing Description projects an instance and never is. Identity comes from the new public `WotNodeSetConverter.TryDescribeProjectedType`, which applies exactly the rules the conversion uses, so an index entry and the projected node cannot drift apart. Ambiguity is preserved rather than resolved: two siblings sharing a qualified name yield both matches so the caller can report it. ## Deliberately not in this PR - **The AddressSpace-backed `IWotNodeResolver`.** The abstraction, the composite, the null default and the sibling-document implementation ship here; the AddressSpace-backed half needs a cached type-hierarchy walk behind a server `OperationContext` and follows separately. Until it exists a host gets the sibling context plus the null fallback, which reports a binding as unresolved rather than mistyping it. - **Two §5.2.1 obligations that need the address space**: not duplicating a mandatory instance declaration of the resolved type, and rejecting disagreement with an instantiated Thing Model. - **Connectivity §7.3 parent resolution.** Each is tracked; none is faked here. ## Related Issues There is no tracking issue: this came out of a spec-versus-implementation audit rather than a reported defect, and the driving artifacts are the two upstream spec PRs linked above. Happy to open one if maintainers prefer — the §5.2.1 follow-up in particular is worth an ADR, since the local-context resolver is a new injectable provider spanning two assemblies. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [x] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. ### Verification detail | | net10.0 | net48 | |---|---|---| | `Opc.Ua.Types.Tests` | 8573 / 8573 | 8555 / 8555 | | `Opc.Ua.WotCon.Tests` | 1075 / 1075 | 1075 / 1075 | Full `UA.slnx` build: **0 errors, 0 warnings** across all target frameworks, re-verified after `master` was merged into the branch. Every new test was mutation-verified: the type-binding tests against three mutations (revert to the hardcoded default, drop the ambiguity check, accept an empty `href`), the severity tests against reinstating the clamp, and the ReferenceType additions against removing them from the map. Each mutation failed the suite before the change was kept. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 9e6a5abf-3299-4cd1-9855-010fedbf0ad8	2026-08-14 07:55:33 -07:00
Marc Schier	1cca744b5c	Retire the last exposed locks: node, browser, server diagnostics and application properties (#4222) ... Closes #4201. Closes #4202. Closes #4203. Closes #4215. Closes #4216. (#4215 and #4216 are @marcschier's originals from the #4188 review; #4202 and #4201 are my later duplicates of the same two findings. All four describe the two changes in section 1 and are closed together.) **This PR now carries what was #4221 as well.** The two were a stack; they have been unstacked and combined here, and #4221 is closed. Everything below the "Read the server diagnostics" section is the work that was previously reviewed as #4221. --- ## 1. The browse path guards itself, and the last node locks are gone `AsyncCustomNodeManager` kept two `lock (source)` sites around `CreateBrowser`, carrying a NOTE that browser creation was not internally synchronized. `NodeBrowser` still handed its lock to derived types through `protected Lock DataLock`. `NodeState.CreateBrowser` now holds a browse lock across `PopulateBrowser` and `OnPopulateBrowser`, so browser construction on a node is serialized — which is what the external `lock (source)` was actually providing, and what a handler that mutates the node during population (the historian's lazy config installer) depends on. Both `lock (source)` statements and the NOTE are gone. **What that lock does not do**, stated plainly in the XML docs and in `docs/NodeManagers.md` rather than over-promised: it is not an atomic snapshot across the node's children, notifiers and references. Writers take those collections' own locks, not the browse lock. The browser is a point-in-time copy and each collection is read consistently, but the combination is not a transaction. No `lock` takes a `NodeState` as its sync root any more. That was the last thing keeping `NodeState` from being documentably self-guarding, so the other eleven went with it: `lock (activeNode)`, `lock (target)`, `lock (source.Node)`, `lock (target.Node)`, `lock (notifier)`, `lock (handle.Node)` in `AsyncCustomNodeManager`, and `lock (node)` in `CustomNodeManager2`. Most were a check-then-act pair now served by `NodeState.AddReferenceIfMissing`, which does the check and the insert under the node's own lock. `NodeBrowser.DataLock` is removed. A browser is **single-consumer**: it belongs to whoever created it, and both server browse paths already serialize on the owning side. The exposed lock only added an inheritance-level locking contract that a derived browser could not reason about. ## 2. Read the server diagnostics under the lock every writer takes `OnUpdateDiagnostics` locked the diagnostics **payload** rather than the lock every writer takes through `UpdateServerDiagnostics`, so the snapshot a client reads from the `ServerDiagnostics` node was never excluded from a concurrent writer. Both halves matter, and the second is the one that is easy to miss: ```csharp lock (m_diagnosticsLock) // was: lock (ServerDiagnostics) { value = Variant.FromStructure(ServerDiagnostics, copy: true); // was: copy defaulted to false } ``` `copy: true` is what makes it a snapshot. `FromStructure(value, copy: false)` does `new ExtensionObject(value, copy)` — it wraps the **live** structure without copying it, so the caller would read the fields long after the lock was released and see them change underneath. Swapping the lock alone would have looked like a fix while still excluding nothing. ## 3. Analyzer numbering The browser rule is **UA0027**, not UA0025. This branch had independently taken UA0025 for `NodeBrowser.DataLock` while #4188 published UA0025 for `ILocalNode.DataLock` and UA0026 for `BaseVariableValue.Lock`. Master's are shipped, so they keep the numbers: | | UA0025 | UA0026 | UA0027 | |---|---|---|---| | master (#4188) | `ILocalNode.DataLock` | `BaseVariableValue.Lock` | — | | **this PR** | `ILocalNode.DataLock` | `BaseVariableValue.Lock` | **`NodeBrowser.DataLock`** | Both sides had written a different `UA0025Tests.cs`, which arrived as an add/add conflict. They are now split: `UA0025Tests.cs` holds master's `ILocalNode` tests, `UA0027Tests.cs` holds the `NodeBrowser` ones. UA0024's help text also drops its reference to `ReadServerDiagnostics`, which #4193 removed as unused, and names `ISession.ReadDiagnostics` / `ISubscription.ReadDiagnostics` instead — those do still exist. ## 4. Two more locks reachable from outside their owner **`ApplicationConfiguration.PropertiesLock` is removed.** It returned the properties dictionary itself, so `lock (configuration.PropertiesLock)` was `lock (configuration.Properties)` — the lock *was* the data it guarded, the same shape as #4203. It had exactly one production consumer (`OAuth2CredentialCollection.Load`, a get-or-add with `ParseExtension` called inside the lock), so it could not simply be deleted. `Properties` is now a `ConcurrentDictionary` — same public type, every operation atomic on its own — and the one multi-operation need gets a member of its own: ```csharp public T GetOrAddProperty<T>(string key, Func<T> valueFactory); ``` It deliberately does **not** invoke the factory under a lock, so `ParseExtension` now runs outside any critical section. Holding a lock across a caller-supplied callback is exactly the shape that produced the attribute/diagnostics deadlock earlier in this work. The two existing tests asserted only `PropertiesLock is not null`, so they tested nothing but its presence. They are replaced by tests of the contract: factory runs once for a missing key, not at all for a present one, 32 concurrent callers all observe the same instance, null arguments throw. `PropertiesLock` ships in 1.5.378, so this is a breaking removal — migration guide section plus analyzer **UA0028**. **`SharedDefinitionCache` no longer hands out its lock.** Three sites in `SharedKeyValueSubscriptionStore` took the nested cache's `Lock` to operate on the cache's own dictionary. Both are private now, behind `ReplaceAll` and `CloneWhere`. `SnapshotCommitLock` stays exposed on purpose: it is a `SemaphoreSlim` sequencing an async commit across `await` points, which `System.Threading.Lock` cannot span, so folding it in would change behaviour rather than hide a lock. ## Verification Merged `master` (`0edfe237a`, including #4234) with no conflicts. - `dotnet build UA.slnx` — 0 warnings, 0 errors - `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` — 4074 passed - `Opc.Ua.Types.Tests` — 8501 passed - `Opc.Ua.MigrationAnalyzer.Tests` — 151 passed on all five TFMs (138 → 151, the new ones being UA0027 and UA0028) - `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` — 4249 passed - `Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server.Tests` — 573 passed ## Note for the reviewer @romanett — your approval was given when this PR's diff was the 7 diagnostics files, because it was measured against `marcschier/node-browse-locks`. Now that the two are combined and the base is `master`, the diff is 23 files, and the extra 16 are the node/browser lock work that was #4221. GitHub kept the approval across the retarget, but it did not cover that code, so please re-review rather than let it ride. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: e9c13dd0-a6e3-4ad2-8ad6-1c3fe6323041 Copilot-Session: b3c0e146-5b9e-4d08-a0f6-db3f940484b1 Copilot-Session: d18f87e9-2484-44ce-98ce-463ba6cf5f63 Copilot-Session: 0ee22c1d-c319-4257-bf78-a5a077a1824a	2026-08-11 22:14:10 +02:00
Marc Schier	466c5cb982	Robot intent follow-ups: multi-controller executors, spec fixes, and an MCP tool library (#4195) ... Follow-ups to #4165, plus the work that followed from re-checking this branch against the specification. Everything started as a defect found by review or by probing the running code; the specification is unchanged except where noted. The TLS certificate lifetime fix (#4196) and the OpenUSD work (#4198) were both merged into this branch. #4196 has since landed on master, so it no longer appears in this diff. #4198 was closed in favour of this PR and its content is here. The MCP trim/AOT work (#4228), the `DataGenerator` null `NodeId` fix (#4227) and the NodeSet external-parent import fix (#4229) have since been merged in as well. All three are closed in favour of this PR and their content is here, described under *Making the MCP libraries trim and AOT clean*, *A generator that returned the value you opted out of* and *A NodeSet parent that lived outside the import batch* below. ## A two-arm cell could not be built `IntentExecution` carried no controller identity, and there was effectively one `IIntentExecutor` per server. An executor handed an execution therefore could not tell **which arm** it was for, so a cell with two `IntentControllerType` instances — an ordinary configuration — was not expressible through the builder or DI. Both halves are addressed: - `IntentExecution` now carries `ControllerId` (`NodeId`, the OPC UA identity) and `ControllerName`, so one shared executor can discriminate; - DI gained per-controller registration — `AddRobotIntentExecutor<TExecutor>(controllerBrowseName)` and an instance overload — so two genuinely different executors can coexist. Resolution order is `WithExecutor` → per-controller DI registration → the single DI executor → a build-time throw. There is still **no silent fallback** to a rejecting executor; that was a Critical defect fixed in #4165 and it stays fixed. `IIntentExecutor` is unchanged, so this is purely additive. ## Declarations that were quietly untrue - **`Accepts<T>` silently discarded a redeclaration.** Declaring an intent type twice — say to narrow `cancelSupported` on the second call — kept the first, wider declaration and said nothing. That is the same class of defect as the capability-honesty problems #4165 fixed (`PauseSupported` declaring a pause the host could not perform; `Aborting` degrading silently to `Buffered`). Identical redeclarations remain idempotent; conflicting ones now throw `BadInvalidArgument`. - **`RI-Interop-40010` assumed Annex B item 3 rather than checking it.** It now requires exact set equality between the OPC 40010 `TaskProgramName` values and the Robot Intent `ProgramType.ProgramId` values. Both sides are readable from the address space without commanding the robot, which is what makes the requirement structural under §12.1. ## Two things the specification requires that this did not do Re-checking the implementation against the merged draft revision turned up two genuine violations. Both are fixed, and the NodeSet is untouched by either. - **Every graphed mission reported `Failed` on success.** `MissionRules.SelectTransition` returned `null` for two different situations — a graph *terminus*, which is the normal success path, and a branch point whose conditions all evaluated false — and the caller collapsed both into `Failed`/`NoTransition`. A three-way result (`Terminus` / `Selected` / `NoConditionMatched`) separates them, so a mission that runs to its end now completes. The failure reason surfaces through the inherited Part 10 result container rather than a new member. - **Facet URIs were never published.** An upstream `may` became a `shall` in the revision this branch adopts. `RobotIntentConformanceUris.Facets` held 31 URIs with **zero** production references — the set existed but nothing emitted it. The published set is now derived from `RobotIntentFacetCalculator`, the same authority that already computed `SupportedFacets`, rather than from a second hand-maintained list that could drift; a reflection test pins the two together. ## An easy client mistake `RequestAuthorityAsync` returns a lease the caller must remember to inspect. Forgetting makes every later submission fail with `ControlNotOwned` for reasons that are invisible at the call site. `RequireAuthorityAsync` throws instead, and names the current owner. `RequestAuthorityAsync` is untouched — inspecting and branching is legitimate. ## Letting an agent drive the robot New `tools/Opc.Ua.Mcp.Robotics` gives a language model the intent API as MCP tools: 36 across discovery, monitoring, direct control and missions, behind a `Robotics` tool profile, composable into any MCP host exactly as the existing OPC UA tool packages are. The `IntentViewerClient` sample hosts them behind `--mcp` (stdio by default, HTTP when `--view`, since MCP stdio and the in-process viewer would otherwise share stdout), and the sample gained a pallet scene so an agent can pick and stack parts and watch the result in the OpenUSD viewer. All the scene logic is server-side — no viewer or connector changes. Four gaps in the client API had to be filled first, since the tools are a thin layer over it and could not have been written honestly without them: `ReadStateAsync`, `ListOperationsAsync`/`ListMissionsAsync`, controller-level `CancelIntent`/`CancelAll`/`Pause`/`Resume`/`Retry`/`ReleaseControl`, and `WaitForCompletionAsync`. The tools refuse rather than paper over: a refusal from the server is returned with its `IntentFailureEnum` and never retried, and command authority is never acquired as a side effect of a tool call. **One defect this surfaced:** `--profile robotics` shipped 36 tools that could not do anything. Every robotics tool resolves a named OPC UA session and only the connection tools can open one, so with no `Connect` in the catalogue the whole profile failed. A test had pinned the defect in place, asserting the profile did *not* contain `Connect` on the line below the `diagnostics` assertion requiring it. Each package now declares its own requirement in its registration extension rather than the host special-casing it, so an application embedding `Opc.Ua.Mcp.Robotics` directly gets a usable catalogue without reproducing the host's pairing. `Full` still takes the connection tools from the core package, so they are never registered twice. The replacement test states the invariant — a profile exposing session-scoped tools must expose the tools that open a session — rather than the instance. ## Making the MCP libraries trim and AOT clean *Merged from #4228.* `Opc.Ua.Mcp.Core` is now `IsAotCompatible` on `net10.0`, and the reflection the analysers then reported is gone. Turning the analysers on is the point: until now they were not running on these libraries at all — including on the tool library this branch adds. - **`OpcUaJsonHelper.Serialize`** went through `JsonSerializer` (IL2026 / IL3050). The conversion helpers in that class already reduce every OPC UA value to a closed set — `null`, the primitive scalars, `string`, `Dictionary<string, object?>` and lists thereof — so the JSON is now written directly with a `Utf8JsonWriter`. Output is unchanged, and that is asserted rather than assumed: `OpcUaJsonHelperTests.SerializeMatchesTheReflectionBasedSerializer` compares the new writer byte for byte against `JsonSerializer` for every shape the helpers emit, including all numeric widths, the custom-formatted scalars, nested sequences and strings that force the encoder to escape. One deliberate contract change: arbitrary object graphs are no longer accepted. Serializing them needs reflection, so `Serialize` now throws `NotSupportedException` naming the type instead of silently stringifying it. No call site in the repository passes anything outside the closed set. - **`McpSchemaFilters`** used `JsonSerializer.SerializeToElement` on a `JsonObject`; it now parses the node's own text, which needs no reflection. `Opc.Ua.Mcp.Diagnostics` is deliberately **not** marked. It depends on SharpPcap and on the reflective service-call dissection in `Opc.Ua.Core.Diagnostics`, neither of which is trim safe — which is why that package does not opt in either. Two improvements are kept regardless: `PacketDecodeTools` serializes `DecodedServiceCall` through a source-generated `JsonSerializerContext`, and `PacketCaptureTools.ListInterfaces` now carries the `RequiresUnreferencedCode` / `RequiresDynamicCode` annotations that `NetworkInterfaceEnumerator.ListLocalInterfaces` already declares, so the constraint is visible to callers instead of implicit. Nothing is suppressed. Marking an assembly `IsAotCompatible` only proves its own IL is clean; it says nothing about whether the library still functions once reflection is gone. So `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` references `Opc.Ua.Mcp.Core` and exercises it with JSON reflection disabled, stating what is and is not true today: - tool **results** serialize without reflection — this would fail outright if the `Utf8JsonWriter` change regressed; - tool **registration** still requires reflection, because the MCP SDK builds each tool's input schema by asking `JsonSchemaExporter` for a `JsonTypeInfo` of every parameter type. Without a source-generated context covering the tool signatures — and with the injected `OpcUaSessionManager` being described rather than treated as a service — that throws `NotSupportedException`. The second test asserts the throw. It documents the remaining gap and turns red the moment someone closes it, rather than leaving it to be found in a published binary. The package README says the same thing in prose. **Two pre-existing issues this surfaced, both outside this PR:** pulling `Opc.Ua.Mcp.Diagnostics` into an AOT publish reports `IL2046` / `IL3051` on `NicCaptureSource.StartAsync`, which is annotated `RequiresUnreferencedCode` / `RequiresDynamicCode` while the `ICaptureSource.StartAsync` it implements is not, and `IL2075` on `ServiceCallReassembler.GetCollectionCount` / `GetPropertyString`, which call `Type.GetProperty` on the result of `GetType()`. Happy to file these separately if useful. ## A generator that returned the value you opted out of *Merged from #4227. Fixes #4226.* `GetRandomNodeId(useBoundaryValues: false)` could still return `NodeId.Null` — one of the boundary values the same method offers when boundary values *are* requested. A caller that opted out should not receive one, and `GetRandomExpandedNodeId` builds on it and inherited the same behaviour. The `IdType.Opaque` branch is the practical path: `GetRandomByteString()` draws its length with `NextInt32(MaxStringLength)`, which is inclusive of zero, and a zero-length opaque identifier in namespace 0 satisfies `NodeId.IsNull`. With three namespaces and `MaxStringLength` at 10 that is roughly **one call in 130**. A numeric identifier of `0` in namespace 0 is null too, at around one in four billion. The draw is now repeated while the result is null and boundary values were not requested. Guarding the result rather than the individual branches covers every identifier type, including the numeric case, rather than only the one that happens to be reachable today. The `useBoundaryValues: true` path is untouched, so boundary values remain available when they are asked for. Four tests in `tests/Opc.Ua.Core.Tests/Types/DataGeneratorTests.cs` loop 20,000 draws, because at one call in 130 a single draw proves nothing. Against the **unmodified** generator they fail on draw 93 and draw 1346. Two of the four exist to keep the fix honest rather than to test the bug: `GetRandomNodeIdStillProducesEveryIdentifierType` catches a "fix" that simply stopped emitting opaque identifiers, which would satisfy the null assertions while silently narrowing the generator, and `GetRandomNodeIdWithBoundaryValuesStillYieldsThem` confirms the leak was closed rather than the feature removed. **How it was found:** an intermittent downstream test failure. A test server initialising a static `NodeId`-valued variable via `TestDataSystem.ReadValue` occasionally stored `NodeId.Null`; the encoder correctly writes that as JSON `null`, and a consumer asserting a value was present failed about one run in five — never reproducibly in isolation. It only surfaced under load because `UnsecureRandom.Shared` is a fixed-seed, process-global generator shared between `DataGenerator` and OPC UA transport jitter, so the number of draws preceding address-space initialisation depends on what else is running in the process. ## A NodeSet parent that lived outside the import batch *Merged from #4229.* `UANodeSetHelpers.LinkParentChildRelationships` builds its lookup table from **only the nodes in the current import batch**, links a child when the parent is found — and then cleared `instance.Handle` **unconditionally**, which is exactly where `Import` had stashed the authored `ParentNodeId`. A node whose parent lives in another NodeSet, or is owned by another NodeManager, therefore lost that parent **silently** at import, and nothing downstream could recover it. `RuntimeNodeSetNodeManager.CreateAddressSpaceAsync` already has a step that wires references to external node managers; the parent link never reached it. Such a parent is now recorded rather than discarded, and exposed through `UANodeSet.TryGetUnresolvedParentNodeId`. A parent that resolved normally inside the batch is **not** recorded, so a caller does not re-wire references that already exist. The record lives in a `ConditionalWeakTable`, so it does not keep an imported node alive and does not widen `NodeState` — whose `Handle` is a general-purpose slot a caller may legitimately use for its own purposes, and so is not a safe place to leave the value. `RuntimeNodeSetNodeManager` consumes it to report the one case that cannot be repaired automatically. In NodeSet2 the `ParentNodeId` attribute is a *hint*; the authoritative edge is the entry under `<References>`, which the reverse-reference pass already turns into an external reference. A node that names an out-of-manager parent but carries **no such Reference** materializes with no path from that parent, and no ReferenceType can be inferred to synthesise one — so it is reported as an authoring defect rather than guessed at or silently accepted. This is deliberately **not** a fix for a specific address-space symptom. It removes a silent loss of authored information and gives callers the means to act on it. Whether any particular orphaned-node report is caused by this path, or by namespace-index translation elsewhere, still needs separate diagnosis. **Changed while merging.** As authored in #4229 the accessor was `GetUnresolvedParentNodeId`, returning `NodeId?`. `NodeId` is a readonly struct implementing `INullable`, so that was a `System.Nullable<NodeId>` wrapped around a type that already carries its own null representation — which this repository excludes in favour of an `IsNull` check, and it asks for `TryGet` over casting on struct types. The tests correspondingly asserted `Is.Null` against a struct, which the testing rules also exclude. It is now `bool TryGetUnresolvedParentNodeId(NodeState, out NodeId)`, yielding `NodeId.Null` when there is no unresolved parent. The API is unshipped — it arrives with this branch — so nothing depended on the previous shape. Both tests were re-verified by mutation after the rewrite: disabling the record in `LinkParentChildRelationships` still fails `ImportKeepsAParentThatIsNotInTheSameBatch`. ## Dependencies - **OpenUSD to `0.7.0-alpha`.** All 11 issues we filed upstream are fixed, so the workarounds they justified are gone and the parts of the pump and generator samples that were blocked on them are implemented. - **ModelContextProtocol to `2.1.0`** across all five MCP tool libraries and the executable. No code changes were needed — the surface we use is unchanged in 2.x — but central package management required a cascade of pins, each commented where it sits. Both transports were verified against a running server rather than assumed. MCP 2.x is stateless (no `initialize`, no `Mcp-Session-Id`); an OPC UA session is application state addressed by a caller-supplied name, which fits that model but does assume process affinity, and that assumption is now written down rather than implied. ## Infrastructure The `code coverage` gate was measuring nothing on this branch and reporting success. It is fixed and now enforced, which immediately exposed real gaps — most usefully `RoboticsIntentJson`, which parses agent-supplied JSON (untrusted input from a language model) and had no tests at all. It is now at full line coverage in CI. Patch coverage is **90.20%** against a 75% floor. The `netstandard2.1` build leg was also failing. The MCP projects build as empty shells under a legacy `CustomTestTarget`, and the viewer sample referenced them on the target framework alone, so it tried to resolve a net10.0 shell from net8.0. The sample now derives MCP support from whether those projects are actually being built. ## From review A review pass over the branch found two real defects, both fixed. `RoboticsIntentJson` parses JSON written by a language model, so every malformed shape it can be handed is reachable input; it indexed pose arrays without checking their length and enumerated properties without checking their kind, so a short or wrongly-typed array escaped as `IndexOutOfRangeException` or `InvalidOperationException` rather than the argument error the tool descriptions promise the agent. Separately, `IntentOperationHandle` treated a zero `QueuePosition` as "not observed" and discarded it, so a handle kept reporting the last queued position after the server had said the operation left the queue. The pose validation immediately caught a latent test defect: the pallet scenario interpolated doubles into JSON with the current culture, so under a comma-decimal culture `[0.12, 0.16, 0.28]` became a six-element array. It passed only because that submission is expected to be refused for want of authority, so the wrong coordinates were never used. A third review finding — that a default-constructed `RobotIntentControllerState` hands out a null `NodeId` — was checked and rejected: `NodeId`, `QualifiedName` and `LocalizedText` are readonly structs here, so `default` is the null value and `IsNull` is `true`. The tests asserting that invariant are kept. A second review pass over the merged branch found two more, both fixed and both about an error surfacing as the wrong kind of failure rather than about a wrong result: - **Malformed agent JSON did not arrive as an argument error.** `RoboticsIntentJson` turns every *validation* failure into an `ArgumentException` — a wrong root kind, a missing property, a short pose array — but three `JsonDocument.Parse` calls and the NodeId parse were unguarded. A syntax error escaped as `JsonException` and an unparseable NodeId as `ServiceResultException`, which are the two shapes a language model is most likely to produce. That is the same defect class as the pose/kind checking above: a caller separating bad input from a genuine fault had to know to catch three unrelated exception types. Parsing now goes through one helper that reports a syntax error as an `ArgumentException` naming the argument, keeping the `JsonException` as the inner exception so the position is not lost, and the NodeId goes through `NodeId.TryParse` rather than `Parse`, collapsing its two failure modes into one. `MalformedIntentJsonIsRejected` had asserted `InstanceOf<JsonException>`, pinning the behaviour rather than the intended contract; it now asserts `ArgumentException` like every neighbouring test, and three tests cover the newly guarded paths. - **`ConditionalWeakTable.Add` throws on a duplicate key.** Not reachable today, but `TryGetUnresolvedParentNodeId` documents `Handle` as a general-purpose slot a caller may use for its own purposes — and a caller doing exactly that before re-importing into the same collection would take a hard throw from inside the import pipeline. Removing first makes the most recent import win. `AddOrUpdate` would say this more directly but does not exist on `netstandard2.0`. ## Deliberately not fixed here `FastenIntentDataType.Joint` is refused when the Server exposes no OPC 40450/40451 model, and a client cannot discover that before calling. That is **not fixable in this repository**: §5.4.2 makes `Joint` the defining mechanism while §11.3 says the parameters otherwise stand alone, and `IntentCapabilityDataType` declares capabilities at intent-type granularity with no member-level mechanism anywhere in the model. It is a specification gap, raised as S4 on [marcschier/opcua-drafts#60](https://github.com/marcschier/opcua-drafts/pull/60) rather than worked around with a bespoke mechanism the spec does not define. ## Validation `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` on the merged branch — **0 errors, 0 warnings**, with the AOT analysers now running over `Opc.Ua.Mcp.Core`. | Suite (net10.0) | Tests | |---|---| | `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` | 4247 (86 skipped) | | `Opc.Ua.Robotics.Tests` | 540 | | `Opc.Ua.OpenUsd.Tests` | 909 | | `Opc.Ua.Tools.Tests` | 419 | | `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` — `RuntimeNodeSet` | 94 | | `Opc.Ua.Robotics.Intent.Tests` | 22 | | `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` — `McpAotTests` | 3 | 0 failures. `Opc.Ua.Tools.Tests` rose from 409 to 419 with the serializer-equivalence tests from #4228 and the malformed-JSON tests from the second review pass, and `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` covers the `DataGenerator` tests from #4227 and the import tests from #4229. `UANodeSetHelpers` also passes on **net48** (5/5). The MCP agent-usability grader scores Core 100 / Full 100. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: a248a589-9a20-4372-868e-5d347e57001b Copilot-Session: 9e6a5abf-3299-4cd1-9855-010fedbf0ad8 Copilot-Session: a0718e8a-a158-45c5-929d-e1d6c0982431	2026-08-11 13:03:36 +02:00
Marc Schier	e05a820c91	Removal of the exposed diagnostics and node locks (#4188) ... ## What this is Design analysis for `Opc.Ua.Server`, the two rounds of design exploration behind it, and the first two implementation chunks it recommends. Draft: the analyses are ready to read, but the *conclusions* deserve discussion before the larger phases proceed. Later chunks stack onto this PR as they land. | File | Kind | Lines | |---|---|---:| | `plans/NodeManagerAnalysis.md` | Evidence — the node-manager plugin surface | 488 | | `plans/ServerRuntimeAnalysis.md` | Evidence — the server runtime cluster | 576 | | `plans/ServerDesignExploration.md` | Design round 2 — delivery strategy | 1,394 | | `plans/ServerDesignExplorationAlt.md` | Design round 1 — four interface designs | 2,119 | | `src/Opc.Ua.Types/State/NodeState.cs` | **Code** — node self-guards attributes | | | `src/Opc.Ua.Types/State/BaseVariableState.cs` | **Code** — value accessors take the lock | | | `src/Opc.Ua.Server/NodeManager/AsyncCustomNodeManager.cs` | **Code** — 6 external locks removed | | | `tests/…/NodeStateAttributeConcurrencyTests.cs` | **Code** — concurrency safety net | 449 | `docs/` is untouched — it holds shipped feature documentation, and none of this is shipped API. ## The analyses Counted mechanically over `src`, `samples` and `tests`; **every figure is reproducible** from commands printed in each document. **Node manager surface.** `AsyncCustomNodeManager` declares **93 `virtual`/`abstract` members** (80 distinct names). Across the repository: **112 override sites, 25 distinct names ever overridden, 55 of 80 never**. Six carry nearly all real use. For scale, `ReferenceNodeManager` is 6,373 lines and overrides **8**. **Server runtime.** Seven findings, **two of which recommend no change**. Findings 1–5 are filed as #4183–#4187. The headline is an `object`-typed sync root published on three public interfaces and taken in **88 `lock` statements across 7 files**, including a shipped sample. **What is deliberately not flagged.** `IStandardServer` — 9 members over 5,575 lines, 16 of 37 virtuals used — is identified as the reference shape to preserve. `IApplicationInstance` and the already-`[Obsolete]` `Stop()` are examined and left alone. ## The design exploration **Round 1** explored four alternative interfaces in parallel under the current back-compat constraint. Its value is the convergence: four designers who never saw each other's work independently arrived at a 6–9 member `IServerContext` replacing the 57-member locator, removal of the `object` node-manager handle, elimination of the `Processed` protocol, and `IHistorianProvider` as the pattern to copy. **Round 2** re-runs it with back-compat lifted and asks how to deliver: full rewrite versus side-by-side fork. **Both option designers independently declined to recommend their own assignment.** Three structural facts were verified: 1. **The fork line already sits at `IAsyncNodeManager`** — old and new node managers can coexist with zero runtime changes, so a fork duplicates ~10% of the assembly, not all of it. 2. **`[OpcUaShim]` cannot shim an inheritance surface** — honest auto-fix ceiling for the authoring surface is **~10%**, against ~70% for the shipped analyzers. 3. **A second lock leak exists** — `NodeState` takes `lock (this)` under a `CA2002` suppression whose own comment documents the contract. Recommendation: **neither pure option**, but a staged path reaching the rewrite end state incrementally, gated on migrating the five framework-internal node managers that today make it impossible for the old base to ever freeze. ## Implementation: NodeState now guards its own attributes This removes the prose-only contract in which `NodeState` took `lock(this)` and every external caller was required to take `lock(source)` on the node instance. The code already carried a TODO describing exactly this fix and noting it required updating every external site. - The node self-guards rather than relying on callers. `BaseVariableState` gains a **fully private** `System.Threading.Lock` covering its value fields; `NodeState`'s other collections keep their existing private locks. - All **6** `lock(this)` sites and both `CA2002`/`RCS1059` suppressions are gone. - `Value`, `Timestamp` and `StatusCode` on `BaseVariableState` take the lock too — without that, a direct property write raced an attribute read once the external lock was gone. - **6 of 9** external sites removed. Five were already redundant (`GetReferences`, `GetChildren`, `ReferenceExists` and `SetAreEventsMonitored` guard themselves; `FindMethod` reaches its state via `GetChildren`); the sixth was an attribute read now covered by the node's own lock. - Attribute read/write deliberately take **no** node-wide lock: both dispatch to caller-supplied handlers (`OnReadValue` and siblings) that may take locks of their own, and holding a lock on the node across one gives the node no fixed place in the lock order. - **3 deliberately retained and annotated in code**: two `CreateBrowser` calls, which are not internally synchronized (tracked in #4216), and one in `CustomNodeManager`, whose class is slated for deletion so refactoring its lock would be wasted work. ### No lock is exposed anywhere, to anyone An earlier revision put the attribute lock on `NodeState` as `private protected`, which still published a lock-sharing contract on the inheritance surface. Review pushed back and it is gone: `BaseVariableState` was the only user, so the lock moved there as a plain `private readonly Lock`. There is no member for a derived type to call, in this assembly or any other. `BaseVariableValue` was the last public leak — it handed out the lock guarding its value through a `public Lock` property, so any caller could hold it across a call back into the stack. That property is removed: - Derived value classes (what the source generator emits for every structure variable) synchronize through a `protected EnterLock()` / `ExitLock()` pair. Callback helpers were the first choice, but the generated bodies pass `ref Variant` / `ref StatusCode` / `ref DateTimeUtc`, and `ref` arguments cannot be captured by a lambda. The lock *object* stays private either way. - `NodeStateTemplates` emits the new form. - `ServerInternalData`, the one cross-assembly caller, was reading the lock back off a value it had itself constructed with that lock. It now takes `m_diagnosticsLock` directly. `NodeBrowser.DataLock` remains `protected` and is tracked in #4215: a subclass extending `Next()` legitimately needs its enumeration state atomic with the base browser's, so the fix needs a base-owned acquisition rather than a deletion. ### Migration coverage for the removed lock members None of the removed lock members get an `[Obsolete]` shim, and the migration guide now says why: a shim would have to be `object`-typed to keep old call sites compiling, and on .NET 9+ `lock (o)` on a statically-`object` reference is `Monitor.Enter`, which does **not** interlock with `Lock.Enter()`. It would compile, run, and silently synchronize nothing — strictly worse than a compile error. Re-adding a member to a downstream-implemented interface is also a break in its own right on `net48` / `netstandard2.0`, where there are no default interface methods. Instead, every removed member has a named replacement on the migration path: | Rule | Covers | Replacement it names | |---|---|---| | `UA0024` | `IServerInternal` / `ISession` / `ISubscription` `DiagnosticsLock`, `DiagnosticsWriteLock` | `UpdateServerDiagnostics(...)` / `UpdateDiagnostics(...)`, `ReadServerDiagnostics` / `ReadDiagnostics` | | `UA0025` | `ILocalNode.DataLock`, `Node.DataLock` | a lock the caller owns; the node guards its own state | | `UA0026` | `BaseVariableValue.Lock` | a lock passed to the `BaseVariableValue` constructor | Each rule fires on sources still written against 1.5.378, where the compiler only says a member is missing. `docs/MigrationGuide.md` gains a section per removal with before/after. ### The tests earned their keep The four concurrency tests were landed **first**, against the unmodified code, because removing a synchronization contract cannot be verified by the compiler and the existing `NodeStateHandlerConcurrencyTests` covers a different concern (racing a handler assignment against a write, not reader/writer exclusion). They now run with **no external locking**, which is what demonstrates the node guards itself. They caught two real problems, and one of them was mine: - The `Value`/`StatusCode`/`Timestamp` setters bypassed the new lock — a genuine race. - One test asserted an invariant the design does not offer. Two property setters are two lock acquisitions, so that pair was **never** atomic; it only passed originally because the test held a lock across both. It now uses a single attribute write carrying a whole `DataValue`, which genuinely is atomic and is the path the server uses. A third issue was found and fixed before it shipped: the reader loops gated on `!writer.IsCompleted`, so a reader scheduled after the writer finished performed zero reads — failing two runs in three on `net48`. Converted to `do…while`; now five consecutive green runs. **Verified:** `Stack.State` 116 passed on `net10.0` *and* `net48`; the concurrency category green 5/5 consecutive on `net48`; `Opc.Ua.Types.Tests` 8,456 passed; the server node-manager suite 1,205 passed, including `NodeManagerLifecycleTests` and `AsyncCustomNodeManagerTests` which exercise the changed paths. ## Two corrections to my own published figures Both were found while starting implementation, and both are recorded on #4183. **`ForceDiagnosticsScan()` was overstated.** The analysis claimed the `DiagnosticsWriteLock` getter *"triggers a full address-space diagnostics rescan"*. It is in fact a single flag assignment (`DiagnosticsNodeManager.cs:700-703`) consumed by the read paths and the periodic timer. The defect stands — a side-effecting property getter with a racy write on a synchronisation path — but its cost was misstated. **The contract was 15 sites, not 19.** A naive search matched ten comment and `#pragma` lines that *mention* `lock(source)` while explaining it. The documents now carry a counting command that excludes comment matches. A third finding expanded scope the other way: the `object`-typed lock leak is **repo-wide**, with ten such members across `Opc.Ua.Core`, `Opc.Ua.Types` and `Opc.Ua.Server` — including `Node.DataLock => this` and `ApplicationConfiguration.PropertiesLock => m_properties`, the same defect class as `Subscription.DiagnosticsLock`. ## Caveats stated in the documents - **Nothing in the designs is implemented or benchmarked.** Every performance claim across all seven designs is a design intention, not a measurement. - The larger phases are a **major undertaking against a live plugin API**; the documents say so rather than letting the neatness of the proposals imply otherwise. - The recommended sequencing puts low-risk, self-contained steps first and notes they are **worth doing regardless** of which strategy is eventually chosen. - Round 2 notes the two option designers' cost estimates are **not independent of their assignments**. ## Review guidance The two analyses make factual claims checkable by running the included commands. The design explorations are exploratory and need not be agreed with to merge. The code change is small, test-backed, and independent of which delivery strategy is eventually chosen. Reasonable outcomes include merging as-is, merging only the analyses and the lock fix, or disagreeing with the recommendation while keeping the evidence. --- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: e9c13dd0-a6e3-4ad2-8ad6-1c3fe6323041 Copilot-Session: d18f87e9-2484-44ce-98ce-463ba6cf5f63	2026-08-10 06:47:50 +02:00
Marc Schier	416d619c41	Split the CI matrix across both systems, split the required test gate from the advisory coverage check, and give background work an owner (#4158) ... # Description Two changes to how CI is routed and how it reports. ## 1. Split the CI matrix back across both systems Flips both halves of the CI backend switch from `ado` to `actions`, so the workload is shared instead of concentrated on the managed pool. The switch is checked into source in **two places that must always be flipped together**: | File | Setting | Before | After | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `azure-pipelines.yml` | `parameters.ciBuildBackend` | `ado` | `actions` | | `.github/workflows/buildandtest.yml` | `env.CI_BUILD_BACKEND` | `ado` | `actions` | | Work | GitHub Actions | Azure Pipelines (managed pool) | | --- | --- | --- | | All-TFM solution builds | `build-all-tfm-windows` + `-linux` | two-TFM PR gate (`net10.0`, `net48`) | | Test matrix | ubuntu, every test project | Windows `net48` + `net10.0` fast PR legs | | Native AoT | ubuntu | Schedule/Manual only | | macOS | always (no managed-pool macOS image) | — | ## 2. Split the required gate from the advisory coverage check The coverage gate job was appended to *every* test stage, so `Fast PR test` emitted three sibling checks whose display names collided — `Coverage Release (net10.0)` appeared twice, once for the Windows leg and once for macOS, with nothing to tell them apart: ```text ✓ Coverage Release (net48) 55s ● Coverage Release (net10.0) ○ Coverage Release (net10.0) ``` That job also fused two unrelated concerns: whether the tests passed (which must block a merge) and whether coverage met its thresholds (which should not — the `net10.0` leg had `enforceCoverage: true`, so a coverage dip blocked merges). Both concerns now get a stage of their own, mirrored in both CI systems: | Concern | Azure Pipelines | GitHub Actions | In the branch ruleset? | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Every test passed | **`Tests passed`** stage | **`build-and-test summary`** job | **Yes — required** | | Coverage meets thresholds | **`Code coverage`** stage | **`code coverage`** job | **No — advisory** | The coverage check reports a clean failure when the thresholds are missed, so the miss is visible, but it never blocks the merge. Coverage is now merged **once** across every leg of the run instead of once per leg, which also removes the `enforceCoverage` / `publishCoverage` "exactly one invocation may set this" parameters. Neither check re-runs any tests — the previous design re-ran the whole suite in one job with the collector attached, which serialised a suite that is deliberately fanned out and always exceeded the stage timeout. ### Coverage checks now exist in GitHub Actions `build-and-test` already ran with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` and uploaded the fragments, but nothing ever merged or evaluated them. It now runs the same `check-coverage.ps1` against the same `coverage-thresholds.json` as Azure. Since `CI_BUILD_BACKEND` defaults to `actions`, that ubuntu matrix — which runs *every* test project — is the fullest coverage signal in the repository. ### Reporting the numbers `check-coverage.ps1` gained `-SummaryPath`, rendering a markdown report that both systems surface: - **GitHub Actions** — appended to the job summary and upserted as a single **sticky pull-request comment**, updated in place on each run. Threshold misses also appear as `::error::` annotations. - **Azure Pipelines** — attached to the build summary via `##vso[task.uploadsummary]`. The report is a pass/fail table of the project floor, patch coverage and baseline delta, with the uncovered changed lines listed by file in a collapsible block. Rendered example: > ## Code coverage > > ❌ **Coverage gate failed.** This check is advisory and does not block the merge. > > | Check | Result | Threshold | > | --- | --- | --- | > | ✅ Project line rate | **72.10%** (40 731/56 496 lines) | >= 70.00% | > | ❌ Patch coverage | **0.00%** (0/1 changed lines) | >= 75.00% | The comment is fork-safe: a `pull_request` from a fork gets a read-only token regardless of the `permissions:` block, so it degrades to the job summary alone. The sticky comment uses `actions/github-script` rather than a community action, keeping this workflow on first-party actions only. ## Notable correctness details These were found and fixed during review, and are the parts most worth a second pair of eyes: - **`dependencies.<stage>.result` resolves at *stage* scope only.** At job scope `dependencies` refers to other jobs of the same stage, so reading stage results from a jobs template would have silently returned empty and the gate would have passed everything. `gate.yml` and `coverage.yml` are therefore **stage** templates that derive their own `dependsOn` from the same stage list they evaluate, so the two can never drift apart. An unresolved result is a hard error. - **Both rollups run on `not(canceled())` / `always()`**, not on success. A check that reports **skipped** is treated by GitHub as **satisfied**, so a required check that skips when its dependency fails would wave a red build straight through. - **`get-matrix.ps1` used to emit an empty matrix on a discovery miss.** The downstream job is then skipped, a skipped job rolls up as a *succeeded* stage, and the gate would have approved a run that executed no tests. It now fails, with an `-AllowEmpty` opt-out. - **Zero coverage reports used to be a green advisory check**, which would hide a broken collector indefinitely. Both systems now distinguish "the tests never ran" (warning) from "the tests ran and published nothing" (error). - The gate reads stage-level results rather than enumerating matrix-generated job names, which change whenever a test project or agent is added. ## Test-host hang and the reconnect defect behind it — both fixed Flipping `CI_BUILD_BACKEND` to `actions` started exercising the ubuntu matrix, which `master` never runs, and it immediately surfaced two real defects. **1. The test host hung for ten minutes.** `Assert.ThrowsAsync` blocks the calling thread with no timeout, and these tests drive a *fake clock* from that same thread — so once the reconnect parked on a fake-clock timer, nothing could ever advance it. NUnit sat in `WaitForCompletion` until `--blame-hang-timeout` killed the host, aborting the run at 3902 of 4238 tests and taking every other test in the assembly down with it. A hang dump named the culprit exactly. Replaced with an awaited, bounded `AssertThrowsAsync` helper (the repo's own rules forbid sync over async). The run now completes in **~1m29s** with all tests executed. **2. A budget-aware reconnect never returned.** With the hang gone, two tests failed with `Expected ServiceResultException but got TimeoutException`. `dumpasync` on a hang dump gave the whole chain: ``` ReconnectAsyncWithBudgetShrinksDelayToFitRemainingAsync → AssertThrowsAsync → ClientChannelManager.ReconnectAsync → ClientChannelManager.ReconnectLeaseAsync → ClientChannelManager.SwapFaultedEntryAsync ← parked here ``` `master` (via #4128) added `IsTerminalReconnectRace` so a reconnect that loses a race against a concurrent close recovers on a freshly swapped entry. The predicate only asks whether the entry ended up `Closed`/`Faulted` with `BadSecureChannelClosed` — which is *also* exactly how a reconnect ends when the caller's retry budget or the reconnect policy is deliberately exhausted. So a budget-exhausted reconnect was misread as a race: the manager swapped the entry and started a **second, unbudgeted** cycle, waiting out the swap back-off first. `ReconnectAsync(channel, budget)` therefore could not return within its budget, and under a fake clock it never returned at all. The fix requires the budget to have room left before treating a terminal failure as a race: ```csharp return !ct.IsCancellationRequested && !budget.IsExhausted && sre.StatusCode == StatusCodes.BadSecureChannelClosed && entry.State is ChannelState.Closed or ChannelState.Faulted; ``` The parameterless `ReconnectAsync(channel, ct)` overload passes an unlimited budget, so genuine race recovery is unchanged. Verified locally: Core 4152, Client 2122 and Sessions 776 tests all pass, and the full GitHub Actions PR run is green across 56 jobs. Two smaller fixes came along the way, neither weakening an assertion: - `ObservableFakeTimeProvider` waiters made **relative** ("N more timers from now") rather than absolute ("the Nth timer of the run"). Absolute numbering let an earlier reconnect consume the slots, so a waiter completed before the awaited timer existed and `Advance()` fired nothing. - The raw worker thread in `NodeStateHandlerConcurrencyTests` was a **foreground** thread whose stop flag was read without a barrier and set only on the success path — a failed assertion leaked a spinning thread that pins the process at exit. Now background, `Volatile`, stopped in a `finally`, joined with a bound. ## Background work now has an owner The reconnect hang above was one symptom of a pattern the codebase had **26 times** across seven assemblies: a bare `_ = Task.Run(...)`. Each one handed work to the thread pool and forgot it — nothing observed the exception if it threw, nothing bounded how many ran at once, and disposal raced them, so a component could finish tearing itself down while work it started was still touching its fields. Two of those sites already carried a standing `// TODO: Await the task completion in shutdown`. `BackgroundTaskScope` (in `Opc.Ua.Types`) gives them an owner: schedule with `Run`, drain with `DisposeAsync`, or signal-only with `Dispose` where the owner's teardown is synchronous and awaiting would be sync over async. `Run` never blocks and never throws — which matters, because most of these call sites went to the thread pool precisely to escape a lock they were holding. 11 unit tests cover drain, cancellation, exception observation, the concurrency cap, post-shutdown rejection and idempotent disposal. Two of the fixes were more than re-wiring: - **`SessionManager` / `SubscriptionManager` loops were structurally unawaitable.** Both return `ValueTask`, so `Task.Factory.StartNew(() => ...)` handed back a `Task<ValueTask>` that completes at the first yield. Storing it would not have helped — awaiting it would only have awaited the *scheduling*. Both now go through `AsTask().Unwrap()`, matching the neighbouring `StartConditionRefreshWorker`. - **`ChannelAsyncOperation` was swallowing subscriber exceptions.** Its `doNotBlock` branch had no try/catch while the inline branch beside it did. It is per-operation with no owner to hang a drain on, so it gained the missing handler rather than a scope. The Kubernetes readiness endpoint keeps a purpose-built semaphore instead: an unauthenticated endpoint needs a hard cap on concurrent handlers, not just an owner. ### ⚠️ Breaking: `ISessionManager.Shutdown()` is removed Replaced by `ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken)`. There is no correct synchronous way to wait for the session monitor loop, so leaving the overload would only have preserved the race. This mirrors `ISubscriptionManager`, which already had `ShutdownAsync`. Migration notes are in `docs/MigrationGuide.md`; only one in-repo implementer existed. Also converted the injected `object partitionLock` shared by `LogicalSubscription` and `CompositeMonitoredItemCollection` to `System.Threading.Lock`, per the repo rule. ## Patch coverage now scales with the size of the patch A flat floor over changed lines punishes small changes for arithmetic: two uncovered lines in a four-line fix reads as 50 % and failed an 80/5 floor — which is exactly how this branch earned a red coverage check for a four-line predicate change. A check that fires on changes nobody considers undertested is one people learn to ignore. | Coverable changed lines | Floor | Below it | | --- | --- | --- | | 1 – 10 | 50 % | warning, still passes | | 11 – 100 | 60 % | warning, still passes | | more than 100 | 75 % | **failure** | Only changes past the last band can fail. Below it the author still gets a warning naming the uncovered lines. Bands live in `patch.bands` in `coverage-thresholds.json` and each carries its own `enforced` flag. Verified end-to-end against synthetic repositories at every boundary. ## Codecov is back, as reporting Dropped in #4122 when the in-pipeline gate replaced it. Keeping the gate was right, but dropping Codecov also lost the PR comment, the file-by-file diff view and the trend. It returns with both statuses `informational: true` — two gates with two sets of thresholds would eventually disagree, and `coverage-thresholds.json` stays the single source of truth. The upload is switchable and can never fail a build: `enableCodecov` (Azure) and `ENABLE_CODECOV` (Actions), both defaulting on, both skipped when `CODECOV_TOKEN` is absent as on fork PRs. Each system uploads the single merged report it already builds, under its own flag. The old `codecov.io/bash` uploader was sunset, so Azure uses the current CLI. ## Follow-up actions for maintainers 1. **Update the branch ruleset.** The per-leg `Coverage Release (…)` checks are gone. Azure reports checks as `<pipeline> (<stage> <job>)`, so the exact names are: | Check | Require? | | --- | --- | | `OPCFoundation.UA-.NETStandard (Tests passed Verify stage results)` | **yes** | | `build-and-test summary` | **yes** (already required) | | `OPCFoundation.UA-.NETStandard (Code coverage Merge and evaluate)` | no | | `code coverage` | no | 2. **Re-calibrate the thresholds.** `coverage-thresholds.json` is still seeded from the last Codecov reading (73.61 %). The two systems now report *different* numbers by design — Actions merges every project on ubuntu, Azure only the Windows fast-PR legs, and scheduled runs read higher still because the Debug / .NET 8 / .NET 9 / netstandard stages also contribute. Re-seed from the GitHub Actions figure. 3. **Note:** a failed advisory coverage stage still turns the whole Azure run red, which the README build badge reflects on `master`. That follows from wanting a visible red X on a threshold miss; say the word if you would rather it were a warning. 4. **The Azure agent pool is the slowest thing here.** Several runs on this PR sat queued for hours, and one build failed with `Insufficient system resources` while writing an XML doc file — an agent exhaustion error, not a code error. It passed on re-run. Worth raising against the `netstandard` Managed DevOps Pool capacity separately. ## Related Issues _No tracking issue; this is CI infrastructure work requested directly. It builds on the switch introduced in #4122._ ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - No product code changed, so there are no unit tests to add. The new logic was verified with purpose-built harnesses instead: - `check-coverage.ps1` run for real against a merged Cobertura report on all three paths — pass, threshold failure, and patch coverage with uncovered changed lines (a scratch commit adding an uncovered method was correctly resolved to `DataTypeException.cs:193`, reported 0 % patch coverage and exited 1). - The gate's accept/reject logic dry-run over `Succeeded` / `SucceededWithIssues` / `Skipped` / empty / `Failed` / `Canceled` — 6/6 correct. - `get-matrix.ps1` exit codes verified in clean processes: empty → 1, normal → 0, `-AllowEmpty` → 0. - All five pipeline/workflow files parse; both PowerShell scripts parse. - Action versions checked against the GitHub API and pinned to current majors. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - Rewrote the coverage section of `docs/DeveloperGuide.md` as *Required checks and coverage*, covering which checks belong in the ruleset and which must not, how coverage is measured, where the numbers appear, and why the two systems disagree. Corrected the stale "BLOCKS" wording in `coverage-thresholds.json`. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - CI YAML, two PowerShell scripts and documentation only; no compilation involved. - [x] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - Not applicable — no product code changed. `Opc.Ua.Core.Schema.Tests` was run repeatedly on net10.0 (119 passed) to generate the real Cobertura fragments used to validate the gate. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. - Feedback on the path-relevance diff (now a merge-base diff) and the target-framework numbering in `docs/DeveloperGuide.md` is fixed in `15b8e38df`. - A review pass over the gate/coverage split produced the four correctness fixes listed above, in `863eefc4d`. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 26aa55a2-5731-4a4c-b61c-df2f7a785eca	2026-08-07 06:56:05 +02:00
Marc Schier	e73e71184d	[WotCon] Add OPC UA WoT Connectivity 1.1 with the Types, source generation, Server and xRegistry work it builds on (#4128) ... ## Summary Adds OPC UA WoT Connectivity 1.1 to the stack, together with the Types, source generation, Server and xRegistry work it is built on. This branch is the merge point for the fourteen-PR stack that replaced integration PR #4093; every constituent PR was reviewed and approved separately and is listed below. 414 files changed, +108,936 / -3,199. Roughly 46k added lines of product code, 57k of tests, plus samples, tools and documentation. ## Types - Complete `ExtensionObject` raw-body decoding for binary, XML and JSON bodies by resolving the concrete type through the message context's encodeable factory, and simplify the `Variant` structure helpers by delegating to it (#4128). - Add `IAtomicFileReplace` as an optional `IFileSystem` capability so existing external implementations keep working, with atomic publish for `LocalFileSystem` via `File.Replace`/`File.Move` and for `VirtualFileSystem` by re-keying the in-memory entry (#4128). - Add lossless conversion between WoT documents and NodeSet2 (`Opc.Ua.Wot.WotNodeSetConverter`). A byte-exact `uav:nodeSet` envelope is preserved when requested, the structured `uav:nodes` projection is used when the readable vocabulary is incomplete, and NodeSet2 is otherwise synthesized from readable WoT terms. Unmapped JSON members survive a round trip as pointer-addressed residue (#4131). ## Source generation - Improve the NodeSet to ModelDesign conversion and the generated node state (#4132). - Generate OPC UA models directly from WoT Thing Description files (#4134). ## Server - Add live NodeManager shadow and immediate reload. A reload materializes a new generation beside the active one and switches atomically; the superseded generation is retired gracefully so existing MonitoredItems keep being served until they drain, or immediately when the caller asks for it. Includes the request admission and drain machinery that lets an orderly shutdown wait for admitted requests instead of tearing down underneath them (#4147). - Make subscription transfer between sessions transactional, so a failed transfer leaves neither session holding a partially moved subscription (#4150). ## xRegistry - Allow clients to use explicit registry roots rather than assuming a well-known location (#4130). ## WoT Connectivity - Add the WoT Connectivity 1.1 information model: a registry-first revision layered on the abstract xRegistry base model, incorporating the complete published OPC 10100-1 v1.02 surface as deprecated nodes in the same namespace so existing 1.02 clients keep working (#4139). - Add the protocol binding abstractions and planners that compile WoT forms into executable plans (#4140). - Add the HTTP, Modbus, OPC UA and MQTT binding executors (#4144). - Add the registry and its stores, including document versioning, validation, dependency resolution and refresh (#4146). - Add the registry client (#4142). - Materialize WoT Thing Descriptions into the server address space, deriving types from Thing Models and instances from Thing Descriptions (#4154). - Restore the WoT asset registry bridge so the deprecated 1.02 asset surface is backed by the registry (#4171). - Add the WoT Connectivity samples and complete the documentation (#4156), and restore the remaining coverage and docs (#4172). ## New projects `src/Opc.Ua.WotCon.Bindings`, `src/Opc.Ua.WotCon.Bindings.Mqtt`, `tests/Opc.Ua.WotCon.Bindings.Tests`, `tests/Opc.Ua.WotCon.Samples.Tests`, and the `samples/WotCon` AggregationServer, AggregationClient and FlatTagServer samples. ## Constituent pull requests Merged into this branch top-down, each independently approved: | PR | Title | | --- | --- | | #4128 | [Types] Complete ExtensionObject decoding and add an atomic file replace capability | | #4131 | [Types] Add lossless conversion between WoT documents and NodeSet2 | | #4132 | [SourceGeneration] Improve NodeSet to ModelDesign conversion and generated node state | | #4134 | [SourceGeneration] Generate OPC UA models from WoT Thing Description files | | #4147 | [Server] Add live NodeManager shadow and immediate reload | | #4150 | [Server] Make subscription transfer between sessions transactional | | #4130 | [XRegistry] Allow clients to use explicit registry roots | | #4139 | [WotCon] Add the WoT Connectivity 1.1 information model | | #4140 | [WotCon] Add the WoT protocol binding abstractions and planners | | #4144 | [WotCon] Add the HTTP, Modbus, OPC UA and MQTT binding executors | | #4146 | [WotCon] Add the WoT Connectivity registry and its stores | | #4142 | [WotCon] Add the WoT Connectivity registry client | | #4154 | [WotCon] Materialize WoT Thing Descriptions into the server address space | | #4156 | [WotCon] Add the WoT Connectivity samples and complete the documentation | | #4171 | Restore WoT asset registry bridge | | #4172 | Restore WoT coverage and docs | Supersedes #4093. ## Follow-up The WoT Connectivity and WoT Binding drafts have moved to 1.1-draft2 since this work was authored. Aligning with that revision - the removed group vocabulary, the new projection/View construct, the remaining model vocabulary terms and the two new portable-identity validation rules - is tracked separately and will follow in its own pull request. ## Validation Built for every target framework with zero warnings and zero errors, and validated at the tip of the stack with `Opc.Ua.WotCon.Tests` at 999 passed / 0 failed and `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` at 4024 passed / 0 failed. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 9e6a5abf-3299-4cd1-9855-010fedbf0ad8	2026-08-05 10:14:15 +02:00
Copilot	5a690c5a7c	Address WSS discovery review feedback and follow-up tests (#4178) ... # Description Addresses the review feedback for application-aware WSS discovery and incorporates the follow-up coverage from #4179. - Observe the returned task when asserting null `ApplicationConfiguration` validation with `Assert.ThrowsAsync`. - Correct the discovery URL comment grammar. - Verify WSS discovery uses the application's certificate validator by rejecting an untrusted discovery certificate and asserting the TLS authentication failure. - Connect the anonymous WSS binary test through the discovered `ConfiguredEndpoint`, then verify the selected transport profile and security mode. ## Related Issues - Supersedes #4179. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Julius Pfrommer <julius.pfrommer@o6-automation.com>	2026-08-04 21:17:08 +02:00
Julius Pfrommer	da3358d371	Jpfr/fix wss session discovery (#4135) ... # Description WSS binary endpoints use the `opcua+uacp` sub-protocol and carry the normal OPC UA Connection Protocol, SecureChannel, and Session layers. User authentication should therefore behave like `opc.tcp`, independently of whether mutual TLS is enabled for the WebSocket connection. `HttpsServiceHost` previously shared an HTTPS-specific rule with WSS: when `HttpsMutualTls` was disabled, it removed the `Anonymous` user-token policy from the endpoint description. This prevented an anonymous OPC UA session even when anonymous access was explicitly configured by the server. This PR: - Preserves the server’s configured OPC UA user-token policies for WSS UA-SC UA-Binary endpoints. - Retains the existing anonymous-token filtering for HTTPS transports. - Adds an integration test that disables mutual TLS, verifies that the WSS endpoint advertises `Anonymous`, and opens a complete anonymous OPC UA session. - Passes `ApplicationConfiguration` into endpoint discovery performed by `updateBeforeConnect`, allowing WSS discovery to use the application’s certificate manager. - Applies certificate-aware discovery to both the default and channel-manager session paths while preserving the existing endpoint-refresh APIs. ## Verification - Anonymous WSS binary session with `HttpsMutualTls = false`: passed. - WSS `updateBeforeConnect` using application certificate validation: passed. - Null application-configuration validation: passed. - Affected projects build without new warnings. ## Related Issues _Reference all GitHub issues this PR addresses. If there is no issue yet, open one and link it here._ _If this is a relatively large or complex change, a design must have been discussed in the related tracking issue and signed off (which becomes the Architectural Decision Record (ADR))._ - Fixes #github-issue-number, ... ## Checklist _Put an `x` in the boxes that apply. You can complete these step by step after opening the PR._ - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [x] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Julius Pfrommer <julius.pfrommer@o6-automation.com>	2026-08-04 10:53:40 +02:00
Marc Schier	168b3de353	Replace the RequestManager AsyncLocal guard with an explicit operation context (#4163) ... # Description `RequestManager` tracked whether the calling flow was serving a Client request in a `private readonly AsyncLocal<bool> m_inServiceDispatch`. It was set by a `StandardServer.ProcessRequestAsync` override and read by `NodeManagerLifecycle`, so that a lifecycle operation (`AddAsync` / `ReloadAsync` / `RemoveAsync`) started from inside a request fails fast with `InvalidOperationException` instead of draining — and therefore waiting for — its own request. Two problems with that mechanism, raised in review of #4093: 1. An `AsyncLocal<T>` written inside an `async` method never flows back to the caller that awaited it, so every scope had to chain to the previous value by hand and restore it on dispose. Subtle, and easy to get wrong when a new entry point is added. 2. Ambient state is invisible at the call site, so the lifetime of the mark could not be reasoned about from the code that depended on it — especially once work is handed to a background task. `RequestManager` also had no business carrying ambient state on behalf of a different subsystem; its job is tracking requests for the drain. ## What changed The guard is now an **exact identity lookup** against the request registry `RequestManager` already maintains, and the operation is threaded **explicitly**: * **`RequestManager`** — `internal bool IsExecutingRequest(IOperationContext?)` performs a reference-identity lookup against `m_requests` under the existing `m_requestsLock`. `m_inServiceDispatch`, `EnterServiceDispatchScope()`, the nested `ServiceDispatchScope` class and the flag-based `IsExecutingRequest` property are gone. * **`StandardServer`** — the `ProcessRequestAsync` override is removed; it existed only to open the dispatch scope. * **`INodeManagerLifecycle`** — every member (`AddAsync` ×2 factory kinds, `ReloadAsync` ×2, `RemoveAsync`) now takes the caller's `IOperationContext?` directly, ahead of `CancellationToken ct = default`. No overloads and no parallel signature are kept: the interface is new in 2.0 and outside the 1.5.378 compatibility rule, so call sites state their context explicitly or pass `null`. * **`HostedNodeManagerLifecycle`** and **`RuntimeNodeSetLifecycleExtensions`** thread the argument through; `AddRuntimeNodeSetAsync` / `ReloadRuntimeNodeSetAsync` remain single methods. * **`SystemContextOperationExtensions.GetOperationContext(this ISystemContext)`** (new, `Opc.Ua.Core`) lets a NodeManager or Method callback hand over the operation it already received without downcasting. It switches on `SessionSystemContext` and `SystemContext`, the two independent roots every context derives from. No new interface is introduced: casting the context to `IOperationContext` would not do, because a context implements that by delegating to the operation it was created for, so the cast yields the context rather than the operation. * **`NodeManagerLifecycle.EnsureNotRequestCallback`** no longer consults `ServerState`. The previous `CurrentState == Running` predicate could let a genuinely re-entrant call slip past while the server was shutting down; the request registry answers exactly in every state. A NodeManager or Method callback now reads: ```csharp await m_lifecycle.ReloadAsync(m_registration, replacement, context.GetOperationContext(), ct); ``` and a control-plane caller (hosted service, DI consumer) passes `null`. ## Behaviour Unchanged for the case the guard exists to catch: a lifecycle call made on behalf of an executing request is still rejected up front with the same `InvalidOperationException` and the same message. Two deliberate differences: * **Improvement** — an internal `OperationContext` that was never enrolled as a Client request is now correctly allowed through. The boolean flag could not distinguish it from a real request. * **Accepted trade-off** — a caller inside a request that passes no operation is no longer detected at entry and falls back to the pre-existing bounded `RequestManager.RequestDrainTimeout`, which already covered any request that bypassed the service pipeline. Automatic detection for an uncooperative caller inherently requires ambient state, which is exactly what this change removes. Documented in `docs/NodeManagers.md`. ## Alternatives considered and rejected | Alternative | Why rejected | | --- | --- | | Delete the guard, rely only on `RequestDrainTimeout` | Turns a clear immediate error into a multi-minute hang. | | Infer the caller from the `CancellationToken` it passes | Works only for the exact request token, breaks on linked tokens; ambient magic of a different kind. | | In-flight callback counter on `MasterNodeManager` | False positives: rejects legitimate control-plane calls whenever any request is concurrently dispatching. | | Defer the drain to a background task so re-entrancy cannot deadlock | The drains are woven into transactional commit / rollback and binding reconciliation; deferring them breaks the transactional guarantees. | | `Activity.Current` / `ThreadLocal` | The same ambient magic the issue asks to remove. | ## Testing * `RequestManagerTests` — the three `EnterServiceDispatchScope` tests are replaced by coverage for `IsExecutingRequest(context)`: null, never-registered, only-while-scope-open, visible across an `await` and a background `Task.Run`, and two concurrently executing requests not confusing each other. * `NodeManagerLifecycleTests` — rejection from an executing request for Add / Reload / Remove without invoking the factory, acceptance for a context that is not an executing request, acceptance once the request has completed, and the full callback shape (`ServerSystemContext.Copy(operation)` → `GetOperationContext()` → rejected). * `HostedNodeManagerLifecycleTests` — forwarding tests for the caller-context argument on all five members. * `tests/Opc.Ua.Core.Tests/Stack/State/SystemContextOperationExtensionsTests.cs` (new) — `GetOperationContext` across both context roots and the null-argument guard. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4149 ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [x] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 14402d11-e540-4faa-a5cd-94881bd7ce85	2026-08-03 20:31:51 +00:00
Marc Schier	0383472ebc	Fix PubSub occurrence publishing and JSON DataValue status encoding (#4106) ... ### Summary Three related gaps mean no `PublishedDataSet` can produce a message that is not a key frame or a derived delta frame. `PubSubDataSetMessageType.Event` and the `ua-event` wire tag of Part 14 §7.2.5.4 are modelled but unreachable. This PR also corrects the JSON `DataValue` status member to the Part 6 Table 42 name `Status`. ### 1. A dataset cannot declare what its sample is `PublishedDataSetSnapshot` carries a metadata version, fields and a timestamp. `WriterGroup.BuildDataSetMessageAsync` therefore decides the message kind alone: `KeyFrameCount <= 1` forces `KeyFrame`, otherwise it derives a delta by comparing the snapshot **positionally** against the previous one. That derivation assumes successive snapshots describe the same fields in the same order, which holds only for a source returning its complete current state every cycle. A source whose samples are *occurrences* — an event, a condition snapshot, or a delta it has already computed — cannot satisfy it: consecutive samples carry different fields, so field *i* of one occurrence is compared against field *i* of an unrelated earlier one, and `Math.Min` silently truncates when the counts differ. `PublishedDataSetSnapshot` now carries an optional `MessageType`. When set, the writer publishes exactly the supplied fields under the declared type and leaves its key-frame state untouched. When null — the default, and every existing caller — behaviour is unchanged. ### 2. The event writer was unreachable `EventDataSetWriter` and `EventPublishedDataSet` implement the Part 14 §6.2.4 event model correctly, but nothing could use them: - `EventPublishedDataSet` did not implement `IPublishedDataSet`, so `PubSubApplication` could not register an event dataset; - nothing in the library constructed `EventDataSetWriter`, and it was not an `IDataSetWriter`; - `WriterGroup` appends at most one message per writer per cycle, whereas an event writer produces one per occurrence. Now: `EventPublishedDataSet` is an `IPublishedDataSet` whose general `SampleAsync` drains one occurrence per cycle declared as an event; `EventDataSetWriter` is an `IDataSetWriter`; `PubSubApplication` builds an event dataset when the configured `DataSetSource` is a `PublishedEventsDataType` and the registered source is an `IEventSampler`; and a writer group drains every pending occurrence in one publish cycle. Event-writer sequence numbers now use the WriterGroup checkpoint state, so failover and restart resume above the shared checkpoint. The rows-returning `EventPublishedDataSet.SampleAsync` is renamed `SampleEventsAsync`, both to make room for the interface member and to match `IEventSampler.SampleEventsAsync`. ### 3. A metadata announcement hides its own payload `JsonMetaDataMessage` documents that the payload *"is exposed both on the base `PubSubNetworkMessage.MetaData` property and on `MetaDataPayload` so callers can use whichever accessor matches their fluent style."* `MetaDataPublisher` set only `MetaDataPayload`, so the documented contract was false: any consumer, transform or encoder hook reading the base property saw an announcement as a message carrying nothing. Both are now populated. Dataset subscriptions also use a dispose-safe subscribe/recheck handshake, preventing a concurrent shutdown from leaving a late handler attached. ### 4. JSON DataValue status used the wrong member name Part 6 section 5.4.2.18 Table 42 names the `DataValue` status member `Status`; `StatusCode` is its data type. `JsonEncoder` and `JsonDecoder` instead shared the member name `StatusCode`, so stack-to-stack round-trips passed while standards-conformant peers could not exchange non-Good status values. Both directions now use `Status`. The encoder regression test also verifies that `StatusCode` is absent from the emitted `DataValue` object. Fixes #4111. ### Compatibility The snapshot property is optional and defaults to null, so existing PubSub sources and current-state sampling behavior remain unchanged. The `EventPublishedDataSet.SampleAsync` rename is source-breaking on a type that could not previously be reached from the runtime. The JSON `DataValue` wire member intentionally changes from `StatusCode` to the specification-defined `Status`. No legacy alias is retained: the encoder emits `Status`, and the decoder expects `Status`. ### Testing `Opc.Ua.PubSub.Tests` on `net10.0`: 1341 passed, 1 skipped, 0 failed. New coverage: - `WriterGroupDeclaredMessageTypeTests` — a declared type is honoured, declared samples never become delta frames and are never suppressed as unchanged, and an undeclared source keeps the existing key-frame cadence. - `EventDataSetWriterTests.EventPublishedDataSet_SamplesOneOccurrencePerSnapshotAsync` — the general contract drains one occurrence per call, declares it as an event, and reports nothing when exhausted. - `WriterGroupEventWriterHotStandbyContinuesSequenceNumberFromSharedCheckpointAsync` — event messages share the checkpointed sequence state and continue monotonically after standby promotion. Issue #4111 validation: - `Opc.Ua.Types.Tests` JSON encoder/decoder fixtures on `net10.0`: 274 passed. - `Opc.Ua.Core.Encoders.Tests` JSON conformance cases on `net10.0`: 604 passed. - `Opc.Ua.PubSub.Tests` JSON fixtures on `net10.0`: 88 passed. - Targeted `net48` regression tests: 2 passed; core JSON conformance cases: 572 passed. - Review-feedback fixtures on `net48`: 11 passed. CI-fix validation: - `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` on `net10.0`: 4145 passed, 86 skipped. - `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` on `net48`: 4070 passed, 92 skipped. - Patch coverage check passes after adding targeted metadata and event publishing tests. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 1a300bc8-8bde-4a82-8fc3-476ef837bc6a Copilot-Session: 9f18bf87-795f-40a9-8494-b6e6334c4a97	2026-07-29 22:06:52 +02:00
Marc Schier	fde50c5700	Enforce ActivateSession transfer and reconnect security (OPC 10000-4 §5.7.3.1) (#4050) ... # Description This draft isolates the Session/ActivateSession, reconnect, and distributed Session security work split from #4021. ### Failure - `ActivateSession` could transfer a Session to a new SecureChannel without consistently enforcing the original client certificate, MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, and exact OPC `ClientUserId` semantics. - Missing or legacy distributed Session security state did not provide enough information to validate transfer safely. - Malformed or reused nonces, concurrent activation, and cancellation could leave activation state inconsistent. - Client reconnect could treat recoverable Session-loss/security responses as fatal, reuse a Session after client-certificate rotation, or report a managed channel ready before Session recreation completed. ### Fix - Serialize activation, consume server nonces once, validate application signatures and user tokens asynchronously, and enforce transfer continuity against the original channel and authenticated identity. - Persist versioned transfer-security state for distributed Sessions and fail closed when certificate, identity, activation, or nonce state is absent or invalid. - Validate server signatures/nonces on the client, recreate Sessions for certificate rotation and recoverable activation failures, and await participant recreation before transitioning the managed channel to `Ready`. - Make the restart recovery integration test use bounded reconnect cycles instead of a fixed startup delay. ### Specification - OPC 10000-4 §5.7.2.2 — CreateSession signatures and nonces. - OPC 10000-4 §5.7.3.1 — ActivateSession identity continuity and SecureChannel transfer. - OPC 10000-4 §6.1.8 — application nonce generation, validation, and reuse requirements. ### Validation - `git diff --check` - Release `net10.0`: `Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server.Tests` 567/567 plus the targeted server Session, Subscription transfer, ClientUserId, client reconnect and certificate rotation suites pass. - Release `net48`: the same redundancy suite (567/567) and the targeted Session/Subscription suites pass. - Full `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` run on `net10.0`: 3633/3634. The single failure, `ServerFluentApiHostingTests.ConfigureApplicationBuildsSharedClientAndServerConfigurationAsync`, reproduces identically on the unmodified commit and is a local certificate-store path issue rather than a regression. These were targeted validation runs; no long-soak result is claimed.	2026-07-28 12:07:02 +02:00
Marc Schier	5b9bcedc62	Add OPC UA ISA-95 Common Model and Job Control support (#4089) ... # Description Adds first-class support for the OPC UA ISA-95 companion specifications: - OPC-10030 Common Model. - OPC-10031-4 Job Control V1. - OPC-10031-4 Job Control V2. The change introduces `Opc.Ua.ISA95`, `Opc.Ua.ISA95.Client`, and `Opc.Ua.ISA95.Server`, together with a NativeAOT-compatible minimal server sample and comprehensive tests. ## Highlights - Compiles the three canonical NodeSets and identifier mapping CSV files through the source generator. - Adds NodeSet identifier mapping validation, typed method arguments/results, companion event records, and generated method argument nodes. - Provides typed Common Model builders with normative relationships and an injectable `GeoSpatialLocationType` provider. - Implements lossless V1/V2 Job Control providers over a shared version-neutral store, including state paths, status events, comments, response queries, catalog changes, and cohesive DI registration. - Adds subtype-aware typed clients, standalone encodeable registration, `IIsa95ClientFactory`, and V2 status-event streaming. - Adds the `MinimalIsa95Server` sample, package documentation, and an ISA-95 guide with conformance and HA guidance. - Tracks typed RSL/GPOS integration as follow-up issue #4095. ## Validation - `Opc.Ua.ISA95.Tests`: 137/137 passed on `net10.0` and `net48`. - Source-generator suites: 81/81 model, 90/90 stack, 3718 passed / 8 skipped core. - `EventRecordFieldReaders` feedback tests: 6/6 on `net10.0` and `net48`. - `EventRecordFieldReaders` changed-method patch coverage: 100% line coverage (36/36) and 100% branch coverage (22/22). - `Opc.Ua.ISA95`, `.Client`, and `.Server` build across all configured target frameworks without new diagnostics. - Cobertura line coverage: 88.08% model, 90.04% client, 91.19% server. - NativeAOT sample publishes and passes a live typed V2 Store/status-event validation. - The ISA-95 NativeAOT smoke test passes in the source-generated native test executable. - OPC UA KB NodeSet validation reports zero errors for Common, V1, and V2. The broader NativeAOT executable still reports unrelated existing GDS and complex-type test failures; the ISA-95-specific native test passes. ## Node state generator fixes Generating method arguments inline for imported nodesets regressed every model that already emits `InputArguments` / `OutputArguments` child node factories: - The inline block ran before the child factories. `MethodState.CreateOrReplaceInputArguments` keeps the property that was assigned first, so the child carrying the well-known NodeId was dropped and a NodeId-less placeholder remained in the address space. This broke browsing (reference descriptions without a target) and made method arguments unreachable at their well-known NodeIds. - The `MethodDeclarationId` fallback keyed on an autogenerated display name redirected every declared method of the standard address space to its own NodeId, which made method calls fail. The inline block is now emitted after the child factories and reduced to a value assignment when a child factory exists. The value is only re-emitted when an argument references a namespace other than OPC UA, because the value of an imported property is the verbatim XML of the source nodeset whose namespace indices do not survive the import. The `MethodDeclarationId` fallback is restricted to declarations without a resolvable NodeId. The generated OPC UA address space is byte-identical to `master` again. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4088 - Follow-up: #4095	2026-07-28 12:01:57 +02:00
Marc Schier	5efba99dbd	Replace legacy EventSource providers with source-generated logging (#4058) ... # Description Replace the four stack-owned `System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventSource` providers with source-generated `ILogger` logging. - Preserve the legacy provider category names, numeric event IDs, event names, levels, message structure, and semantic structured fields. - Remove `ClientTraceFlags.EventLog` and route `ClientTraceFlags.Log` through the canonical `OPC-UA-Core` compatibility events. - Keep ChannelManager activities and metrics while moving its diagnostic events to the `Opc.Ua.ChannelManager` logger category. - Replace EventListener-based unit and stress-test collection with structured logger providers. - Document the ETW removal, retained compatibility identities, and migration path for existing consumers. ## Validation - `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 -p:NuGetAudit=false` - Focused Core, Client, and Server logging tests on `net10.0` and `net48` - Stress harness Release build and `SessionRecoversFromAcceptButStallAsync` - Direct AOT test application: 115 tests passed - `dotnet test UA.slnx -c Release -p:CustomTestTarget=net48 -p:NuGetAudit=false` The full `net10.0` `dotnet test UA.slnx` invocation is currently blocked by the repository's existing mixed VSTest/Microsoft.Testing.Platform configuration in `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests`; the AOT project builds and its test executable passes directly. ## Related Issues - Related to #1262 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: b0d90b8a-cde9-4fca-9a75-84f4cecb227d	2026-07-23 21:53:31 +02:00
Marc Schier	2a4bc0fe24	Make reverse connect lifecycle fully asynchronous (#4059) ... ## Summary - add cancellation-aware asynchronous start, lazy initialization, stop, reload, and disposal for `ReverseConnectManager` - make listener replacement transactional with explicit ownership, rollback/restoration, stale watcher protection, and deterministic concurrent start/stop/dispose behavior - add injectable async configuration providers, remove the former protected configuration hooks, and retain obsolete synchronous lifecycle compatibility wrappers - integrate eager Generic Host startup plus non-host lazy startup, including custom application-configuration providers - serialize `ReverseConnectHost` lifecycle and extend raw TCP, Kestrel TCP, WSS, hosting, concurrency, rollback, and NativeAOT coverage - document the async lifecycle, hosting behavior, cancellation guarantees, provider model, and migration path ## Validation - `Opc.Ua.Client` Release build across all supported target frameworks - reverse-connect client and core tests on net10.0 and net48 - raw TCP, Kestrel TCP, and WSS integration tests on net10.0; raw TCP on net48 - NativeAOT publish and 115-test executable run Closes #4013. Related: #3985, #4009.	2026-07-23 10:40:32 +02:00
Copilot	f95d65754d	Register mandatory opc.tcp transport in AddOpcUa (make AddOpcTcpTransport optional) (#4074) ... # Description `AddOpcUa()` did not register an `ITransportBindingRegistry`. The client resolves it with `GetRequiredService(...)`, so a client built with `AddOpcUa().AddClient(...)` threw during managed-session creation unless `AddOpcTcpTransport()` was also called. (Servers tolerated a missing registry via `ServerBase`'s lazy `WithDefaultTcp()` fallback, which is why `MinimalBoilerServer` worked but `MinimalClient` did not.) This change makes the mandatory `opc.tcp` transport always available while keeping it overridable and removable, then reverts the sample workaround. ## Changes - **`AddOpcUa()` seeds the mandatory transport.** `AddTransportBindingRegistry()` now seeds the registry with the raw-socket `opc.tcp` secure-channel listener and tcp connection channel factories **before** running the registered `ITransportBindingConfigurator`s, and `AddOpcUa()` calls it. `AddOpcTcpTransport()` is now optional (kept for backward compatibility). - **Overridable.** Because the seed runs before configurators, `AddKestrelOpcTcpTransport()` / `AddHttpsTransport()` / `AddWssTransport()` / `AddCustomTransport<,>()` still override the seeded defaults last-writer-wins per URI scheme — now without needing `AddOpcTcpTransport()` first. - **Removable.** Added `RemoveListenerFactory(scheme)` / `RemoveChannelFactory(scheme)` to `ITransportBindingRegistry` (+ `DefaultTransportBindingRegistry`) so an implementer can unregister the seeded defaults from a plain `ITransportBindingConfigurator` — no fluent API required. - **Sample.** Reverted the `MinimalClient` `.AddOpcTcpTransport()` workaround; it now connects with just `.AddOpcUa().AddClient(...)`. - Small note in `docs/Transports.md` that `AddOpcTcpTransport()` is optional. ## Tests / validation - New/updated unit tests in `TransportBindingRegistryTests`: mandatory-`opc.tcp`-by-default, override-default-without-`AddOpcTcpTransport`, implementer-can-unregister-default, and `Remove*` unit tests; updated `ParallelServiceProvidersHaveIndependentRegistries` for the seeded default. - Client DI regression test in `ClientDiFluentApiTests` (`AddOpcUa().AddClient(...)` resolves the registry + channel manager without an explicit tcp transport). - Updated the `SpyTransportBindingRegistry` test double for the two new interface members. - **End-to-end:** started `MinimalBoilerServer` and ran `MinimalClient --auto-accept` → discovered a `SignAndEncrypt` / `Basic256Sha256` endpoint, connected, browsed the Objects folder, read `ServerStatus.CurrentTime`, and created a subscription (exit code 0) with no `AddOpcTcpTransport()`. - **Green locally:** `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` (4123 passed), `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` (1962 passed), `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` Hosting (141 passed) on **net10.0**; transport + client-DI tests on **net48**; `Opc.Ua.Core` builds with 0 warnings. ## Related Issues Tracked by the linked issue. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Marc Schier <marcschier@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Marc Schier <marcschier@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-23 07:26:19 +02:00
Copilot	9883c41e48	Default TransportQuotas in ApplicationConfiguration.ValidateAsync to prevent server-start NullReferenceException (#4055) ... # Description `ValidateAsync(ApplicationType.Server)` accepted a null `TransportQuotas` without error, but the transport/secure-channel layers assume it is non-null, so `ApplicationInstance.StartAsync` later threw a `NullReferenceException`. The fluent builder path (`ApplicationInstance.Build`) already always initializes `TransportQuotas = new TransportQuotas()`; manually-assembled configurations could leave it null. Changes: - **`ApplicationConfiguration.ValidateAsync`**: default `TransportQuotas` when null, aligning the manual-construction path with the builder path and the existing `SecurityConfiguration` setter convention. ```csharp // Transport/secure-channel layers rely on this being non-null during bring-up. TransportQuotas ??= new TransportQuotas(); ``` `TransportQuotas`'s default constructor yields complete, valid limits (`DefaultEncodingLimits` / `TcpMessageLimits`), so minimal server configs now start with sensible defaults instead of crashing. - **Tests** (`ApplicationConfigurationTests`): `ValidateAsyncDefaultsTransportQuotasWhenNull` (full server config with temp cert stores, mirroring the repro) and `ValidateAsyncKeepsExplicitTransportQuotas` (explicitly-set instance is preserved). Note: chose graceful defaulting over throwing a `ConfigurationError`, consistent with the "simple API" goal and the builder behavior. Happy to switch to strict validation if maintainers prefer. ## Related Issues ## Checklist _Put an `x` in the boxes that apply. You can complete these step by step after opening the PR._ - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-21 20:55:13 +02:00
Marc Schier	d9c77cd23f	Validate HTTPS client trust and CRL algorithms (OPC UA HTTPS / RFC 5280) (#4027) ... # Description This draft splits the certificate-related changes from #4021, sourced only from commits `31350bf3b` and `1aed3b7ed`. - Enforces OPC UA HTTPS trust-list semantics for every presented client certificate, even when platform TLS/OS trust reports no policy errors. This prevents OS trust from bypassing the configured UA HTTPS trust list. - Passes the full TLS-supplied certificate chain to the UA validator and selects `TrustListIdentifier.Https`, preserving intermediates for application-level chain validation. - Uses the signature generator's exact `AlgorithmIdentifier` in both the CRL `TBSCertList` and outer `CertificateList`. RFC 5280 §5.1.1 requires these inner and outer identifiers to match; independently encoding the inner value could disagree with the actual signature algorithm. ## Validation - HTTPS certificate-validation tests: net10.0 (6 passed), net48 (6 passed). - CRL tests: net10.0 (95 passed), net48 (95 passed). - `Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https` and `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates`: netstandard2.1 builds succeeded with 0 warnings and 0 errors. - `git diff --check` passed. ## Related Issues - Split from #4021. ## Checklist _Only verified claims are checked._ - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-21 20:47:40 +02:00
Marc Schier	1d2a7c8d00	Complete partial vectored UA-TCP sends (OPC 10000-6) (#4028) ... # Description Stream socket semantics permit a successful vectored send to complete after fewer bytes than requested. The previous one-shot send treated that legal partial completion as a closed connection and left the remaining bytes unsent, risking truncation of an OPC 10000-6 UA-TCP message chunk. The transport now continues sending while advancing across copied buffer segments, without mutating the caller's `BufferCollection`, and rejects zero-byte or impossible over-reported sends. ## Validation - `TcpByteTransportTests`: net10.0 (10 passed), net48 (10 passed). - `git diff --check` passed. ## Related Issues - Split from #4021. ## Checklist _Only verified claims are checked._ - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-21 07:21:35 +02:00
Marc Schier	41a648c9db	Fail fast on reverse connect listener startup (#4009) ... # Description Fail reverse-connect listener startup immediately instead of logging bind failures and surfacing a later connection timeout. - Validate and stage configured and programmatic listener endpoints before replacing active configuration. - Open all listeners atomically and report endpoint-specific failures with `BadTcpEndpointUrlInvalid`, the transport-specific status, or `BadNoCommunication`. - Roll back listeners opened by a failed attempt without reacquiring the manager lock, including forced listener disposal when normal close fails. - Preserve meaningful `ServiceResultException` status codes through both `StartService` overloads. - Dispose replaced configuration watchers and reject callbacks from stale watcher generations. - Keep the intended shared-listener behavior: one long-lived `ReverseConnectManager` can accept connections from multiple Servers on the same Client URL. - Expand `Docs/ReverseConnect.md` with listener lifetime, shared-manager usage, diagnostics, and specification references. ## Validation - `ReverseConnectManagerTests`: net10.0 and net48. - `ReverseConnectHostTests`: net10.0 and net48. - Ordered reverse-connect listener reuse integration tests: net10.0. ## Related Issues - Relates to #3985. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.	2026-07-17 13:20:24 +02:00
Marc Schier	8538f531e7	Update paths for the consolidated repository layout	2026-07-16 06:26:05 +02:00
Marc Schier	7cec2d614d	Move repository files to the consolidated layout	2026-07-16 06:25:54 +02:00