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Author SHA1 Message Date
romanett 9b034f8291 Enable nullable reference types centrally; migrate all unset and annotations-only projects (#4700)
# Description

Nullable reference types are now enabled once, in `common.props`, and
every project in the repository builds warning-clean with them.

**Configuration**
- `<Nullable>enable</Nullable>` lives in `common.props`. All per-project
`<Nullable>` settings are removed: 178 project files (enable,
annotations, and the `disable` in the three Aot test projects).
- 419 per-file `#nullable enable`/`restore` directives and the 4
`#nullable disable` directives are removed.
- Kept on purpose:
- The 5 `<auto-generated>` schema files (`UANodeSet.cs`, `UA Type
Dictionary.cs`, `OPCBinarySchema.cs`, `SecuredApplication.cs`,
`PInvokeHelper.cs`) keep `#nullable enable`. The compiler ignores the
project setting in generated code, so the directive is required there.
- `tests/Opc.Ua.Interop.LegacyPeer` keeps `disable`. It builds against
the 1.5.378 packages and does not import the repository props.
- `docs/DeveloperGuide.md` and `.github/copilot-instructions.md` now
describe the central setting.

**Migration** (the 43 unset and 13 annotations-only projects, roughly
10k diagnostics)
- **Production code: annotated at the declarations.** Covers
`tools/Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core`, `src/Opc.Ua.Lds.Server` and the
LDS sample.
- Members, parameters and returns are nullable where null actually
flows.
- Null-check helpers carry `[NotNullWhen]` (`IsNull`, `IsValidXmlName`,
`IsMethodTypeDesign`).
- `CoreUtils.Format`, `Utils.Format`, `ITemplateWriter.WriteLine` take
`params object?[]`. `Template.AddReplacement` takes `string?` (rendering
already skips null replacements).
- `IRegisteredServerStore.RegisterAsync` returns
`Task<RegistrationEntry?>`: it returns null when a registration is
removed.
- Dereferences backed by an invariant (for example, the validated model)
use `!`, so runtime behaviour is unchanged.
- **Behavioural changes in production code** (small, deliberate):
- `NodeSetToModelDesign` throws `InvalidOperationException` when the
file is not a NodeSet. Before, it threw a NullReferenceException on the
next line.
- `ModelDesignValidator` starts its lookup tables empty instead of null.
A redundant `if (m_nodes == null) return;` guard is gone.
- **Test code: minimal annotations.**
  - `?` on values that can be null, `!` where the test asserts non-null.
  - `= null!` for fixture members assigned in SetUp.
- `TryGetStructure<T>(out T? x)` where the inferred `T?` broke the
`IEncodeable` constraint.
- A few redundant `== null` checks on structs (`NodeId`, `ArrayOf<T>`)
folded into the adjacent `IsNull`/`Count` checks.

**Notes for reviewers**
- The diff is large (~1,500 files) but almost entirely mechanical: `?`,
`!` and directive removal. The non-annotation changes are listed above.
- Known follow-up, not done here:
`IModelDesign.Namespaces/TargetNamespace/NamespaceUris` stay
non-nullable even though the validator returns null before it loads a
dictionary. Making them nullable would ripple through every generator
call site.

## Related Issues

- Fixes #4439

## Checklist

- [ ] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [x] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.

The "no new warnings" box covers net10.0 and net48: full non-incremental
builds of `UA.slnx`, `tools/SourceGeneration.slnx`,
`tools/MigrationAnalyzer.slnx` and the Aot test projects finished with 0
warnings and 0 errors under the repository's warnings-as-errors
settings. net9.0 and net8.0 also had no nullable diagnostics, but they
were not rebuilt after the final fixes. Tests have not been run locally
yet.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 08:48:13 +02:00
Marc Schier fa8d45f2cf Fix server/core validation, lifecycle and protocol regressions (#4477)
# Description

**Server/core audit fixes with regression tests. Latest review-fix
validation, merge validation and earlier acceptance results are
distinguished below.**

This addresses a 95-finding server/core report. Every finding was
reviewed with
the OPC UA specification knowledge base or, where the standard does not
prescribe a C# implementation, the corresponding ownership/configuration
contract. Incorrect or withdrawn subclaims remain qualified rather than
being
presented as additional fixes.

The original checkpoint covers session identity/certificate validation
and
revocation; certificate/key ownership and transactional updates; TCP
reconnect,
receive/admission and buffer lifetime; HTTP quotas; subscription
admission,
durability and pooled payloads; file-operation lifecycle; historian
aggregates;
fluent/state-machine behavior; and related utilities. It includes
targeted
regressions and directly related documentation.

The approved acceptance cleanup is separate in the commit history:

| Cleanup | Verified result |
| --- | --- |
| Invalid identity-policy and KeyCredential fixture inputs | Fixtures
explicitly advertise Username and use its generated policy ID.
Credential persistence uses valid clear mode inside the existing
encrypted admin context. Original permission, lockout and negative
encryption assertions remain. |
| Native GDS lifetime and concurrent connection failures | Retain
ApplicationInstance until client teardown. A deterministic native
reproducer proved the test-only channel cap of 10 was exhausted;
removing that override restores the existing bounded default of 1000. No
global serialization or production quota change. |
| Stress certificate ownership and close accounting | Balance two helper
references and the fake transport's server-certificate ownership.
Replace the invalid event-count bound with exactly-once physical
disposal, opens = closes, zero active entries and one logical entry
lifetime. |
| Participant deadlines | Use the injected TimeProvider with the
existing cross-framework WaitAsync overload. Tests pin one tick before,
exact expiry, terminal notification, recovery and timely completion. |
| Reproducibility and platform assertions | Preserve canonical WoT
bytes/hashes, explicit display-culture contracts and exact
numeric-vector assertions. Accept Apple's CryptographicException subtype
without weakening disposal balance. |
| Missing user-signature proof | Reject null/empty proofs before OS
crypto. Return BadUserSignatureInvalid per Part 4, 5.7.3.3. None-policy
and valid-signature controls remain. A CI-only test nullable-context
error was corrected without changing production behavior. |
| Durable sample restore and shared test storage | Dequeue waits for
actual batch residency instead of treating failed restore completion as
success, and restored files close before deletion. Five deterministic
regressions failed before the fix. The two fixtures that clear the
shared batch directory are isolated; all original 3,000-item assertions
remain unchanged. |

## Latest review follow-up

Commit `828856850219518970e8e2f580b8f94b3c1fc748` fixes the deferred
robotics
disposal reported in the latest review.
`RobotIntentNodeManager.DisposeAsync`
now joins a shared controller-host drain and then explicitly awaits base
node-manager disposal. A controller's bounded shutdown wait may defer
its
cleanup, but no longer lets the node-manager override finish early.
Concurrent
callers, including an asynchronous call after synchronous `Dispose`,
cannot
bypass the drain after the host list has been detached.

Synchronous disposal remains nonblocking for deferred work. Deferred
initialization failures are logged and retained, and base cleanup
failures
propagate to asynchronous callers. The existing controller-level bounded
disposal contract is unchanged; the node-manager contract is documented
in
`docs/Robotics.md`.

| Regression requirement | Evidence |
| --- | --- |
| Wait for deferred hosts; preserve synchronous compatibility and
concurrent joins | `NodeManagerAsyncDisposalWaitsForDeferredHostsAsync`:
four cases covering both entry-point orders and zero/positive host
shutdown waits. All four failed before the fix. |
| Wait through base cleanup and observe failures |
`NodeManagerDisposalWaitsForBaseCleanupAndReportsItsFailureAsync`: four
cases hold the actual base-resource semaphore, verify pending callers
after the host finishes, then check success or the same propagated
exception and exactly-once cleanup. |

The focused `IntentHostingCoverageTests` and
`IntentControllerHostTests.Dispose`
selection passed **30/30 on net10.0 and 30/30 on net48**, with no
failures or
skips. The final net10 solution build passed with zero errors and only
the four
previously documented CA2249 warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. No
new
warnings, analyzer suppressions, dependencies, or weakened assertions
were added.
The review thread received a commit-specific reply and was explicitly
resolved.

This verification is scoped to the robotics feedback; the earlier full
Subscriptions-run limitation remains recorded in the merge section
below.


## Documentation review follow-up (2026-09-14)

Commit `f9a9686fcc5d3cfd19cbbc8c2d826e20f5c7e72f` addresses the six
follow-up
threads on documentation and implementation rationale. Each has an
in-thread
reply citing the commit and an explicit resolution.

Multiline XML documentation now covers the declarations introduced or
modified
throughout the entire PR, including internal contracts, samples, tests,
and
public members of related private helpers. A syntax-aware inventory
checked
**2,031 declarations across all 256 PR C# paths with zero documentation
gaps**.
A supplementary check also covers **75 previously unchanged public
members**
of private helpers involved in the changed code. Token comparison across
the
conditional-compilation branches proves this follow-up changes **no
executable
C# or test assertions**. Project-file changes are rationale comments
only.

The implementation questions are documented at their source:

| Question | Resolution |
| --- | --- |
| Certificate assembly friendship | Server Push configuration reuses the
internal explicit-subject CSR helper with the existing key; no public
crypto API was added. |
| Core.Types assembly friendship | Server builders use internal
transition callbacks/revision guards; Server.Tests checks the revision
deterministically without creating a public compatibility contract. |
| Always-single-reader notifications | One dequeuer preserves event
order; optional concurrency fans out within one event and joins before
the next event. |
| Asynchronous disposal completion | `DisposeAsync` already joins the
completion published after admitted operations and all cleanup attempts.
The compatibility `Dispose` remains nonblocking to avoid deadlocking an
admitted callback against its own drain. |

The requested detailed review disposition follows. It distinguishes
actual
fixes from confirmed policies and incorrect subclaims rather than
counting every
comment as a new runtime change.


### Detailed disposition of review 5191795284

The [SDK
review](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/pull/4477#pullrequestreview-5191795284)
was submitted against `1c4a9df6c`, before the subsequent merge and
feedback fixes.
Its **15 inline threads** have each received an action-specific reply
and an
explicit resolution. A fresh GraphQL query verified those replies and
resolution
states; the fixes in `b8a59990f` remain ancestors of the current branch.

| Review concern | Action and disposition | Concrete regression evidence
|
| --- | --- | --- |
| Injected certificate-store providers bypassed | **Fixed.**
Registration, configuration snapshots, and validation use the injected
providers. Explicit custom types remain authoritative; the built-in
Directory catch-all is deferred so native X509 paths and later custom
providers are not captured. Failed store opens dispose the created
store. | `InjectedProviderResolvesRegisteredAndConfiguredTrustStores`
covers default-provider ordering and both registration paths; provider
validation/open-failure cases and the unchanged
`TrustedCertificateInjectedViaIndependentX509StoreIsObservedAsync` cover
real use and independent-store visibility. |
| Unguarded timer-thread leadership callbacks | **Fixed.** Each
subscriber's exception is logged independently and cannot suppress
subsequent subscribers or fail lease operations. `IsLeader` reads the
deadline without invoking application callbacks. |
`ThrowingLeadershipSubscriberDoesNotFailAcquireOrDisposeAsync`,
`ExpiryNotifiesOtherSubscribersWhenOneThrowsAsync`, and
`IsLeaderDoesNotDispatchExpiryNotificationsAsync` were all demonstrated
failing before the fix. |
| Legacy pending-key provider accepts an unfinishable regenerated CSR |
**Fixed by explicit capability validation.** A provider implementing
only `IPendingCertificateKeyStore` receives `BadNotSupported` before key
generation or persistence when regeneration is requested. Existing-key
CSR/update remains supported. Regeneration requires matching-only
consumption; no unsafe destructive probing was introduced. |
`LegacyPendingProviderRejectsRegenerationBeforeCreatingOrSavingAKeyAsync`
checks no key or store mutation;
`LegacyPendingProviderCompletesExistingKeySigningAndUpdateAsync` proves
the supported flow completes. |
| Shutdown waits behind user deactivation | **Fixed.** Accepted
deactivations drain before the master's lifecycle gate is taken.
Configuration retains its binding until the shared drain completes,
including concurrent shutdown callers and direct master disposal. | Four
cases of `ShutdownDrainsDeactivationOutsideTheSessionClosingGateAsync`
exercise real configuration/binding/ServerInternalData/master reentry,
retained address space, exact session/subscription closure, and no
production cancellation shortcut. |
| Subclass cleanup runs under the operation-lifetime lock | **Fixed.**
Cleanup starts outside that lock. A pre-published completion joins all
disposers, and only the active asynchronous teardown context may use
guarded helpers. Captured contexts lose that privilege when the callback
exits. |
`SynchronousOwnedCleanupLetsSamplingWorkerReachClosedAdmissionAsync`,
`DisposeCoreCanUseGuardedMembersWithoutReopeningCallerAdmissionAsync`,
captured-context rejection, and exact cleanup-failure/ownership
assertions cover both synchronous and suspended cleanup. |
| Discovery requestId-zero chunk read after pool return | **Fixed by the
earlier merge.** Discovery validation precedes `SaveIntermediateChunk`;
no read occurs after that path can return the buffer. The ordering is
retained. | `DiscoveryChannelReadsTheFirstChunkBeforeItIsReturnedAsync`
uses a poisoning pool and the requestId-zero path. |
| T1.8 OPN cleanup misses post-decryption throws | **Fixed by the
earlier merge and pinned with new regressions.** Both sequence rejection
and certificate mismatch release the decrypted body and input ownership.
| `OpenSecureChannelRejectionAfterDecryptionReturnsEveryRentalAsync`
checks the exact audit status and pool conservation. Omitting either
corresponding release in an isolated snapshot made its case fail; no
mutation remains. |
| T1.2 mount-root protection depends on the provider | **Fixed at the
host boundary.** Separator-only aliases resolve to the protected root.
Traversal, empty/whitespace segments, backslashes, and drive/stream
qualifiers are rejected before arbitrary providers are invoked. Valid
nested paths and root destinations remain supported. | A deliberately
permissive provider is used by
`NonCanonicalObjectPathsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyAsync` and invalid-target
cases; exact zero-call checks are paired with legitimate
nested-path/root-destination controls. |
| Inline trusted/issuer entries now face CRL checks | **Intentional
strict behavior, documented and tested.** A configured backing store
with strict unknown-status rejection requires current revocation
information. Explicit-only lists without a store retain their no-store
behavior. Actual revocation cannot be suppressed; a matching store
entry's policy takes precedence. |
`InlineIssuerWithStoreHonorsStrictUnknownRevocationPolicyAsync`,
`InlineIssuerRevocationIsNeverSuppressedAsync`, store-precedence cases,
and explicit-only controls preserve the missing-information versus
actual-revocation distinction in Part 4 6.1.3. |
| RSA minimum applied to unspecified ECC identifiers | **Fixed at the
application-certificate check.** The RSA minimum is compared only with
an actual RSA public key. An unspecified ECC identity is not replaced
simply because its key size is below an RSA threshold. |
`SilentCertificateCheckPreservesUnspecifiedEccIdentityAsync` checks DER,
thumbprint, store contents, and private-key retention; explicit RSA and
HTTPS minimum controls remain. |
| Failed directory refresh wedges corrective mutations | **Fixed.**
Recoverable automatic pre-refresh failures are logged and leave
reconciliation pending, but do not block corrective provider mutations.
Explicit refresh errors, capacity admission, caller cancellation, and
actual provider denials remain enforced. |
`CorrectiveDeleteRecoversAfterPersistentOverLimitRefreshFailureAsync`
converges an externally over-limit directory back to its exact allowed
contents. Capacity, cancellation/token, and six refresh-error controls
check negative paths. |
| Timed-transition rejection logs at 10 Hz | **Fixed.** Repeated
`(state, revision, status)` warnings are deduplicated without changing
the retry cadence. A different status or state entry permits another
warning. | `RepeatedTimedRejectionLogsOnceAndRecoversAsync` checks one
warning over eleven rejections and success on the next attempt.
Status-change and same/different-state reentry controls pin reset
behavior. |
| Bad unsubscribe strands retired-generation bookkeeping | **Fixed.**
Retired all-event bookkeeping completes even when unsubscribe reports
Bad; the first Bad is still returned to the caller. | Good and
BadCommunicationError cases of
`RetiredAllEventsDeletionCompletesBookkeepingAndReleasesGenerationAsync`
check event/snapshot removal, generation release, and exactly one
unsubscribe without finalization replay. |
| CSR subject parsing and fallback | **Fixed for existing and
regenerated keys.** Omitted subjects fall back to the actual stored
certificate. Regeneration resolves the public certificate's subject
before creating a key. Malformed or unresolvable subjects return
`BadInvalidArgument` before pending-key mutation. | Store-only fallback,
real-generator null/empty cases, and missing-subject/malformed-DN
controls verify the signed CSR, matching fresh pending key, unchanged
active identity, and no destructive side effects. |
| Committed RemoveUser change reported as failed | **Fixed for
RemoveUser and ModifyUser.** Accepted cleanup is still awaited and close
failures remain logged, but cannot replace the committed mutation
result. Precommit failures retain their original result and side
effects. |
`CommittedUserChangeKeepsResultAndPublishedUsersWhenCloseFailsAsync`
checks published Users, Good result, logging, and continued closes.
`FailedUserChangeKeepsPublishedUsersAndDoesNotCloseSessionsAsync` checks
BadNotFound with no publication or close. |
| Alleged pooled decoded-request aliasing | **No runtime redesign
needed; reviewer rebuttal confirmed.** The decoder copies the relevant
input data. Misleading ownership comments were corrected rather than
introducing a new dispatch model. |
`DecodedRequestRetainsValuesAfterInputBuffersAreReturnedAsync` checks
the exact decoded NodeId and ByteString after returned arrays are
poisoned. |

The current documentation-only follow-up rechecked **104 Core, 473
Server, and
4 Configuration cases** covering these concerns: **581 passed, zero
failed or
skipped**. The final net10 solution build also passed with **zero
warnings and
errors**. The complete earlier Core/Server/Configuration and net48
results remain
listed separately rather than being presented as rerun current-head
acceptance.

## Earlier review follow-up

Commit `b8a59990fe2e8e967a12ffd5d9158beed7831143` addresses all 19
review
threads. Each thread has an in-thread reply naming this commit and was
explicitly
resolved after verification; the final paginated query found 19 resolved
and
zero unresolved threads.

The follow-up fixes injected certificate-store selection (including
default
provider ordering and native X509 paths), actual-RSA minimum
enforcement, and
CSR capability/subject validation before key mutation. Node-manager
teardown
uses simpler scoped ownership and drains accepted user revocation
outside the
master gate; committed user results and retired-event cleanup remain
correct
when cleanup reports failure. File mutations can recover after failed
refresh
without bypassing capacity or cancellation, provider paths protect mount
roots,
and repeated timed rejections no longer flood logs. Leadership
subscriber
failures are isolated without callbacks from `IsLeader`.

Regressions also pin the already-merged OPN/discovery buffer fixes and
prove
decoded request values do not borrow returned input buffers. The strict
inline
issuer revocation policy is documented and tested, not weakened.
Existing tests
were changed only for the reviewed behavior: the incorrect
committed-user result
was corrected, and inline-issuer/root-alias controls were expanded.

### Review-fix validation

| Suite | Scope | Framework | Passed | Existing TRX NotExecuted |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: |
| Core | Complete project | net10.0 | 4,970 | 88 |
| Server | Complete project | net10.0 | 6,414 | 69 |
| Configuration | Complete project | net10.0 | 231 | 0 |
| Core | Certificate, lease and buffer compatibility slice | net48 | 153
| 0 |
| Server | Reviewed lifecycle, user, file, timer and CSR compatibility
slice | net48 | 692 | 0 |
| Configuration | Complete project | net48 | 231 | 0 |
| CSR provider regressions | Final portable-mock follow-up | net10.0 |
11 | 0 |

All runs exited successfully with normal concurrency and leak detection.
The Server console reports 5 skips; its TRX additionally records
existing
assumption/explicit cases, hence the 69-record count above. The
Framework build
caught two modern-only `ValueTask.CompletedTask` usages in new mock
setup; only
those expressions changed to the equivalent portable
`default(ValueTask)`.
The complete modern suites precede that test-only correction; all
production
files remained byte-identical, and the corrected fixture passed on both
targets.

The final net10 solution build succeeded with 0 errors and the same 4
CA2249
warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. Diff checks and changed-line
whitespace
checks are clean; whole-file formatting still identifies 10 unchanged
baseline
lines, which were not reformatted outside the feedback scope. The
committed
35-file tree was hash-verified against the validation inputs.

This is the review-feedback verification scope, not a rerun or sign-off
of the
historical complete platform/native/soak acceptance campaign below.


## Latest upstream merge

Merge `9d9bf679f317164c5b2b90924cd3cdc27a86d451` integrates `master`
through `162fc5ebb` (#4486),
including the AddNodes child-name index, shared certificate-error
reporting,
CTT sample-data corrections, and the accompanying regressions and
documentation.

The CreateSession conflict preserves this branch's certificate
ownership,
required certificate, application-URI, and channel-certificate checks.
The
validation result now retains nested errors through `ThrowIfInvalid`,
allowing
the upstream shared reporting helper to mask trust, policy, and
revocation
failures consistently without losing audit detail.

The new indexed AddNodes regression initially attempted to reuse a
deterministic
NodeId after renaming its existing node. Renaming frees the BrowseName,
not that
NodeId. `IndexedBrowseNameReusePreservesExistingNodeIdentityAsync` now
proves
both contracts: the derived-ID collision leaves the original node
intact, then
a fresh explicitly requested ID can reuse the old name while the new
name
remains protected against duplicates. No production identity rule was
relaxed.
The incoming seeded random-index test uses the existing `UnsecureRandom`
wrapper
with the same seed and sequence; no new analyzer suppression was added.

| Local merge validation | Framework | Passed | Existing exclusions |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: |
| Core, complete project | net10.0 | 5,081 | 88 |
| NodeState / BaseInstanceState | net10.0 | 579 | 0 |
| Server node management, certificate and session-security selection |
net10.0 | 112 | 0 |
| InformationModel node-management services | net10.0 | 29 | 1 |
| NodeState / BaseInstanceState | net48 | 578 | 0 |
| Core certificate validation, error reporting and TCP buffers | net48 |
111 | 0 |
| Server node management, certificate and session-security selection |
net48 | 112 | 0 |

All selected runs exited successfully at normal concurrency: **6,602
passing
test executions**. Modified test assemblies were explicitly rebuilt, and
the
combined name/identity regression was verified by name in both net10 and
net48
results. No skips or weakened assertions were introduced.

The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release --no-restore -m:1` with
`CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded with **zero warnings and zero
errors**.
The resolved source and adjusted tests pass whitespace verification, and
their
source hashes match the validation inputs.

This is merge-specific verification. Earlier review results and the
previously
reported incomplete full Subscriptions runs below remain scoped to their
own
commits; they were not reopened or relabeled as passing by this
operation.

## Previous upstream merge (2026-09-15 morning)

Merge `c4694e20ab089c555af233642042133ff3a03ac8` integrates `master`
through `484d6c887`, retaining
#4481's shared Like parser/GDS query fixes, #4488's RequestHandle
recovery in
ServiceFaults, and #4487's expired-session and durable-transfer
corrections.

Three conflict resolutions preserve both sides:

- Alias searches now use the shared `LikePattern` implementation,
including
upstream malformed-list validation. A timeout overload retains this
branch's
100 ms per-alias deadline and `BadTimeout` reporting without keeping a
second
wildcard translator. The shared matcher's original unlimited overload
remains
unchanged for existing GDS/ContentFilter callers. New regressions cover
bounded prefix/list scans, reuse after timeout, and the alias service
result.
- Expired activation closes outside the session-manager gate using
upstream's
once-only timeout claim, audit, and diagnostic accounting. This branch's
  original-channel and security-policy checks remain in place.
- TCP buffer tests retain this branch's ownership, poisoning-pool and
post-decryption checks alongside the upstream RequestHandle/fault
overload
  tests; neither set was discarded.

The upstream HTTPS binary behavior is intentionally retained: a decoder
`ServiceResultException` produces HTTP 200 with an OPC UA ServiceFault
carrying
the decoder status, response timestamp, and recoverable RequestHandle,
rather
than the previous HTTP 500 text response. Other exceptions retain their
existing HTTP error handling.

| Local validation | Framework | Passed | TRX NotExecuted |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: |
| Core, complete project | net10.0 | 5,054 | 88 |
| Sessions, complete project | net10.0 | 780 | 610 |
| Server aliases, expiry/security and subscriptions | net10.0 | 288 | 0
|
| GDS database, paging and live directory calls | net10.0 | 263 | 0 |
| Shared Like patterns and bounded evaluation | net10.0 | 109 | 0 |
| Subscriptions transfer/durability/service selection | net10.0 | 23 | 1
|
| HTTPS WebApi, complete project | net10.0 | 346 | 0 |
| InformationModel aliases | net10.0 | 54 | 5 |
| Shared Like patterns and bounded evaluation | net48 | 109 | 0 |
| Core fault handles, TCP/HTTPS and filters | net48 | 268 | 0 |
| Server aliases, expiry/security and subscriptions | net48 | 288 | 0 |

These selected runs exited successfully with normal test concurrency:
**7,582 passing test executions**. Sessions' console reports 379 skips;
the
TRX also contains conditional/assumption exclusions, so the table uses
the
actual 610 NotExecuted records. No skips or weakened assertions were
added.
The new `EvaluationTimeoutBoundsWorkAndPreservesPatternReuse` and
`SharedPatternTimeoutRemainsAnAliasServiceError` tests passed on both
targets.

**Validation limitation:** two unfiltered Subscriptions runs did not
produce
a final result and were stopped, including a retry with a hang guard.
They
are not counted as passing. The isolated failover fixture passed 2/2,
and the
transfer/durability/service selection above passed. The stall's cause
was not
established; no unrelated code or test was changed to conceal it.

The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release --no-restore -m:1` with
`CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded with **0 warnings and 0 errors**.
Whitespace verification passed for all hand-reconciled files, and staged
source hashes match the validation inputs.

These are merge-specific checks, not a new full platform/native/soak
acceptance
sign-off. Earlier review and acceptance evidence below remains dated to
its
own commit.

## Previous upstream merge (2026-09-14)

Merge `c3e09553e4d1509502d4ba751960d58491bea2cf` integrates `master`
through `6313e38a0` (#4478),
including the CTT-driven Part 13 aggregate corrections and FindAlias
argument
validation. The upstream tests and CTT documentation are retained.

The single conflict in `AliasNameWildcardMatcher` is reconciled through
the
branch's shared regex compiler: upstream malformed-pattern rejection and
`IsValidPattern` coexist with OPC UA character escaping,
whole-string/newline
matching, the 100 ms timeout, and service-level error reporting. The
upstream
ReferenceTypeFilter checks and chronological aggregate behavior are
preserved.

Local merge verification:

| Suite / selection | Framework | Passed | Existing skips |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: |
| Server aliases, aggregates and historian | net10.0 | 1,011 | 0 |
| Server aliases, aggregates and historian | net48 | 1,011 | 0 |
| InformationModel aliases | net10.0 | 54 | 5 |
| Features aliases | net10.0 | 11 | 0 |
| Client aliases | net10.0 | 28 | 0 |
| History aggregate/historical-access consumers | net10.0 | 265 | 0 |

All selected tests passed at normal concurrency. The final net10
solution
build passed with 0 errors and 0 warnings.
The resolved file's whitespace check and the staged diff check passed.
These
are merge-specific checks, not a new full platform/native/soak
acceptance claim.

## Previous upstream merges

Integrates `master` through `8e874d073`, including the Client, Types,
Core and
source-generator audit fixes in #4471, #4473, #4474 and #4475, plus the
event queue-size revision from #4480. The merge commits are `150ea0439`
(26 conflict resolutions) and `a0e17c07c` (the base update that arrived
during
validation).

The overlapping fixes are reconciled rather than replacing either
branch:

- **Rejected-certificate retention follows this branch, as explicitly
requested:**
zero means unlimited history; negative values disable new storage while
preserving existing backend trimming behavior (Directory clears prior
history;
shared key/value leaves it intact). The processor and manager policy are
not
  redefined, and documentation/tests describe the distinction.
- Preserve owned certificate snapshots and borrowed validation-core
lifetimes
  alongside upstream cache invalidation, store-first CRL checks and
  `BadCertificateRevocationUnknown` for unsupported revocation lookup.
- Combine exactly-once chunk ownership, receive-loop cancellation,
stale-epoch
rejection and detach-before-adoption with upstream
signature-before-padding
  verification and secret cleanup.
- Preserve pooled `HttpClient` per-request configuration together with
bounded
response reads and deadlines that remain active through body
consumption.
Regression cases exercise already-used clients and both timeout
precedence cases.
- Retain the binary-compatible channel-key constructor and normalize
omitted
profiles; preserve exact profile filtering and upstream binary-first
HTTPS/WSS
  endpoint ordering.
- Preserve monotonic lease expiry and stale-confirmation fencing while
adding
ordered, non-reentrant leadership notifications outside the state lock.

## Validation

Local validation of the conflict-resolution merge:

| Suite | Framework | Passed | Existing skips |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: |
| Core | net10.0 | 4,940 | 88 |
| Client | net10.0 | 2,278 | 0 |
| Server | net10.0 | 6,088 | 5 |
| Types | net10.0 | 10,394 | 1 |
| SourceGeneration.Core | net10.0 | 3,940 | 8 |
| SourceGeneration | net10.0 | 185 | 0 |
| Core | net48 | 4,855 | 104 |

After the subsequent four-file #4480 update, the related Server slice
passed
811 tests with 5 existing skips, the real durable queue-size cases
passed 6/6,
and EventManager's 21 cases passed again after analyzer-only
expected-array
cleanup. The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` with
`CustomTestTarget=net10.0`
succeeded: 0 errors and 4 pre-existing CA2249 warnings in unchanged
fuzz-test
code. Whitespace verification passed for the resolved files and the
follow-up.

Merge-specific proof includes
`RequestTimeoutRemainsActiveWhileReadingTheOpenApiBodyAsync` on
already-used
shared clients with either the request or HttpClient timeout shorter,
the
existing ownership/expiry regressions from both branches, and both
branches'
retention tests adjusted only to the explicitly chosen zero/negative
contract.

Earlier acceptance at `1c4a9df6c` passed hosted Linux/macOS CI, CodeQL,
image
builds and the canonical coverage gate (87.15% line, 77.27% branch,
92.14% patch).
Both Framework project matrices, all three Windows native suites (183
cases),
and the unfiltered net10 stress project (230 cases, including full
60-minute
chaos and 30-minute memory soaks) also passed. Those are **pre-merge
results**,
not a claim that the full framework/platform/native/soak matrix has been
rerun
on this merge. The previous acceptance workflow remains separate from
this
review-feedback operation.

Security checks, meaningful assertions, leak detection, default native
concurrency, full soak durations and coverage thresholds remain intact.
The user-set ready-for-review state is unchanged. No architectural or
complete
merged-head acceptance sign-off is claimed.

## Related Issues

- Fixes #4476

## Checklist

- [ ] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [x] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.
2026-09-16 04:42:09 +00:00
romanett 747f635518 Fix the Opc.Ua.Core defects from the server/core audit (#4475)
# Description

Fixes every `src/Opc.Ua.Core` item found by a twelve-reviewer audit of
`src/Opc.Ua.Server` + `src/Opc.Ua.Core` taken at 0e600c0f0, across all
three tiers of that report (security/data-loss/crash, confirmed
functional, and reviewer-traced). **The `src/Opc.Ua.Server` half of the
audit is deliberately out of scope here** and remains open.

## Security and resource safety

- **Explicitly configured trusted certificates were ignored.**
`CertificateTrustList.TrustedCertificates` (the `<TrustedCertificates>`
config element, `SecurityConfiguration.AddTrustedPeer`) never reached
the validator, so a peer trusted only that way was rejected with
`BadCertificateUntrusted`. The list now travels from configuration
through `TrustListEntry` into `TrustListState`, and is consulted both
when deciding trust and when completing a chain — OPC 10000-4 6.1.3:
"The list of trusted Certificates may contain a Certificate issued to
another Application or it may be a Certificate belonging to a CA". The
store is still consulted first, so a CA configured both ways keeps its
CRL check. Cached validation cores are evicted when a trust list is
re-registered, so a reconfiguration actually takes effect.
- **Unauthenticated receive-buffer leak.** `SaveIntermediateChunk` now
always takes ownership of the chunk: it either stores it or returns it
to the `BufferManager`. A server without a `None` endpoint gives every
TCP client a discovery-only channel, and each non-discovery request
leaked one `ReceiveBufferSize` buffer. Added `TakeSavedChunks` for the
"body already saved" case; passing the chunk again would have queued the
same buffer twice. A channel torn down while a multi-chunk message is
still arriving now releases what it had buffered, which nothing did
before.
- **Decrypted OpenSecureChannel buffers** are returned when verification
fails, including the sibling paths where the sequence-number or
certificate check rejects the message *after* the body was handed back.
- **RSA Diffie-Hellman peer values** are validated against `2 <= y <=
p-2` (RFC 7919 5.1), so the shared secret can no longer be forced to a
known constant by sending 0, 1 or p-1.
- **`RemovePadding` verified no padding at all** for channel messages:
the loop started at `data.Offset` and stopped at `paddingSize`, so on
any message with a header it ran zero times. The filler loop is
corrected — OPC 10000-6 6.7.2.5.1: "The value of each byte of the
padding is equal to PaddingSize" — and the signature is now checked
*before* the padding is inspected so the two failures cannot be told
apart.
- **Key material zeroing** on the ECC secret path: the plain text, the
derived key and IV, and the ECDH shared secret, on both sides. The
decrypt wipe covers the failure path too, which is the one that matters
— the body is decrypted in place before the signature is verified.
- **HTTPS responses** are read with `ResponseHeadersRead` and bounded by
`MaxMessageSize`, instead of the whole body being allocated before the
limit was applied.
- **`X509CertificateStore.IsRevokedAsync`** reports an unanswerable
revocation check as `BadCertificateRevocationUnknown` instead of
throwing. The throw surfaced as an unsuppressible
`BadCertificateInvalid` and failed every CA-issued certificate on Linux
and macOS. See reviewer note 2.
- **Certificate handle ownership**: `ClientChannelManager` AddRefs what
it hands to a transport that disposes it (and releases it again when the
channel never opens), `CertificateTrustList` releases the handle `Add`
took its own reference to, and `X509CertificateStore` disposes the
platform handles nothing else owns.

## Transport

- The receive loop is now **one atomically swapped epoch of (transport,
token)**, so a reconnect that binds a new socket to an existing channel
supersedes the old loop rather than racing it. Previously the supersede
path was unguarded and could start two readers on one socket, dispose an
in-use `CancellationTokenSource`, and leak one per reconnect.
- A **reconnect hand-over detaches the transport before closing
anything**, so the socket the adopted channel now answers on is not
closed underneath it. Previously the queued `OpenSecureChannelResponse`
failed with `BadConnectionClosed` and reconnect to a dropped channel
could never succeed.
- A blocked or unservable **accepted socket is closed** rather than left
open until process exit.
- An **invalid response sequence number reconnects the channel** instead
of throwing into a handler that did nothing, which left the pending
request hanging until timeout. OPC 10000-6 6.7.7 requires the receiver
to close the channel, and the same section requires the error to be
logged — which `HandleMessageProcessingError` now does instead of
discarding it silently.
- The **abort chunk** is encoded against the room the chunk has rather
than what it currently holds, so a short offending chunk can still carry
the error body (OPC 10000-6 6.7.3).

## Discovery and endpoints

- `GetEndpoints` no longer drops the HTTPS and WSS JSON/OpenAPI
endpoints, and no longer collapses them onto the binary one (the dedup
ignored `TransportProfileUri`). `profileUris` filtering matches them too
— OPC 10000-4 5.5.4.2 defines it as the "List of Transport Profile that
the returned Endpoints shall support", and a client asking for the JSON
profile previously got an empty list back. Results are ordered
deterministically with **binary first**, so a client that takes the
first endpoint that fits keeps getting the one it got before these twins
were published.

## Smaller confirmed defects

`FilterEvaluator.InList` returned after the first string operand;
`SelectedUserTokenPolicy` setter always ended at `-1`;
`Utils.UpdateExtension` could not delete; a lease holder never stepped
down while the shared store was unreachable *or hanging*;
`IsUriHttpRelatedScheme` never matched `http`;
`SessionLessServiceMessage` dropped a single `LocaleId`;
`GetRandomDouble` used `ToSingle` and typed variant arrays ignored the
requested `builtInType`; source-generated log calls never reached the
trace file.

## Related Issues

- No tracking issue was opened for this work; it derives from an audit
report rather than a filed issue. Happy to open one and link it if
maintainers prefer.

## Notes for reviewers

1. **`MaxRejectedCertificates` semantics.**
`ICertificateStore.AddRejectedAsync` documented "0 is unlimited", but
`DirectoryCertificateStore` wrote every certificate and then deleted all
of them at 0 (net effect: store nothing), and `CertificateManager`
clamped a negative value onto 0 and *depended* on that to implement
"clear the store". `SharedKeyValueCertificateStore` meanwhile treated 0
as genuinely unlimited, so the two store types did opposite things at
the same setting. This PR keeps the existing observable behaviour (0 or
less keeps no history and clears what is stored), removes the
write-then-delete-all churn, aligns the KV store, and corrects the
interface doc and `docs/DependencyInjection.md`. **The KV store is the
one place whose behaviour changes** relative to master.

2. **Revocation status where X509Store has no CRLs.** `IsRevokedAsync`
used to throw there, which surfaced as an unsuppressible
`BadCertificateInvalid` and failed every CA-issued certificate on Linux
and macOS - the outage the audit flagged. It now returns
`BadCertificateRevocationUnknown`, which is what the Windows branch of
the same method and a directory store without a CRL already return, and
the status `RejectUnknownRevocationStatus` decides on (OPC 10000-4
6.1.3, Find Revocation List). With the default policy the certificate is
accepted; an operator who opted into strict mode gets a rejection, as
before on master. An earlier revision returned `BadNotSupported`, which
the validator discards outright and which made revocation fail open even
in strict mode; review caught it.
3. **`ManagedChannelKey` gained a `TransportProfileUri`** property and
an optional trailing constructor parameter. Source-compatible, but it is
public API.

## Checklist

- [ ] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [ ] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.

### Regression test coverage

Each of these fails against `master`'s source and passes with the fix.

| Fix | Test |
|---|---|
| Padding filler bytes were never verified |
`CryptoUtilsSymmetricPaddingTests` — forged filler rejected, plus a
round trip over every padding length |
| Padding removed before the signature was checked |
`CryptoUtilsSymmetricPaddingTests.SymmetricDecryptReportsSignatureFailureAheadOfPadding`
|
| RSA-DH peer value not range checked | `RsaDiffieHellmanPeerValueTests`
— 0, 1, p-1, p, above p, both range boundaries, group mismatch |
| A degenerate DH nonce threw instead of being rejected |
`UaSCBinaryChannelNonceTests` |
| `<TrustedCertificates>` never reached the validator |
`CertificateValidationCoreTests` (peer, issuer, and the negative
control),
`CertificateManagerTests.ExplicitlyTrustedPeerFromConfigurationIsAcceptedAsync`
|
| Cached validation cores survived a trust-list change |
`CertificateManagerTests` — registration after a failed validation, and
`UpdateAsync` onto a different store |
| `MaxRejectedCertificates` normalisation |
`CertificateManagerTests.MaxRejectedCertificatesNormalisesNegativeValues`
|
| `AddRejectedAsync` retention contract |
`RejectedCertificateRetentionTests` — both store types, at zero,
negative and a positive cap |
| PEM rewrite left the old tail behind |
`DirectoryCertificateStoreTests.DeleteFromAMultiCertificatePemFileTruncatesTheFileAsync`
|
| `IsRevokedAsync` threw where CRLs are unsupported |
`CertificateStoreTest.IsRevokedAsyncReportsNotSupportedWithoutCrlSupportAsync`
(runs on Linux/macOS, ignored on Windows) |
| ECC secret left in the caller's buffer |
`EncryptedSecretTests.EccDecryptWipesThePlainTextFromTheCallersBufferOnFailure`
|
| Trust-list read leaked a handle per entry |
`CertificateTrustListHandleTests` |
| A channel that never opened leaked its certificate |
`ClientChannelManagerHandleTests` |
| Chunk ownership, CLO double free, chunk-limit teardown |
`TcpServerChannelBufferTests` (4 new) |
| Receive loop did not follow a replaced transport |
`TcpServerChannelDeterministicTests` (3 new) |
| HTTPS body unbounded, failures unmapped |
`HttpsTransportChannelResponseTests` (5) |
| JSON/OpenAPI endpoints dropped, collapsed, or unordered |
`ServerBaseTransportProfileTests` (12) |
| Channel key ignored the transport profile |
`ClientChannelManagerManagedTests` (2 new) |
| `SelectedUserTokenPolicy` setter always ended at -1 |
`ConfiguredEndpointTests` (4 new) |
| `UpdateExtension` could not delete | `UtilsAdditionalTests` (3 new) |
| A single `LocaleId` was dropped | `SessionLessServiceMessageTests` (2
new) |
| `GetRandomDouble` / typed variant arrays | `DataGeneratorTests` (4
new) |
| `TraceLoggerProvider.IsEnabled` short-circuited every log call |
`TraceLoggerProviderTests` (3 new) |
| A leader never stepped down on an expired lease |
`SharedStoreLeaseElectionTests` (3 new) |
| `FilterEvaluator.InList`, `IsUriHttpRelatedScheme` | existing tests
corrected in the first commit |

**Not covered.** The reconnect hand-over ordering, the OpenSecureChannel
decrypted-buffer returns, the client-side bad-sequence reconnect, the
abort-chunk sizing and the listener closing a blocked socket all need a
two-socket reconnect or a full asymmetric OpenSecureChannel exchange,
which the deterministic channel harness does not model. They are
exercised by the integration suites but not asserted on directly.
## Spec conformance

Where a fix has a normative basis I checked it against the published
specification rather than only against the audit report:

| Change | Reference |
|---|---|
| Every padding filler byte is verified | OPC 10000-6 6.7.2.5.1 — "The
value of each byte of the padding is equal to PaddingSize". The loop
started at `data.Offset` and stopped at `paddingSize`, so on any message
with a header it ran zero times and no filler byte was ever checked. |
| Signature verified before the padding is inspected | OPC 10000-6
6.7.2.5.1 — the signature "includes the headers, all Message data, the
PaddingSize and the Padding"; 6.7.7 — the chunk "shall not be
interpreted until the Message is decrypted and the signature and
sequence number verified". |
| Message-processing errors are logged | OPC 10000-6 6.7.7 — "the
receiver shall log a Bad_SequenceNumberInvalid error", and stacks "shall
have a mechanism to log errors when invalid Messages are discarded". The
handler was an empty method. |
| A bad response sequence number reconnects the channel | OPC 10000-6
6.7.7 — "the receiver shall close the communication channel". It
previously threw into that empty handler and the pending request hung
until timeout. |
| The trust list's own certificates are honoured as peers **and** as
issuers | OPC 10000-4 6.1.3 — "The list of trusted Certificates may
contain a Certificate issued to another Application or it may be a
Certificate belonging to a CA". |
| The abort chunk is sized by the chunk's capacity | OPC 10000-6 6.7.3 —
the abort body is `Error` plus a `Reason` string, so a chunk shorter
than the error body could not carry it. |
| JSON/OpenAPI endpoints are published and match `profileUris` | OPC
10000-4 5.5.4.2 — `profileUris` is the "List of Transport Profile that
the returned Endpoints shall support"; a client asking for the JSON
profile previously got an empty list. |
| RSA-DH peer value restricted to `2 <= y <= p-2` | RFC 7919 5.1, which
the finite-field policies are built on. I found no OPC-specific wording
for this. |

One point where the spec argues against the current shape is called out
in reviewer note 2 below.

### Test runs

On **net10.0**, with `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` and
`Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates.Tests` also run on **net48**. The
remaining suites were not run on the .NET Framework targets locally, so
that checklist box stays unchecked.

| Suite | Result |
|---|---|
| Opc.Ua.Core.Tests (net10.0) | 4630 passed, 0 failed, 88 skipped |
| Opc.Ua.Core.Tests (net48) | 4545 passed, 0 failed, 104 skipped |
| Opc.Ua.Core.Security.Tests | 556 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates.Tests (net10.0) | 355 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates.Tests (net48) | 353 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Configuration.Tests | 227 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Core.Encoders.Tests | 2929 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https.WebApi.Tests | 346 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server.Tests | 783 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Client.Tests | 2217 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Server.Tests | 5552 passed, 0 failed |
| Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests | 778 passed, 0 failed, 379 skipped |
| Opc.Ua.Gds.Tests | 1117 passed, 0 failed |

`Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` reports 379 skipped; that is identical to a
`master` baseline run in a separate worktree (security policies the
platform does not advertise), not a regression from this change.

`dotnet format whitespace --verify-no-changes` reports no violations in
any file this PR touches.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 08:22:41 +02:00
Copilot 5a690c5a7c Address WSS discovery review feedback and follow-up tests (#4178)
# Description

Addresses the review feedback for application-aware WSS discovery and
incorporates the follow-up coverage from #4179.

- Observe the returned task when asserting null
`ApplicationConfiguration` validation with `Assert.ThrowsAsync`.
- Correct the discovery URL comment grammar.
- Verify WSS discovery uses the application's certificate validator by
rejecting an untrusted discovery certificate and asserting the TLS
authentication failure.
- Connect the anonymous WSS binary test through the discovered
`ConfiguredEndpoint`, then verify the selected transport profile and
security mode.

## Related Issues

- Supersedes #4179.

## Checklist

- [x] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [x] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Julius Pfrommer <julius.pfrommer@o6-automation.com>
2026-08-04 21:17:08 +02:00
Julius Pfrommer da3358d371 Jpfr/fix wss session discovery (#4135)
# Description

WSS binary endpoints use the `opcua+uacp` sub-protocol and carry the
normal OPC UA Connection Protocol, SecureChannel, and Session layers.
User authentication should therefore behave like `opc.tcp`,
independently of whether mutual TLS is enabled for the WebSocket
connection.

`HttpsServiceHost` previously shared an HTTPS-specific rule with WSS:
when `HttpsMutualTls` was disabled, it removed the `Anonymous`
user-token policy from the endpoint description. This prevented an
anonymous OPC UA session even when anonymous access was explicitly
configured by the server.

This PR:

- Preserves the server’s configured OPC UA user-token policies for WSS
UA-SC UA-Binary endpoints.
- Retains the existing anonymous-token filtering for HTTPS transports.
- Adds an integration test that disables mutual TLS, verifies that the
WSS endpoint advertises `Anonymous`, and opens a complete anonymous OPC
UA session.
- Passes `ApplicationConfiguration` into endpoint discovery performed by
`updateBeforeConnect`, allowing WSS discovery to use the application’s
certificate manager.
- Applies certificate-aware discovery to both the default and
channel-manager session paths while preserving the existing
endpoint-refresh APIs.

## Verification

- Anonymous WSS binary session with `HttpsMutualTls = false`: passed.
- WSS `updateBeforeConnect` using application certificate validation:
passed.
- Null application-configuration validation: passed.
- Affected projects build without new warnings.

## Related Issues

_Reference all GitHub issues this PR addresses. If there is no issue
yet, open one and link it here._

_If this is a relatively large or complex change, a design must have
been discussed in the related tracking issue and signed off (which
becomes the Architectural Decision Record (ADR))._

- Fixes #github-issue-number, ...

## Checklist

_Put an `x` in the boxes that apply. You can complete these step by step
after opening the PR._

- [x] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [x] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [x] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.

---------

Co-authored-by: Julius Pfrommer <julius.pfrommer@o6-automation.com>
2026-08-04 10:53:40 +02:00
Marc Schier 7cec2d614d Move repository files to the consolidated layout 2026-07-16 06:25:54 +02:00