UA-.NETStandard

mirror of https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard.git synced 2026-10-22 01:26:20 +08:00

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
romanett	d552634258	Enable ECC security policies on net48 via a BouncyCastle raw-ECDH polyfill (#4703 ) Closes #4510. ## Summary OPC UA Part 6 feeds the raw ECDH shared secret into HKDF. .NET Framework only exposes `ECDiffieHellman.DeriveKeyMaterial`, which always hashes it, so the ECC SecureChannel and user-token policies were unavailable on `net48` (`SecurityPolicies.GetInfo` returned `null`). This adds a BouncyCastle polyfill for just that primitive: - `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates/Org.BouncyCastle/EcdhRawAgreement.cs` (`net48` only): an internal `DeriveRawSecretAgreement(this ECDiffieHellman, ECDiffieHellmanPublicKey)` extension using `ECDHBasicAgreement`. It returns the X coordinate padded to the field size, exactly like the .NET 8 BCL method. Keys stay CNG keys; ECDSA signatures and HKDF stay on the platform — only the agreement step is managed code. The point is validated (on curve, not infinity) and mismatched curves are rejected. - Because the extension mirrors the .NET 8 signature, `Nonce.GenerateSecret` now has one code path on every target. - `SupportsRawEccSecretAgreement()` is removed; the CBC-based ECC policies (`ECC_nistP256`, `ECC_nistP384`, `ECC_brainpoolP256r1`, `ECC_brainpoolP384r1`) are offered on every target (still subject to OS curve support). - BouncyCastle was already a `net48` dependency of `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates`; no new package. (Only `net48` is downlevel now — `netstandard2.1`/`net472` from the issue text are no longer targets.) Not in scope: the `_AesGcm` / `_ChaChaPoly` ECC variants (and PubSub DTLS) still need .NET 8 because .NET Framework has no AEAD ciphers — follow-up stacked on this branch. ## Docs `EccProfiles.md` (Known limitations), `migrate/2.0.x/certificates.md`, `ProductionChecklist.md`, `Profiles.md`, `WhatsNewIn2.0.md`. Calls out that on `net48` the agreement step does not run in a FIPS/validated module. ## Tests (local) \| Suite \| Result \| \|---\|---\| \| `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` full, net48 \| 5956 passed, 0 failed \| \| `EccInteropTests` net48 vs 1.5.378 peer (net8.0, native raw ECDH) \| 26 passed; 28 skipped (AEAD + curve25519/448) — all four CBC curves, both directions, UserName tokens, token renewal \| \| `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` ECC filter, net48 \| 52 passed, 0 failed \| \| Server `SessionCoverageTests`/`EphemeralNonce*`, Configuration builder tests, net48 \| all pass \| \| Nonce/ECC/EncryptedSecret + session tests, net10.0 \| all pass \| New tests: symmetric agreement on all four curves; on net48 an oracle against CNG (`SHA256(raw) == DeriveKeyFromHash`); curve mismatch and off-curve rejection. Tests that asserted the old net48 limitation were updated. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-08 21:52:44 +02:00
romanett	9b034f8291	Enable nullable reference types centrally; migrate all unset and annotations-only projects (#4700 ) # Description Nullable reference types are now enabled once, in `common.props`, and every project in the repository builds warning-clean with them. Configuration - `<Nullable>enable</Nullable>` lives in `common.props`. All per-project `<Nullable>` settings are removed: 178 project files (enable, annotations, and the `disable` in the three Aot test projects). - 419 per-file `#nullable enable`/`restore` directives and the 4 `#nullable disable` directives are removed. - Kept on purpose: - The 5 `<auto-generated>` schema files (`UANodeSet.cs`, `UA Type Dictionary.cs`, `OPCBinarySchema.cs`, `SecuredApplication.cs`, `PInvokeHelper.cs`) keep `#nullable enable`. The compiler ignores the project setting in generated code, so the directive is required there. - `tests/Opc.Ua.Interop.LegacyPeer` keeps `disable`. It builds against the 1.5.378 packages and does not import the repository props. - `docs/DeveloperGuide.md` and `.github/copilot-instructions.md` now describe the central setting. Migration (the 43 unset and 13 annotations-only projects, roughly 10k diagnostics) - Production code: annotated at the declarations. Covers `tools/Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core`, `src/Opc.Ua.Lds.Server` and the LDS sample. - Members, parameters and returns are nullable where null actually flows. - Null-check helpers carry `[NotNullWhen]` (`IsNull`, `IsValidXmlName`, `IsMethodTypeDesign`). - `CoreUtils.Format`, `Utils.Format`, `ITemplateWriter.WriteLine` take `params object?[]`. `Template.AddReplacement` takes `string?` (rendering already skips null replacements). - `IRegisteredServerStore.RegisterAsync` returns `Task<RegistrationEntry?>`: it returns null when a registration is removed. - Dereferences backed by an invariant (for example, the validated model) use `!`, so runtime behaviour is unchanged. - Behavioural changes in production code (small, deliberate): - `NodeSetToModelDesign` throws `InvalidOperationException` when the file is not a NodeSet. Before, it threw a NullReferenceException on the next line. - `ModelDesignValidator` starts its lookup tables empty instead of null. A redundant `if (m_nodes == null) return;` guard is gone. - Test code: minimal annotations. - `?` on values that can be null, `!` where the test asserts non-null. - `= null!` for fixture members assigned in SetUp. - `TryGetStructure<T>(out T? x)` where the inferred `T?` broke the `IEncodeable` constraint. - A few redundant `== null` checks on structs (`NodeId`, `ArrayOf<T>`) folded into the adjacent `IsNull`/`Count` checks. Notes for reviewers - The diff is large (~1,500 files) but almost entirely mechanical: `?`, `!` and directive removal. The non-annotation changes are listed above. - Known follow-up, not done here: `IModelDesign.Namespaces/TargetNamespace/NamespaceUris` stay non-nullable even though the validator returns null before it loads a dictionary. Making them nullable would ripple through every generator call site. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4439 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. The "no new warnings" box covers net10.0 and net48: full non-incremental builds of `UA.slnx`, `tools/SourceGeneration.slnx`, `tools/MigrationAnalyzer.slnx` and the Aot test projects finished with 0 warnings and 0 errors under the repository's warnings-as-errors settings. net9.0 and net8.0 also had no nullable diagnostics, but they were not rebuilt after the final fixes. Tests have not been run locally yet. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-08 08:48:13 +02:00
romanett	b8f07843b2	Secure channel: never answer with an expired token; accept a just-expired one (+ labelled soak/stress CI) (#4698 ) ## Summary Secure channel: a client could drop the channel when the server answered with a just-expired token. Running the long-dormant ConnectionStability soak locally, the subscription channel shut down with `BadSecureChannelClosed`. The session then timed out and the subscription was abandoned. Root cause, against OPC 10000-4 §5.6.2.1: 1. Server (rule 2: use the old token only "until the SecurityToken expires"). After a renew, the server keeps securing messages with the old token until the client sends something secured with the new one. That activation only happened on receive. A client that sends nothing, for example one whose Publish requests are all outstanding, kept getting responses secured with the old token after it expired. 2. Client (rule 3: "accept Messages secured by an expired SecurityToken for up to 25 % of the token lifetime"). The client rejected any such response the moment the token expired, throwing `BadTcpSecureChannelUnknown`, and shut the channel down. From the failing run (token lifetime 10 s): the client renewed to token #11 at 09:59:01.686 and sent nothing on that channel afterwards. The server, still on #10, sent a Publish response at 09:59:04.389, 380 ms after #10 expired. The client rejected it and closed the channel. Nothing reconnected, the 10 s session timeout expired, and the server abandoned the subscription. Both halves date back to the 2016 initial commit; this is not a recent regression. It hits whenever the client sends nothing on the channel between renewing and the old token's expiry, so it is timing-dependent. ### Fix - `UaSCBinaryChannel.ActivateRenewedTokenIfDue()` activates a pending renewed token once the current one passes `TokenActivationPeriod` (95 %). This is the rule the receive path already applied. It is now shared, and `TcpServerChannel.SendResponse` calls it before securing a response. - `ReadSymmetricMessage` accepts responses (not requests) secured with an expired token for `TcpMessageLimits.TokenExpiryGracePeriod` (25 %) of its lifetime. ### Tests `TcpReconnectKeyAgreementTests` now runs the server channel and the peer on one shared `FakeTimeProvider`: - `ResponseSentAfterTheCurrentTokenExpiresUsesTheRenewedTokenAsync`: a response sent at 96 % of the old token's lifetime is secured with the renewed token. - `ResponseSecuredWithTheExpiredTokenIsAcceptedWithinTheGracePeriodAsync`: accepted at 120 % of the lifetime, rejected at 130 %. Both fail without the fix. All 40 tests in the fixture pass with it. ## CI: soak and stress runs on labelled PRs (and the soak that tested nothing) The bug stayed hidden because `stability-test.yml` still filtered `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` after #3810 moved the test to `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` (2026-05-28). Since then the nightly has run zero tests while reporting green: runs dropped from ~100 min to ~15 min. - `stability-test.yml` now targets `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` and writes a TRX file. - New `.github/scripts/assert-tests-ran.ps1`, used by all three opt-in workflows, fails a run in which no test executed, or none passed. Contract-tested in `CiAssertTestsRanTests`. - Like `interop`, the opt-in workflows can now run on a labelled PR. They are not required checks. A later push cancels the run in progress, and adding an unrelated label neither starts nor cancels a run. \| Label \| Workflows \| Run on a PR \| \| --- \| --- \| --- \| \| `stress` \| Stress Tests (ChaosTCP) \| Random seed, saved as `chaos-seed.txt` in the results artifact \| \| `soak` \| Connection Stability Test, Sample HA Long-Haul Test \| 30 min stability; 15 min per HA scenario \| ## Test plan - [x] `TcpReconnectKeyAgreementTests`: 40/40 pass; the 2 new tests fail without the fix - [x] All `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests.Stack` tests (net10.0): 3548 passed, 0 failed - [x] `CiAssertTestsRanTests`: 4/4 - [x] `soak` + `stress` labelled run on this PR (before the fix): both stability tests, both HA long-haul scenarios and ChaosTCP passed on Linux (the label triggers and push-cancellation work) - [x] Local short-haul soak with the fix (Windows, 10 s tokens), 2 runs: both pass with full notification counts; run 2 hit the window once (`Token activated forced` on send) and kept the channel - [x] `soak` + `stress` labelled run with the fix: Connection Stability (2 tests), Sample HA Long-Haul and ChaosTCP all pass 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-07 19:14:25 +02:00
romanett	3bb0cd8d55	Fix ComplexTypes interop and TCP channel dispose CI flakes (#4663 ) # Description Fixes two intermittent CI failures on master. ## Interop: `LegacyClientExtendedCheckAsync("ComplexTypes")` / `LoadAndDecodeLegacyComplexTypesAsync` Flaky since #4630. The node reported as "not decoded" is always `Data__UserScalar_VariantValue` (ns=5;i=2340 on the 2.0 reference server, ns=3;i=3104 on the 1.5 one). Its DataType is the BaseDataType-derived `VariantDataType`, and `TestDataSystem` fills it with `DataGenerator.GetRandomVariant()`. About 2.4 % of the time that draw is an `ExtensionObject` with a random TypeId (e.g. `s=香蕉`) that no client can decode. Both checks counted every ExtensionObject of a variable with a non-ns0 DataType as a structure. Fix:* both checks now count only variables whose DataType derives from `Structure`. They browse the `HasSubtype` closure of `Structure` to decide this. - In the 2.0 test, the browse-with-continuation loop moved into a shared `BrowseAsync` helper. - In the 1.5 peer, the existing Structure-subtype walk in `DiagnoseEncodingNodesAsync` moved into `BrowseStructureSubtypesAsync`, which both places now use. Seen in master CI for `fbdd0af`, `5d26681` and `c801ac1`. Locally, pristine master failed 2 of 16 runs; with this change, 20 of 20 repeated runs of both tests passed. ## Core: `SecureClientAndTcpListenerExchangeSignedEncryptedRequestAsync` — "Collection was modified" `TcpTransportListener.Dispose` took a snapshot of `m_channels.Values` and then called `Clear()`. In between, `ChannelClosed` on the receive thread could still `TryRemove` the same channel. Both threads then believed they owned the `TcpServerChannel`, and `UaSCUaBinaryChannel.Dispose` had no once-guard, so both disposed the certificate chain. Fix: - The listener claims each channel with `TryRemove`. Whichever side removes a channel is the one that disposes it. - `UaSCUaBinaryChannel.Dispose()` runs once, guarded by `Interlocked.Exchange`. The guard sits in the public `Dispose()` rather than `Dispose(bool)` because `TcpServerChannel` and `UaSCUaBinaryClientChannel` release certificates before they chain to the base class. CA1063 is suppressed there with a justification, following the `ReverseConnectManager` precedent. This race could not be reproduced locally (0 failures in 4,800 iterations), so the fix rests on code inspection. All 789 Core `Stack.Transport` / `Stack.Tcp` tests pass on net10.0. ## Related Issues - No issue filed; CI flakes on master. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-04 20:02:24 +02:00
romanett	61edaa1ed0	Remove netstandard2.1 and net472 target frameworks (#4624 ) # Description Drops support for netstandard2.1 and .NET Framework 4.7.2. Libraries now target `net48`, `net8.0`, `net9.0` and `net10.0`. `Opc.Ua.Types` and `Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core` still also target `netstandard2.0`, but only because the Roslyn source generators load them. There is no general netstandard2.0 support. Preprocessor directives (112 files) - Every `#if`/`#elif` mentioning `NETSTANDARD2_1`, `NET472`, `NET_STANDARD_TESTS`, `SKIP_ECC_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SIGNING` or `NETSTANDARD` was evaluated against the remaining TFM set (net48, net8/9/10, plus netstandard2.0 inside `Opc.Ua.Types`/`tools`) and simplified. Dead branches were removed. - Example: `NETSTANDARD2_1 \|\| NET8_0_OR_GREATER` → `NET8_0_OR_GREATER`. - Example: `NET8_0_OR_GREATER \|\| NET472_OR_GREATER` → removed (always true). - Netstandard-only code was removed: `UnixFileModeShim`, the CRDT reflection path in `ReplicatedGossipOptions.CreateReaderOptions`, and the netstandard2.1-only test variants. Custom test logic* - `targets.props` drops the `net472`, `netstandard2.0` and `netstandard2.1` `CustomTestTarget` profiles, `NetStandardTests` and `SKIP_ECC_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SIGNING`. Supported values are now `net48`, `net8.0`, `net9.0`, `net10.0`. - The `NET_STANDARD_TESTS` define is removed from 29 test projects. - The "build netstandard shells as net10.0" overrides are removed from 18 projects. - `RestrictForLegacyTfm` now only applies to `net48`. - `tests/customtest.bat` is updated to the new values. Build / packaging / CI - MSBuild TFM conditions are simplified: Kestrel package choice, MQTTnet v4 (net48 only), BouncyCastle, Di/OpenUsd/Vision/Stress test excludes, and `System.IO.FileSystem.AccessControl` (dropped from Core). - The MigrationAnalyzer nuspec drops its net472/netstandard2.1 lib groups. The Azure signing lists are updated. - `get-ci-matrix.ps1` removes the net472/netstandard test profiles (including the PR-gating `linux-netstandard2.1`) and the matching build legs. Breaking API change (2.0 preview): removed `HttpsTransportListener.IsWssTransportSupported` and `ReplicatedGossipOptions.IsGossipStateDecodingSupported`. They only returned `false` on netstandard2.1 and are now always `true`. The test guards that used them were removed as well. Docs - NuGet READMEs, `README.md`, `DeveloperGuide.md`, `PubSub.md`, the certificate/ECC/identity docs and the 2.0 migration guide (plus its `.agents` skill mirror) are updated. - The migration guide notes that 4.7.2 consumers must move to 4.8 and netstandard2.1 consumers to net8.0+. ### Reviewer notes - The `System.IO.FileSystem.AccessControl` `PackageVersion` pin is left in `Directory.Packages.props`. It has no direct reference any more, but transitive pinning is on, so it was kept to avoid shifting resolved versions. - The `#if` rewrite was done mechanically by a truth-table evaluator. The diff in the `.cs` files is limited to directive lines, removed dead branches, and stale-comment updates. ### Verified locally - `dotnet build UA.slnx -p:CustomTestTarget=net48`: 0 errors. - `dotnet build UA.slnx -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0`: 0 errors. - Default multi-target builds (no `CustomTestTarget`) of Opc.Ua.Types, Bindings.Https, PubSub.Mqtt and Redundancy.Server succeeded. - net10.0 tests: - Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server.Tests: 840/840 passed. - Opc.Ua.Types.Tests: 11363 passed, 1 skipped. - ModelDependencyScanner tests: 20/20 passed. - The full test suite was not run locally. ## Related Issues - None ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [ ] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-02 17:09:49 +02:00
romanett	920ebda69b	Fix transport channel and encryption audit findings (#4626 ) ## Summary Fixes the Critical, High and Medium findings of a read-only audit of the low-level transport channels (UA-TCP / UASC, HTTPS, WSS, Kestrel TCP, buffer management) and the encryption layer (key derivation, nonces, RSA/ECC, EncryptedSecret, security policies). Every finding was traced in source and checked against the specification (Parts 2, 4, 6, 7) before fixing. Scope: 2 Critical, 1 High, 21 Medium → 21 fixed, 3 partial. Low findings are not part of this PR. ### Critical / High T7-1: HTTPS session isolation (Critical). - Affects: servers that expose a secured `opc.https` endpoint. - Problem: over HTTPS all clients share one SecureChannel (Part 6 7.4.1), so the session AuthenticationToken is the only thing that keeps sessions apart. The spec therefore requires it to be at least 32 random bytes. For secured channels the server issued tokens that are not hard to predict. - Impact: another client on the same HTTPS endpoint could act within a session that does not belong to it, with that session's identity and permissions. - Fix: `SessionManager` now always issues a random 32-byte opaque token, on every transport (Part 6 7.4.1, Part 4 7.35). T1-1: secured client channels could lose their protection (Critical). - Affects: opc.tcp clients connecting to Sign or SignAndEncrypt endpoints. - Problem: the client did not verify that the OpenSecureChannel response used the security policy and mode it had requested, as Part 4 5.6.2.1 and Part 6 6.7.4 require. - Impact: an attacker in the network path could make a secured channel continue without message security. The check on the server signature in CreateSession limits this on first connect. The session reconnect path has no equivalent check. Traffic of an existing session could then lose confidentiality and integrity without the application noticing. Other users of the channel (discovery, registration, custom service clients) were not protected at all. - Fix: a client channel for a secured endpoint is now bound to the requested policy and mode. A response with any other policy or mode, or without the server certificate, faults the channel, on connect and on reconnect. T8-1: Kestrel opc.tcp listener availability (High). - Affects: servers using `KestrelTcpTransportListener`. - Problem: the listener did not expire idle channels and did not reclaim unused ones when it reached `MaxChannelCount`, unlike the classic listener. Part 4 5.6.2.1 requires closing the oldest unused channel without a session before refusing new ones. - Impact: an unauthenticated peer could exhaust the channel slots and deny service to legitimate clients. - Fix: activity tracking, an inactivity sweep based on ChannelLifetime, and reclaiming the least recently used channel without a session at the limit. E2-1: user token decryption errors (Medium, High where lockout is disabled). - Problem: the result of a failed user identity token decryption could reveal more than Part 4 7.40.2.1 allows, which says every decryption error must look like `Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid`. - Mitigation already in place: the default failed-authentication lockout limits how this can be used. - Fix: clients now receive only `Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid`, with the detail logged on the server. Token decryption takes the same steps whichever check fails. ### Medium - Key derivation / sequence numbers: E1-1/T2-1 renewal XORs the previous secret only for SecureChannelEnhancements policies (Part 6 6.8.1 Step 2); T2-2 Sign-mode HKDF length uses enc key / IV length 0 (Part 6 6.8.1); T2-3 server chains a second renewal from the pending renewed token like the client; T2-4 receiver rejects sequence-number gaps (Part 2 5.1.14). - OPN / client channel: T1-2 (partial) OPN sender certificate checked against the policy's key family / curve and RSA key-length window (Part 4 6.1.3, Part 6 6.1); T3-1 renewal completion no longer blocks on a newer handshake while holding the gate; T3-9 reverse-connect listener bounded (1000 pending, 500/s, burst 1000). - TCP listener / buffers: T5-1 Basic128Rsa15 abuse tracker fails open for untracked IPs when full; T5-2 refused connections get `Bad_TcpNotEnoughResources` after the HEL (Part 6 7.1.2.3); T6-2 (partial) idle sockets no longer hold a receive buffer; T6-3 `AsyncResultBase` completes exactly once, reverse-connect timeout cancels the connect. - HTTPS: T7-3 chunked request bodies supported (Part 6 7.4.1); T7-4 mTLS CreateSession compares only the leaf certificate and answers a mismatch with a ServiceFault; T7-5 (partial) opcua+openapi WSS path gets the discovery-only gate; T7-6 default rate limiter partitioned per client IP; T7-7 shared Kestrel host owns its TLS certificate and rotation rebuilds it for all listeners. - WSS / Kestrel TCP: T8-2 SecureChannel and certificate audit events (Part 4 6.5.5); T8-3 queued senders fail with BadConnectionClosed on close instead of hanging; T8-4 WSS clients keep the mTLS client certificate alive; T8-5 WSS+JSON close bounded by timeout and cancellation. ### Partial / not fixed - T1-2: missing CertificateSignatureAlgorithm check per chain certificate, issuer key length ≥ issued key length, and checks on ECC issuers. - T6-2: `BufferManagerMemoryLimiter` still blocks the calling thread when real traffic exhausts the budget (needs an async TakeBuffer API). - T7-5: the fallback to any SecurityMode=None endpoint stays, because HTTPS listeners advertise `HttpsOpenApiTransport`. - Not covered: the HTTPS listener's WSS uacp channels likely need the same idle cleanup / reclaim as T8-1. - Not covered: the certificate/policy key check (T1-2) applies to UASC channels; the opc.https session path is a follow-up. ## Behaviour changes reviewers should look at Wire-incompatible with older versions of this SDK (both conform to the spec now): 1. Renewals on ECC_nistP256/P384, ECC_brainpoolP256r1/P384r1, ECC_curve25519/448 no longer mix in the previous secret; a renewal between this and an older SDK fails on the first message after renewal. 2. Sign-mode channels on those CBC+HMAC ECC policies derive different keys; Sign-mode channels to older SDKs fail. Other: 3. Every session AuthenticationToken is a 32-byte opaque ByteString NodeId, on every transport. 4. Any sequence-number gap faults the channel with `BadSequenceNumberInvalid` (client side previously reported `BadSecurityChecksFailed`). Only a reconnect OpenSecureChannel may skip ahead. 5. OPN peer certificates outside the policy's key-length window or with the wrong key family/curve are rejected (e.g. 4096-bit RSA on Basic256 / Basic128Rsa15). 6. Refused opc.tcp connections get an ERR after their Hello; a refused socket can stay open up to 2 s waiting for it. 7. Kestrel opc.tcp listener closes idle channels and, at MaxChannelCount, the oldest unused channel (BadNoCommunication) instead of refusing the new client. 8. HTTPS mTLS CreateSession mismatch → ServiceFault `Bad_SecurityChecksFailed` instead of HTTP 401; oversized HTTPS bodies → 413 instead of 500; default HTTPS rate limit is 100 req/s per client IP. 9. Certificate rotation on a shared (host, port) restarts the shared Kestrel host once; TLS connections on that port reconnect. 10. `EncryptedSecret.TryDecrypt/TryDecryptAsync` return false on the RSA branch instead of throwing (public API behaviour); `TryDecryptRsa` reports `Bad_SecurityChecksFailed` for padding/layout/signature failures. A KeyData whose encrypted length differs from what the policy and receiver key imply is rejected the same way, before decryption. 11. Client reverse-connect listener limits pending connections and connection rate; at its cap the oldest connection that has not sent a ReverseHello is closed to make room. On opc.wss the cap applies only to connections not yet handed off. 12. `ApplicationInstance` creates its own RSA application certificate with at least 2048 bits (except the RsaMin type), even when `MinimumCertificateKeySize` is lower; that setting only bounds accepted peers. 13. Kestrel opc.tcp listener: `ChannelLifetime` <= 0 disables the idle sweep; otherwise the sweep runs at most once per second. 14. Certificate rotation on a shared Kestrel host closes the listener's WebSocket connections and outbound reverse-connect channels even when the TLS certificate is unchanged; if the new host fails to start, a host with the previous TLS certificate is restored and the error is rethrown. Listeners on the same (host, port) share a Kestrel host only when their host-level settings (mutual TLS, admission limits, middleware) match; otherwise the listener uses its own host, as for a TLS certificate mismatch. 15. On a second renewal before the first renewed token was used, the server makes the first renewed token current (raising `TokenActivated` then) instead of dropping it; a reconnect chains from the current token. 16. Sign-only HKDF channels report empty IV/key plus the signing key length in channel diagnostics and the Wireshark keyset. 17. `UserNameIdentityTokenHandler.DecryptAsync` throws the specific RSAEncryptedSecret failure; the server still answers clients with a plain `Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid` and logs the cause. 18. Refused ReverseHello messages up to the maximum valid size also get the `Bad_TcpNotEnoughResources` reply; `TcpByteTransport` rents receive buffers at the chunk size. ## Tests New regression tests for every Critical/High fix fail before the fix. Tests that pinned old behaviour were updated: `TcpReconnectKeyAgreementTests`, `UaSCBinaryChannelSequenceRolloverTests`, `TcpMessageFailureRegressionTests`, `TcpTransportListenerDeterministicTests`. Combined branch, net10.0: \| Suite \| Passed \| Skipped \| Failed \| \|---\|---\|---\|---\| \| Opc.Ua.Core.Tests \| 6036 \| 88 \| 0 \| \| Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https.WebApi.Tests \| 405 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| Opc.Ua.Server.Tests \| 7806 \| 5 \| 0 \| \| Opc.Ua.Client.Tests \| 2733 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| Opc.Ua.Gds.Tests \| 1234 \| 56 \| 0 \| \| Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests \| 790 \| 379 \| 0 \| net48 builds of the Core, Server, Client and WebApi test projects and the netstandard2.1 Release build: 0 errors, no new warnings. One telemetry test (`ActivityTraceFlags_Metrics_ShouldRecordMetricsOnly`) failed once under parallel load and passes on rerun. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-02 12:08:16 +02:00
romanett	ce88955f70	Harden encoders/decoders against untrusted input and align them with Part 6 / Part 14 (#4599 ) # Description Hardens the encoders and decoders against untrusted input and aligns them with OPC 10000-6 (1.05) and OPC 10000-14. This comes from an audit of every codec reachable from a peer: - Binary, JSON and XML decoders and encoders; - built-in and complex types; - UA-TCP/UASC framing; - PubSub UADP and PubSub JSON. The audit found 97 issues: 1 critical, 7 high, 39 medium and 50 low. They are all fixed here, one commit per finding (IDs B1-, J1-, X1-, T1-, S1-, U1-, P1-, E1-, E2- in the commit subjects). Every fix was then checked against the spec a second time, and the deviations that re-check found were fixed as well (`-spec` commits). ## Security (decoders reachable from unauthenticated peers) - Allocation from length prefixes (B1-1, B1-5, U1-1, U1-3).* - Array, string and byte-string lengths are checked against the bytes left in the message before anything is allocated. - Arrays read element by element grow as elements are decoded, so nested length prefixes can no longer multiply memory. - UADP discovery counts and chunk reassembly buffers are bounded the same way. - Stack exhaustion. Nesting is checked for remaining stack (`RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack` mapped to `BadEncodingLimitsExceeded`), and the large Variant read/write methods were split into scalar, array and matrix methods. Measured on 1 MB and 256 KB threads, no codec overflows at the default limits any more. - XML element depth (X1-1). XmlElement values and raw ExtensionObject bodies are copied node by node with a depth limit, instead of with the recursive `InnerXml`, `ImportNode`, `InnerText` and `DeepEquals` calls. - Limit bypasses: - JSON NodeId, QualifiedName and opaque strings now respect MaxStringLength and MaxByteStringLength (J1-1). - Matrix rank is limited to 32. - Decimal size is bounded (T1-3). - XML base64 is checked before it is decoded. - XML arrays are checked before each element is read. - CPU and algorithmic cost: - UADP reassembly uses an O(1) overlap check with a per-message chunk cap (U1-2). - PubSub JSON matches fields to metadata through a name index (P1-2). - LocalizedText "mul" text is parsed lazily (T1-5). - Unknown SecurityTokenIds trigger a throttled background SKS refresh instead of an inline call per datagram (U1-9). - PubSub metadata poisoning (P1-1). Inbound metadata is registered only for identities a configured reader expects, is capped, and an unauthenticated message can no longer pin a version. - Exception contract. Decoders fail with `ServiceResultException` (BadDecodingError / BadEncodingLimitsExceeded) instead of letting ArgumentException, InvalidOperationException, TypeLoadException and similar escape. - *UASC (S1-): - OPN and CLO must be single final chunks. - The certificate of an unsigned OPN is ignored. - The padding and ExtraPadding bytes are validated. - A renewed token is activated only after a chunk has been verified with it. - A policy change on renewal is rejected before the channel certificate is touched. - Secured chunk length arithmetic is bounded. ## Wire-visible behaviour changes All follow the spec exactly; there is no reader for the old forms unless noted. - UA Binary: - Variant type ids 26-31 decode as ByteString. - Picoseconds without their timestamp are ignored, and values of 10000 and above are clamped to 9999. - A Null-type Variant with the array flag consumes its length and dimensions. - UA JSON: - Messages are ExtensionObjects with the body inline; there is no `UaBody` envelope any more (5.4.9 / 5.4.2.16). - The Variant `Value` is omitted exactly for NULLs of nullable types (Table 41). - RawData keeps nested UaType/UaTypeId and the StatusCode Symbol. - Duplicate member names are rejected. - `{}` decodes as a null ExtensionObject. - Numbers and identifiers are parsed strictly and culture-independently. - QualifiedName follows 5.4.2.14. - Opaque bodies of known types carry the DataType id. - Enumerations without a literal are written as the number. - UA XML: - The earliest DateTime is written as `0001-01-01T00:00:00Z`. - Null typed scalars and null array elements are written with `xsi:nil`. - An ExtensionObject without a body has no `Body` element. - Strings XML cannot represent are rejected. - Only the xs:dateTime and xs:date forms are accepted; a value without a zone is still read as UTC, because published model files use it. - Only the Part 6 Guid form is accepted. - Booleans are case-sensitive in XmlDecoder. - UA-TCP: - OPNC/OPNA/CLOC/CLOA fault the channel. Older releases that split a long-chain OPN into chunks are rejected, so this needs a release note. - The sender truncates the certificate chain to fit a single chunk. - The received certificate chain is sized from the chunk size. - Hello buffer sizes down to 1024 bytes are honoured; below that, an ERR with Bad_TcpInternalError is sent. - A 4096-byte Error reason is accepted, and the SecurityPolicyUri limit is 255 bytes. - PubSub UADP: - Chunk NetworkMessages use the Part 14 7.2.4.4.4 layout, and each chunk is secured on its own with its own sequence number. - The Sizes array is part of the secured payload. - Padded RawData keeps its length prefix, and null values are written as -1. - DataSetMessages with the valid bit clear are skipped. - Null discovery arrays are accepted. - PubSub JSON:** - Variants use `UaType`/`Value`, with the 7.2.5.4.2 top-level collapse. The deprecated `Type`/`Body` form is still read. - Status is written as a `{Code,Symbol}` object; a numeric Status is still accepted. - Discovery messages follow Tables 188-192, with GUID MessageIds. - Enumeration fields are written as `Name_Value`. - Fields appended with a MinorVersion bump are accepted. ## Known deviations and limitations (documented, not changed) - A known type whose ExtensionObject XML body fails to decode fails the message, like a failing binary body. 5.2.2.15 only says the decoder should continue, and continuing reopens the log-flooding path. - Reserved Variant type ids 26-31 are passed to the application as ByteString without the raw type id. - JSON UaTypeId of an opaque body of an unknown type stays the encoding id, because no type system is available to map it. - PubSub JSON encoder: - Structure fields without a subtype are still wrapped with a UaType, and concrete multi-dimensional or abstract-rank fields still carry a UaType (Table 186). - Namespace-0 enumerations without EnumDataTypes are written as a numeric string. - Chunked transcoded frames have no writer group, so their sequence numbers continue from the source number. - Pre-existing and out of scope: the HTTPS JSON binding uses Content-Type `application/opcua+uajson`, while 1.05 7.4.5 requires `application/json`. ## Tests - Every fix has a regression test. - Tests that pinned non-conformant behaviour were updated, and their commit messages say so. - Fuzz seeds were regenerated where the wire changed. Local results: net10.0, 27 suites green (Types 11354, Core.Encoders 2933, Encoders.Fuzz 8112, Core 5955 + 1 known intermittent ActivityTraceFlags metrics test that passes alone, Client 2732, Server 7802, Sessions 790, GDS 1234, Subscriptions 641, SourceGeneration.Core 4266, PubSub 1490 and all PubSub transport suites). Full UA.slnx build 0 warnings / 0 errors on net10.0 and net48. ## Related Issues - Follow-up: #4598 (possible throughput regression of per-element binary array reads). ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. (net10.0 suites run; net48 build only) - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-01 05:12:47 +00:00
romanett	0b9af4db34	Fix flaky BuilderDisposesOwnedHttpProviderAndChannelManagerAsync on net48 (#4597 ) ## Problem `ManagedSessionResourceOwnershipTests.BuilderDisposesOwnedHttpProviderAndChannelManagerAsync` failed on net48 in [run 36598770373](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/36598770373) (job `test-windows-net48 (5/30)`, on PR #4595, which only touches `version.json`). It failed after 12.1 s with a `TaskCanceledException`. This was not a disposal problem. The TRX shows that `ConnectAsync` never finished: - The shared channel entered `TransportConnecting` and never reached `Ready`. - After 10 s the test's connect deadline cancelled `ConnectionStateMachine.WaitForConnectedAsync`, with `ClientChannelManager.GetCoreAsync` still waiting on the open. - The open was still running after the shutdown token was cancelled, so it was stuck on something that ignores cancellation. - On passing runs this test takes about 0.4 s on CI. ## Root cause While opening, `WebApiTransportChannel` sends a sessionless `GetEndpoints` to fill in the endpoint description. That request goes to the test's scripted `HttpMessageHandler`. On .NET Framework the handler read the request body with the tokenless `ReadAsByteArrayAsync()`. For a `ByteArrayContent` this copies the bytes through `Stream.BeginWrite`, which runs on a thread-pool thread. On a starved runner the read can therefore stall indefinitely. Because it cannot be cancelled, it outlasts both the channel's own 6 s `GetEndpoints` timeout and the test's 10 s deadline. On net8+ the handler already passes the token. ## Proof - Non-cancellable 12 s delay injected at that point in the handler: reproduces the CI failure exactly. The channel sits in `TransportConnecting` for 10 s, then `TaskCanceledException` is thrown from `WaitForConnectedAsync`. - Cancellable 12 s delay at the same point: the channel's 6 s `GetEndpoints` timeout cuts it off, the channel opens and the test passes. - Probe on net48: `ReadAsByteArrayAsync()` on the request content never completes synchronously, while `ReadAsStreamAsync()` on a `ByteArrayContent` always does. The product's own response reading (`HttpResponseBodyReader`) already uses `ReadAsStreamAsync` and passes the token, so only the test handler is affected. ## Fix On .NET Framework the handler now reads the content stream, which `ByteArrayContent` creates synchronously, and copies it in memory. There is no thread-pool hop left in the handler. ## Testing `ManagedSessionResourceOwnershipTests` passed 15 of 15 runs on net48 and 15 of 15 on net10.0. Before the fix, the test also passed 150 repeats locally, including under full CPU load. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-30 08:05:09 +02:00
romanett	20c2d77d57	Fix Core/Types audit findings and conform them to the OPC UA spec (stacked on #4569 ) (#4573 ) > Stacked on #4569. The base branch is `romanett/practical-murdock-fd9c56`, so this diff shows only the commits of this PR. Retarget to `master` after #4569 merges. ## Summary Bug audit of `Opc.Ua.Core`, `Opc.Ua.Core.Types`, `Opc.Ua.Types` and `Opc.Ua.Core.Schema`, with the findings fixed and the fixes grounded against the OPC UA specification (reference.opcfoundation.org). 133 commits in four groups: 1. Audit fixes (`Fix <ID>: ...`): 116 findings from a read-only audit, each with a regression test. IDs follow the audit scopes: T1-T6 `Opc.Ua.Types`, C1-C4 `Opc.Ua.Core`, S1 `Opc.Ua.Core.Types` + `Opc.Ua.Core.Schema`. 2. Review fixes (`Fix review <ID>: ...`): issues a code review of group 1 found, plus lower-severity leftovers. 3. Spec fixes (`Spec: #<n> ...`): the 18 places where an earlier fix only partly matched the spec text. 4. Test and analyzer follow-ups. Where `master` (#4516, #4522, #4540, #4564) or #4569 already fixed the same issue, their version was kept and this PR only adds what they didn't cover. ## Behaviour and user-facing changes ### Wire format and interoperability (breaking) - PubSub AES-CTR (Aes128-CTR / Aes256-CTR) now follows Part 14 Tables 156/157: - The counter block is `KeyNonce[4] \| MessageNonce[8] \| BlockCounter[4]`, and the block counter starts at 1. - The SecurityHeader nonce is 8 bytes: `Random[4] \| UInt32 SequenceNumber`, with the sequence number starting at 1. - SKS key data is split with a 4-byte KeyNonce, giving 52 / 68 bytes. - Not interoperable with earlier releases of this stack, but matches the spec. There is a test against the independent RFC 3686 vector. - User token signature (Part 4 6.1.8): - The signed data is now built from the user token policy's SecurityPolicy on both client and server. - It also supports the SecurityMode None layout `ServerNonce \| HASH(ServerCertificate) \| ClientNonce`. - New overload `SecurityPolicyInfo.GetUserTokenSignatureData(..., MessageSecurityMode)`. - Secure channel: - The ECC AEAD `LastSequenceNumber` is correct across the 32-bit sequence wrap (Part 6 6.8.1). - The incoming chunk counts against MaxChunkCount/MaxMessageSize. - The sender no longer lets a message through that is 24 bytes over MaxMessageSize. - The OPN response signature is verified without overrunning the buffer (RSA_DH with differing key sizes). ### Sessions (server) - CreateSession nonce: - The client nonce is kept on None channels, because the None-mode user token signature covers it. - A nonce over 128 bytes returns `Bad_NonceInvalid` on every channel (Part 4 5.7.2.3). - The duplicate-nonce check runs only on secured channels. - A non-empty nonce under 32 bytes is still accepted on None, for compatibility. - ActivateSession: an embedded `EccEncryptedSecret` signing certificate is validated with the server's peer certificate validator (Part 6 6.8.3). Byte equality with the client certificate is only the fallback when no validator is available. New opt-in interface `ICertificateValidatorProvider`. - FindServers / GetEndpoints: `GatewayServerUri` and `DiscoveryProfileUri` are no longer swapped. ### Write, Read and Call (NodeState / node managers) - UserWriteMask: - Enforced for non-value attributes and for VariableType Value writes (`ValueForVariableType`), returning `Bad_UserAccessDenied`. - An unconfigured UserWriteMask (0, no handler) is not enforced, and reads back as the WriteMask so Read and Write agree (Part 3 8.60). - A throwing or Bad `OnReadUserWriteMask` handler fails only that item. - Index-range writes: - Slices are merged into the cached value under the attribute lock, also for `OnWriteValueAsync` handlers. - A data-change notification is still produced when the cache cannot absorb the slice. - The slice must match the unclipped range, otherwise `Bad_IndexRangeDataMismatch` (new status code in `Opc.Ua.Types`). - A range past the target returns `Bad_IndexRangeNoData`. - A handler without index-range support returns `Bad_WriteNotSupported` (Part 4 7.27, 5.11.4.4). - Index-range reads on matrices return partial results clipped to the source, instead of allocating the requested size (a Read with `"0:40000,0:40000"` no longer allocates about 1.6e9 elements). - DataTypeDefinition writes: - A value that isn't a decoded DataTypeDefinition, or whose kind doesn't match the DataType category, returns `Bad_TypeMismatch`. - Null is rejected for concrete Structure/Enumeration/OptionSet types. - WriteMask is checked first (Part 3 5.8.3). - AnalogItem: a null write skips the InstrumentRange check again. - Method call: the async fallback passes the ObjectId to the method handlers. - Redundancy: `DistributedValueParticipation` merges index-range writes and applies the index range on reads. - Change masks: `ClearChangeMasks` takes the bits atomically, so concurrent changes are no longer lost. - `AccessLevelEx`: preserved by Clone/Export. ### Alarms & Conditions (Part 9) - Acknowledge / Confirm / AddComment: - Accept any EventId the condition or its branches reported while that state is still pending (5.7.3). - An unknown id returns `Bad_EventIdUnknown`. - An already handled state returns `Bad_ConditionBranchAlreadyAcked` / `...AlreadyConfirmed`. - AddComment on a branch no longer changes the trunk, and the branch table is re-keyed when a branch's EventId changes. - Shelving: - OneShotShelve without MaxTimeShelved no longer overflows the timer. - A timed shelve is measured on the monotonic clock, so wall-clock steps don't delay the unshelve. - The state is named `OneShotShelved`. - Audit events: - They report failure for rejected method calls. - `SelectedResponse` is a UInt32. - A rejected negative Respond leaves SelectedResponse unset. - `ContentFilterElement.Validate`: an unknown FilterOperator is reported per element as `Bad_FilterOperatorInvalid`, instead of failing the whole service call. ### ContentFilter evaluation (Part 4 7.7.3, on top of #4564) - Bitwise operators: - The result takes the size of the larger operand. - Boolean, numeric String and one-element array operands are converted to integers implicitly. - Types without an implicit integer conversion give NULL. - Strings: ordering is ordinal, no longer culture dependent. - Cast: restricted to the Table 121 conversions, and QualifiedName to LocalizedText is added. The general `Variant.ConvertTo` keeps its wider set. - Null and empty operands: - `Like` with a NULL operand is NULL. - Empty arrays of the same DataType compare equal. - Null-string operands are NULL everywhere. ### Encoders and built-in types - XML: - Strings keep leading, trailing and whitespace-only content (Part 6 5.3.1.5). NodeSet import opts back into treating whitespace-only strings as empty with the new `XmlDecoder.TreatWhitespaceOnlyStringsAsEmpty`. - Layout whitespace around `<Identifier>` values is ignored, and trailing control characters are stripped from `s=` ids. - `XmlElement` ignores DTDs without expanding entities. - JSON: - A DateTime without an offset is read as UTC. - An unmappable `nsu=` NodeId and an unknown `svu=` ExpandedNodeId decode to a namespace-0 String NodeId (5.4.2.10 / 5.4.2.11). - `svr=` is rejected in a NodeId field. - Bad matrix dimensions return `BadDecodingError`. - The non-strict body stack stays balanced after an error. - The nesting limits match between encoder and decoder. - Binary: - `MaxByteStringLength` no longer applies to strings. - ExtensionObject bodies count toward the nesting limit on seekable streams (and in the XML encoder). - Parsing: - The NodeId parser requires `i=`/`s=`/`g=`/`b=`. - `ExpandedNodeId.Parse` rejects an empty `nsu=`/`svu=`. - NumericRange rejects a trailing `,` with `Bad_IndexRangeInvalid`. - RelativePath escapes `#`. - Status codes: `StatusCode.WithSubCode`/`WithCodeBits` keep the severity bits and look up the symbolic id for the new code. - Variant / VariantHelper: - `TryCastTo` returns false on a type mismatch. So `DataValue.GetValue<T>(default)` returns the default, and `GetValueOrDefault` / `CastTo` throw `BadTypeMismatch` as documented. - `System.DateTime` casts are supported. - Concrete encodeable arrays (e.g. `Argument[]`) no longer throw. - `ConvertTo` keeps one-element and empty arrays as arrays and checks the conversion is legal for empty arrays. - `CastFrom(object[])`, `CastFrom(Enum[])` and the obsolete `Variant(object)` constructors keep the array shape (previously a one-element array collapsed to a scalar and an empty one to Null). - `TypeInfo.Unknown` / `Variant.Null.TypeInfo` report `ValueRanks.Any`. - Equality and hashing contracts fixed: - Types: Matrix/MatrixOf, typed-null Variants, NodeId (the namespace index is now hashed), ExpandedNodeId, LocalizedText, DiagnosticInfo, StructureDefinition/EnumDefinition, CertificateIdentifier, UserIdentity and DateTimeUtc. - `MatrixOf.Dimensions` returns a copy. - Decimal equality and hashing now run in bounded time. - Localized text: a LocalizedText with locale `"mul"` and no usable translations, or null client locale ids, no longer throw. ### NodeSet, address space and utilities - NodeSet export/import: - Server index 0 is the local server on import and export, so local ids are no longer written as `svr=65535`. - `StructureDefinition.BaseDataType` is filled from the supertype on import. - `NodeTable.Import`: replaces duplicates, keeping the references neighbouring nodes hold. `TypeTable.Add` detaches a re-parented type from its old supertype, and `Node.Clone` gets its own ReferenceTable. - `StringTable` / `NamespaceTable`: capped at UInt16 indexes (`BadEncodingLimitsExceeded`) for Append and Update, instead of silently wrapping. - Small fixes: - `UnsecureRandom.Shared` is seeded randomly. - The peer's RetryAfterMs is clamped to one day. - The `CancelAsync` and `string.GetHashCode(StringComparison)` polyfills match BCL behaviour. - `CoreUtils.IsEqual` compares strings ordinally. ### Schema generation and ComplexTypeSystem - JSON schema: describes the 1.05 layout with the compact/verbose null rules, and now validates real `JsonEncoder` output. - XSD: - `EncodingMask` (`xs:unsignedLong`) only for StructureWithOptionalFields. - Guid and StatusCode are complex types. - Standard types are in the `Types.xsd` namespace. - Structure-backed OptionSets are described as `{Value, ValidBits}`. New `UaTypeDescription.IsStructureOptionSet` property and constructor overload. - ComplexTypeSystem: - A malformed type in a server dictionary is skipped per type instead of discarding the whole dictionary. - Cyclic supertype walks are bounded. - Declared definitions are no longer changed. - A dictionary validator is kept only if the dictionary parsed. ### Certificates and trust lists (Part 4 6.1.3, Part 12) - Revocation: - Checked for issuers supplied in the peer's chain and for inline-trusted issuers, against the CRLs in the trusted and issuer stores. - A store without CRL support no longer hides "revocation unknown". - `RejectUnknownRevocationStatus` is honoured for inline-trusted issuers unless the entry sets `SuppressRevocationStatusUnknown`. This changes the strict case of `ExplicitIssuerChainIsHonoredWithoutStorePathAsync`. - Basic constraints / path length violations fail with `Bad_CertificateInvalid`. - `TreatAsInvalid`: - Now yields `Bad_CertificateUntrusted`, which can't be suppressed or auto-accepted. - It is honoured on individual trust-list entries even when the certificate is also in a store. - `EccEncryptedSecret`: enforces the result of validating the sender certificate. - `TrustListTransaction`: - Routes each CRL to the store holding its issuer (TrustedCrls/IssuerCrls). - Validates staged CRLs, including the store's CRL support, before changing anything. - Applies certificates before CRLs. - Other: - One failing `CertificateChanges` observer no longer stops the others. - `InMemory:` stores share their contents per path, and `InMemoryStoreProvider` is `IDisposable`. ### WoT (`Opc.Ua.Types/Wot`) - Projection security: projection security schemes whose qualified names collide are refused. New diagnostic `WotDiagnosticCode.ProjectionSecurityConflict = 6063`. - Input handling: - Invalid Unicode (lone surrogates, bad UTF-8) is rejected as `JsonException`. - External-schema results are keyed per affordance. - A duplicate security-floor member is rejected. - `nsu=` ids are percent-encoded (Part 6 5.1.12). - The configured JSON depth is honoured on re-parse. - An oversized document is reported before it is parsed back. - Performance and limits: - Subtype-graph validation, `componentOf` linking and the namespace table are now linear. - Namespaces are capped at UInt16. ### New or changed public API - `ICertificateValidatorProvider` (server) - `SecurityPolicyInfo.GetUserTokenSignatureData(..., MessageSecurityMode)` overload - `XmlDecoder.TreatWhitespaceOnlyStringsAsEmpty` - `UaTypeDescription.IsStructureOptionSet` plus a constructor overload - `WotDiagnosticCode.ProjectionSecurityConflict` - `StatusCodes.BadIndexRangeDataMismatch` in the `Opc.Ua.Types` list - `InMemoryStoreProvider : IDisposable` ## Not changed / open - Deferred: - S1-14 (BSD OptionSet size needs the base type in `UaTypeDescription`, and BSD is deprecated). - C2-7 (restoring the own-certificate trust exemption would accept certificates the spec says to reject; removing the dead code is a separate decision). - A1-4 (config values keep surrounding whitespace, as the pre-April-2026 loader did). - H-2 (JsonDecoder has no real nesting counter). - A2-3 (the StringTable cap also applies to diagnostics tables; default `MaxArrayLength` already bounds them). - Needs a product decision: - The general `ConvertToString` writes a QualifiedName as `ns:Name`, while Table 121 drops the namespace. - Short (< 32 byte) client nonces are accepted on None channels. ## Verification - Every commit added a regression test that fails without its fix, where practical. - Before the rebases, with all audit and review fixes (before the `Spec: #…` commits): 0 build warnings and 16 test suites green on net10.0. The suites: Types, Core, Core.Encoders, Core.Security, Core.Schema, Client, Client.ComplexTypes, Server, Sessions, Gds, History, Features, Redundancy.Server, PubSub, WotCon and WotCon.Bindings. Core hit its known intermittent end-of-run hang once, and reruns were clean. - The `Spec: #…` fixes were verified per group on their own suites. Those include PubSub.Udp, Redundancy.PubSub, PubSub.Server, Configuration and SourceGeneration.Core. - Not yet built or tested on this base. It was rebased onto master (resolving overlaps with #4522, #4540 and #4564) and then onto #4569. This PR stays a draft until the full run on this base is green. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Marc Schier <marcschier@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-29 11:14:15 +00:00
romanett	ea9a8a07e1	Fix two test races: reverse connect reload commit and TCP chunk release (#4582 ) ## Reverse connect reload commit race (`ReverseConnectManagerLifecycleTests`) Fixes the flaky `CanceledStopRollbackRequeuesInFlightReloadAndAppliesChange` failure seen on #4574 (run 36466677911, `test-linux-netstandard2.1 (5/30)`): ``` Expected: "Started" But was: "Starting" ``` ### Root cause (test-only race) The failing assert is the final `Started` check (line 3294), not the one after the cancelled stop. The cancelled stop does restore `Started` synchronously before it faults: the in-flight reload is still parked in `GatedProvider` at that point, so no activation can publish `Starting`. After `releaseReload`, the re-queued reload runs in the background. `ActivateAsync` opens the candidate listener (`OpenHostsAsync`) and only then creates the watcher and commits `Started` under the lock. `WaitForAsync` returned as soon as the new listener was open, so the next assert could observe the transient `Starting` state. The manager's contract holds; the test only waited for part of the transition. `WatcherTriggeredReloadReappliesReverseConnectOptionOverlay` has the same shape: it waits for the reloaded listeners, then asserts `Started`. ### Fix Both `WaitForAsync` predicates now also require `manager.CurrentStateForTest == "Started"`. The new listener is open and the state is `Started` only after the reload commits: a rollback would close the candidate listener. ### Verification - Causality: a temporary `Task.Delay(200)` right after `OpenHostsAsync` in `ActivateAsync` made the original test fail deterministically at line 3294 with exactly `Expected "Started" But was "Starting"`. With the fix and the delay still in place, all 120 `ReverseConnectManagerLifecycleTests` passed. The delay was then removed; the PR changes only the test file. - Stability: `ReverseConnectManagerLifecycleTests` ran 10x on net10.0 and 10x with `CustomTestTarget=netstandard2.1` (net8.0 host): 20/20 runs, 120/120 tests each. ## TCP chunk release race (`TcpMessageFailureRegressionTests`) `ResponseSequenceFailureCompletesPendingRequestWithoutWaitingForTimeoutAsync` asserts that `pool.Outstanding` is zero right after the request completes. The request chunks, however, are released by `HandleWriteComplete`, which runs on a pool thread after the transport send has returned. When the response completes the request first, that release can still be pending, and the assert sees outstanding buffers. The test channel now overrides `HandleWriteComplete` to signal a `WriteCompleted` task. The test waits for it (5 s bound) before it checks the pool. Stability: `TcpMessageFailureRegressionTests` ran 10x on net10.0 and 10x with `CustomTestTarget=netstandard2.1` (net8.0 host): 20/20 runs, 51/51 tests each. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 07:49:51 +02:00
Copilot	df927cbb85	Honor cancellation during TCP endpoint connection (#4553 ) # Description `SelectEndpointAsync` accepted a cancellation token, but legacy TCP connection attempts could wait for socket timeout. Pending connection cancellation now consistently surfaces as `OperationCanceledException`. - TCP cancellation - Preserve native cancellation-token socket connect on modern targets. - Normalize legacy disposal-triggered `SocketException` / `ObjectDisposedException` to cancellation. ```csharp catch (SocketException) when (ct.IsCancellationRequested) { throw new OperationCanceledException("Connection attempt was cancelled.", ct); } ``` - Coverage - Add transport coverage for a pre-cancelled connection attempt and verify no endpoint is established. ## Related Issues ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. <!-- START COPILOT CODING AGENT SUFFIX --> - Fixes #4551 --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Marc Schier <marcschier@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-28 09:37:36 +00:00
Marc Schier	f9892020a3	Add configurable server resource isolation (#4541 ) # Description Add configurable server resource isolation on top of the merged #4522 foundation. - Coordinate connection, handshake, retained-message, session-establishment, queue, execution, request-cost and parked-request limits through one server-scoped provider. - Keep configured startup, continuity/reconnect, control and trusted-owner reservations inside existing totals. Shared capacity remains usable up to explicit owner ceilings. - Use authoritative Session membership for reassembly continuity capacity without granting unrelated resource or rate privileges. Preserve explicit owner mappings and bounded tracking. - Cache immutable classification evidence while retaining current Session and classifier checks. - Support weighted request ordering or FIFO independently of resource accounting. Installed providers enforce decoded-request limits in both modes. - Preserve fail-fast reassembly, valid Abort handling, fixed deadlines, active-work protection, reverse-connect handoff and bounded OpenAPI processing. - Support custom-handler parking through `IRequestParkingPolicy`, `WithRequestParking(...)`, and `RequestLifetime.ParkSink`. Parking releases execution capacity only, keeping retained-data and parked charges until completion. Built-in Publish and the global opt-out remain unchanged. - Provide direct, fluent and DI configuration, public incoming-request parking support, effective startup limit logs and user-facing documentation. Balanced remains the default. SharedOnly without an explicit provider retains shared behavior for intentionally incompatible/unlimited configurations. Reservations are finite and are not one full-message allowance per Session. ## Related Issues Builds on merged #4522. Fixes #4554. ## Review and CI corrections All three previously missed findings in [review 5326734718](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/pull/4541#pullrequestreview-5326734718) are addressed in `9e25e4ecc`: 1. A custom FIFO provider receives RequestQueue, RequestQueueBytes, RequestExecution and ParkedRequest accounting. A blocked head cannot be overtaken. 2. `IResourceIsolationReassemblyProvider` replaces the sessionless threshold independently of `UseFairScheduling`. The aggregate byte ceiling remains enforced. 3. Runtime `ReservedReassemblyBytes` includes all configured protected stage floors, including ControlReserved. The review's two already-resolved changes remain intact. The CI collection race was fixed at its source in `e1a994a4b`: `ArrayOf.ToArrayOf` treats a separately read collection count as an initial capacity hint and grows/trims for the actual enumeration. Deterministic tests cover growth, shrinkage and stale-zero counts. The subsequent recovery-test race was fixed in `05753ce77`: fake time advances only after a gated keepalive response has been processed and reset its timer, not merely after request arrival. Recovery-order and timeout assertions remain intact, with additional response-state assertions. Instrumentation reproduced the original failure twice; both fixed variants passed 400 executions per framework. CodeQL alert 388 was verified and dismissed as a false positive. Startup logs contain aggregate numeric capacities, not credentials or caller identities. ## Validation \| Scope \| Result \| \| --- \| --- \| \| Latest automated checks at `05753ce7775a58801b4ba9d8f6d7781b709d0b89` \| 167 successful, one package-publication check skipped, no failures \| \| Remaining external prerequisite \| `license/cla` pending: Contributor License Agreement is not signed yet \| \| FIFO/weighted queues, custom parking and server-channel selection \| 175 passed on each net10.0/net48 \| \| Isolation, configuration and parking-hosting selection \| 259 passed net10.0; 257 passed net48 \| \| ArrayOf conversion tests \| 73 passed on each net10.0/net48 \| \| Recovery-audit and keepalive fixtures \| 40 passed on each net10.0/net48 \| \| NativeAOT smoke from preceding updates \| Published and executed successfully \| No tests, assertions, coverage thresholds, or required checks were weakened. The remaining CLA prerequisite must be completed through [CLA Assistant](https://cla-assistant.io/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard?pullRequest=4541). This is not CTT certification or an unconditional network-DDoS, whole-process-memory or fleet-wide guarantee. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [x] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed all PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-27 21:11:52 +02:00
Marc Schier	46fa7d364a	Harden recovery, concurrency, and resource lifetimes across the OPC UA stack (#4516 ) # Description Bound managed-session recovery, preserve Publish workers and recovery ownership, and address the client, server, transport, and certificate audit findings and subsequent concurrency review. Also reduce the memory retained by exhaustive session-test diagnostics. ## Recovery and Publish ownership - Add `ManagedSessionOptions.ChannelReconnectTimeout` through direct construction, the fluent builder, and DI. The automatic duration is `max(3 * KeepAliveInterval, revised SessionTimeout, OperationTimeout)`, sampled at cycle start. Positive overrides are supported; `Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan` explicitly opts out. Raw sessions retain their unlimited default. - Add `CreateReconnectBudget(TimeProvider)` as a required `IReconnectParticipant` member, as agreed in review. Custom participants implement it and may return null for no participant-specific bound. - Enforce the earliest participant/caller deadline through transport reconnect, activation/recreation, and subscription restoration. Late callers can shorten an active cycle but cannot extend it. - Cancel and unwind recovery, fence late responses, and release channel recovery ownership before the existing `Faulted` event hands control to the outer reconnect/failover policy. Preserve session recreate admission through final Publish cleanup and keepalive suppression until shared recovery is complete. - Treat participant budget creation/evaluation failures, including exceptions at the exact deadline, as terminal shared-recovery failures. Notify participants before exposing `Faulted`, preserve the original diagnostic, and never silently replace a finite budget with unlimited recovery. - Keep caller-supplied replacement channels, managed bindings, wrapper event subscriptions, and recovery-owner identities consistent across success, failure, and cancellation. Reject replacement during active recovery and fence retired callbacks so they cannot clear newer ownership or suppress later keepalive recovery. - Retain eligible Publish workers through temporary subscription-identifier clearing without retaining workers for never-created or removed subscriptions. Preserve cancellation, acknowledgement rollback, and drain-before-replacement ordering. - Coordinate automatic subscription updates with session recovery: cancel admitted updates, keep them paused across a failed-restoration handoff, and retry only after explicit restoration completes. This prevents competing CreateSubscription requests and updates against a retiring session, while preserving manual recreation, transfer fallback, and pending option changes. - Exercise the real ManagedSession, V2 subscription engine, and channel ready gate with scripted transports and an injected clock. Cover transfer fallback, deadline handoff, late completions, and resumed notification delivery. ## Audit and review corrections - Correct certificate/trust-list transactions, change-pump lifetimes, validation, peer revalidation, and reset/resource ownership. - Harden node admission, attribute/range/dimension validation, monitored-item sampling and lifecycle transitions, event fanout, and server shutdown. Run lifecycle readiness and compensation outside shared monitored-item admission, with stale-completion ownership checks. - Close synchronous node-manager admission before teardown and retain resources until admitted service, lifecycle, and asynchronous method work returns. Dispose the monitored-item manager outside both locks, reject late calls before they can reach it, and forward asynchronous disposal through the adapter so the master awaits the same completion. Preserve reentrant shutdown initiation, cancellation/failure unwinding, and shared cleanup-failure reporting. - Bound WSS pending-request retention using connection-local wire handles while preserving caller-visible request handles and translating Cancel targets. Safely ignore retired replies and drain admitted send/close users before resource disposal. - Clarify that the shared `ClientBase` caller-handle sequence is distinct from the non-wrapping WSS wire allocator. Existing exhaustion/reopen, late-reply, and Cancel-translation regressions verify the connection-local contract; no allocator behavior was changed by this clarification. - Preserve virtual-node validation and resolver service errors instead of converting them to cached misses. A mismatched NodeId reports `BadNodeIdInvalid`; callback type mismatches and resolver service errors keep their exact status. Per-item boundaries preserve unaffected reads, writes, history operations, method calls, browse paths, and monitored-item creation/restoration, including permission-validation paths. Caller cancellation still propagates; stored-item validation failures are logged without aborting later restores. - Correct client file/role/state-machine/streaming APIs, node-cache behavior, redundancy/failover ownership, and session configuration/identity handling. - Cancel each owned peer-discovery scope before disposing it, including when the bounded wait wins a cancellation-delivery race. Keep late results out of the endpoint cache and preserve single-flight lookup ownership. - Keep materialized alias Browse results synchronized with the live store by default, preserving explicit startup-only opt-out. Apply HistoryUpdate service results per value while retaining explicit all-or-nothing provider APIs. - Update the directly related feature documentation and add focused positive, negative, concurrency, and ownership regressions. ## Latest review-feedback corrections - Fence stale failed lease observations with a successful-confirmation generation distinct from the revocation epoch. Snapshot it before each store read, including failed-CAS revalidation, so an old failure cannot revoke or reschedule a newer lease while fresh ownership loss still revokes leadership. Preserve independent overlapping acquisitions, expiry, disposal, and late-success protections. - Isolate attributable WSS response-decoding errors to their request, including retired handles. Keep admitted socket sends connection-owned so caller timeout/cancellation cannot abort sibling requests; shutdown still cancels and drains those sends. - Restart keepalive and classic Publish replenishment after successful session reuse. Retire V2 worker demand after intentional deletion/disable without confusing that state with temporary recovery resets. - Browse virtual directories lazily across continuation pages without the 1,024-entry snapshot cap. Preserve active-page cancellation, bounded metadata retention, pushback, and exactly-once asynchronous cursor cleanup. - Apply certificate/CRL staging in last-operation order, preflight required issuer storage before writes, select actual policy-compatible RSA keys for None endpoints, frame certificate chains independently of signature OIDs, and preserve admitted validation results during rejected-writer shutdown. - Preserve base asynchronous disposal when a legacy override omits its base call; avoid double derived disposal in the adapter. Let genuinely admitted nested work finish while rejecting stale captured contexts and returning null from closed lookup APIs. - Re-park recovered monitored items if AddNodes rolls back. Give event compensation a fresh finite deadline, and preserve healthy Browse/Translate siblings at every reference/path boundary while retaining starting-node errors and caller cancellation. - Give final reconnect notifications a live, bounded shutdown-linked lifetime. Synchronize child state before parent lifecycle handlers outside the parent transition lock. - Document the accepted existing policies: direct reverse connections are single-use without a ReverseConnectManager, and multi-node stream capacity is shared rather than reserved per node. The expanded readiness controls also exposed a real generation-handoff race: an old source could finish draining after activation was deferred but before readiness tasks were collected, causing the wanted replacement to be omitted from the wait set. A deterministic test gates that exact interval; the fix keeps the replacement in the readiness wait. The original race passed 200 repetitions after the fix. A separate control now awaits both producer readiness and iterator entry under the same original deadline, rather than treating those independent signals as equivalent. Temporary logging and repetition are removed. ## CI integration contracts The History and Server CI failures exposed integration tests that still asserted the behavior intentionally changed by the audit fixes. A Windows WoT negative test raced its caller deadline against upstream retries. A subsequent Ubuntu Client failure exposed a real automatic-update versus explicit-restoration race: - History insertion collisions now verify exact per-value statuses and all persisted timestamps/values, including preservation of the existing conflicting entry. Explicit atomic-provider rollback controls remain. - Alias materialization tests wait for actual publication and verify the added node plus forward/inverse `AliasFor` references, instead of racing a startup-only snapshot expectation. Explicit refresh opt-out controls remain. - The unavailable-upstream WoT test uses an explicit finite retry policy through existing DI configuration, preserving its original four-minute guard and requiring a mapped-value service error before caller cancellation. Production retry defaults remain unchanged. - The Client fix retains the exact one-create and late-response assertions. Three deterministic real-subscription/real-manager cases cover paused creation, disposal while paused, and cancellation of an admitted create followed by explicit restoration and a pending option update. Both composed restoration-deadline cases also prove automatic updates stay blocked at the outer handoff and resume after restoration. - The merged-head net48 correction prevents lost peer-resolver cancellation and distinguishes the harness's delayed initial `Connected` event from actual outer recovery completion. A deterministic timer-order test covers both cooperative and cancellation-ignoring resolvers, cancellation before return, rejection of late cached results, and a fresh subsequent lookup. - The remaining CodeQL alert was a false content flow through `ArrayOf.Count` into an integer-only trust-list summary. Projecting the same count through `Span.Length` keeps cardinality distinct from serialized contents without allocating, dropping diagnostics, suppressing the rule, or dismissing the alert. Five log-contract cases cover null/empty/nonempty results and mixed chain-capable/fallback listeners, asserting the exact count, message, and structured properties. - Classic transfer acknowledges messages selected for asynchronous Republish only after their responses arrive. The existing locked replay-selection decision returns the immediate-acknowledgement subset to Session, preserving the public transfer API, advertised availability, and immediate acknowledgement of older gapped messages not selected for replay. A callback changing `RepublishAfterTransfer` cannot change the already-selected acknowledgement ownership. - Transfer integration tests explicitly control acknowledged versus retained origin messages. Exact assertions distinguish retained replay from requested fresh initial values by sequence number, client handles, values, status, and source timestamp. Atomic counters, observed delivery/keepalive progress, and failure-safe session/file cleanup replace timing assumptions and racy resets. - Server lifecycle tests verify the documented independent five-second compensation deadline rather than requiring a non-cancellable token. They cancel the actual request, prove compensation and unrelated monitored-item creation still proceed one tick before the deadline, preserve the original failure and ownership assertions, and verify the completed deadline is retired. - Synchronous and asynchronous directory-browser tests require the exact provider exception instead of an empty-directory success, then verify the failed cursor is not enumerated again. These correct expectations left behind by the intentional, documented provider-error propagation change; production behavior is unchanged. No tests were disabled, assertions loosened, coverage thresholds lowered, or CI checks made optional. Existing platform exclusions and Explicit debug variants remain. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4514 - Fixes #4515 - Builds on merged #4503 and retains the #4508 publishing-drain behavior. ## Validation Lease-election review correction (`a13afa641182c70983e16bbcfebf507e666a45a5`): The correction is based on the existing upstream merge `43079e2b851fe338a4082066f8d14abfdafb6e32`. Three deterministic stale-verdict cases fail on the original source and pass with separate confirmation fencing. Six new cases cover the initial foreign-owner verdict, failed-CAS revalidation in both invocation orders, and fresh ownership loss through both read paths, including revalidation begun after another successful confirmation. \| Target and configuration \| Passed \| Failed \| Skipped \| \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| ---: \| \| net10.0 Debug \| 120 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| net48 Debug \| 120 \| 0 \| 0 \| The selection is the full `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests.Redundancy` namespace, including all 38 `SharedStoreLeaseElectionTests` cases and the existing expiry, clock rollback, disposal, and overlapping-success regressions. New witnesses are `StaleForeignLeaseReadDoesNotRevokeNewerAcquisitionAsync`, `StaleFailedRevalidationDoesNotRevokeNewerAcquisitionAsync`, and `FreshForeignLeaseObservationRevokesLeadershipAsync`. They assert resulting leadership, exact transitions, independent progress, and the unchanged expiry boundary. Retaining the initial generation for the fallback read independently makes the fresh-loss-after-confirmation control fail; that mutation was removed before the final rebuilt runs. The successful scoped command is `dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Core.Tests\Opc.Ua.Core.Tests.csproj -c Debug --no-restore --filter "FullyQualifiedName~Opc.Ua.Core.Tests.Redundancy"`, with `CustomTestTarget` and `-f` matching each row and that framework's assets restored. Both changed C# files pass formatting and analyzers through informational severity on both frameworks. These are scoped results, not a full-solution test or measured coverage-delta claim. CI monitoring is paused for this feedback-only operation; no current-head CI success is claimed. Latest CI contract correction (`1cd1f2047bb5b50c9bf300b1ff710b0b2e935a29`): All four failing Server shard 23 jobs in [run 36120946740](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/36120946740) reported the same six cases. Two local replays reproduced all six failures. The source changes and documentation from `cd43b831a` establish both intentional contracts: independent bounded event compensation and surfaced provider errors. Only the two test files are corrected; production code and CI policy are unchanged. \| Target and configuration \| Passed \| Failed \| Skipped \| \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| ---: \| \| net48 Debug \| 113 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| net10.0 Release, CI Coverlet settings \| 113 \| 0 \| 0 \| The selection contains `MonitoredItemManagerLifecycleTests`, `DirectoryObjectStateTests`, `DirectoryBrowserBoundedEnumerationTests`, and `EventCompensationReadinessHasFiniteDeadlineWithInfiniteSourceTimeoutAsync`. Both changed files pass formatting and analyzers through informational severity on both frameworks. Independent mutations restoring a non-cancellable compensation token and swallowing provider errors fail all four lifecycle cases and both browser cases, respectively. Both mutations were removed before the final passing runs and commit. The scoped command is `dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Server.Tests\Opc.Ua.Server.Tests.csproj` with `CustomTestTarget` and `-f` set to the selected framework, `--no-restore`, and `--filter "FullyQualifiedName~MonitoredItemManagerLifecycleTests\|FullyQualifiedName~DirectoryObjectStateTests\|FullyQualifiedName~DirectoryBrowserBoundedEnumerationTests\|FullyQualifiedName~EventCompensationReadinessHasFiniteDeadlineWithInfiniteSourceTimeoutAsync"`. The modern run additionally uses `-c Release /p:CollectCoverage=true --collect "XPlat Code Coverage" --settings tests\coverlet.runsettings.xml`. These are scoped results, not a full-solution test or measured coverage-delta claim. Hosted checks for that commit were pending at publication. The fail-fast CI watch was stopped when the requested operation switched to review feedback; no current-head CI success is claimed. Earlier master merge (`8b15ea6ef9fc2214ac8ec886f373bb3846dd6d6f`, base `b4136d8e9bab0df680f41d9ef985f519160534b1`): The `TcpListenerChannel` conflict preserves both lifetime responsibilities: disposal clears the retained peer-certificate chain and unregisters the quota-scoped message-assembly scheduler. Both fields and all upstream deadline handling remain intact. The only additional manual source adjustment adds the parentheses required by the existing analyzer around the session-count fallback. Master advanced during validation. The initial transport merge `80303c434ce813cf75aa7fe54a6a32fe2aeafc30` was retained, and the newer base was merged normally in `8b15ea6ef9fc2214ac8ec886f373bb3846dd6d6f`, without rewriting history. The additional recovery, fluent-pipeline, and test-framework overlaps were inspected; the branch's cancellation, validation-error, and acknowledgement ownership fixes remain alongside the upstream changes. Full `UA.slnx` builds passed on net10.0 and net48 with 0 warnings and 0 errors. The final scoped tests rebuilt against the committed tree `2074f8efcb61d8d9c6106e7d6f76ee941940e358`: \| Target \| Passed \| Failed \| Skipped \| \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| ---: \| \| net10.0 \| 2,653 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| net48 \| 2,529 \| 0 \| 7 \| The net48 skips are existing platform exclusions: six RSA_DH_AesGcm nonce cases and one ClientWebSocket certificate-validation case requiring .NET 7 or later. The selection covers transport cleanup, reassembly budgets/deadlines/admission, peer-chain ownership, server session binding, fluent lifecycles and source generation, reconnect and keepalive, transfer acknowledgements, Publish queues, and JSON encoding. Modern-.NET WSS transport and real-server integration cases also pass. The resolved file passed solution-relative formatting and analyzer verification through informational severity on both frameworks. These are scoped test results, not unfiltered full-suite or measured-coverage claims. Hosted CI was not monitored or repaired as part of this merge-only operation. Selected local results below are overlapping validation runs, not distinct-test totals. Earlier review-feedback batch (`cd43b831a8f11de3f7d65c3681712a61e3c669a5`): The final net10.0 scoped selection passed 471 tests, with no failures or skips. The final net48 solution-root selection passed 439 tests, with no failures and one unchanged platform skip (`ValidateServerCertificateFallsBackToTlsPolicyErrors`, which requires newer ClientWebSocket certificate-validation support). Both full nonincremental solution builds completed with 0 warnings and 0 errors, and all 40 changed C# files passed informational-level formatting/analyzer verification. Both frameworks validated the identical final tracked diff. The focused matrix covers every one of the 20 current review threads, including real mid-frame WSS cancellation, stale admission contexts, directory continuation ownership, multi-element Browse/Translate failures, and the readiness drain race. The net10.0 solution-root test command has a separate pre-existing runner conflict: three unrelated AOT projects reject the VSTest target under Microsoft.Testing.Platform 2.4.0 and SDK 10. Per-project net10.0 results are recorded separately; no runner migration, test exclusion, assertion relaxation, or CI-policy change is included. These are bounded selections, not unfiltered full-suite or measured coverage claims. At publication of `cd43b831a`, hosted CI was not green: the `OPCFoundation.UA-.NETStandard` check reported `ACTION_REQUIRED`, AppVeyor reported `FAILURE`, and the two signed-build jobs were in progress. No CI jobs were rerun, cancelled, approved, or repaired as part of that feedback-only operation. Classic transfer correction (`f425376fca045794122e19aaf9cafebc4a717d91`): The preceding head's [macOS net10.0 shard 25/30](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/35980326299/job/107570512458) failed `TransferSubscriptionTest(DisconnectedRepublish).TransferSubscriptionAsync(True,False)` at the static-node count assertion: expected 10, received 20. The trace contains a successful, explicitly requested republish of retained sequence 1 and a fresh initial-value batch at sequence 3, not duplicate dispatch of one response. Controlled lost origin acknowledgements reproduced that incorrect test expectation on both the preceding PR head and exact master base `a2539cb53dd1666cef856f33812d7a8830d68909`. The maintainer explicitly authorized correcting this existing issue in the PR. Retained replay and requested initial values are independent, as specified by [OPC UA Part 4, TransferSubscriptions](https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-4/5.14.7). The reason that the original hosted run retained its particular origin message remains unproved. The expanded full-suite run then exposed a real production race, not just a count assertion: Session queued acknowledgements for all transferred available messages before the asynchronous Republish responses arrived. Publish could delete those messages first, causing `BadMessageNotAvailable`. A gated real-Session/classic-engine regression failed both replay-enabled cases on the original implementation while both no-replay controls passed. The ownership fix passes all 24 combinations of empty/consecutive/unsorted-gapped queues, replay preference, sequential delivery, and a reentrant preference change. All 40 normal real-server transfer cases pass on both frameworks. Independent mutations suppressing actual replay and duplicating observed sequence records each fail the intended assertion; both mutations were removed. The full classic suite passes on both frameworks. Hosted CI was pending when that correction was published; the earlier failed hosted job was not rerun for a lucky pass. Local net48 caveat: the full Client run timed out in the pre-existing fake-clock test `ReconnectAsyncSwapsFaultedLeaseEntryAsync`, which does not exercise subscription transfer. Its unchanged isolated replay passed, but that does not resolve the full-suite timeout. No unrelated code or assertions were changed, and a clean full Client net48 run is not claimed. \| Scope \| net10.0 \| net48 \| \| --- \| --- \| --- \| \| Full Client.Tests after transfer acknowledgement correction \| 2,549 passed \| 2,552 passed, 1 timeout failure noted above, 1 existing platform skip \| \| Full classic-subscription project after transfer correction \| 57 passed, including all 40 normal transfer cases \| 57 passed, including all 40 normal transfer cases \| \| Gated transferred-message acknowledgement ownership \| 24 passed, included above \| 24 passed, included above \| \| Saved-session consumer of the shared subscription helper \| 40 passed \| 16 passed, 24 existing unsupported-security-policy skips \| \| Audit regression matrix \| 2,339 passed \| 1,934 passed, 34 existing skips \| \| Full Client.Tests after review follow-ups \| 2,520 passed \| Focused selections only \| \| Full Client.Tests after CI recovery correction \| 2,523 passed, CI coverage collector \| 2,527 passed, 1 existing platform skip \| \| Latest merged-head recovery/redundancy selection \| 139 passed \| 139 passed \| \| Full Client.Tests after merged-head net48 correction \| Focused selection above \| 2,529 passed, 1 existing platform skip \| \| Lifecycle and actual-dimension regressions \| 146 passed \| 146 passed \| \| Focused recovery follow-ups \| 7 passed \| 7 passed \| \| WSS-related fixtures \| 93 passed \| Not applicable \| \| CI History integration corrections \| 28 passed \| 28 passed \| \| CI alias, dispatcher, and explicit-atomic controls \| 63 passed \| 63 passed \| \| Full WoT sample project with CI coverage collector \| 29 passed \| Not applicable \| \| Trust-list effects and count-only summary contract \| 22 passed \| 22 passed \| \| Virtual-node feedback, node-manager, dispatcher, and lifecycle selections \| 661 passed, 63 existing not-executed cases; all 48 virtual-node cases passed \| 661 passed, 63 existing not-executed cases; all 48 virtual-node cases passed \| \| WSS wire-handle exhaustion, late replies, and Cancel translation \| 9 passed \| Not applicable \| \| Synchronous node-manager disposal and related service/lifecycle suites \| 1,037 passed, 64 not-executed cases from existing fixture assumptions; all 93 sampling/disposal cases passed \| 1,037 passed, 64 not-executed cases from existing fixture assumptions; all 93 sampling/disposal cases passed \| - Full solution builds passed on net10.0 and net48 during the audit work. The subsequent full non-incremental net10.0 build also completed with zero warnings/errors. - Modified source/test formatting and analyzer checks passed through informational severity. - Original composed recovery regressions passed repeated runs on both frameworks. Independent mutations removing Publish cancellation, bypassing the recreate drain call, or ignoring ready-gate cancellation each failed the intended assertion; all mutations were restored before passing runs. - The latest recovery correction passed 100 executions of each original restoration-deadline scenario with unchanged assertions. Restoring premature update admission independently made both strengthened handoff cases fail; the correct retention behavior was restored afterward. - Startup-event and cancellation-delivery timing probes reproduced the subsequent net48 failures, then passed 100 executions of each of the three scenarios with the fixes. All timing probes and repetition were removed. The permanent timeout-order regression also went RED on the original cancellation cleanup without sleeps or scheduling amplification. - Final post-format recovery/subscription/engine checks passed all 151 selected cases on net10.0. The first local full net48 attempt aborted in `clr.dll` with native access violation `0xc0000005`; an unchanged-assembly full diagnostic rerun passed as recorded above. That native host crash has not been attributed or claimed fixed. - A minimal replay with the same CodeQL CLI and query-pack versions reproduced the custom-count alert and confirmed that the standard span-length projection is clean while direct sensitive-value and raw-identifier logging controls remain flagged. The source was already logging only a count; no identifier or certificate disclosure was established at the reported location. - The virtual-node feedback regressions first reproduced five error-preservation/cache failures; expanded service-dispatch cases exposed two additional whole-batch failures before the operation-boundary fixes. The final selections pass on both frameworks. Genuine misses remain cached, successful results remain reusable, failed validation allows same-cache retry, and request cancellation still stops the batch. - Three deterministic synchronous-manager disposal regressions reproduced early resource release and lifecycle calls reaching a manager during disposal. The fix passes direct and adapted calls, a sampling-worker join after the last operation exits, reentrant shutdown, cancellation and failure paths, repeated disposal, and exact rejection across 39 service/lifecycle entry points both during drain and after cleanup. The original outside-node-lock disposal regression remains and now requires the worker to observe closed admission. - Prior-head CI on `c985f8bded77a60449d9cd381c8a004d8590ccf6` completed with 168 passing checks, one expected release-package-publication skip, and no failures or pending checks. All test shards, signed builds, container builds, the coverage check, and the CodeQL PR check passed. Hosted CodeQL analysis `1829262912` completed successfully and marks count-flow alert 385 fixed. This is evidence for that head, not a claim that subsequent review follow-ups have completed hosted CI. ### Session-test diagnostic memory Complete browse listings are streamed to unique NUnit attachments rather than retained in inline NUnit/VSTest output. Detached regression-test results are cleaned up without deleting runner-collected attachments. - Two covered session-suite runs each completed with 782 passed and 379 existing skips. Peak working set fell from 4.86 GiB to 2.44-2.78 GiB. - TRX output shrank from 303.1 MiB to approximately 40.7 MiB, retaining all 46 complete browse attachments. - Seven output regressions cover exact content, empty/single/large listings, disabled/enabled output, bounded inline summaries, and unique filenames. The separate Azure build-18452 VM deprovisioning cause remains unproved without provider logs. The memory measurements do not establish its cause. Unfiltered local `UA.slnx` tests, including the long stress/soak suites, have not been run on both frameworks. A local coverage delta was not collected; builds and focused tests are not substitutes for those claims. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] All checks on the latest review-follow-up head have completed successfully; prior-head CI passed as recorded above. - [x] I have addressed all PR feedback received. Tests have been added and pass as recorded above; the hosted coverage check passed on the prior head identified above. The combined tests/coverage-increase checkbox remains open because no local coverage delta was measured. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 68f26810-22b8-476f-abcd-0a8c82d6e208	2026-09-25 14:59:34 +00:00
romanett	d6356766c5	Resolve the open CTT findings: aggregate fixes, de-DE ApplicationName and CTT configuration (#4545 ) # Description Resolves the open items of `plans/ctt-issues.md` (Needs clarification, Open server findings, CTT project configuration notes). Each item was checked against the OPC 10000 spec text. A server change was made only where the server was wrong, and every server change has a regression test. CTT script and oracle defects are filed in Mantis instead. ### Server changes (`Opc.Ua.Server`) - NumberOfTransitions honours TreatUncertainAsBad. - Part 13 §5.4.3.24 does not count Bad values. §4.2.1.2 makes Uncertain values "equivalent to Bad" when TreatUncertainAsBad is True, and the aggregate definition doesn't override that. - Uncertain values are therefore no longer counted, and no longer used as the previous value, when the setting is True. The now unused `TimeSlice.NonBadEarlyBound` is removed. - DurationInStateZero/NonZero status follows the variable's interpolation. - §5.4.3.2.2: "A region is Uncertain if a region ends in a Bad or Uncertain value and SlopedInterpolation is used." - The calculator always built stepped status regions. So on a sloped variable, the last region stayed Good while TimeAverage2 and Total2 over the same interval were already Uncertain. - The duration value doesn't change. - AnnotationCount returns `Bad_NoData` and sets Partial. - Table 68 requires `Bad_NoData` for intervals before the start or after the end of data. §5.3.3.2 requires the Partial bit for incomplete intervals. - `HistorianDispatcher` now derives the start and end of data from the raw history (read with bounds) plus the annotation timestamps. It passes them to a new `CalculateAnnotationCounts` overload; the old overload is unchanged. - Three existing dispatcher tests change their expectations. For example, a node without any data now returns `Bad_NoData` instead of Good zeros. ### Reference server sample and CTT configuration - `de-DE` ApplicationName. The server advertises `de-DE` in LocaleIdArray, but FindServers and GetEndpoints always returned the en-US name. The sample now keys the ApplicationName and registers en-US and de-DE translations (Part 4 §5.5.2.2 / §5.5.4.2 localeIds). - Subscription limit. `Max Supported Subscriptions` in `samples/UAReferenceServer.ctt.xml` and `MaxSubscriptionCount` in `Ctt.ReferenceServer.Config.xml` go from 100 to 200. Subscription Publish Min 05 `003.js` needs 190 subscriptions. - Alarm Cycle Time. The CTT template's Alarm Cycle Time is 30 s. At 60 s it equalled `RequestedSessionTimeout`, so a Limit/Level CU that starts a run finds its session expired (C40). ### Tests only - AddNodes duplicate BrowseName test: `AddNodeAsync_DuplicateBrowseNameUnderParent_ReturnsBadBrowseNameDuplicatedAsync` never ran. Its items had no TypeDefinition, so its `Assume` always made it inconclusive. The finding it belongs to (AddNodes after a rename returning `BadNodeIdExists`) was already fixed by #4477. - RequestHandle echo: a new test covers the ServiceFault for an oversized argument in a chunked request (already fixed by #4488). - Value-based status: a new test covers the aggregate status with TreatUncertainAsBad = false (already fixed by #4503). ### Not changed - GDS QueryApplications/QueryServers still return records with ServerCapability `NA`. OPC 10000-12 §6.5.10/§6.5.11 says they "shall not", but the CTT GDS scripts expect those records. Implementing the exclusion turned 40 GDS test cases from pass to error, so it waits for the script fix ([Mantis 11458](https://mantis.opcfoundation.org/view.php?id=11458)). - Idle SecureChannels are still closed after `ChannelLifetime`. Keeping them open would be security relevant. The CTT configuration's `ChannelLifetime` of 120000 (#4502) covers the CTT case. ### Mantis issues filed \| Id \| Issue \| \| --- \| --- \| \| C51 \| [11458](https://mantis.opcfoundation.org/view.php?id=11458) GDS scripts expect NA records in query results \| \| C52 \| [11459](https://mantis.opcfoundation.org/view.php?id=11459) A & C Refresh scripts leak subscriptions on the shared alarm session \| \| C53 \| [11460](https://mantis.opcfoundation.org/view.php?id=11460) `StartThreadPublish.js` defaults misspelled properties \| \| U2 \| [11461](https://mantis.opcfoundation.org/view.php?id=11461) Minimum2 oracle on reverse reads \| \| U4 \| [11462](https://mantis.opcfoundation.org/view.php?id=11462) Part 13 clarification: TreatUncertainAsBad and simple bounds (DeltaBounds) \| The A & C `BadSubscriptionIdInvalid` failures (Refresh, Refresh2, Shelving) come from CPU load: with other processes at 100 % CPU, all subscriptions of the CTT alarm session expire within one second. This happens with and without this PR (3 of 3 loaded runs, 0 of 2 idle runs). ### CTT verification CTT 1.05.06, scripts 1.05.513, compared at test-case level against a build of the starting commit: \| Group \| Before \| After \| \| --- \| --- \| --- \| \| Aggregates \| 4,562 error messages \| 4,186. NumberOfTransitions: 12 test cases go from error to pass. AnnotationCount `005-01.js`/`005-02.js` pass. NumberOfTransitions `003-02.js`/`004-02.js` now fail because of C1 ([Mantis 11420](https://mantis.opcfoundation.org/view.php?id=11420)): they request TreatUncertainAsBad = false, but the harness makes the server use its default of true. \| \| Discovery \| 10 warnings \| 0. Find Servers Filter `003.js`/`006.js` and Get Endpoints `002.js` pass. \| \| Subscription \| – \| Publish Min 05 `003.js` goes from warning to pass. \| \| Historical Access, GDS, Node Management \| – \| no new failures \| `plans/ctt-issues.md` is updated: resolved items leave the open sections, and the new Mantis issues are recorded. ## Related Issues - Related to #4479 (CTT configuration notes) - Follows #4502 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [ ] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. Tests run locally on net10.0 after merging master: \| Project \| Filter \| Passed \| \| --- \| --- \| --- \| \| `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` \| Aggregate, Historian, NodeManagement, Publish, Subscription \| 1,419 \| \| `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` \| TcpServerChannelBuffer \| 65 \| \| `Opc.Ua.History.Tests` \| Aggregate, Annotation \| 67 \| \| `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` \| discovery locale tests \| 8 \| Before the merge, the whole `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` ClientTest fixture passed (372 passed, 0 failed). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-25 12:30:25 +02:00
Cristi Pogacean	d2ec51d035	Normalize transport connection failures at the client channel boundary (#4549 ) ## Summary Translate socket and I/O connection failures into `ServiceResultException(BadNotConnected)` at `UaSCUaBinaryClientChannel.ConnectAsync`, so public discovery creation does not leak raw transport exceptions. - Preserve the original exception as `InnerException` for diagnostics. - Keep the existing operation fault, channel shutdown and operation completion paths. - Leave cancellation, existing `ServiceResultException` instances/statuses, and programming errors unchanged. - Do not change the lower-level byte transport contract or reconnect behavior. Fixes #4535 ## Regression Coverage - Deterministic injected HostNotFound, ConnectionRefused, socket timeout and IOException failures assert BadNotConnected, exact inner cause and closed transport/channel. - Separate controls assert caller cancellation and unchanged service/programming exceptions. - Public `DiscoveryClient.CreateAsync` integration uses a bound, non-listening loopback port. It asserts the translated failure and verifies a previously connected discovery client can still retrieve endpoints afterward. A separate public-API cancellation control remains a cancellation. - No live DNS lookup is required in the committed tests; DNS failure is injected deterministically. ## Validation Base `b4136d8e9`, Windows Release: \| Focused selection \| net10.0 \| net48 \| \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| \| UaSCBinaryClientChannelDeterministicTests + TcpByteTransportTests \| 51 passed \| 51 passed \| \| SessionlessInvocationTests \| 22 passed \| 22 passed \| All four selections exited 0, with zero failures/skips. Changed-file whitespace verification, diagnostics and `git diff --check` passed. Before the fix, the seven new deterministic cases produced 4 raw-transport failures / 3 passing controls. The two new public-API cases produced 1 raw SocketException failure / 1 cancellation-control pass with only the production fix reversed. The source fix was restored, rebuilt, and the full focused selections above passed. The complete framework/platform matrix is left to PR CI. No repository guidance, feed configuration, security policy or unrelated consumer workaround was changed. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-25 12:29:56 +02:00
Marc Schier	57c0a32ed4	Fix incomplete-message buffering and channel cleanup (#4522 ) # Description Fix incomplete-message buffering, channel cleanup, session resource accounting, and enforcement of existing transport admission settings. - Share a targeted `ChunkReassemblyBudget` across server listeners. The reference default is 64 MiB, with a 32 MiB global occupancy threshold for sessionless intermediate chunks. This is priority headroom for activated sessions, not a guaranteed bootstrap partition. Single/final chunks and unrelated response/client buffers remain outside this budget. - Retain precise incoming/final payload quotas, valid Abort handling without channel teardown, terminal late-final rejection, and exactly-once buffer/reservation cleanup. - Use one assembly timer per quota/clock scope, asynchronous cleanup, a fixed deadline, a 30-second fallback for non-positive lifetimes, and best-effort ERR `BadTimeout` before closure. - Apply negotiated TCP/WebSocket/Pipe receive limits and size pipe rentals to actual chunks. - Add the optional `ISessionBindingProvider` and immutable `SessionBindingContext` seam. Managed membership counts distinct committed sessions, not responses, and handles reactivation, transfer, closure, expiry, restoration and shutdown. Read-only snapshots require token/channel/security validation and never replace service authorization. - Wire default and explicitly injected binding providers through raw TCP, Kestrel and UACP WebSockets; preserve existing callback/manager interfaces and direct construction. - Enforce existing `ConnectionRateLimiter` and channel capacity settings on Kestrel TCP and UACP WebSocket admission, with physical-transport leases surviving reverse handoff and releasing on cancellation, close, failed attachment and stop. HTTP/JSON requests are not treated as UASC channels. - Add regression coverage and documentation. Stabilize the CI cancellation test by waiting for the resolver to enter before canceling. This is the foundation only. New Balanced/FairShare/TrustedReservations policies, tenant isolation and guaranteed bootstrap reserves belong in the separate stacked follow-up, not this PR. ## Related Issues Fixes #4521. ## Validation \| Scope \| Result \| \| --- \| --- \| \| Core transport, budget, binding-context and DI tests, net10.0 \| 717 passed \| \| Core transport, budget, binding-context and DI tests, net48 \| 664 passed, 6 platform-specific skips \| \| Session bindings, transfer/security/expiry/restore and hosted DI, net10.0 \| 69 passed \| \| Same focused Server suite, net48 \| 69 passed \| \| ServerRedundancyHandlerTests, Release/net48 \| 39 passed \| \| ConsoleReferenceServer net10.0 \| Build succeeded, zero warnings/errors \| \| Server and HTTPS binding netstandard2.1 \| Both builds succeeded, zero warnings/errors \| The new admission fixtures also passed five repeated runs after correcting asynchronous connection-context disposal. Full-solution validation, coverage comparison and CI for this update remain pending. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received.	2026-09-24 20:12:55 +02:00
Marc Schier	138086863b	Fix audit findings and review regressions across the OPC UA stack (#4503 ) ## Scope Audit fixes and review follow-ups across the OPC UA Core, Client, Server, transport, and redundancy components. This includes implemented Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 work; it does not claim that every item in the 244-finding audit backlog is complete. The review batch fixes mandatory full-key record protection and owned plaintext buffers; transactional pending-certificate claims; shared-channel nonce and certificate ownership; discovery and token-policy validation; reconnect/callback ordering without changing unbounded buffering defaults; server permissions, filters, monitored-item lifetime, and alarm topology; historian paging, retention, and annotations; atomic user/password metadata; and canonical file identities with bounded alias and role refresh workers. ## Review-batch verification at `ab686ccae` The following results come from fresh test builds using `dotnet test`, `--no-restore`, `-m:1`, and an explicit `CustomTestTarget`. They replace the earlier description's library-build/`--no-build` totals, which did not establish the state of the merged test sources. \| Scope \| Target \| Passed \| Skipped \| \|---\|---\|---:\|---:\| \| Core review regressions \| net10.0 \| 827 \| 0 \| \| Client and lifecycle regressions \| net10.0 \| 630 \| 0 \| \| Server review regressions \| net10.0 \| 1970 \| 0 \| \| Redundancy Server / Client / PubSub \| net10.0 \| 276 / 10 / 11 \| 0 \| \| Sessions / file-and-alias / streaming / HTTPS-WSS integration \| net10.0 \| 8 / 21 / 30 / 20 \| 0 \| \| Core review regressions \| net48 \| 786 \| 39 \| \| Client recovery and policy regressions \| net48 \| 54 \| 0 \| \| Server ownership, aliases, queues, and user-state regressions \| net48 \| 137 \| 0 \| Every listed run exited successfully. The 39 net48 skips are existing platform/capability cases. New key-agreement tests assert unavailable-policy behavior on unsupported targets rather than adding skips or pretending those targets performed an unsupported handshake. Additional exact node/permission/filter/alarm checks passed 13 Core and 46 Server cases. The PR-scoped formatter verification covers 26 projects and 389 non-generated C# files. A Roslyn syntax audit covers 53 changed interfaces and 263 members, with no missing parameter/type-parameter/return contracts and a 120-column limit for their declarations and documentation. No full-solution, all-target-framework, or NativeAOT matrix is claimed from these local runs; the new CI run must establish its own result. ## CI follow-up at `e1bc3ac3b` The follow-up fixes the failures reported by Azure build 18400. TLS certificates retain configured DNS names, including mixed-case URI schemes, without relaxing hostname validation. Reverse-WSS fixtures use the DNS identity in the client certificate. Reconnect completion is published only after cycle cleanup, so a subsequent reconnect cannot join an old completed cycle and retain old certificates. Certificate-alarm roots now support event subscriptions. The pump sample has one continuous notifier path, with no duplicate shortcut. Historian and aggregate fixtures share the provider's retention clock. Alarm collection lets the server expire idle Publish requests rather than canceling only the client wait. The corrected server, WoT, and managed-session fixtures exercise valid requests and initialized lifecycle contracts. Downlevel crypto tests preserve real credential and key-ownership assertions without enabling unsupported raw-ECDH policies or adding skips. Fresh local evidence after integration includes: \| Scope \| Target \| Passed \| Skipped \| \|---\|---\|---:\|---:\| \| Client lifecycle / channel ownership / builder fixtures \| net10.0 and net48, each \| 96 / 103 / 123 \| 0 \| \| Combined server lifecycle, events, aggregates, crypto, and contracts \| net48 \| 358 \| 0 \| \| Full lifecycle plus certificate-alarm and aggregate fixtures \| net10.0 \| 116 \| 0 \| \| Final server-contract and history-routing delta \| net10.0 and net48, each \| 84 \| 0 \| \| Subscription / XRegistry / WoT event regressions \| net10.0 \| 7 / 2 / 3 \| 0 \| \| Full Sessions project \| net10.0 \| 780 \| 379 \| \| Full ComplexTypes project / downlevel resolver fixtures \| net10.0 / net48 \| 2854 / 15 \| 0 \| \| Full WoT project / downlevel structured-write fixtures \| net10.0 / net48 \| 1496 / 27 \| 0 \| \| TLS domain-name regressions \| net10.0 and net48, each \| 21 \| 0 \| All listed runs exited 0. The Sessions skips come from existing endpoint and policy capability guards; they are not counted as passes. No skip was added. Worker validation also covered full DI (426 passes), full History (540 passes, 21 existing skips), 38 exact downlevel event/history failures, and 60 repeated certificate-rotation race cases. The final crypto fixtures passed 73 cases on each target with the unchanged leak detector; a temporary premature-disposal mutation made all three borrower tests fail and was then removed. All 29 C# files in this follow-up pass included-file formatting at info severity across 12 projects. The complete PR interface audit now covers 54 interfaces and 271 members with zero missing contracts or line-width findings. No full-solution or NativeAOT matrix is claimed. New-head CI has started and remains authoritative for the remote result. ## Test-result gate follow-up at `4b6e1203a` Azure build 18401 reported the net48 Client job as successful despite a test-host crash after only 264 passing tests. Its old evaluator counted per-test failures but ignored the failed run verdict. This was a partial run, not a benign exit after the suite had completed. The shared result evaluator now rejects aborted, errored, incomplete, malformed, or inconsistent TRX reports. Each file must describe a completed run, so a passing file cannot mask another file's failure. It retains support for completed runs followed by a benign nonzero host exit, existing skipped-result conventions, and no-TRX MTP jobs. All 78 regression cases pass after integration using Windows PowerShell 5.1. Real completed Sessions and Client reports also pass. The process-test fixture follows the existing NET10_0-only tools-test pattern; its net48 build is not counted as a test run. Formatting passes for the added test file. The Client host crash itself has not reproduced locally. The isolated fixture passed 59 tests, and two fresh full fast-CI selections each completed with 2,392 passes and three existing skips, including a run with crash collection enabled. The CI merge tree is identical to the tested source tree. No speculative runtime change was made, and the original partial CI run is not claimed as a full-suite pass. Azure build 18402 has now completed the full net48 Client run: 2,392 passed, three existing console skips, and a successful test-host exit. The corrected evaluator independently validated outcome=Completed. Across the matrix, 119 test-project jobs succeeded; Sessions net10.0 was canceled when the remote provider deprovisioned its runner, so the overall Azure pipeline was canceled. That cancellation is not claimed as a code failure or a successful run. CodeQL and three Docker image jobs were still running at the latest check. The migration discovery failure remains separate. ## Documentation follow-up at `57ed02bea` The environment blocker has been removed by the maintainer. The three bundled migration references now exactly match the canonical documents after deterministic link rewriting; all 15 bundled documents pass `validate-migration-plugin.ps1`. The canonical migration prose was not rewritten. `FileSystemClient.md` now documents that extended Windows roots preserve literal trailing-dot names, completing the filesystem review follow-up. The filesystem thread has been replied to and resolved after publication. The review pass now has 108 of 110 threads resolved. The two explanation-only threads remain open as requested; no unfinished change request is being represented as resolved. ## Cross-platform follow-up at `0d9d936a8` With migration discovery restored, the Linux and macOS test matrix exposed two stale durable-subscription expectations. The expected value 83,442 encoded the old 32-bit overflow when converting 3,600 hours to milliseconds. The existing overflow-safe server correctly returns 14,400,000 lifetime intervals at a 900 ms publishing interval. Only those two expected constants changed; production behavior, negotiated-hour checks, and all other assertions remain unchanged. The exact local lifetime selection reproduced both failures before the correction. The full durable suite now passes 36 cases with 11 existing skips on each of net10.0 and net48. All four lifetime cases executed and passed on both targets, and included-file info-severity formatting passes. ## Session shutdown follow-up at `8daf7f091` A late net48 Sessions failure exposed a shutdown race. Canceling an in-flight keepalive read can produce a transport `ServiceResultException`. The retiring worker treated its own cancellation as proof that the peer was unavailable, so `CloseAsync` or `DisposeAsync` could skip the server-side `CloseSession` request. The worker now ignores that service error only when its own token is canceled; genuine peer errors still update liveness. The full integration fixture reproduced the original error-code mismatch. Four deterministic mock-transport cases then produced three failures and one passing genuine-error control before the fix. They verify successful close, returned server error, asynchronous disposal, and unchanged behavior for a real keepalive failure. Fresh related runs pass 75 client and 101 integration cases on each of net48 and net10.0, with no skips. Ten repetitions of the formerly flaky full net48 fixture pass all 1,010 cases. All three changed files pass info-severity formatting, and temporary diagnostic instrumentation was removed. ## Atomic listener snapshot follow-up at `82dc22b5d` Ubuntu Core CI exposed an unsafe formatter rewrite in TCP listener disposal: `ConcurrentDictionary.ToArray()` had become a collection spread. A concurrent channel removal between the spread's count and copy operations could leave a default entry, causing a null dereference during disposal. The listener now uses the dictionary's atomic `Values` snapshot and disposes those channels outside the listener lock. Deterministic regressions close zero, one, or all channels at the copy boundary. Before the fix, the one/all-removal cases reproduced the exact null dereference; the unchanged-count control passed. All 23 admission/listener cases now pass on net10.0 and net48, and the full fast Core net10.0 suite passes 5,267 cases with 88 existing platform skips. Both changed files pass info-severity formatting. A bounded audit of the formatter's other snapshot rewrites found no further verified unsafe concurrent-registry copies. ## Shutdown-test observation follow-up at `58403ee8b` The net48 shutdown-order test raced its own observation: it read `m_publishWorkerTask` after starting shutdown, which can legitimately drain the worker and clear that field immediately. The test now captures the worker before shutdown starts and confirms it is initially running. It still requires the worker to finish while shutdown remains blocked by the held manager semaphore. Production behavior is unchanged. A temporary scheduling perturbation reproduced the exact null-field failure. The corrected capture passed 100 perturbed iterations; both the temporary repeat and yield were then removed. The final 126 subscription/lifecycle cases pass on each of net48 and net10.0, and formatting passes. A complete local Sessions net10.0 run also passed 780 cases with 379 existing capability skips in 7m20s after the earlier keepalive correction. ## Retirement and alias-startup follow-up at `1a048ff39` The shadow-generation test now observes its documented asynchronous cleanup through the existing bounded helper. Removing the replacement does not join a background drain that already claimed the retired generation. The test still checks live-registration removal immediately and requires the old node to disappear; no timeout or production lifecycle behavior changed. All 81 lifecycle cases pass on each of net10.0 and net48. Initial alias-node materialization now retries one timed-out, read-only snapshot query before creating nodes for that root. The retry is logged through source-generated logging. Each query retains the original shared 100 ms deadline; repeated timeouts, other errors, and cancellation still abort startup. Client searches and live refresh do not gain this immediate retry. Fault-injection tests cover success after one timeout, a persistent timeout, a different store failure, and cancellation. All 187 related alias/hosting cases and the original certificate-rotation integration case pass on each target; the positive test records exactly one retry warning. The alias documentation now accurately describes the shared request budget. All changed C# files pass formatter checks, and the complete 54-interface/271-member documentation audit passes. Fresh CI is running on `1a048ff39`; the previous completed matrix exposed only the two failures corrected in this batch and their dependent summaries. ## Sample endpoint allocation follow-up at `d08a94925` The strong-cluster test harness allocated OPC UA and Raft endpoints in separate released-port batches. Uniqueness was enforced only inside each batch, so the same OS-assigned port could appear in both protocol groups. The harness now requests one distinct batch for both groups and splits it before launching any replicas. Deterministic one- and three-replica allocation cases reproduced overlapping groups with the old plan and pass with the corrected plan. The complete 17-case short-haul sample suite passes without skips; all failover, historian-continuation, and service assertions remain unchanged. Both changed files pass info-severity formatting. This prevents intra-cluster self-collisions but does not claim to reserve released ports against unrelated external processes. ## Code-review follow-up at `085fd9636` A review of the complete branch diff found five defects this PR introduced. All are now fixed, each in its own commit. `RelatedTo`'s recursive-to-iterative rewrite defaulted the optional `includeTypeDefinitionSubtypes` and `includeReferenceTypeSubtypes` operands to `false`. Part 4 §7.7.4 specifies both default to `true`, so a filter that omitted them silently stopped matching subtypes. Dynamically created key-credential nodes derived their namespace from the containing folder, which is the standard `i=18155` node in namespace 0 — the namespace reserved for the OPC UA standard address space; they now resolve the server-owned namespace and fail with `BadInternalError` rather than guessing index 1. The retained audience-less `CreateTokenData` overload produced tokens that verification always rejects, so it is now `[Obsolete]` and throws instead. A failed reference to a remote parent left the new node registered with a one-sided inverse reference, and is now rolled back. An existing `.pfx` is restricted before it is rewritten, rather than after its new key bytes are on disk. One further reported finding was rejected after investigation. `JwksIssuerKeyResolver` deliberately does not dispose retired key snapshots: `RetiredKeysAreCollectibleWhileResolverRemainsAliveAsync` proves the resolver retains no retired snapshot, and `ReturnedKeysSurviveRepeatedRefreshAndResolverDisposalAsync` requires already-returned keys to keep verifying across refreshes and resolver disposal. Adding disposal would have broken that tested contract, so the exploratory change was reverted. Validated on net10.0 and net48: 256 Core and 633 Server cases pass, with one pre-existing net48 skip. The build reports zero compiler and analyzer diagnostics, all eight included-file info-format checks pass, the contract audit covers 58 interfaces and 310 members with no findings, and the 15 bundled migration documents validate. All 122 review threads are resolved; the key-credential namespace thread was reopened to retract an earlier incorrect answer and then resolved against the real fix. ## Review-body follow-up at `da0d59cfb` The re-review at `8daf7f091 + 82dc22b5d` listed four items in its summary that had no inline thread of their own, so they had not been picked up. All four are now fixed. Both event-dispatch permission gates had been tightened from not-Bad to `IsGood`, which silently dropped events whose permission verdict is Uncertain; the data-change path in the same file still treated Uncertain as deliverable, so the two had diverged. `EventSourceRegistry` only cleared `ConsecutiveFailures` when a source was deactivated, so a source that had backed off to the 30-second cap kept that delay for the rest of the process even after starting successfully. `UserNameIdentityTokenHandler` built a temporary issuer chain whose `Add` calls take independent certificate references, and never released them. The fourth was the receiver-side sequence rollover, which the reviewer had correctly re-flagged as still open despite its thread being resolved. `m_sequenceRollover` was set permanently, so the second legal wrap on a long-lived channel was rejected and faulted the channel along with the transport-reconnect OPN. OPC 10000-6 does not cap a SecureChannel at one wrap. The flag is now cleared once an accepted number has traversed the normal range, which keeps rejecting a replayed low number that never left the rollover window. Validated on net10.0 and net48: 636 / 593 Core cases and 135 / 134 Server cases pass, including the new `UaSCBinaryChannelSequenceRolloverTests` and the Uncertain-permission delivery cases. The build reports zero compiler and analyzer diagnostics and the changed files pass included-file info-format checks on both targets. The previous head `085fd9636` was fully green: 279 checks passed and Azure build 18414 succeeded with 137 of 137 jobs, after the platform automatically retried a job whose NuGet tool download had hit a transient TLS error. ## Reported issues #4508 and #4509 at `6ad1ecf16` #4508 (V2 subscription recreate deadlocks against a faulted transport) was not yet fixed and is now closed by `bac260a06`. Both drain sites the report identifies were still unbounded. A publish worker that started its request before the quiesce parks inside the service call on the channel ready gate while holding an active publish request; the recreate that would make the channel ready is the very operation awaiting the drain, so the wait never ends. The drain now cancels in-flight attempts through a per-attempt token linked to the worker token. An aborted worker rolls its acknowledgements back, releases the request and returns to the paused park instead of terminating, so it resumes when the caller leaves the quiesce. Publish ingress stays quiesced for the caller's operation, so `DropPendingForSubscription` keeps the guarantee the report asks to preserve and no blind timeout is added. The new regression parks a worker on a cancellable gate that never completes on its own: it reproduces the hang for the full 30-second budget before the change and passes after it. #4509 (identity provider fails the initial connect) was already fixed for its primary symptom. `HandleConnectAsync` materializes the provider's identity through `CreateIdentitySelectionContext` before the first `CreateAsync`, so Anonymous is no longer substituted against a UserName-only endpoint. `6ad1ecf16` adds the two remaining details from the report: the enabled-policy set now includes the negotiated channel policy, so a client cannot reject the policy it already accepted as `NotEnabledByClient`; and when discovery has not populated the endpoint's token policies the connect keeps the configured identity so the attempt fails at the transport layer for the reconnect policy to retry, instead of failing at the identity layer. Validated on net10.0 and net48: 477 / 473 client session and subscription cases pass, the build is free of compiler and analyzer diagnostics, and the changed files pass included-file info-format checks on both targets. The full `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` suite also passes locally on net10.0 with 782 passed and 379 pre-existing capability skips. GitHub checks are green on this head: Build and Test .NET 10.0, Docker Sample Images CI, and NuGet Publish all succeeded. Azure build 18417 completed 134 of its 135 jobs successfully; its net10.0 Sessions job was cancelled by the hosted-agent provider ("Received request to deprovision"), the same infrastructure flake that hit build 18409 earlier on a head predating these changes. That job is not claimed as passing, and the local full-suite run above covers the same project. The previous head `da0d59cfb` completed Azure build 18415 with every job succeeded. ## Review follow-up at `a08f0c12b` Eleven new review threads arrived, nearly all documentation. Before acting on each "this is new in 2.0" remark I checked the API against `master378` rather than assuming, because a genuine 1.5 API still needs its migration entry. `ManagedSession`'s server-redundancy refresh had two hard-coded two-second bounds. The new `ServerRedundancyOptions` exposes `RefreshTimeout` for the metadata read and `PeerDiscoveryTimeout` for each peer lookup, defaults both to the previous two seconds, validates that a bound is positive or `Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan`, and flows through `ManagedSessionOptions`, `ManagedSession.CreateAsync`, the fluent builder, and `DefaultServerRedundancyHandler`. `AsyncCustomNodeManager` and `KeyCredentialBridgeAuthenticator` are both absent from `master378`, so their obsolete members had no compatibility constraint and are removed rather than carried: `AsyncCustomNodeManager.ReadInitialValue`, the audience-less `CreateTokenData` that only threw, and the audience-less `CreateProof` that produced a proof no server accepts. `CustomNodeManager2.ReadInitialValue` and the `MonitoredNode2` migration section are genuine 1.5 APIs and are untouched. The documentation now states master's behaviour instead of the delta from 1.5.378, with each moved item already covered under `docs/migrate/2.0.x/`. `IHistorianAnnotationProvider` is described by its annotation-time key rather than as "legacy" — it is new in 2.0, so the label implied a compatibility constraint that does not exist. The KeyCredential bridge payload's `"version"` field is explained as a vendor-extension format version with no OPC UA counterpart, and its version-1 upgrade narrative is gone. `CertificateManager.md`'s migration walkthrough is replaced by the resolver API it targets. `NodeManagers.md`, `Sessions.md`, `AsyncServerSupport.md`, `Certificates.md`, and `Profiles.md` no longer announce features relative to 1.5. `Benchmarks.md`, `WhatsNewIn2.0.md`, `DeveloperGuide.md`, and `docs/migrate/` keep their 1.5.378 references, which are their subject. CI then exposed a defect this batch introduced: five fixtures resolve `ManagedSession`'s private constructor by its exact positional parameter types, so the added parameter compiled cleanly but made `GetConstructor` return `null` at run time. `7df1d5c40` updates every site; `Redundancy.Client` passes 126 of 126 and the affected client fixtures 112 of 112. The BouncyCastle question is answered and tracked in #4510: `Opc.Ua.Core` already project-references `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates`, which already carries the conditional BouncyCastle reference, so the raw-ECDH polyfill belongs there rather than as a new Core dependency. The `IUserDatabase` metadata question is addressed to another maintainer and is deliberately left open. ## Reported issue #4509 follow-up at `5d4d13d63` The reporter verified `6ad1ecf16` and found one case still failing, correctly. The empty-token-policies branch kept the configured identity so a server that is down surfaces a transport failure rather than an identity error. A provider-only configuration has no configured identity, so it kept `null`: `OpenCoreAsync` turned that into Anonymous and `OpenValidateIdentity` rejected it with `BadIdentityTokenInvalid`, silently ignoring the configured provider. The branch now requires a configured identity to defer to. Without one the provider is consulted, so its own `BadIdentityTokenRejected` names the offered and rejected policy set instead. Two regression tests cover both configurations; the first fails against the previous behaviour by reaching the session factory with a `null` identity, which is the exact step that produced the reported error. That branch had shipped without a test, which is why the case was missed. ## Review and CI status at `5d4d13d63` All actionable review threads are resolved: 132 of 133. The single open thread is a question the reviewer addressed to another maintainer about moving user metadata into `IUserDatabase`; it is left open for them rather than resolved silently. Every resolved thread carries a reply naming its fix commit. Latest-head CI is green on `5d4d13d63`: 279 checks passed, zero failed, zero pending, with one conditional signed-package publishing job skipped. Local validation for this batch: the full `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` suite passes 2,430 of 2,430 on net10.0, `Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Client.Tests` 126 of 126, and `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` 590 of 590 for the affected selections. Both net10.0 and net48 build clean for `Opc.Ua.Client`, `Opc.Ua.Server`, and the changed test projects, and all changed files pass included-file info-severity formatting on both targets. The PR remains open; no merge was performed. As stated at the top, this does not claim that every item in the 244-finding audit backlog is complete. ## Latest CI follow-up at `b6f2dfa43` Azure build 18442 exposed a net48 compile regression in the Kafka adapter: `RuntimeHelpers.GetUninitializedObject` is unavailable on .NET Framework. Commit `2cf1e0eed` now uses normal `ProducerMessage` construction on `NETFRAMEWORK` while retaining reflection-based construction for modern targets that can load a different Dekaf runtime asset. The exact net48 CI selection passes 92 of 92 tests, and the netstandard2.1 adapter guard selection passes 11 of 11. After merging the latest `master`, GitHub Actions run 35643592139 is green. The initial Ubuntu Core.Schema job built successfully and passed 160 of 160 tests, then hit an external 403 while finalizing its test-result artifact; its failed-job rerun completed successfully. Azure build 18451 was canceled when its remote provider deprovisioned the net10.0 Sessions runner (`Received request to deprovision: The request was cancelled by the remote provider`). Azure attached no test task log or source error, and the canceled parent left that child check stale as in-progress. No source workaround, test skip, or check relaxation was made for either infrastructure failure. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 68f26810-22b8-476f-abcd-0a8c82d6e208	2026-09-22 09:10:58 +02:00
Marc Schier	fa8d45f2cf	Fix server/core validation, lifecycle and protocol regressions (#4477 ) # Description Server/core audit fixes with regression tests. Latest review-fix validation, merge validation and earlier acceptance results are distinguished below. This addresses a 95-finding server/core report. Every finding was reviewed with the OPC UA specification knowledge base or, where the standard does not prescribe a C# implementation, the corresponding ownership/configuration contract. Incorrect or withdrawn subclaims remain qualified rather than being presented as additional fixes. The original checkpoint covers session identity/certificate validation and revocation; certificate/key ownership and transactional updates; TCP reconnect, receive/admission and buffer lifetime; HTTP quotas; subscription admission, durability and pooled payloads; file-operation lifecycle; historian aggregates; fluent/state-machine behavior; and related utilities. It includes targeted regressions and directly related documentation. The approved acceptance cleanup is separate in the commit history: \| Cleanup \| Verified result \| \| --- \| --- \| \| Invalid identity-policy and KeyCredential fixture inputs \| Fixtures explicitly advertise Username and use its generated policy ID. Credential persistence uses valid clear mode inside the existing encrypted admin context. Original permission, lockout and negative encryption assertions remain. \| \| Native GDS lifetime and concurrent connection failures \| Retain ApplicationInstance until client teardown. A deterministic native reproducer proved the test-only channel cap of 10 was exhausted; removing that override restores the existing bounded default of 1000. No global serialization or production quota change. \| \| Stress certificate ownership and close accounting \| Balance two helper references and the fake transport's server-certificate ownership. Replace the invalid event-count bound with exactly-once physical disposal, opens = closes, zero active entries and one logical entry lifetime. \| \| Participant deadlines \| Use the injected TimeProvider with the existing cross-framework WaitAsync overload. Tests pin one tick before, exact expiry, terminal notification, recovery and timely completion. \| \| Reproducibility and platform assertions \| Preserve canonical WoT bytes/hashes, explicit display-culture contracts and exact numeric-vector assertions. Accept Apple's CryptographicException subtype without weakening disposal balance. \| \| Missing user-signature proof \| Reject null/empty proofs before OS crypto. Return BadUserSignatureInvalid per Part 4, 5.7.3.3. None-policy and valid-signature controls remain. A CI-only test nullable-context error was corrected without changing production behavior. \| \| Durable sample restore and shared test storage \| Dequeue waits for actual batch residency instead of treating failed restore completion as success, and restored files close before deletion. Five deterministic regressions failed before the fix. The two fixtures that clear the shared batch directory are isolated; all original 3,000-item assertions remain unchanged. \| ## Latest review follow-up Commit `828856850219518970e8e2f580b8f94b3c1fc748` fixes the deferred robotics disposal reported in the latest review. `RobotIntentNodeManager.DisposeAsync` now joins a shared controller-host drain and then explicitly awaits base node-manager disposal. A controller's bounded shutdown wait may defer its cleanup, but no longer lets the node-manager override finish early. Concurrent callers, including an asynchronous call after synchronous `Dispose`, cannot bypass the drain after the host list has been detached. Synchronous disposal remains nonblocking for deferred work. Deferred initialization failures are logged and retained, and base cleanup failures propagate to asynchronous callers. The existing controller-level bounded disposal contract is unchanged; the node-manager contract is documented in `docs/Robotics.md`. \| Regression requirement \| Evidence \| \| --- \| --- \| \| Wait for deferred hosts; preserve synchronous compatibility and concurrent joins \| `NodeManagerAsyncDisposalWaitsForDeferredHostsAsync`: four cases covering both entry-point orders and zero/positive host shutdown waits. All four failed before the fix. \| \| Wait through base cleanup and observe failures \| `NodeManagerDisposalWaitsForBaseCleanupAndReportsItsFailureAsync`: four cases hold the actual base-resource semaphore, verify pending callers after the host finishes, then check success or the same propagated exception and exactly-once cleanup. \| The focused `IntentHostingCoverageTests` and `IntentControllerHostTests.Dispose` selection passed 30/30 on net10.0 and 30/30 on net48, with no failures or skips. The final net10 solution build passed with zero errors and only the four previously documented CA2249 warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. No new warnings, analyzer suppressions, dependencies, or weakened assertions were added. The review thread received a commit-specific reply and was explicitly resolved. This verification is scoped to the robotics feedback; the earlier full Subscriptions-run limitation remains recorded in the merge section below. ## Documentation review follow-up (2026-09-14) Commit `f9a9686fcc5d3cfd19cbbc8c2d826e20f5c7e72f` addresses the six follow-up threads on documentation and implementation rationale. Each has an in-thread reply citing the commit and an explicit resolution. Multiline XML documentation now covers the declarations introduced or modified throughout the entire PR, including internal contracts, samples, tests, and public members of related private helpers. A syntax-aware inventory checked 2,031 declarations across all 256 PR C# paths with zero documentation gaps. A supplementary check also covers 75 previously unchanged public members of private helpers involved in the changed code. Token comparison across the conditional-compilation branches proves this follow-up changes no executable C# or test assertions. Project-file changes are rationale comments only. The implementation questions are documented at their source: \| Question \| Resolution \| \| --- \| --- \| \| Certificate assembly friendship \| Server Push configuration reuses the internal explicit-subject CSR helper with the existing key; no public crypto API was added. \| \| Core.Types assembly friendship \| Server builders use internal transition callbacks/revision guards; Server.Tests checks the revision deterministically without creating a public compatibility contract. \| \| Always-single-reader notifications \| One dequeuer preserves event order; optional concurrency fans out within one event and joins before the next event. \| \| Asynchronous disposal completion \| `DisposeAsync` already joins the completion published after admitted operations and all cleanup attempts. The compatibility `Dispose` remains nonblocking to avoid deadlocking an admitted callback against its own drain. \| The requested detailed review disposition follows. It distinguishes actual fixes from confirmed policies and incorrect subclaims rather than counting every comment as a new runtime change. ### Detailed disposition of review 5191795284 The [SDK review](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/pull/4477#pullrequestreview-5191795284) was submitted against `1c4a9df6c`, before the subsequent merge and feedback fixes. Its 15 inline threads have each received an action-specific reply and an explicit resolution. A fresh GraphQL query verified those replies and resolution states; the fixes in `b8a59990f` remain ancestors of the current branch. \| Review concern \| Action and disposition \| Concrete regression evidence \| \| --- \| --- \| --- \| \| Injected certificate-store providers bypassed \| Fixed. Registration, configuration snapshots, and validation use the injected providers. Explicit custom types remain authoritative; the built-in Directory catch-all is deferred so native X509 paths and later custom providers are not captured. Failed store opens dispose the created store. \| `InjectedProviderResolvesRegisteredAndConfiguredTrustStores` covers default-provider ordering and both registration paths; provider validation/open-failure cases and the unchanged `TrustedCertificateInjectedViaIndependentX509StoreIsObservedAsync` cover real use and independent-store visibility. \| \| Unguarded timer-thread leadership callbacks \| Fixed. Each subscriber's exception is logged independently and cannot suppress subsequent subscribers or fail lease operations. `IsLeader` reads the deadline without invoking application callbacks. \| `ThrowingLeadershipSubscriberDoesNotFailAcquireOrDisposeAsync`, `ExpiryNotifiesOtherSubscribersWhenOneThrowsAsync`, and `IsLeaderDoesNotDispatchExpiryNotificationsAsync` were all demonstrated failing before the fix. \| \| Legacy pending-key provider accepts an unfinishable regenerated CSR \| Fixed by explicit capability validation. A provider implementing only `IPendingCertificateKeyStore` receives `BadNotSupported` before key generation or persistence when regeneration is requested. Existing-key CSR/update remains supported. Regeneration requires matching-only consumption; no unsafe destructive probing was introduced. \| `LegacyPendingProviderRejectsRegenerationBeforeCreatingOrSavingAKeyAsync` checks no key or store mutation; `LegacyPendingProviderCompletesExistingKeySigningAndUpdateAsync` proves the supported flow completes. \| \| Shutdown waits behind user deactivation \| Fixed. Accepted deactivations drain before the master's lifecycle gate is taken. Configuration retains its binding until the shared drain completes, including concurrent shutdown callers and direct master disposal. \| Four cases of `ShutdownDrainsDeactivationOutsideTheSessionClosingGateAsync` exercise real configuration/binding/ServerInternalData/master reentry, retained address space, exact session/subscription closure, and no production cancellation shortcut. \| \| Subclass cleanup runs under the operation-lifetime lock \| Fixed. Cleanup starts outside that lock. A pre-published completion joins all disposers, and only the active asynchronous teardown context may use guarded helpers. Captured contexts lose that privilege when the callback exits. \| `SynchronousOwnedCleanupLetsSamplingWorkerReachClosedAdmissionAsync`, `DisposeCoreCanUseGuardedMembersWithoutReopeningCallerAdmissionAsync`, captured-context rejection, and exact cleanup-failure/ownership assertions cover both synchronous and suspended cleanup. \| \| Discovery requestId-zero chunk read after pool return \| Fixed by the earlier merge. Discovery validation precedes `SaveIntermediateChunk`; no read occurs after that path can return the buffer. The ordering is retained. \| `DiscoveryChannelReadsTheFirstChunkBeforeItIsReturnedAsync` uses a poisoning pool and the requestId-zero path. \| \| T1.8 OPN cleanup misses post-decryption throws \| Fixed by the earlier merge and pinned with new regressions. Both sequence rejection and certificate mismatch release the decrypted body and input ownership. \| `OpenSecureChannelRejectionAfterDecryptionReturnsEveryRentalAsync` checks the exact audit status and pool conservation. Omitting either corresponding release in an isolated snapshot made its case fail; no mutation remains. \| \| T1.2 mount-root protection depends on the provider \| Fixed at the host boundary. Separator-only aliases resolve to the protected root. Traversal, empty/whitespace segments, backslashes, and drive/stream qualifiers are rejected before arbitrary providers are invoked. Valid nested paths and root destinations remain supported. \| A deliberately permissive provider is used by `NonCanonicalObjectPathsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyAsync` and invalid-target cases; exact zero-call checks are paired with legitimate nested-path/root-destination controls. \| \| Inline trusted/issuer entries now face CRL checks \| Intentional strict behavior, documented and tested. A configured backing store with strict unknown-status rejection requires current revocation information. Explicit-only lists without a store retain their no-store behavior. Actual revocation cannot be suppressed; a matching store entry's policy takes precedence. \| `InlineIssuerWithStoreHonorsStrictUnknownRevocationPolicyAsync`, `InlineIssuerRevocationIsNeverSuppressedAsync`, store-precedence cases, and explicit-only controls preserve the missing-information versus actual-revocation distinction in Part 4 6.1.3. \| \| RSA minimum applied to unspecified ECC identifiers \| Fixed at the application-certificate check. The RSA minimum is compared only with an actual RSA public key. An unspecified ECC identity is not replaced simply because its key size is below an RSA threshold. \| `SilentCertificateCheckPreservesUnspecifiedEccIdentityAsync` checks DER, thumbprint, store contents, and private-key retention; explicit RSA and HTTPS minimum controls remain. \| \| Failed directory refresh wedges corrective mutations \| Fixed. Recoverable automatic pre-refresh failures are logged and leave reconciliation pending, but do not block corrective provider mutations. Explicit refresh errors, capacity admission, caller cancellation, and actual provider denials remain enforced. \| `CorrectiveDeleteRecoversAfterPersistentOverLimitRefreshFailureAsync` converges an externally over-limit directory back to its exact allowed contents. Capacity, cancellation/token, and six refresh-error controls check negative paths. \| \| Timed-transition rejection logs at 10 Hz \| Fixed. Repeated `(state, revision, status)` warnings are deduplicated without changing the retry cadence. A different status or state entry permits another warning. \| `RepeatedTimedRejectionLogsOnceAndRecoversAsync` checks one warning over eleven rejections and success on the next attempt. Status-change and same/different-state reentry controls pin reset behavior. \| \| Bad unsubscribe strands retired-generation bookkeeping \| Fixed. Retired all-event bookkeeping completes even when unsubscribe reports Bad; the first Bad is still returned to the caller. \| Good and BadCommunicationError cases of `RetiredAllEventsDeletionCompletesBookkeepingAndReleasesGenerationAsync` check event/snapshot removal, generation release, and exactly one unsubscribe without finalization replay. \| \| CSR subject parsing and fallback \| Fixed for existing and regenerated keys. Omitted subjects fall back to the actual stored certificate. Regeneration resolves the public certificate's subject before creating a key. Malformed or unresolvable subjects return `BadInvalidArgument` before pending-key mutation. \| Store-only fallback, real-generator null/empty cases, and missing-subject/malformed-DN controls verify the signed CSR, matching fresh pending key, unchanged active identity, and no destructive side effects. \| \| Committed RemoveUser change reported as failed \| Fixed for RemoveUser and ModifyUser. Accepted cleanup is still awaited and close failures remain logged, but cannot replace the committed mutation result. Precommit failures retain their original result and side effects. \| `CommittedUserChangeKeepsResultAndPublishedUsersWhenCloseFailsAsync` checks published Users, Good result, logging, and continued closes. `FailedUserChangeKeepsPublishedUsersAndDoesNotCloseSessionsAsync` checks BadNotFound with no publication or close. \| \| Alleged pooled decoded-request aliasing \| No runtime redesign needed; reviewer rebuttal confirmed. The decoder copies the relevant input data. Misleading ownership comments were corrected rather than introducing a new dispatch model. \| `DecodedRequestRetainsValuesAfterInputBuffersAreReturnedAsync` checks the exact decoded NodeId and ByteString after returned arrays are poisoned. \| The current documentation-only follow-up rechecked 104 Core, 473 Server, and 4 Configuration cases covering these concerns: 581 passed, zero failed or skipped. The final net10 solution build also passed with zero warnings and errors. The complete earlier Core/Server/Configuration and net48 results remain listed separately rather than being presented as rerun current-head acceptance. ## Earlier review follow-up Commit `b8a59990fe2e8e967a12ffd5d9158beed7831143` addresses all 19 review threads. Each thread has an in-thread reply naming this commit and was explicitly resolved after verification; the final paginated query found 19 resolved and zero unresolved threads. The follow-up fixes injected certificate-store selection (including default provider ordering and native X509 paths), actual-RSA minimum enforcement, and CSR capability/subject validation before key mutation. Node-manager teardown uses simpler scoped ownership and drains accepted user revocation outside the master gate; committed user results and retired-event cleanup remain correct when cleanup reports failure. File mutations can recover after failed refresh without bypassing capacity or cancellation, provider paths protect mount roots, and repeated timed rejections no longer flood logs. Leadership subscriber failures are isolated without callbacks from `IsLeader`. Regressions also pin the already-merged OPN/discovery buffer fixes and prove decoded request values do not borrow returned input buffers. The strict inline issuer revocation policy is documented and tested, not weakened. Existing tests were changed only for the reviewed behavior: the incorrect committed-user result was corrected, and inline-issuer/root-alias controls were expanded. ### Review-fix validation \| Suite \| Scope \| Framework \| Passed \| Existing TRX NotExecuted \| \| --- \| --- \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| \| Core \| Complete project \| net10.0 \| 4,970 \| 88 \| \| Server \| Complete project \| net10.0 \| 6,414 \| 69 \| \| Configuration \| Complete project \| net10.0 \| 231 \| 0 \| \| Core \| Certificate, lease and buffer compatibility slice \| net48 \| 153 \| 0 \| \| Server \| Reviewed lifecycle, user, file, timer and CSR compatibility slice \| net48 \| 692 \| 0 \| \| Configuration \| Complete project \| net48 \| 231 \| 0 \| \| CSR provider regressions \| Final portable-mock follow-up \| net10.0 \| 11 \| 0 \| All runs exited successfully with normal concurrency and leak detection. The Server console reports 5 skips; its TRX additionally records existing assumption/explicit cases, hence the 69-record count above. The Framework build caught two modern-only `ValueTask.CompletedTask` usages in new mock setup; only those expressions changed to the equivalent portable `default(ValueTask)`. The complete modern suites precede that test-only correction; all production files remained byte-identical, and the corrected fixture passed on both targets. The final net10 solution build succeeded with 0 errors and the same 4 CA2249 warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. Diff checks and changed-line whitespace checks are clean; whole-file formatting still identifies 10 unchanged baseline lines, which were not reformatted outside the feedback scope. The committed 35-file tree was hash-verified against the validation inputs. This is the review-feedback verification scope, not a rerun or sign-off of the historical complete platform/native/soak acceptance campaign below. ## Latest upstream merge Merge `9d9bf679f317164c5b2b90924cd3cdc27a86d451` integrates `master` through `162fc5ebb` (#4486), including the AddNodes child-name index, shared certificate-error reporting, CTT sample-data corrections, and the accompanying regressions and documentation. The CreateSession conflict preserves this branch's certificate ownership, required certificate, application-URI, and channel-certificate checks. The validation result now retains nested errors through `ThrowIfInvalid`, allowing the upstream shared reporting helper to mask trust, policy, and revocation failures consistently without losing audit detail. The new indexed AddNodes regression initially attempted to reuse a deterministic NodeId after renaming its existing node. Renaming frees the BrowseName, not that NodeId. `IndexedBrowseNameReusePreservesExistingNodeIdentityAsync` now proves both contracts: the derived-ID collision leaves the original node intact, then a fresh explicitly requested ID can reuse the old name while the new name remains protected against duplicates. No production identity rule was relaxed. The incoming seeded random-index test uses the existing `UnsecureRandom` wrapper with the same seed and sequence; no new analyzer suppression was added. \| Local merge validation \| Framework \| Passed \| Existing exclusions \| \| --- \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| \| Core, complete project \| net10.0 \| 5,081 \| 88 \| \| NodeState / BaseInstanceState \| net10.0 \| 579 \| 0 \| \| Server node management, certificate and session-security selection \| net10.0 \| 112 \| 0 \| \| InformationModel node-management services \| net10.0 \| 29 \| 1 \| \| NodeState / BaseInstanceState \| net48 \| 578 \| 0 \| \| Core certificate validation, error reporting and TCP buffers \| net48 \| 111 \| 0 \| \| Server node management, certificate and session-security selection \| net48 \| 112 \| 0 \| All selected runs exited successfully at normal concurrency: 6,602 passing test executions. Modified test assemblies were explicitly rebuilt, and the combined name/identity regression was verified by name in both net10 and net48 results. No skips or weakened assertions were introduced. The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release --no-restore -m:1` with `CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded with zero warnings and zero errors. The resolved source and adjusted tests pass whitespace verification, and their source hashes match the validation inputs. This is merge-specific verification. Earlier review results and the previously reported incomplete full Subscriptions runs below remain scoped to their own commits; they were not reopened or relabeled as passing by this operation. ## Previous upstream merge (2026-09-15 morning) Merge `c4694e20ab089c555af233642042133ff3a03ac8` integrates `master` through `484d6c887`, retaining #4481's shared Like parser/GDS query fixes, #4488's RequestHandle recovery in ServiceFaults, and #4487's expired-session and durable-transfer corrections. Three conflict resolutions preserve both sides: - Alias searches now use the shared `LikePattern` implementation, including upstream malformed-list validation. A timeout overload retains this branch's 100 ms per-alias deadline and `BadTimeout` reporting without keeping a second wildcard translator. The shared matcher's original unlimited overload remains unchanged for existing GDS/ContentFilter callers. New regressions cover bounded prefix/list scans, reuse after timeout, and the alias service result. - Expired activation closes outside the session-manager gate using upstream's once-only timeout claim, audit, and diagnostic accounting. This branch's original-channel and security-policy checks remain in place. - TCP buffer tests retain this branch's ownership, poisoning-pool and post-decryption checks alongside the upstream RequestHandle/fault overload tests; neither set was discarded. The upstream HTTPS binary behavior is intentionally retained: a decoder `ServiceResultException` produces HTTP 200 with an OPC UA ServiceFault carrying the decoder status, response timestamp, and recoverable RequestHandle, rather than the previous HTTP 500 text response. Other exceptions retain their existing HTTP error handling. \| Local validation \| Framework \| Passed \| TRX NotExecuted \| \| --- \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| \| Core, complete project \| net10.0 \| 5,054 \| 88 \| \| Sessions, complete project \| net10.0 \| 780 \| 610 \| \| Server aliases, expiry/security and subscriptions \| net10.0 \| 288 \| 0 \| \| GDS database, paging and live directory calls \| net10.0 \| 263 \| 0 \| \| Shared Like patterns and bounded evaluation \| net10.0 \| 109 \| 0 \| \| Subscriptions transfer/durability/service selection \| net10.0 \| 23 \| 1 \| \| HTTPS WebApi, complete project \| net10.0 \| 346 \| 0 \| \| InformationModel aliases \| net10.0 \| 54 \| 5 \| \| Shared Like patterns and bounded evaluation \| net48 \| 109 \| 0 \| \| Core fault handles, TCP/HTTPS and filters \| net48 \| 268 \| 0 \| \| Server aliases, expiry/security and subscriptions \| net48 \| 288 \| 0 \| These selected runs exited successfully with normal test concurrency: 7,582 passing test executions. Sessions' console reports 379 skips; the TRX also contains conditional/assumption exclusions, so the table uses the actual 610 NotExecuted records. No skips or weakened assertions were added. The new `EvaluationTimeoutBoundsWorkAndPreservesPatternReuse` and `SharedPatternTimeoutRemainsAnAliasServiceError` tests passed on both targets. Validation limitation: two unfiltered Subscriptions runs did not produce a final result and were stopped, including a retry with a hang guard. They are not counted as passing. The isolated failover fixture passed 2/2, and the transfer/durability/service selection above passed. The stall's cause was not established; no unrelated code or test was changed to conceal it. The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release --no-restore -m:1` with `CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded with 0 warnings and 0 errors. Whitespace verification passed for all hand-reconciled files, and staged source hashes match the validation inputs. These are merge-specific checks, not a new full platform/native/soak acceptance sign-off. Earlier review and acceptance evidence below remains dated to its own commit. ## Previous upstream merge (2026-09-14) Merge `c3e09553e4d1509502d4ba751960d58491bea2cf` integrates `master` through `6313e38a0` (#4478), including the CTT-driven Part 13 aggregate corrections and FindAlias argument validation. The upstream tests and CTT documentation are retained. The single conflict in `AliasNameWildcardMatcher` is reconciled through the branch's shared regex compiler: upstream malformed-pattern rejection and `IsValidPattern` coexist with OPC UA character escaping, whole-string/newline matching, the 100 ms timeout, and service-level error reporting. The upstream ReferenceTypeFilter checks and chronological aggregate behavior are preserved. Local merge verification: \| Suite / selection \| Framework \| Passed \| Existing skips \| \| --- \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| \| Server aliases, aggregates and historian \| net10.0 \| 1,011 \| 0 \| \| Server aliases, aggregates and historian \| net48 \| 1,011 \| 0 \| \| InformationModel aliases \| net10.0 \| 54 \| 5 \| \| Features aliases \| net10.0 \| 11 \| 0 \| \| Client aliases \| net10.0 \| 28 \| 0 \| \| History aggregate/historical-access consumers \| net10.0 \| 265 \| 0 \| All selected tests passed at normal concurrency. The final net10 solution build passed with 0 errors and 0 warnings. The resolved file's whitespace check and the staged diff check passed. These are merge-specific checks, not a new full platform/native/soak acceptance claim. ## Previous upstream merges Integrates `master` through `8e874d073`, including the Client, Types, Core and source-generator audit fixes in #4471, #4473, #4474 and #4475, plus the event queue-size revision from #4480. The merge commits are `150ea0439` (26 conflict resolutions) and `a0e17c07c` (the base update that arrived during validation). The overlapping fixes are reconciled rather than replacing either branch: - Rejected-certificate retention follows this branch, as explicitly requested: zero means unlimited history; negative values disable new storage while preserving existing backend trimming behavior (Directory clears prior history; shared key/value leaves it intact). The processor and manager policy are not redefined, and documentation/tests describe the distinction. - Preserve owned certificate snapshots and borrowed validation-core lifetimes alongside upstream cache invalidation, store-first CRL checks and `BadCertificateRevocationUnknown` for unsupported revocation lookup. - Combine exactly-once chunk ownership, receive-loop cancellation, stale-epoch rejection and detach-before-adoption with upstream signature-before-padding verification and secret cleanup. - Preserve pooled `HttpClient` per-request configuration together with bounded response reads and deadlines that remain active through body consumption. Regression cases exercise already-used clients and both timeout precedence cases. - Retain the binary-compatible channel-key constructor and normalize omitted profiles; preserve exact profile filtering and upstream binary-first HTTPS/WSS endpoint ordering. - Preserve monotonic lease expiry and stale-confirmation fencing while adding ordered, non-reentrant leadership notifications outside the state lock. ## Validation Local validation of the conflict-resolution merge: \| Suite \| Framework \| Passed \| Existing skips \| \| --- \| --- \| ---: \| ---: \| \| Core \| net10.0 \| 4,940 \| 88 \| \| Client \| net10.0 \| 2,278 \| 0 \| \| Server \| net10.0 \| 6,088 \| 5 \| \| Types \| net10.0 \| 10,394 \| 1 \| \| SourceGeneration.Core \| net10.0 \| 3,940 \| 8 \| \| SourceGeneration \| net10.0 \| 185 \| 0 \| \| Core \| net48 \| 4,855 \| 104 \| After the subsequent four-file #4480 update, the related Server slice passed 811 tests with 5 existing skips, the real durable queue-size cases passed 6/6, and EventManager's 21 cases passed again after analyzer-only expected-array cleanup. The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` with `CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded: 0 errors and 4 pre-existing CA2249 warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. Whitespace verification passed for the resolved files and the follow-up. Merge-specific proof includes `RequestTimeoutRemainsActiveWhileReadingTheOpenApiBodyAsync` on already-used shared clients with either the request or HttpClient timeout shorter, the existing ownership/expiry regressions from both branches, and both branches' retention tests adjusted only to the explicitly chosen zero/negative contract. Earlier acceptance at `1c4a9df6c` passed hosted Linux/macOS CI, CodeQL, image builds and the canonical coverage gate (87.15% line, 77.27% branch, 92.14% patch). Both Framework project matrices, all three Windows native suites (183 cases), and the unfiltered net10 stress project (230 cases, including full 60-minute chaos and 30-minute memory soaks) also passed. Those are pre-merge results, not a claim that the full framework/platform/native/soak matrix has been rerun on this merge. The previous acceptance workflow remains separate from this review-feedback operation. Security checks, meaningful assertions, leak detection, default native concurrency, full soak durations and coverage thresholds remain intact. The user-set ready-for-review state is unchanged. No architectural or complete merged-head acceptance sign-off is claimed. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4476 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed all PR feedback received.	2026-09-16 04:42:09 +00:00
romanett	162fc5ebb3	Fix AddNodes scaling and OpenSecureChannel revocation errors found by CTT Monitored Item, Node Management and security runs (#4486 ) # Description Findings from running the CTT conformance groups Monitored Item Services, Node Management Services, Security General and Security User Token against `ConsoleReferenceServer --ctt` (CTT 1.05.06, scripts 1.05.513). The security groups ran without `-a`, against an isolated server PKI built from the CTT's `copyToServer` folders, so the negative certificate tests are meaningful. ## Server fixes ### AddNodes below one parent was quadratic (Node Management Delete Node `Err-002.js`) The CTT adds 15,000 variables below `ns=2;s=CTT` in batches of 5,000 and warned that AddNodes responses took 400–800 ms. For every added node the server searched all children of the parent twice: once in the BrowseName duplicate check in `AsyncCustomNodeManager.AddNodeCoreAsync`, which also copied the children list, and once in the NodeVersion lookup of `FilterChangesByNodeVersion`. - `NodeState.FindChild` now searches children lists with ≥ 64 entries through a BrowseName index kept in a `ConditionalWeakTable`, so nodes with few children get no extra field. - It keeps first-match semantics and is maintained by `AddChild`/`RemoveChild`. - It is dropped on replacement and invalidated when a child is renamed or moves to another parent. - Lists whose children point at another parent (clones) are still searched linearly. - The duplicate check uses `FindChild` instead of copying the list. \| 5,000-node AddNodes batch (in-process, Debug) \| 1st \| 2nd \| 3rd \| \| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \| \| before \| 769 ms \| 2,083 ms \| 4,011 ms \| \| after \| 141 ms \| 166 ms \| 172 ms \| In the CTT, AddNodes of 5,000 items now answers in 51–72 ms and the warning is gone. ### OpenSecureChannel leaked revocation errors (Security Certificate Validation `002.js`) Part 4 §6.1.3, Table 106: - For the revocation check (`Bad_CertificateRevoked`, `Bad_CertificateIssuerRevoked`), `Bad_SecurityChecksFailed` shall be reported to the client. - For a missing revocation list (`Bad_CertificateRevocationUnknown`, `Bad_CertificateIssuerRevocationUnknown`), it should be. `TcpServerChannel` masked only `Bad_CertificateRevoked`, and `StandardServer.OnApplicationCertificateError` (CreateSession) had its own list that missed `Bad_CertificatePolicyCheckFailed`. Both now use one helper, `CertificateErrorReporting` in Opc.Ua.Core, which also inspects the nested errors of the certificate validator (both paths now throw the validation result with `ThrowIfInvalid`). Only validity period, host name, URI and usage errors keep their own code, and audit events still carry the specific result. The CTT warning is gone. ### Sample data - Monitor Value Change V2 `020.js` skipped because `Scalar_Static_Arrays_ByteString` had a 1-byte and a 3-byte element. The script checks every element, and the simulation only padded elements 0–2. The seed value now has no element shorter than four bytes, and the simulation pads every element. - Monitor Value Change V2 `042.js` got 18 of 19 notifications. The missing item is the Float matrix: its element [1,1] was `-1.03179664E+33`, where adding 1 is below Float precision, so the value really did not change. The server did not drop a notification. The element is now `-1031.79664`. ## CTT results after the fixes \| Group \| Result \| \| --- \| --- \| \| Monitored Item Services (208) \| Monitor Value Change V2 44/44. Remaining: Monitor Basic `039.js` (C17, missing include), `038.js` warning (C32), and 1–2 sporadic timestamp-tolerance warnings that move between test cases from run to run. \| \| Node Management Services (15) \| Only Add Node `Err-008.js` (Mantis 11266). \| \| Security General (314) \| Certificate Validation: 23 pass, 24 not implemented, 3 not-applicable skips. None CreateSession/ActivateSession: all pass. The other 50 CUs are Not Implemented in scripts 1.05.513. \| \| Security User Token (66) \| Anonymous `002.js` (C35) and User Name Password 2 `015.js` (C36) fail because of CTT defects. X509: 18/18 automated cases pass. \| ## CTT defects documented (`plans/ctt-issues.md`) - C32 `038.js` compares a RevisedSamplingInterval of 0 with a project setting instead of the node's MinimumSamplingInterval or the server's MinSupportedSampleRate. - C33 `020.js` requires every ByteString element to be ≥ 4 bytes, but its message says elements 0–2. - C34 `RequestedNewNodeId()` always sends `ns=1`, regardless of `RequestedNodeId_Namespace`, so client NodeIds can't be enabled. - C35 Security User Anonymous picks the `opc.wss` endpoint, which the CTT cannot open (`BadNotSupported`). - C36 `UaEndpointDescription.FindTokenType` rewrites the cached endpoints' token policies, so `015.js` reports PolicyIds as reused. The server's GetEndpoints output was verified compliant (PolicyIds unique per configuration, Mantis 11258). - Evidence added to C9 (042.js) and issue 17 (015.js). `plans/ctt-testing.md` gains how to run the Monitored Item/Node Management groups and a recommended setup for the security groups: isolated PKI from `copyToServer`, no `-a`, PKI restore per part, and waiting for `Server started`. Other findings recorded there: - the Create/DeleteMonitoredItems timing warnings are jitter; - `LoginNameAccessDenied` is not a real user; - `samples\UAReferenceServer.ctt.xml` needs no change (enabling `RequestedNodeId` breaks six Add Node cases because of C34). Note: `plans/ctt-testing.md` and the refreshed `plans/ctt-issues.md` are introduced by #4482. The plans files here are based on #4482's versions, and new entries start at C32 because #4481 uses C19–C31. Please merge after #4482 (or rebase the plans files onto it). ## Tests - `NodeStateChildNameIndexTests` (Opc.Ua.Types.Tests): index semantics (duplicates, remove, rename, replace, re-parent, clone, shrink/grow, 2,000 random operations against a linear search). Also a scan guard: 5,000 misses against 50,000 children take 97 ms with the index and 7,083 ms with it disabled. - `AsyncCustomNodeManagerNodeManagementTests.AddNodeAsync_DuplicateBrowseNameUnderParentWithManyChildren…` - `TcpServerChannelCertificateErrorTests` (Opc.Ua.Core.Tests): masked vs reported certificate errors. - Opc.Ua.Server.Tests 5,553 passed, Opc.Ua.Core.Security.Tests 556 passed, Opc.Ua.Core.Tests (Security + Stack) 3,561 passed, InformationModel NodeManagement 26 passed (net10.0). - Opc.Ua.Types.Tests 10,404 passed and 1 failed: `WotSpecFixtureManifestTests.EveryEmbeddedExampleMatchesItsRecordedHash`. That test hashes WoT assets which are `eol=lf` in the index but CRLF in this worktree's checkout; no WoT file is touched by this PR. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the CLA and read the CONTRIBUTING doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using UA.slnx against .NET Framework and .NET 10 (net10.0 suites listed above only). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: romanett <7413710+romanett@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-15 10:08:30 +00:00
romanett	aee30e9bf6	Echo the RequestHandle in ServiceFaults for requests that cannot be decoded (#4488 ) # Description OPC 10000-4 §7.33 (ServiceFault): "The requestHandle in the ResponseHeader should be set to what was provided in the RequestHeader even if these values were not valid." When the decoder rejects a request, for example a string argument above `MaxStringLength` (`BadEncodingLimitsExceeded`), the server answered with a ServiceFault carrying RequestHandle 0 and no Timestamp. The OPC Foundation CTT reports this: "CallResponseHeader.RequestHandle does not match expected RequestHandle. Expected: 18 Received: 0". It was seen during the CTT GDS triage of #4481, with a FindApplications ApplicationUri of MaxStringLength + 10 % characters. ### Changes - `RequestHandleReader` (new, internal, `Opc.Ua.Core`) reads the RequestHandle best effort from a message that could not be decoded: - binary: the encoding NodeId, then the leading RequestHeader fields AuthenticationToken (NodeId), Timestamp (UtcTime) and RequestHandle (UInt32); - JSON: `UaBody.RequestHeader.RequestHandle`, ignoring same-named members anywhere else. It returns 0 when the handle cannot be read. - `TcpServerChannel` / `TcpListenerChannel`: new `SendServiceFault` overloads take the RequestHandle, and faults now carry a response Timestamp. `ProcessRequestMessage` (decode failure, null request, discovery-only rejection) and the OpenSecureChannel error path pass the handle. This covers `opc.tcp`, the Kestrel TCP listener and UA-SC over WebSocket, which all use `TcpServerChannel`. - `EndpointBase.CreateFault`: - new internal overload with a fallback RequestHandle for a request that was not decoded; - the Timestamp is always set; - no longer dereferences a null RequestHeader. - `HttpsTransportListener`: - The JSON path and both JSON-over-WebSocket loops (`opcua+uajson`, OpenAPI) now echo the handle read from the payload. - Discovery-only faults use the handle of the decoded request. ### ⚠️ Behaviour change for reviewers: HTTPS binary A binary HTTPS request the decoder rejects used to get HTTP 500 with a text body and no ServiceFault. It now gets HTTP 200 with a ServiceFault carrying the decoder status and the echoed RequestHandle, the same as the JSON path in the same listener. Other exceptions in that path still return HTTP 500. OPC 10000-6 §7.4 does not specify how an HTTPS server reports an undecodable request. The existing test `SendAsyncReturnsInternalServerErrorForInvalidBodyAsync` was replaced by `SendAsyncRespondsWithServiceFaultForInvalidBodyAsync`. If HTTP 500 should be kept, that hunk can be reverted independently. WebApi REST (`WebApiServer`) already echoed the handle and is unchanged. ### Tests - `RequestHandleReaderTests`: - binary messages above MaxStringLength, with numeric and string authentication tokens, from a byte array and from a stream; - truncated and null input; - JSON field order, decoy `RequestHandle` members, wrong types and malformed JSON; - `CreateFault` fallback and precedence. - `TcpServerChannelBufferTests.UndecodableRequestServiceFaultEchoesRequestHandleAsync`: feeds a ReadRequest with a 640-character NodeId (MaxStringLength 64) through `TcpServerChannel`. It asserts that the sent ServiceFault has `BadEncodingLimitsExceeded`, RequestHandle 4711, the request id and a Timestamp. - `HttpsTransportListenerTests`: the binary ServiceFault for an invalid body, the echoed handle for an oversized binary request, and the echoed handle for an undecodable JSON request. - No unit test covers the two JSON-over-WebSocket loops; the test infrastructure has no WebSocket driver, and the change there is mechanical. Local results (net10.0): - `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests`: 4,669 passed, 0 failed, 88 skipped. - `Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https.WebApi.Tests`: 346 passed. - `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests`: 2,266 passed. `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` also builds for net48. `dotnet format whitespace --verify-no-changes` passes on the changed files. ## Related Issues - Found while triaging the CTT GDS group in #4481 (`plans/ctt-issues.md` there, "Open server findings"). ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-14 18:51:49 +00:00
romanett	747f635518	Fix the Opc.Ua.Core defects from the server/core audit (#4475 ) # Description Fixes every `src/Opc.Ua.Core` item found by a twelve-reviewer audit of `src/Opc.Ua.Server` + `src/Opc.Ua.Core` taken at `0e600c0f0`, across all three tiers of that report (security/data-loss/crash, confirmed functional, and reviewer-traced). The `src/Opc.Ua.Server` half of the audit is deliberately out of scope here and remains open. ## Security and resource safety - Explicitly configured trusted certificates were ignored. `CertificateTrustList.TrustedCertificates` (the `<TrustedCertificates>` config element, `SecurityConfiguration.AddTrustedPeer`) never reached the validator, so a peer trusted only that way was rejected with `BadCertificateUntrusted`. The list now travels from configuration through `TrustListEntry` into `TrustListState`, and is consulted both when deciding trust and when completing a chain — OPC 10000-4 6.1.3: "The list of trusted Certificates may contain a Certificate issued to another Application or it may be a Certificate belonging to a CA". The store is still consulted first, so a CA configured both ways keeps its CRL check. Cached validation cores are evicted when a trust list is re-registered, so a reconfiguration actually takes effect. - Unauthenticated receive-buffer leak. `SaveIntermediateChunk` now always takes ownership of the chunk: it either stores it or returns it to the `BufferManager`. A server without a `None` endpoint gives every TCP client a discovery-only channel, and each non-discovery request leaked one `ReceiveBufferSize` buffer. Added `TakeSavedChunks` for the "body already saved" case; passing the chunk again would have queued the same buffer twice. A channel torn down while a multi-chunk message is still arriving now releases what it had buffered, which nothing did before. - Decrypted OpenSecureChannel buffers are returned when verification fails, including the sibling paths where the sequence-number or certificate check rejects the message after the body was handed back. - RSA Diffie-Hellman peer values are validated against `2 <= y <= p-2` (RFC 7919 5.1), so the shared secret can no longer be forced to a known constant by sending 0, 1 or p-1. - `RemovePadding` verified no padding at all for channel messages: the loop started at `data.Offset` and stopped at `paddingSize`, so on any message with a header it ran zero times. The filler loop is corrected — OPC 10000-6 6.7.2.5.1: "The value of each byte of the padding is equal to PaddingSize" — and the signature is now checked before the padding is inspected so the two failures cannot be told apart. - Key material zeroing on the ECC secret path: the plain text, the derived key and IV, and the ECDH shared secret, on both sides. The decrypt wipe covers the failure path too, which is the one that matters — the body is decrypted in place before the signature is verified. - HTTPS responses are read with `ResponseHeadersRead` and bounded by `MaxMessageSize`, instead of the whole body being allocated before the limit was applied. - `X509CertificateStore.IsRevokedAsync` reports an unanswerable revocation check as `BadCertificateRevocationUnknown` instead of throwing. The throw surfaced as an unsuppressible `BadCertificateInvalid` and failed every CA-issued certificate on Linux and macOS. See reviewer note 2. - Certificate handle ownership: `ClientChannelManager` AddRefs what it hands to a transport that disposes it (and releases it again when the channel never opens), `CertificateTrustList` releases the handle `Add` took its own reference to, and `X509CertificateStore` disposes the platform handles nothing else owns. ## Transport - The receive loop is now one atomically swapped epoch of (transport, token), so a reconnect that binds a new socket to an existing channel supersedes the old loop rather than racing it. Previously the supersede path was unguarded and could start two readers on one socket, dispose an in-use `CancellationTokenSource`, and leak one per reconnect. - A reconnect hand-over detaches the transport before closing anything, so the socket the adopted channel now answers on is not closed underneath it. Previously the queued `OpenSecureChannelResponse` failed with `BadConnectionClosed` and reconnect to a dropped channel could never succeed. - A blocked or unservable accepted socket is closed rather than left open until process exit. - An invalid response sequence number reconnects the channel instead of throwing into a handler that did nothing, which left the pending request hanging until timeout. OPC 10000-6 6.7.7 requires the receiver to close the channel, and the same section requires the error to be logged — which `HandleMessageProcessingError` now does instead of discarding it silently. - The abort chunk is encoded against the room the chunk has rather than what it currently holds, so a short offending chunk can still carry the error body (OPC 10000-6 6.7.3). ## Discovery and endpoints - `GetEndpoints` no longer drops the HTTPS and WSS JSON/OpenAPI endpoints, and no longer collapses them onto the binary one (the dedup ignored `TransportProfileUri`). `profileUris` filtering matches them too — OPC 10000-4 5.5.4.2 defines it as the "List of Transport Profile that the returned Endpoints shall support", and a client asking for the JSON profile previously got an empty list back. Results are ordered deterministically with binary first, so a client that takes the first endpoint that fits keeps getting the one it got before these twins were published. ## Smaller confirmed defects `FilterEvaluator.InList` returned after the first string operand; `SelectedUserTokenPolicy` setter always ended at `-1`; `Utils.UpdateExtension` could not delete; a lease holder never stepped down while the shared store was unreachable or hanging; `IsUriHttpRelatedScheme` never matched `http`; `SessionLessServiceMessage` dropped a single `LocaleId`; `GetRandomDouble` used `ToSingle` and typed variant arrays ignored the requested `builtInType`; source-generated log calls never reached the trace file. ## Related Issues - No tracking issue was opened for this work; it derives from an audit report rather than a filed issue. Happy to open one and link it if maintainers prefer. ## Notes for reviewers 1. `MaxRejectedCertificates` semantics. `ICertificateStore.AddRejectedAsync` documented "0 is unlimited", but `DirectoryCertificateStore` wrote every certificate and then deleted all of them at 0 (net effect: store nothing), and `CertificateManager` clamped a negative value onto 0 and depended on that to implement "clear the store". `SharedKeyValueCertificateStore` meanwhile treated 0 as genuinely unlimited, so the two store types did opposite things at the same setting. This PR keeps the existing observable behaviour (0 or less keeps no history and clears what is stored), removes the write-then-delete-all churn, aligns the KV store, and corrects the interface doc and `docs/DependencyInjection.md`. The KV store is the one place whose behaviour changes relative to master. 2. Revocation status where X509Store has no CRLs. `IsRevokedAsync` used to throw there, which surfaced as an unsuppressible `BadCertificateInvalid` and failed every CA-issued certificate on Linux and macOS - the outage the audit flagged. It now returns `BadCertificateRevocationUnknown`, which is what the Windows branch of the same method and a directory store without a CRL already return, and the status `RejectUnknownRevocationStatus` decides on (OPC 10000-4 6.1.3, Find Revocation List). With the default policy the certificate is accepted; an operator who opted into strict mode gets a rejection, as before on master. An earlier revision returned `BadNotSupported`, which the validator discards outright and which made revocation fail open even in strict mode; review caught it. 3. `ManagedChannelKey` gained a `TransportProfileUri` property and an optional trailing constructor parameter. Source-compatible, but it is public API. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. ### Regression test coverage Each of these fails against `master`'s source and passes with the fix. \| Fix \| Test \| \|---\|---\| \| Padding filler bytes were never verified \| `CryptoUtilsSymmetricPaddingTests` — forged filler rejected, plus a round trip over every padding length \| \| Padding removed before the signature was checked \| `CryptoUtilsSymmetricPaddingTests.SymmetricDecryptReportsSignatureFailureAheadOfPadding` \| \| RSA-DH peer value not range checked \| `RsaDiffieHellmanPeerValueTests` — 0, 1, p-1, p, above p, both range boundaries, group mismatch \| \| A degenerate DH nonce threw instead of being rejected \| `UaSCBinaryChannelNonceTests` \| \| `<TrustedCertificates>` never reached the validator \| `CertificateValidationCoreTests` (peer, issuer, and the negative control), `CertificateManagerTests.ExplicitlyTrustedPeerFromConfigurationIsAcceptedAsync` \| \| Cached validation cores survived a trust-list change \| `CertificateManagerTests` — registration after a failed validation, and `UpdateAsync` onto a different store \| \| `MaxRejectedCertificates` normalisation \| `CertificateManagerTests.MaxRejectedCertificatesNormalisesNegativeValues` \| \| `AddRejectedAsync` retention contract \| `RejectedCertificateRetentionTests` — both store types, at zero, negative and a positive cap \| \| PEM rewrite left the old tail behind \| `DirectoryCertificateStoreTests.DeleteFromAMultiCertificatePemFileTruncatesTheFileAsync` \| \| `IsRevokedAsync` threw where CRLs are unsupported \| `CertificateStoreTest.IsRevokedAsyncReportsNotSupportedWithoutCrlSupportAsync` (runs on Linux/macOS, ignored on Windows) \| \| ECC secret left in the caller's buffer \| `EncryptedSecretTests.EccDecryptWipesThePlainTextFromTheCallersBufferOnFailure` \| \| Trust-list read leaked a handle per entry \| `CertificateTrustListHandleTests` \| \| A channel that never opened leaked its certificate \| `ClientChannelManagerHandleTests` \| \| Chunk ownership, CLO double free, chunk-limit teardown \| `TcpServerChannelBufferTests` (4 new) \| \| Receive loop did not follow a replaced transport \| `TcpServerChannelDeterministicTests` (3 new) \| \| HTTPS body unbounded, failures unmapped \| `HttpsTransportChannelResponseTests` (5) \| \| JSON/OpenAPI endpoints dropped, collapsed, or unordered \| `ServerBaseTransportProfileTests` (12) \| \| Channel key ignored the transport profile \| `ClientChannelManagerManagedTests` (2 new) \| \| `SelectedUserTokenPolicy` setter always ended at -1 \| `ConfiguredEndpointTests` (4 new) \| \| `UpdateExtension` could not delete \| `UtilsAdditionalTests` (3 new) \| \| A single `LocaleId` was dropped \| `SessionLessServiceMessageTests` (2 new) \| \| `GetRandomDouble` / typed variant arrays \| `DataGeneratorTests` (4 new) \| \| `TraceLoggerProvider.IsEnabled` short-circuited every log call \| `TraceLoggerProviderTests` (3 new) \| \| A leader never stepped down on an expired lease \| `SharedStoreLeaseElectionTests` (3 new) \| \| `FilterEvaluator.InList`, `IsUriHttpRelatedScheme` \| existing tests corrected in the first commit \| Not covered. The reconnect hand-over ordering, the OpenSecureChannel decrypted-buffer returns, the client-side bad-sequence reconnect, the abort-chunk sizing and the listener closing a blocked socket all need a two-socket reconnect or a full asymmetric OpenSecureChannel exchange, which the deterministic channel harness does not model. They are exercised by the integration suites but not asserted on directly. ## Spec conformance Where a fix has a normative basis I checked it against the published specification rather than only against the audit report: \| Change \| Reference \| \|---\|---\| \| Every padding filler byte is verified \| OPC 10000-6 6.7.2.5.1 — "The value of each byte of the padding is equal to PaddingSize". The loop started at `data.Offset` and stopped at `paddingSize`, so on any message with a header it ran zero times and no filler byte was ever checked. \| \| Signature verified before the padding is inspected \| OPC 10000-6 6.7.2.5.1 — the signature "includes the headers, all Message data, the PaddingSize and the Padding"; 6.7.7 — the chunk "shall not be interpreted until the Message is decrypted and the signature and sequence number verified". \| \| Message-processing errors are logged \| OPC 10000-6 6.7.7 — "the receiver shall log a Bad_SequenceNumberInvalid error", and stacks "shall have a mechanism to log errors when invalid Messages are discarded". The handler was an empty method. \| \| A bad response sequence number reconnects the channel \| OPC 10000-6 6.7.7 — "the receiver shall close the communication channel". It previously threw into that empty handler and the pending request hung until timeout. \| \| The trust list's own certificates are honoured as peers and as issuers \| OPC 10000-4 6.1.3 — "The list of trusted Certificates may contain a Certificate issued to another Application or it may be a Certificate belonging to a CA". \| \| The abort chunk is sized by the chunk's capacity \| OPC 10000-6 6.7.3 — the abort body is `Error` plus a `Reason` string, so a chunk shorter than the error body could not carry it. \| \| JSON/OpenAPI endpoints are published and match `profileUris` \| OPC 10000-4 5.5.4.2 — `profileUris` is the "List of Transport Profile that the returned Endpoints shall support"; a client asking for the JSON profile previously got an empty list. \| \| RSA-DH peer value restricted to `2 <= y <= p-2` \| RFC 7919 5.1, which the finite-field policies are built on. I found no OPC-specific wording for this. \| One point where the spec argues against the current shape is called out in reviewer note 2 below. ### Test runs On net10.0, with `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` and `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates.Tests` also run on net48. The remaining suites were not run on the .NET Framework targets locally, so that checklist box stays unchecked. \| Suite \| Result \| \|---\|---\| \| Opc.Ua.Core.Tests (net10.0) \| 4630 passed, 0 failed, 88 skipped \| \| Opc.Ua.Core.Tests (net48) \| 4545 passed, 0 failed, 104 skipped \| \| Opc.Ua.Core.Security.Tests \| 556 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates.Tests (net10.0) \| 355 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates.Tests (net48) \| 353 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Configuration.Tests \| 227 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Core.Encoders.Tests \| 2929 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https.WebApi.Tests \| 346 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server.Tests \| 783 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Client.Tests \| 2217 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Server.Tests \| 5552 passed, 0 failed \| \| Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests \| 778 passed, 0 failed, 379 skipped \| \| Opc.Ua.Gds.Tests \| 1117 passed, 0 failed \| `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` reports 379 skipped; that is identical to a `master` baseline run in a separate worktree (security policies the platform does not advertise), not a regression from this change. `dotnet format whitespace --verify-no-changes` reports no violations in any file this PR touches. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-14 08:22:41 +02:00
romanett	30ed2390a8	Import NodeSet2 documents into a fluent node manager (#4432 ) ## What `INodeManagerBuilder.Import(UANodeSet, INodeSetImportFactoryProvider?)` lets a source-generated (or hand-written fluent) node manager overlay a NodeSet2 document that is only known at runtime onto the model it was generated from. Every document imported during one `Configure` pass forms a single batch that is linked exactly once after the pass. A node may therefore declare a `ParentNodeId` that lives in another document of the batch, or a node the manager already owns — which is what makes an overlay possible. Imported nodes resolve through `Node(...)`/`NodeFromTypeId(...)` immediately, so they can be wired in the same pass; they are registered with the manager when `CompleteConfigureAsync` runs. ### Public surface - +1 method: `INodeManagerBuilder.Import(UANodeSet nodeSet, INodeSetImportFactoryProvider? factoryProvider = null)`. - +3 contracts in `Opc.Ua.Server.Nodes`: `INodeSetImportFactoryProvider`, `INodeSetImportFactory`, `NodeSetImportDiscriminator` (TypeDefinition / MethodDeclaration / NodeId). - In `Opc.Ua.Export`: a public `UANodeSet.Import` overload taking a `NodeSetImportStateFactory`, and a public batch `LinkParentChildRelationships(context, nodes, NodeSetImportLinkOptions)`. These replace what would otherwise have been an `InternalsVisibleTo("Opc.Ua.Server")` on `Opc.Ua.Types`. - `NodeState.IsExplicitlyDefinedChild(context, child)` and `protected DetachExplicitlyDefinedChild(child)`, used to tell a generated slot apart from an ordinary child. ### Typed states, no reflection The generator emits `{Model}NodeSetImportFactoryProvider` — one factory per model type/declaration, each calling a concrete constructor for an empty state — and makes the generated node manager implement `INodeSetImportFactoryProvider` by delegating to it. So the builder resolves the provider from the manager (`NodeManager as INodeSetImportFactoryProvider`); `Import` also accepts one directly, and the generated manager exposes `partial void AddNodeSetImportFactories(List<INodeSetImportFactory>)` for dependency models. An imported node of a generated type materializes as its generated `*State` subclass with no type lookup, which keeps the path NativeAOT-safe. Because the factories create empty states, an imported instance carries exactly the children its document declares. ### Reconciliation When an imported child lands in a slot the generated parent declares (same BrowseName), it replaces the generated placeholder: the displaced node and every descendant the document does not carry over are removed from the manager, and references to them are retargeted at the replacement. Replacing a node the same `Configure` pass already wired is rejected with `BadInvalidState` rather than silently dropping the wiring, and sealing a builder with an unregistered import batch is rejected too. ### Also - `RuntimeNodeSetNodeManager` now uses the same importer: its documents are one batch, so a node may declare a parent in another document of the group regardless of parse order, and duplicate NodeIds across documents are detected while parsing. - Linking resolves an imported child's reference type from its own inverse reference (previously always `HasComponent`/`HasProperty`). - Method import keeps the document's `UserExecutable`; it previously copied `Executable` into it. View import keeps `EventNotifier`. ## Tests - `NodeSetImporterTests` (15) — discriminator selection, generic fallbacks, field/value/reference fidelity against a generic import, cross-document linking, typed replacement of inherited and argument slots, deferred linking preserving an application `Handle`, duplicate NodeIds, factory misuse. - `NodeSetImportBuilderTests` (15) — staging and lookup before registration, batch linking, attaching to an existing node, provider resolution, placeholder replacement with reference retargeting, configured-placeholder rejection, seal/completion guards. - `NodeSetImportIntegrationTests` (5) — a generated `[NodeManager]` overlaying its own model on a running server: typed states through the generated provider, cross-document linking, placeholder replacement, and browse through a session. - `NodeManagerGeneratorTests` (+4) — the emitted provider and the manager's delegation, including that no factory uses `Activator.CreateInstance`/reflection. - `NodeSetAotTests` (+1) — the public state-factory import under NativeAOT. Full `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` (4946), `Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core.Tests` (3821), `Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Tests` (165) and `Opc.Ua.Types.Tests` pass locally on net10.0. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-07 23:12:43 +00:00
romanett	d9efda1d7d	Make certificate leak assertions immune to concurrent test activity (#4440 ) # Description `UaSCBinaryClientChannelDeterministicTests` had a concurrency bug that made the full `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` suite fail on master (`e8bec27d5`), while the fixture passed 25/25 when run filtered. ``` dotnet test tests/Opc.Ua.Core.Tests/Opc.Ua.Core.Tests.csproj -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 => Failed: 1, Passed: 4391, Skipped: 86, Total: 4478 => ReadAsymmetricMessageHeaderDisposesSenderChainWhenReceiverCertificateMissing Assert.That(Certificate.InstancesCreated - createdBefore, Is.EqualTo(Certificate.InstancesDisposed - disposedBefore)) Expected: 1 But was: 2 ``` Cause. The three `ReadAsymmetricMessageHeaderDisposesSenderChain` tests took a baseline of `Certificate.InstancesCreated` / `InstancesDisposed` — static, process-wide counters — ran one parse, then asserted the two deltas were equal. The fixture is `[Parallelizable]`, so any certificate a concurrently running test allocated inside the measured window inflated the created delta without a matching dispose. Which test lost the race varied by environment (locally `...WhenReceiverCertificateMissing`, on GitHub Actions `test-ubuntu-latest-Core` the sibling `...WhenReceiverThumbprintMismatches`), which is itself evidence of a race rather than a product defect. The product path is fine — the assertion passes whenever the window is uncontended. Fix.* Observe the exact handles the header parser allocated rather than global counters. `ReadAsymmetricMessageHeader` disposes the sender chain and clears the `out` parameter when validation fails, so the chain is unreachable from the caller; an `internal SenderCertificateChainParsedForTest` hook now surfaces it the moment it is parsed. It is reachable through the existing `InternalsVisibleTo Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` and follows the `IsHeldBySomeContextForTest` precedent in `ChannelGate`. The tests snapshot those handles — a copy without `AddRef`, since a disposed `CertificateCollection` clears itself and throws on enumeration — and probe each one with `AddRef()`, the only observable that distinguishes a released core from a live one. The probe handle is disposed immediately, so the refcount is untouched. Non-null and non-empty assertions guard against a vacuous pass. The fixture stays `[Parallelizable]`; `[NonParallelizable]` was rejected as it only narrows the window and costs suite time. ## Audit of the other counter readers \| Site \| Status \| \| --- \| --- \| \| `CertificateValidationHelpersTests.ConstructionFailureDisposesAlreadyBuiltCertificates` \| Converted. It asserted an absolute `created - before == 1`. Its own factory delegate builds the instances, so it now tracks them directly — no product change needed. \| \| `CertificateManagerTests` (`GetIssuersAsync`) \| Left as-is. Already `[NonParallelizable]` on the test; the window spans a whole trust-list resolve, where instance capture isn't practical. \| \| `UaSCBinaryLoopbackTests.FailedReconnectDisposesCandidateCertificateHandlesAsync` \| Left as-is. Fixture is `[NonParallelizable]`; measures a full TCP reconnect. \| \| `TrustedIssuerStoreResolverTests` (PubSub.Mqtt) \| Left as-is. No `[Parallelizable]` on the fixture and no assembly-level attribute, so it runs in NUnit's non-parallel shift. \| \| `LeakDetectionSetup` \| Left as-is. Assembly-level teardown, where the global counters are the correct observable. \| ## Verification - Three full (unfiltered) `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` runs on net10.0: 0 failed, 4392 passed, 86 skipped, 4478 total — one more pass than the 4391 on master. A filtered run cannot reproduce this failure, so the full suite is the only meaningful check. - Negative control: temporarily removing the product's `senderCertificateChain?.Dispose()` failed all three tests with `Expected: True, But was: False`, then reverted. The new assertions still detect a genuine leak. - Not run locally: the full UA.slnx solution against .NET Framework. Leaving that to CI. ## Related Issues No tracked issue — this is a test-infrastructure fix for a failure observed on master and in the `test-ubuntu-latest-Core` CI job. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. _(Opc.Ua.Core.Tests on net10.0 only — see Verification.)_ - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-07 22:57:43 +00:00
romanett	ede0b68154	Fix reverse-connect certificate leak and stale-connection retry (#4386 ) Two related robustness fixes on the reverse-connect / UA-SC handshake path, both surfaced by the Sessions suite. ## 1. Certificate handle leak in the asymmetric header parse `UaSCBinaryChannel.ReadAsymmetricMessageHeader` parses the sender certificate chain (`Utils.ParseCertificateChainBlob`, allocating fresh `Certificate` handles) and then runs several validations that can throw — invalid/missing sender thumbprint, no matching receiver certificate, receiver thumbprint mismatch, missing receiver thumbprint. The chain is returned through an `out` parameter, so a throw never reaches the caller's `using (senderCertificateChain)` in `ReadAsymmetricMessageAsync`, and the freshly parsed chain is abandoned. For a self-signed leaf that is exactly the intermittent `created == disposed + 1` seen on the Release leak gate under coverage instrumentation. This is the third sibling of the two concurrent-reconnect ownership leaks closed in #4356. Fix: wrap the post-allocation region in a `try/catch` that disposes the chain before rethrowing (validation logic unchanged). Test: `ReadAsymmetricMessageHeaderDisposesSenderChainWhenReceiverThumbprintMismatches` crafts a header with a valid sender certificate and a mismatched receiver thumbprint; without the fix it reproduces `created=3, disposed=2` and trips the assembly leak gate, with the fix it passes. ## 2. Stale reverse-connection retry A reverse connection the `ReverseConnectManager` delivers can already have been closed by the server before the secure-channel handshake runs: a server rotates and times out the outbound connections it offers, so the one matched here — especially after an `updateBeforeConnect` discovery round consumed an earlier one — may be stale. That surfaced as an intermittent `BadConnectionClosed` ("Remote side closed the connection") failing the whole connect (e.g. `ReverseConnect2Async(true,true,…)`). Fix: wrap reverse-connect session creation in `DefaultSessionFactory` in a bounded retry (3 attempts) that requests a freshly delivered connection when an attempt fails with a connection-drop status (`BadConnectionClosed` / `BadNotConnected` / `BadSecureChannelClosed`). Non-transient failures and cancellation still surface immediately; the bound prevents an unbounded loop against a genuinely unreachable server. ## 3. Test-host crash: NULL channel map in the inactivity timer `TcpTransportListener.DetectInactiveChannels` (a fire-and-forget inactivity-timer callback) iterated `m_channels` without holding `m_lock`, while `CloseAsync` disposes the timer and nulls `m_channels` under the lock. Disposing an `ITimer` does not join an already-dispatched callback, so a late callback dereferenced the now-null map and threw an unhandled `NullReferenceException` on a thread-pool thread, crashing the process. This intermittently aborted the `test-macOS-latest-Client` host. Fix: snapshot `m_channels` and return early when null (mirroring the existing guarded read on the accept path). Deterministic regression test invokes the callback on a listener whose channel map is null (its state before `OpenAsync` / after `CloseAsync`) and asserts it does not throw. ## Verification - `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` Stack.Transport/Client/Server: 2178 passed, leak gate green. - Coverage-instrumented `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` (the CI leg): 775 passed, 0 failed, leak gate green. - Reverse-connect suite (`ReverseConnect*`): 52 passed with the retry. - `Opc.Ua.Core` and `Opc.Ua.Client` build warning-free (net10.0, net48, netstandard2.1, net472). Note: the reverse-connect failure is a rare timing flake (0 reproductions in 88 local attempts), so fix #2 addresses the root cause identified from the ADO log and is validated by construction plus regression rather than by a captured local repro. ## Related - Follows #4356 (concurrent channel reconnect certificate leaks). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Marc <marcschier@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-02 12:24:42 +02:00
Marc Schier	8d3eccd41c	Fix concurrent channel reconnect certificate leaks (#4356 ) # Description Fix the intermittent one-certificate leak reported by the macOS Sessions suite. The leak had two concurrent ownership paths: 1. `ChannelEntry.OpenInitialAsync` could complete after a reconnect cycle had already installed a newer transport. The initial-open path overwrote `m_underlying`, orphaning the reconnect transport and its certificate handles. 2. `UaSCUaBinaryTransportChannel.ReconnectAsync` did not dispose a newly created inner channel when `ConnectAsync` failed. Initial-open cleanup could also be skipped when it reused the caller's already-cancelled token. The fix keeps the transport installed first, closes and disposes the losing candidate, disposes failed reconnect candidates, and performs failed initial-open cleanup independently of caller cancellation. This also adds opt-in Release allocation tracking for outstanding `Certificate` handles. Set `OPCUA_CERTIFICATE_LEAK_TRACKING=1` to include allocation stacks and NUnit suite attribution in leak failures. The contributor workflow is documented in `docs/DeveloperGuide.md`. ## Tests and verification - Added a deterministic `ChannelEntry` race test that orchestrates concurrent initial open and reconnect, then verifies the losing transport is closed and disposed. - Added deterministic UA-binary transport tests for failed reconnect certificate cleanup and retry after a cancelled initial open. - Pre-fix macOS diagnostic run reproduced 3 leaks in 15 full Sessions runs: https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/33329288604 - Post-fix targeted macOS run passed 50/50 exact reproducer executions: https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/33334875967 - Post-fix full macOS run passed 15/15 complete Sessions suites: https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/33335718790 - Full local net10 Sessions suite passed: 775 passed, 379 skipped, 1,154 total. - Focused ownership regressions passed on net10 and net48. - `Opc.Ua.Core` built warning-free across all supported target frameworks. - Final branch Build/Test, CodeQL, and NuGet workflows passed. The temporary reproduction workflow and trigger tags were removed after verification. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4338 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [x] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-31 15:04:50 +02:00
Marc Schier	06ae192084	Fix CI failures tracked by #4299 (#4308 ) ## Summary - stabilize the History, authentication lockout, Robotics, redundancy, and DI tests reported in #4301-#4305 - fix the closed-transport buffered-write completion deadlock that hung `ConnectMultipleSessionsAsync` - add macOS crash diagnostics for #4306 and retain evidence for root-cause analysis - run macOS tests and NativeAOT in GitHub Actions pull requests, using supported Intel and ARM64 runners, while keeping every Azure macOS definition disabled by default - move all remaining source-level `InternalsVisibleTo` declarations into project files so signed OpenUSD builds receive the repository public key ## Local validation - MCP PubSub: 29 passed - History focused tests: 3 passed - Sessions lockout: 3 passed - Sessions multiple-session regression: 3 passed - deterministic binary client channel tests: 22 passed - Robotics runtime: 34 passed - Redundancy focused tests: 4 passed - OpenUSD net10.0: 914 passed - affected OpenUSD projects build on net10.0 and net48 Refs #4299, #4300, #4306 Fixes #4301 Fixes #4302 Fixes #4303 Fixes #4304 Fixes #4305 --------- Copilot-Session: 7cb486de-8b4c-43c5-a900-e7d2e0ad04a8	2026-08-22 19:30:19 +00:00
Marc Schier	aad8350bc1	Pluggable symmetric cryptography, an awaitable asymmetric path, registrable security policies, and PubSub crypto offboarding (#4206 , #4207 , #4208 , #4210 ) (#4232 ) # Description Closes the three crypto-offboarding follow-ups split out of #4192. Each was recorded there as knowingly not done, with the reason and what would justify revisiting it. Those conditions are met, and where one of them turned out to be unachievable that is written down rather than worked around. The safety property throughout: every seam is opt-in and null-checked, and in the default software configuration the added code is observably inert. No interface dispatch on the per-message path, and the asynchronous paths complete synchronously — so channel locking order, buffer ownership and error sequencing are unchanged for a deployment that configures nothing. ## #4207 — symmetric, key-derivation and RNG provider seams `ISymmetricCryptoProvider`, `IKeyDerivationProvider` and `ISecureRandomSource`, added on the terms #4207 set: only once a concrete requirement arrived (a validated module that must perform every operation, not just the asymmetric ones), behind a fast path, with `SymmetricChannelCryptoBenchmarks` as the gate. They are facets discovered by type test, not members of `ICryptoProvider`, so providers written against the shipped interface still compile. `PlatformCryptoProvider` implements all three, which answers the "an interface nothing implements" objection recorded in the issue. `CryptoProviderFacets` returns `null` both when no registry is configured and when resolution lands on the platform, because the platform facets are the inline code. Resolution happens once, in `CalculateSymmetricKeySizes`, and is held for the life of the channel. `CryptoCompliance.GetUnservedOperationPurposes` closes the failure the seam would otherwise introduce: a provider bound to `ChannelSymmetric` without implementing the facet is silently replaced by the platform, so a deployment could believe its validated module performed the per-message cryptography while the platform did. Under `FipsOnly` that now refuses to start. ## #4208 — the asymmetric path is awaitable `RSA` and `ECDsa` are .NET's contracts and cannot be replaced without making every ready-made hardware and cloud implementation unusable. Instead an implementation may also declare `IAsyncRsaKey` / `IAsyncEcdsaKey`, which the stack finds by type test. Now asynchronous: the secure channel open and renew path, user identity token signing and decryption, and session activation. A software key declares neither facet, so those paths complete synchronously and nothing about their ordering changes. `ReadAsymmetricMessage` is refactored into shared helpers rather than duplicated — adding an `await` was not worth two hundred cloned lines of signature, padding and endpoint-selection logic. `AsymmetricMessage` / `AsymmetricWriteResult` exist because an asynchronous method cannot have `out` parameters. The channel no longer serialises its state on a monitor. A monitor cannot be held across an `await`, and a plain `SemaphoreSlim` was not an option at the time: the code relied on re-entrancy in eight places (`HandleIncomingMessage` holds the lock and calls `ForceChannelFault`, which takes it again; `ForceReconnect` and `Shutdown` do the same). `ChannelGate` replaces it at 32 sites and `DataLock` is `[Obsolete]`. That reliance has since been removed as well — see [Removing the gate's re-entrancy](#removing-the-gates-re-entrancy) below. ### Defects this surfaced, all fixed and regression-tested Detached work started inline. Writes were started with `_ = WriteBuffersAsync(...)`. An async method runs its prologue on the caller's stack, so `LeaveInheritedContext` — which exists to stop detached work inheriting the right to re-enter the gate — was stripping the caller's own entitlement; when the send then completed synchronously, the completion blocked on a gate that very thread was holding. The client sent its OpenSecureChannel request and never processed the response. Writes are now queued. A synchronous gate handle held across an `await`. `Enter()` records the acquiring thread so an inline completion callback can re-enter — `ChannelAsyncOperation` invokes its callback both inline and detached. That record is only sound while the holder is synchronously on that thread; the token renewal path held it across an await, so a reused pool thread was recognised as the holder. `SignAsync` rejected the policy that signs nothing. It validated the certificate before the algorithm, so `SecurityPolicies.None` — which carries no certificate — threw where the synchronous `Sign` returns `null`. `EnterAsync` lost the holder when contended (found in review). The `AsyncLocal` recording ownership was written inside the awaiting method, and .NET restores the caller's execution context when an async method completes, so the write was discarded. The caller returned owning the semaphore while `IsHeldByCurrentContext` reported `false` — and any nested `Enter()` then blocked forever on a gate its own context held. Reachable remotely: `HandleIncomingMessageAsync` → error path → `ForceChannelFault`. The holder is now published from the caller's frame before the wait, and only its depth is raised in the continuation. Queued writes lost their order (found in review). Sequence numbers are assigned under the gate, but independently queued work items reach the transport's FIFO send lock in arbitrary order, so a peer could reject a chunk with `BadSequenceNumberInvalid`. Writes are now appended to a chain: still off the caller's stack, but a write cannot start before its predecessor finishes. ### Four more this surfaced in CI, on paths only the integration suites reach Queuing the writes to fix the deadlock above turned out to have moved three implicit guarantees, and the gate had one more liveness bug. Each was reproduced locally against a clean baseline before it was changed. A faulting channel's error message never reached the peer. A listener channel sends a UASC `Error` describing why it faulted and closes the transport as its next statement. That worked only because the write started on the caller's stack, so the bytes reached the socket first; queued, the close discarded them and the client saw `BadConnectionClosed` instead of the certificate status it was told to expect. Nine `SecurityCertValidationTests` cases assert exactly that status. The terminal error is written inline again, on a path that touches the gate only to disclaim what it inherited and reports nothing — a channel that is already faulted is owed nothing beyond its buffer. The certificate of a rejected sender leaked. An asynchronous method cannot have `out` parameters, so the asymmetric read returns a record instead. That silently dropped an ownership guarantee: an `out` parameter reaches the caller even when the method goes on to throw, so the caller's `catch` disposed the sender certificate and reported it to the audit. A return value does not — nine leaked certificates, one per rejection case, which the leak detector fails the run on. The parsed certificate is now handed to the caller before anything that can reject the message, restoring both the disposal and the audit. The gate could strand its own permit. It released only when the holder's depth returned to zero, but that depth lives in an `AsyncLocal` and is therefore shared with every context forked from the owner's — a timer callback whose timer was created inside the region, for instance. Such a context entering the gate raised the shared depth, so the owner's own exit saw a non-zero depth and returned without releasing, and nothing afterwards could: the nested exit is not the owner. Every later entry on that channel blocked forever. `Opc.Ua.Features.Tests` hung after its tests had finished, with a receive loop waiting on the gate and the server unable to stop. The owner now releases when it leaves; depth still gates re-entrancy, but liveness no longer depends on a count another context can move. Write completion throttled the writer. Reporting a completed write sat inside the ordering chain, and the client channel implements that callback by entering the gate — so every write queued behind a gate the receive loop contends for on each incoming chunk. A session with fifty subscriptions publishing continuously had its publish requests throttled enough that the client kept topping them up past its own limit, which `Subscriptions.Classic` asserts against. Completion is now reported off the chain, which covers only what ordering actually requires. ### Still synchronous, and why Certificate, certificate request and revocation list signing cannot be made asynchronous at all: `X509SignatureGenerator.SignData` is invoked by .NET's own builders. Service faults and the `Reconnect` override are reached from synchronous call sites (`SendServiceFault` alone has eight) and are left as they are behind scoped, commented suppressions. All three are documented rather than left to be rediscovered. ## #4210 — PubSub This one produced a finding rather than the API the issue asked for, and the finding is the point: > With a standard Security Key Service the key necessarily exists in process memory. `GetSecurityKeys` (Part 14 §8.3.2) returns raw key bytes over the wire, so the "key never leaves the device" property #4192 achieved for client and server cannot be achieved for PubSub through the SKS pull profile. That is a property of the specification, not of this stack. A wrapped-key envelope would change what is on the wire and break interoperability with third-party key services and publishers, so it was rejected rather than built. What is achievable is delivered: the per-message AES-CTR and HMAC route through `ISymmetricCryptoProvider`, so a validated module performs them. `IPubSubSecurityPolicy` is not modified — new members would break every implementation of it; the provider is supplied through the policy constructor. `PlatformSymmetricCryptoProvider` gained AES counter mode, which the seam should have covered anyway since the algorithm enum names it. Key lifetime is also tightened: unpacking an SKS response copied key material into intermediates that `ByteString.Create` then copied again, leaving plain keys in the heap for the lifetime of the process. Those are now zeroed. ### Two wiring gaps this depended on, both found in review The registrations above were inert, so this section originally claimed more than the code did: - `CryptoProviderConfiguration` was applied nowhere outside tests, so `AddCryptoProvider(configure)` never reached the registry in a real host. The registry now applies every registered configuration when it is first resolved — which also affects #4207's DI story. - `PubSubSecurityWrapperResolver` selected `PubSubAes256CtrPolicy.Instance`, the provider-less static singleton, ignoring the provider-backed bundles registered for it. A `FipsOnly` deployment therefore certified while the platform did the work. The resolver now selects from the registered policies; the container and `PubSubApplicationBuilder` both supply theirs. A third, smaller one: `CryptoProviderBuilder.Use` published a policy-scoped random source as the process-wide nonce source, so `.For(purpose, policyUri).Use(hsm)` redirected nonce generation for every other policy too. Only an unscoped binding does that now. ## #4206 — a provider can contribute a security policy Added in review: the policy set was fixed at compile time, so a provider could contribute key custody but not a profile. It is now table-driven and open, and the blockers #4206 listed are gone. ```csharp using IDisposable registration = SecurityPolicies.Register( new SecurityPolicyInfo("urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile", "CustomProfile") { PlatformSupport = () => true, SupportedCertificateTypes = [ObjectTypeIds.RsaSha256ApplicationCertificateType], IsDefault = true }); services.AddOpcUa() .AddCryptoProvider(crypto => crypto .For(CryptoPurpose.ChannelSymmetric, "urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile").Use(module)) .AddSecurityPolicy(customPolicy); ``` - The reflection is gone. Four lookup tables were built by reflecting over the fields of `SecurityPolicies` and `SecurityPolicyInfo`. They are one explicit table now, which removes the last reflection in `Security/Constants` — so this is a trimming and Native AOT improvement as much as a feature. - `SecurityPolicyInfo` is constructible from another assembly and carries the metadata the helpers need, so `IsPlatformSupportedName`, `GetDefaultUris`, `MapSecurityPolicyToCertificateTypes` and `GetCurveFromCertificateTypeId` read that table instead of each being hand-written. Adding a policy is one entry rather than five edits. - The dead `#if CURVE25519` conditional is deleted from `Security/Constants`. - Registration is copy-on-write, so the read path stays lock-free. Shadowing a built-in policy requires `replaceExisting: true` and is reversible by disposing the registration. `RegisterLightsUpCurvePoliciesFromOutsideCore` is the acceptance test the issue asked for: it registers `ECC_curve25519` and `ECC_curve448` from the test project and asserts they become discoverable through the public API. Registering a policy makes it advertised and resolvable; it does not supply the cryptography behind it. For those two curve profiles the in-tree key agreement is still behind a compile symbol no project defines plus a BouncyCastle dependency, so a deployment lighting them up provides the operations through a provider. That division is the point: the policy set says what is offered, the provider says who performs it. ## Removing the gate's re-entrancy Folded in from #4242, which was merged into this branch. `ChannelGate` was re-entrant, and that forced the design behind most of the defects above. A holder that awaits releases its thread, so ownership could not be tracked by thread identity — it had to live in an `AsyncLocal<Holder?>`. A logical context is inherited, so anything started while the gate was held inherited the right to re-enter and ran inside the guarded region alongside whatever started it, unless it opted out by hand via `LeaveInheritedContext()` at each of eight sites, enforced by review alone. Five of the defects listed above trace to that mechanism, including both CI hangs. So the requirement was removed rather than the mechanism, and the `AsyncLocal` then deleted itself. Every path that re-entered now calls a lock-free `Core` method (`ForceChannelFaultCore`, `ShutdownCore`, `ForceReconnectCore`, `CompleteConnectCore`), and three regions stopped running foreign code under the lock: the `RequestReceived` dispatch is deferred until the gate is released, `OnTransportError` no longer wraps the `HandleSocketError` virtual, and the callback setters and `EndpointDescription` publish a single reference with a volatile write instead of locking — the last is load-bearing, because `AsyncResultBase.OperationCompleted` invokes the reverse-hello callback inline while the gate is held. `ChannelGate` is now a `SemaphoreSlim(1,1)` behind a `Releaser`; `Holder`, the thread-identity fallback, `LeaveInheritedContext`, `IsHeldByCurrentContext` and all eight disclaimer calls are gone, with the call shape at all 32 sites unchanged. `SaveIntermediateChunk`, `GetSavedChunks` and `DoMessageLimitsExceeded` gained a `gateHeld` argument, because the client reaches them both with and without the gate and must pick the matching teardown — without it an oversized `OpenSecureChannel` response deadlocked the receive loop against itself. The remaining paths were not found by reading the code, since that is what missed them originally. A temporary strict mode made every re-entrant acquisition throw with its stack, the suite was run under it until clean, and it was deleted with the re-entrancy it measured. It caught two sites review had missed: the `EndpointDescription` property getter taking the gate, and the `RequestReceived` dispatch to application code happening inside the guarded region. Two deliberate residuals are documented for reviewers: `Dispose` no longer takes the gate (unavoidable — it is reached from `ChannelFaulted` with the gate held, where the old re-entrant acquisition excluded nothing anyway), and the deferred request dispatch builds `SecureChannelContext` just after gate release rather than under it. ## Testing New: the three seams and their platform implementations, facet discovery and resolution precedence, `FipsOnly` refusing a provider that cannot serve what it was bound to, AES counter mode (including a non-block-aligned round trip and a check that the counter carries, since one that did not would silently reuse key stream), `ChannelGate` (exclusion, re-entrancy across an await, re-entrancy on a reused thread, and the deadlocks above), the asynchronous channel paths, and the PubSub policy provider. Each review finding got a test that fails without its fix: - `ContendedEntryStillRecordsTheHolderAsync` — established contention deterministically, then re-entered; failed on the pre-fix gate. Removed with the re-entrancy it covered; `ChannelGateTests` now asserts the non-re-entrant contract instead. - `SecureClientAndTcpListenerKeepChunkOrderUnderConcurrentRequestsAsync` — 60 concurrent multi-chunk `SignAndEncrypt` requests over a real loopback listener; failed 3 runs out of 3 with the previous dispatch, passes 3 out of 3 with the chain. - `DependencyInjectionRoutesPubSubCryptoThroughTheRegisteredProviderAsync` — builds a container, registers a counting provider, wraps a message and asserts the provider actually performed the encryption and the signature. This is the assertion the PubSub claim above now rests on. - `PolicyScopedRandomBindingDoesNotEscapeItsPolicy`. Two further assertions are the ones that would catch a silent defect: a provider and the platform must produce byte-identical output — a validated module that disagreed could not interoperate — and with a software key the returned `ValueTask` must report `IsCompletedSuccessfully`, which is what makes "ordering is unchanged" checkable rather than merely asserted. `SymmetricChannelCryptoBenchmarks` gains a provider-registered variant beside the existing baseline, so the cost of the indirection is measured rather than assumed. Verified locally, every suite at or above its recorded baseline: `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` 0 warnings, 0 errors on all six target frameworks; Core 4413 (net10.0); Core.Security 617, with its certificate-leak detector clean; PubSub 1350 plus PubSub.Diagnostics 54 and PubSub.Udp 233; Features 156; Subscriptions.Classic 32; Server integration 4053; Client integration 2123; MigrationAnalyzer 151 and MigrationAnalyzer.Core 13. Zero failures in each. Core moved from 4388 to 4381 when the gate change landed — eight re-entrancy tests were removed along with the behaviour they covered, and one deadlock regression test added — and has since grown to 4413 with the registry isolation, provider-output and security-review tests. `ChannelGateTests` was rewritten around the new contract — exclusion across both entry modes, an uncontended asynchronous entry not suspending, re-entry blocking by contract, and the property that used to be the hazard: work started while the gate is held is excluded without having to opt out. Every CI failure this PR produced was reproduced locally, diagnosed against a clean `origin/master` baseline in a second worktree, and fixed at the source. Two hangs were found from `--blame-hang-timeout` dumps read with `dotnet-dump`. One failure that looked like a candidate was confirmed not to be: an intermittent `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` connect failure, pre-existing on `origin/master` (5 of 8 baseline runs failed, versus 3 of 14 here). ### The publish request overshoot `Subscriptions.Classic.PublishRequestCountAsync` failed on the Windows net10.0 leg with 207 outstanding publish requests against a cap of `max(maxServerPublishRequest, subscriptions)` = 50. It failed in 2 of 6 pipeline builds on this branch, never on `master` in 13 sampled builds, and never locally in 12 attempts including under deliberate CPU contention. The mechanism is a genuine race. `ClassicSubscriptionEngine.QueueBeginPublish` was a check-then-act: it read `GoodPublishRequestCount`, compared it against `GetDesiredPublishRequestCount(false)`, and issued a publish if it was below. It runs on every publish completion, so n completions that overlap each read the same value, each conclude they are below the cap, and each issue — overshooting by up to n per round. The read also lags: a request only becomes visible to `GoodPublishRequestCount` once `AsyncRequestStarted` has recorded it, which happens after the request has already been sent. That code is pre-existing and was untouched by this PR. What this PR changed is how hard the race is hit: the server used to hold the channel gate across request processing, which serialised every request on a channel, so publish completions arrived one at a time. Dispatching `RequestReceived` outside the gate — an intended improvement, since a channel should not serialise on application request-processing time — lets them complete concurrently. Rather than change the publish pipeline blind, the race was first made reproducible. `ConcurrentPublishReEvaluationDoesNotExceedDesiredRequestCount` drives 64 barrier-released completions against a mocked context whose count lags the send exactly the way the session's does. It issued 64 requests where 5 were desired — the same defect the CI leg hit, now deterministic and running in milliseconds. The engine now tracks the requests it has in flight and reserves a slot with a compare-exchange before sending, so the decision and the send are one atomic step. The reservation is released when the request completes, when the send is declined, or when it throws. The repro test then issues at most the desired count. `StartPublishing` is deliberately left uncapped. It is the recovery valve that refills a pipeline whose requests are outstanding but no longer expected to return, so gating it on the in-flight count would remove the only path out of a stalled pipeline. An earlier revision of this fix did gate it, and that is the one change here that could not be justified on the evidence — it was reverted. The assertion was not loosened, retried away, or marked flaky: it caught a real throttling regression earlier in this PR and is worth keeping sharp. Validated: the repro test red before the fix and green after; `Subscriptions.Classic` 32/32 five consecutive runs on net10.0 and once on net48; `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` 2124 on net10.0 across four consecutive runs and 2127 on net48; `Opc.Ua.Subscriptions.Tests` 604 passed with this fix in place. ### The SSH.NET advisory that turned CI red repo-wide Partway through this work every build job began failing with `NU1903: Package 'SSH.NET' 2025.1.0 has a known high severity vulnerability` ([GHSA-q939-rpr3-3284](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q939-rpr3-3284), `<= 2025.1.0` affected, first patched `2026.0.0`). Nothing in the dependency graph changed — the advisory was published. Build 17026 failed on it where build 17000, two hours earlier on an identical graph, had passed every build job. SSH.NET is not referenced anywhere in the repository; it arrives transitively through `Testcontainers.Kafka`. `master` landed the remediation independently while this was being investigated (a central transitive pin to `2026.0.0`, which `CentralPackageTransitivePinningEnabled` exists for). This branch briefly carried its own identical pin, which made the merge commit hold two `PackageVersion` entries for SSH.NET and fail restore with `NU1506`. The duplicate is removed and `master` is merged, so the pin now comes from one place only. The audit was not suppressed: `NuGetAudit` stays enabled and `NU1903` stays an error. Verified after the merge — `dotnet restore UA.slnx` reports neither NU1903 nor NU1506, and `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` is 0 warnings, 0 errors with the audit live. The remaining red check in build 17026 was not from this change either. `aot-ubuntu-latest` is the intermittent `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` failure already noted above — `ReconnectSessionAsync` timed out at 30s with 135 of 136 passing. It remains below the `origin/master` baseline rate (4 of 15 sampled here against 5 of 8 on the baseline), and the managed reconnect paths are green throughout: `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` 2124 across four consecutive runs and `Opc.Ua.Subscriptions.Tests` 604. ## Documentation `docs/CryptoProvider.md` gains sections on substituting the symmetric primitives, using a key served over a network, and PubSub — including what cannot be claimed and why, the scope rule for a random-source binding, and how to supply a provider-backed policy outside the container. `docs/MigrationGuide.md` covers the `[Obsolete]` channel virtuals and `DataLock`, and the non-re-entrant gate's contract for channel subclasses. `docs/WhatsNewIn2.0.md` is updated. `plans/cryptooffboard.md` is deleted now that the work it planned has landed. ## Note for reviewers This touches the secure channel handshake, which is the most security-critical code in the stack. Nine distinct concurrency and lifetime defects were found and fixed in it during this work — three during development, two in review, four from CI — so `ChannelGate`, the write path and the certificate ownership across the new suspension points deserve the closest reading. Five of those nine traced to the gate's `AsyncLocal`, which is why the re-entrancy was subsequently removed and the `AsyncLocal` deleted. The wrapper/`Core` split and the two documented residuals in that section are the parts most worth a second reading. The #4206 work removes the last reflection from `Security/Constants` and rewrites the policy lookup tables, so `SecurityConfiguration.SupportedSecurityPolicies` and the endpoint set it feeds are worth a second look: an earlier revision of it changed that set and broke six server tests, which is now covered by `SecurityConfigurationBuildsExpectedSupportedPolicySet`. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4206 - Fixes #4207 - Fixes #4208 - Fixes #4210 - Follow-up #4250 — this PR makes the security policy set injectable, but nothing in the stack resolves `ISecurityPolicyRegistry` from DI yet, so every production path still lands on the `Default` fallback. #4250 tracks threading it through `Session` and `UaSCBinaryChannel`, which is what makes the injection points already added here load-bearing. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [x] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed all PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 7a68ca72-83e8-496c-b2f5-3df4c718320b Copilot-Session: 3f5ab76a-c0ba-4f47-87ac-54d1f4182c6b	2026-08-15 05:23:20 -07:00
Marc Schier	d9c77cd23f	Validate HTTPS client trust and CRL algorithms (OPC UA HTTPS / RFC 5280) (#4027 ) # Description This draft splits the certificate-related changes from #4021, sourced only from commits `31350bf3b` and `1aed3b7ed`. - Enforces OPC UA HTTPS trust-list semantics for every presented client certificate, even when platform TLS/OS trust reports no policy errors. This prevents OS trust from bypassing the configured UA HTTPS trust list. - Passes the full TLS-supplied certificate chain to the UA validator and selects `TrustListIdentifier.Https`, preserving intermediates for application-level chain validation. - Uses the signature generator's exact `AlgorithmIdentifier` in both the CRL `TBSCertList` and outer `CertificateList`. RFC 5280 §5.1.1 requires these inner and outer identifiers to match; independently encoding the inner value could disagree with the actual signature algorithm. ## Validation - HTTPS certificate-validation tests: net10.0 (6 passed), net48 (6 passed). - CRL tests: net10.0 (95 passed), net48 (95 passed). - `Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https` and `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates`: netstandard2.1 builds succeeded with 0 warnings and 0 errors. - `git diff --check` passed. ## Related Issues - Split from #4021. ## Checklist _Only verified claims are checked._ - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-21 20:47:40 +02:00
Marc Schier	1d2a7c8d00	Complete partial vectored UA-TCP sends (OPC 10000-6) (#4028 ) # Description Stream socket semantics permit a successful vectored send to complete after fewer bytes than requested. The previous one-shot send treated that legal partial completion as a closed connection and left the remaining bytes unsent, risking truncation of an OPC 10000-6 UA-TCP message chunk. The transport now continues sending while advancing across copied buffer segments, without mutating the caller's `BufferCollection`, and rejects zero-byte or impossible over-reported sends. ## Validation - `TcpByteTransportTests`: net10.0 (10 passed), net48 (10 passed). - `git diff --check` passed. ## Related Issues - Split from #4021. ## Checklist _Only verified claims are checked._ - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran all tests locally using the UA.slnx solution against at least .net framework and .net 10, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed all failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and all CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed all PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-21 07:21:35 +02:00
Marc Schier	8538f531e7	Update paths for the consolidated repository layout	2026-07-16 06:26:05 +02:00
Marc Schier	7cec2d614d	Move repository files to the consolidated layout	2026-07-16 06:25:54 +02:00

31 Commits