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fix/encoder-stack-depth-json-flake
5
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1da9fc0543 |
Redundancy.Server session mirroring: fix fast reconnect lifecycle (#4627) (#4704)
Fixes #4627 — the eight Redundancy.Server session mirroring defects (HotAndMirrored fast reconnect). ## Changes | ID | Fix | |----|-----| | RS-1 | The owning replica mirrors a liveness heartbeat (`LastContactAt`), written at most once per quarter of the session timeout while the client uses the session (`DistributedSessionOptions.LivenessInterval`, default 1 s). A restore expires the timeout after the later of the last activation and the last mirrored contact, plus the heartbeat's maximum lag. | | RS-2 | Entries record their owning replica (`OwnerId`). Only the owner mirrors and deletes the entry. A restore takes ownership with a conditional write. A stale copy on the previous replica is dropped without deleting the entry, both when its heartbeat sees the change and when the client fails back to it. `ISharedSessionStore` gains `TryReplaceAsync`, `TryRemoveAsync` and `EnumerateAsync`. Over a store without CAS (the CRDT gossip store) they fall back to compare-then-write. | | RS-3 | A restored session keeps the SessionId from `CreateSession`: `Session.RequestedId`, and `DiagnosticsNodeManager` honours a requested id when it is free. `DistributedSessionManager` mints GUID SessionIds that are unique across the replica set. Continuation points therefore stay under one owner id across repeated failovers. | | RS-4 | Sessions whose user token is encrypted with an ECC/RSA-DH EphemeralKey are flagged. Their restore is rejected up front (`EphemeralKeyUnavailable`), before anything is consumed or counted as a failed authentication. The documented option from the issue was chosen over mirroring ephemeral private keys. | | RS-5 | New `SessionManager.AdmitRestoredSessionAsync` hook: the mirrored nonce is consumed only after the restored activation has passed the signature, identity and continuity checks. If a restored session's first activation fails, the session is discarded without the virtual close, so the shared entry is untouched. Restored copies that are not admitted now also release their diagnostics node, and `CurrentSessionCount` is balanced for restored sessions. | | RS-6 | Expired entries are deleted on restore and by a periodic sweep (`SweepInterval`, default 5 min). The sweep also purges consumed-nonce markers that no live entry references and that are older than `NonceMarkerRetention` (default 1 h), via `ISingleUseNonceRegistry.PurgeAsync`. | | RS-7 | `SharedKeyValueSessionStore` and `DistributedSessionManagerFactory` now throw for an external store without an `IRecordProtector`, as the DI registration already does. Pass `NullRecordProtector.Instance` to opt out explicitly. | | RS-8 | Entries carry the original server certificate. A restored session accepts a client signature over either that certificate or its own one (`Session.OriginalServerCertificate`). | Entries are now written at `SecurityStateVersion` 5. Entries at versions 3 and 4 can still be restored, without an owner. ### API changes (Redundancy.Server) - New members on `ISharedSessionStore` and `ISingleUseNonceRegistry`. - An optional `TimeProvider` parameter on `SharedSingleUseNonceRegistry`. - New `DistributedSessionOptions` properties. - `SharedSessionEntry` v5 fields. - `SharedKeyValueSessionStore` and `DistributedSessionManagerFactory` throw for external stores without a protector. ## Tests - New unit tests for every finding: the restore/heartbeat/ownership/sweep/SessionId paths of `DistributedSessionManager`; store conditional writes, the CAS fallback and v5 round-trips; the registry purge; the factory/store guard; base `SessionRestoreTests` (admitted once, discarded on validation failure or rejected admission); and `SessionOriginalServerCertificateTests`. - New end-to-end test `SessionUsedPastItsTimeoutFailsOverWithItsSessionIdAsync`. The client uses the session for 2× its timeout, then fails over. The test checks that the SessionId is preserved and that the standby serves that SessionId and owns the entry. It also closes the stale copy and checks the entry survives. With the heartbeat disabled, the test fails as expected. - Local net10.0 runs: Redundancy.Server.Tests 883/883, Server.Tests 8347 passed / 5 skipped, Sessions.Tests 849 passed / 379 skipped (the usual baseline). The net48 build is clean. The Redundancy session tests pass on net48; the ECC-only cases are skipped there. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9b034f8291 |
Enable nullable reference types centrally; migrate all unset and annotations-only projects (#4700)
# Description Nullable reference types are now enabled once, in `common.props`, and every project in the repository builds warning-clean with them. **Configuration** - `<Nullable>enable</Nullable>` lives in `common.props`. All per-project `<Nullable>` settings are removed: 178 project files (enable, annotations, and the `disable` in the three Aot test projects). - 419 per-file `#nullable enable`/`restore` directives and the 4 `#nullable disable` directives are removed. - Kept on purpose: - The 5 `<auto-generated>` schema files (`UANodeSet.cs`, `UA Type Dictionary.cs`, `OPCBinarySchema.cs`, `SecuredApplication.cs`, `PInvokeHelper.cs`) keep `#nullable enable`. The compiler ignores the project setting in generated code, so the directive is required there. - `tests/Opc.Ua.Interop.LegacyPeer` keeps `disable`. It builds against the 1.5.378 packages and does not import the repository props. - `docs/DeveloperGuide.md` and `.github/copilot-instructions.md` now describe the central setting. **Migration** (the 43 unset and 13 annotations-only projects, roughly 10k diagnostics) - **Production code: annotated at the declarations.** Covers `tools/Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core`, `src/Opc.Ua.Lds.Server` and the LDS sample. - Members, parameters and returns are nullable where null actually flows. - Null-check helpers carry `[NotNullWhen]` (`IsNull`, `IsValidXmlName`, `IsMethodTypeDesign`). - `CoreUtils.Format`, `Utils.Format`, `ITemplateWriter.WriteLine` take `params object?[]`. `Template.AddReplacement` takes `string?` (rendering already skips null replacements). - `IRegisteredServerStore.RegisterAsync` returns `Task<RegistrationEntry?>`: it returns null when a registration is removed. - Dereferences backed by an invariant (for example, the validated model) use `!`, so runtime behaviour is unchanged. - **Behavioural changes in production code** (small, deliberate): - `NodeSetToModelDesign` throws `InvalidOperationException` when the file is not a NodeSet. Before, it threw a NullReferenceException on the next line. - `ModelDesignValidator` starts its lookup tables empty instead of null. A redundant `if (m_nodes == null) return;` guard is gone. - **Test code: minimal annotations.** - `?` on values that can be null, `!` where the test asserts non-null. - `= null!` for fixture members assigned in SetUp. - `TryGetStructure<T>(out T? x)` where the inferred `T?` broke the `IEncodeable` constraint. - A few redundant `== null` checks on structs (`NodeId`, `ArrayOf<T>`) folded into the adjacent `IsNull`/`Count` checks. **Notes for reviewers** - The diff is large (~1,500 files) but almost entirely mechanical: `?`, `!` and directive removal. The non-annotation changes are listed above. - Known follow-up, not done here: `IModelDesign.Namespaces/TargetNamespace/NamespaceUris` stay non-nullable even though the validator returns null before it loads a dictionary. Making them nullable would ripple through every generator call site. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4439 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. The "no new warnings" box covers net10.0 and net48: full non-incremental builds of `UA.slnx`, `tools/SourceGeneration.slnx`, `tools/MigrationAnalyzer.slnx` and the Aot test projects finished with 0 warnings and 0 errors under the repository's warnings-as-errors settings. net9.0 and net8.0 also had no nullable diagnostics, but they were not rebuilt after the final fixes. Tests have not been run locally yet. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d98eb6b28c |
Fix server session defects found by a spec-checked review of CreateSession, ActivateSession, session lifecycle and continuation points (#4632)
# Description
Fixes defects found by a spec-checked review of the server session
implementation: CreateSession, ActivateSession, the session lifecycle
(per-request validation, CloseSession, Cancel, timeout, shutdown) and
session continuation points. Each finding was checked against OPC
10000-4 (§5.7, §7.9, §7.32), OPC 10000-5 (session diagnostics and audit
events) and OPC 10000-6 §6.8.2.
There is one commit per finding, and each commit message cites the spec
section. A max-effort code review of the fixes then found 15 more
issues, mostly regressions the first round introduced; they are fixed in
the `revfix` merges.
## What changed
**CreateSession**
- At MaxSessionCount the oldest session that was never activated is
closed to make room (§5.7.2.1). Sessions that are activated, already
closing, or have an activation in flight are never evicted. The victim
is claimed atomically, so a late activation commit on it is rejected.
- `requestedSessionTimeout` NaN is revised. A malformed `endpointUrl` no
longer fails the call with Bad_UnexpectedError. `serverUri` is ignored,
as §5.7.2.2 requires.
- Unnamed sessions get distinct names.
- Session diagnostics now report `MaxResponseMessageSize` and
`ServerUri`, and `SessionSecurityDiagnostics.Encoding` uses the
specified names ("UA Binary", "XML", "JSON").
- AuditCreateSessionEvent carries SecureChannelId and the request
certificate, also on failure.
- Every rejected CreateSession is counted, and only once. A rejection
during server startup no longer turns into Bad_UnexpectedError.
- If an `OnApplicationCertificateError` override accepts an error, the
certificate is now kept and the remaining checks still run. A
certificate accepted this way does not grant TrustedApplication or
application-based roles.
**ActivateSession**
- EphemeralKey handling follows OPC 10000-6 §6.8.2:
- A key used to decrypt a UserName or IssuedToken secret is retired and
replaced in the same commit.
- A key that was not used is kept, and nothing is returned.
- ECDHPolicyUri is honoured; an unsupported policy gets
Bad_SecurityPolicyRejected.
- Request parameters are no longer echoed back.
- After the activation commits, a failure or cancellation no longer
faults the response, which would hide the new server nonce. Post-commit
callbacks run uncancellably.
- An activation that overlaps a session close or timeout fails with
Bad_SessionClosed instead of returning Good.
- The PolicyId of an AnonymousIdentityToken is validated.
- Status codes now follow §5.7.3.3:
- Bad_ApplicationSignatureInvalid for a mismatched client-signature
algorithm
- Bad_UserSignatureInvalid for a mismatched X509 user-token signature
algorithm
- Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid for an undecodable token or an unknown policy
- `ClientUserIdOfSession` keeps the user of the first activation.
**Lifecycle and requests**
- Requests on an expired or closing session are rejected with
Bad_SessionClosed (§5.7.2.1). A CloseSession on an expired session that
is not yet closing is still processed as the client's close and honours
`deleteSubscriptions`.
- Closing a session aborts its outstanding requests with
Bad_SessionClosed. A request that registers after that abort pass is
rejected too.
- Cancel completes the matching requests with
Bad_RequestCancelledByClient (§5.7.5.1). It also reaches requests still
waiting in the request queue, but only when both timestamps prove the
request was sent earlier.
- There is one AuditCancelEvent per Cancel call, carrying the client's
audit entry id and user.
- Every close path goes through a single close claim, so
SessionAbortCount, SessionTimeoutCount and the "Session/Terminated" and
"Session/Timeout" audits are each counted once.
- Teardown that started cannot be cancelled. Requests rejected by
session validation are counted.
**Continuation points**
- HistoryRead returns Bad_NoContinuationPoints instead of evicting
points of the same request (§7.9). Only the request that saved a point
pins it, so points from prior requests can still be freed.
- Points saved by a HistoryRead that faults are released.
- Session-less Browse and BrowseNext no longer dereference a null
session.
## Behaviour changes reviewers should know about
- At the session cap, CreateSession evicts a non-activated session
instead of returning Bad_TooManySessions. The eviction is counted in
SessionAbortCount.
- Clients see Bad_SessionClosed for requests on expired or closing
sessions, and Bad_RequestCancelledByClient for cancelled requests.
- `ActivateSessionProcessAdditionalParameters` is now called on every
successful activation, with or without an AdditionalHeader.
- If an `OnApplicationCertificateError` override returns instead of
throwing, CreateSession now accepts the certificate.
- Timeout and termination audits are now raised after the session
teardown.
- The only public API changes are additive overloads in `AuditEvents`
and `RequestManager`.
**Known partial fixes:**
- The session's `maxResponseMessageSize` is reported but not enforced;
only the channel limit applies.
- With overlapping ActivateSession calls on one session, an earlier
response can still carry a key that a later activation has already
replaced. Closing that fully needs a new `ISession` member.
## Related Issues
- The Redundancy.Server session-mirroring findings from the same review
are tracked separately in #4627.
## Tests
- Regression tests cover each finding. The new files are:
- `CreateSessionSpecRegressionTests`
- `ActivateSessionValidationRegressionTests`
- `StandardServerActivateSessionRegressionTests`
- `SessionLifecycleRegressionTests`
- `SessionRequestAdmissionRegressionTests`
- `HistoryReadContinuationDispatchTests`
Existing test classes were extended too.
- Local results on net10.0:
- `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests`: 7883 passed / 0 failed / 5 skipped
- `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests`: 790 passed / 0 failed / 379 skipped (same as
master)
- net48 Release build of `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests`: 0 errors / 0 warnings.
## Checklist
- [x] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [ ] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fde50c5700 |
Enforce ActivateSession transfer and reconnect security (OPC 10000-4 §5.7.3.1) (#4050)
# Description This draft isolates the Session/ActivateSession, reconnect, and distributed Session security work split from #4021. ### Failure - `ActivateSession` could transfer a Session to a new SecureChannel without consistently enforcing the original client certificate, MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, and exact OPC `ClientUserId` semantics. - Missing or legacy distributed Session security state did not provide enough information to validate transfer safely. - Malformed or reused nonces, concurrent activation, and cancellation could leave activation state inconsistent. - Client reconnect could treat recoverable Session-loss/security responses as fatal, reuse a Session after client-certificate rotation, or report a managed channel ready before Session recreation completed. ### Fix - Serialize activation, consume server nonces once, validate application signatures and user tokens asynchronously, and enforce transfer continuity against the original channel and authenticated identity. - Persist versioned transfer-security state for distributed Sessions and fail closed when certificate, identity, activation, or nonce state is absent or invalid. - Validate server signatures/nonces on the client, recreate Sessions for certificate rotation and recoverable activation failures, and await participant recreation before transitioning the managed channel to `Ready`. - Make the restart recovery integration test use bounded reconnect cycles instead of a fixed startup delay. ### Specification - OPC 10000-4 §5.7.2.2 — CreateSession signatures and nonces. - OPC 10000-4 §5.7.3.1 — ActivateSession identity continuity and SecureChannel transfer. - OPC 10000-4 §6.1.8 — application nonce generation, validation, and reuse requirements. ### Validation - `git diff --check` - Release `net10.0`: `Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server.Tests` 567/567 plus the targeted server Session, Subscription transfer, ClientUserId, client reconnect and certificate rotation suites pass. - Release `net48`: the same redundancy suite (567/567) and the targeted Session/Subscription suites pass. - Full `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` run on `net10.0`: 3633/3634. The single failure, `ServerFluentApiHostingTests.ConfigureApplicationBuildsSharedClientAndServerConfigurationAsync`, reproduces identically on the unmodified commit and is a local certificate-store path issue rather than a regression. These were targeted validation runs; no long-soak result is claimed. |
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7cec2d614d | Move repository files to the consolidated layout |