9 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
romanett	d552634258	Enable ECC security policies on net48 via a BouncyCastle raw-ECDH polyfill (#4703) ... Closes #4510. ## Summary OPC UA Part 6 feeds the **raw** ECDH shared secret into HKDF. .NET Framework only exposes `ECDiffieHellman.DeriveKeyMaterial`, which always hashes it, so the ECC SecureChannel and user-token policies were unavailable on `net48` (`SecurityPolicies.GetInfo` returned `null`). This adds a BouncyCastle polyfill for just that primitive: - **`Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates/Org.BouncyCastle/EcdhRawAgreement.cs`** (`net48` only): an internal `DeriveRawSecretAgreement(this ECDiffieHellman, ECDiffieHellmanPublicKey)` extension using `ECDHBasicAgreement`. It returns the X coordinate padded to the field size, exactly like the .NET 8 BCL method. Keys stay CNG keys; ECDSA signatures and HKDF stay on the platform — only the agreement step is managed code. The point is validated (on curve, not infinity) and mismatched curves are rejected. - Because the extension mirrors the .NET 8 signature, `Nonce.GenerateSecret` now has one code path on every target. - `SupportsRawEccSecretAgreement()` is removed; the CBC-based ECC policies (`ECC_nistP256`, `ECC_nistP384`, `ECC_brainpoolP256r1`, `ECC_brainpoolP384r1`) are offered on every target (still subject to OS curve support). - BouncyCastle was already a `net48` dependency of `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates`; no new package. (Only `net48` is downlevel now — `netstandard2.1`/`net472` from the issue text are no longer targets.) **Not in scope:** the `_AesGcm` / `_ChaChaPoly` ECC variants (and PubSub DTLS) still need .NET 8 because .NET Framework has no AEAD ciphers — follow-up stacked on this branch. ## Docs `EccProfiles.md` (Known limitations), `migrate/2.0.x/certificates.md`, `ProductionChecklist.md`, `Profiles.md`, `WhatsNewIn2.0.md`. Calls out that on `net48` the agreement step does not run in a FIPS/validated module. ## Tests (local) | Suite | Result | |---|---| | `Opc.Ua.Core.Tests` full, net48 | 5956 passed, 0 failed | | `EccInteropTests` net48 vs 1.5.378 peer (net8.0, native raw ECDH) | 26 passed; 28 skipped (AEAD + curve25519/448) — all four CBC curves, both directions, UserName tokens, token renewal | | `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` ECC filter, net48 | 52 passed, 0 failed | | Server `SessionCoverageTests`/`EphemeralNonce*`, Configuration builder tests, net48 | all pass | | Nonce/ECC/EncryptedSecret + session tests, net10.0 | all pass | New tests: symmetric agreement on all four curves; on net48 an oracle against CNG (`SHA256(raw) == DeriveKeyFromHash`); curve mismatch and off-curve rejection. Tests that asserted the old net48 limitation were updated. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-08 21:52:44 +02:00
romanett	9b034f8291	Enable nullable reference types centrally; migrate all unset and annotations-only projects (#4700) ... # Description Nullable reference types are now enabled once, in `common.props`, and every project in the repository builds warning-clean with them. **Configuration** - `<Nullable>enable</Nullable>` lives in `common.props`. All per-project `<Nullable>` settings are removed: 178 project files (enable, annotations, and the `disable` in the three Aot test projects). - 419 per-file `#nullable enable`/`restore` directives and the 4 `#nullable disable` directives are removed. - Kept on purpose: - The 5 `<auto-generated>` schema files (`UANodeSet.cs`, `UA Type Dictionary.cs`, `OPCBinarySchema.cs`, `SecuredApplication.cs`, `PInvokeHelper.cs`) keep `#nullable enable`. The compiler ignores the project setting in generated code, so the directive is required there. - `tests/Opc.Ua.Interop.LegacyPeer` keeps `disable`. It builds against the 1.5.378 packages and does not import the repository props. - `docs/DeveloperGuide.md` and `.github/copilot-instructions.md` now describe the central setting. **Migration** (the 43 unset and 13 annotations-only projects, roughly 10k diagnostics) - **Production code: annotated at the declarations.** Covers `tools/Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core`, `src/Opc.Ua.Lds.Server` and the LDS sample. - Members, parameters and returns are nullable where null actually flows. - Null-check helpers carry `[NotNullWhen]` (`IsNull`, `IsValidXmlName`, `IsMethodTypeDesign`). - `CoreUtils.Format`, `Utils.Format`, `ITemplateWriter.WriteLine` take `params object?[]`. `Template.AddReplacement` takes `string?` (rendering already skips null replacements). - `IRegisteredServerStore.RegisterAsync` returns `Task<RegistrationEntry?>`: it returns null when a registration is removed. - Dereferences backed by an invariant (for example, the validated model) use `!`, so runtime behaviour is unchanged. - **Behavioural changes in production code** (small, deliberate): - `NodeSetToModelDesign` throws `InvalidOperationException` when the file is not a NodeSet. Before, it threw a NullReferenceException on the next line. - `ModelDesignValidator` starts its lookup tables empty instead of null. A redundant `if (m_nodes == null) return;` guard is gone. - **Test code: minimal annotations.** - `?` on values that can be null, `!` where the test asserts non-null. - `= null!` for fixture members assigned in SetUp. - `TryGetStructure<T>(out T? x)` where the inferred `T?` broke the `IEncodeable` constraint. - A few redundant `== null` checks on structs (`NodeId`, `ArrayOf<T>`) folded into the adjacent `IsNull`/`Count` checks. **Notes for reviewers** - The diff is large (~1,500 files) but almost entirely mechanical: `?`, `!` and directive removal. The non-annotation changes are listed above. - Known follow-up, not done here: `IModelDesign.Namespaces/TargetNamespace/NamespaceUris` stay non-nullable even though the validator returns null before it loads a dictionary. Making them nullable would ripple through every generator call site. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4439 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. The "no new warnings" box covers net10.0 and net48: full non-incremental builds of `UA.slnx`, `tools/SourceGeneration.slnx`, `tools/MigrationAnalyzer.slnx` and the Aot test projects finished with 0 warnings and 0 errors under the repository's warnings-as-errors settings. net9.0 and net8.0 also had no nullable diagnostics, but they were not rebuilt after the final fixes. Tests have not been run locally yet. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-08 08:48:13 +02:00
romanett	d98eb6b28c	Fix server session defects found by a spec-checked review of CreateSession, ActivateSession, session lifecycle and continuation points (#4632) ... # Description Fixes defects found by a spec-checked review of the server session implementation: CreateSession, ActivateSession, the session lifecycle (per-request validation, CloseSession, Cancel, timeout, shutdown) and session continuation points. Each finding was checked against OPC 10000-4 (§5.7, §7.9, §7.32), OPC 10000-5 (session diagnostics and audit events) and OPC 10000-6 §6.8.2. There is one commit per finding, and each commit message cites the spec section. A max-effort code review of the fixes then found 15 more issues, mostly regressions the first round introduced; they are fixed in the `revfix` merges. ## What changed **CreateSession** - At MaxSessionCount the oldest session that was never activated is closed to make room (§5.7.2.1). Sessions that are activated, already closing, or have an activation in flight are never evicted. The victim is claimed atomically, so a late activation commit on it is rejected. - `requestedSessionTimeout` NaN is revised. A malformed `endpointUrl` no longer fails the call with Bad_UnexpectedError. `serverUri` is ignored, as §5.7.2.2 requires. - Unnamed sessions get distinct names. - Session diagnostics now report `MaxResponseMessageSize` and `ServerUri`, and `SessionSecurityDiagnostics.Encoding` uses the specified names ("UA Binary", "XML", "JSON"). - AuditCreateSessionEvent carries SecureChannelId and the request certificate, also on failure. - Every rejected CreateSession is counted, and only once. A rejection during server startup no longer turns into Bad_UnexpectedError. - If an `OnApplicationCertificateError` override accepts an error, the certificate is now kept and the remaining checks still run. A certificate accepted this way does not grant TrustedApplication or application-based roles. **ActivateSession** - EphemeralKey handling follows OPC 10000-6 §6.8.2: - A key used to decrypt a UserName or IssuedToken secret is retired and replaced in the same commit. - A key that was not used is kept, and nothing is returned. - ECDHPolicyUri is honoured; an unsupported policy gets Bad_SecurityPolicyRejected. - Request parameters are no longer echoed back. - After the activation commits, a failure or cancellation no longer faults the response, which would hide the new server nonce. Post-commit callbacks run uncancellably. - An activation that overlaps a session close or timeout fails with Bad_SessionClosed instead of returning Good. - The PolicyId of an AnonymousIdentityToken is validated. - Status codes now follow §5.7.3.3: - Bad_ApplicationSignatureInvalid for a mismatched client-signature algorithm - Bad_UserSignatureInvalid for a mismatched X509 user-token signature algorithm - Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid for an undecodable token or an unknown policy - `ClientUserIdOfSession` keeps the user of the first activation. **Lifecycle and requests** - Requests on an expired or closing session are rejected with Bad_SessionClosed (§5.7.2.1). A CloseSession on an expired session that is not yet closing is still processed as the client's close and honours `deleteSubscriptions`. - Closing a session aborts its outstanding requests with Bad_SessionClosed. A request that registers after that abort pass is rejected too. - Cancel completes the matching requests with Bad_RequestCancelledByClient (§5.7.5.1). It also reaches requests still waiting in the request queue, but only when both timestamps prove the request was sent earlier. - There is one AuditCancelEvent per Cancel call, carrying the client's audit entry id and user. - Every close path goes through a single close claim, so SessionAbortCount, SessionTimeoutCount and the "Session/Terminated" and "Session/Timeout" audits are each counted once. - Teardown that started cannot be cancelled. Requests rejected by session validation are counted. **Continuation points** - HistoryRead returns Bad_NoContinuationPoints instead of evicting points of the same request (§7.9). Only the request that saved a point pins it, so points from prior requests can still be freed. - Points saved by a HistoryRead that faults are released. - Session-less Browse and BrowseNext no longer dereference a null session. ## Behaviour changes reviewers should know about - At the session cap, CreateSession evicts a non-activated session instead of returning Bad_TooManySessions. The eviction is counted in SessionAbortCount. - Clients see Bad_SessionClosed for requests on expired or closing sessions, and Bad_RequestCancelledByClient for cancelled requests. - `ActivateSessionProcessAdditionalParameters` is now called on every successful activation, with or without an AdditionalHeader. - If an `OnApplicationCertificateError` override returns instead of throwing, CreateSession now accepts the certificate. - Timeout and termination audits are now raised after the session teardown. - The only public API changes are additive overloads in `AuditEvents` and `RequestManager`. **Known partial fixes:** - The session's `maxResponseMessageSize` is reported but not enforced; only the channel limit applies. - With overlapping ActivateSession calls on one session, an earlier response can still carry a key that a later activation has already replaced. Closing that fully needs a new `ISession` member. ## Related Issues - The Redundancy.Server session-mirroring findings from the same review are tracked separately in #4627. ## Tests - Regression tests cover each finding. The new files are: - `CreateSessionSpecRegressionTests` - `ActivateSessionValidationRegressionTests` - `StandardServerActivateSessionRegressionTests` - `SessionLifecycleRegressionTests` - `SessionRequestAdmissionRegressionTests` - `HistoryReadContinuationDispatchTests` Existing test classes were extended too. - Local results on net10.0: - `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests`: 7883 passed / 0 failed / 5 skipped - `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests`: 790 passed / 0 failed / 379 skipped (same as master) - net48 Release build of `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests`: 0 errors / 0 warnings. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [ ] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-03 05:42:01 +02:00
romanett	61edaa1ed0	Remove netstandard2.1 and net472 target frameworks (#4624) ... # Description Drops support for **netstandard2.1** and **.NET Framework 4.7.2**. Libraries now target `net48`, `net8.0`, `net9.0` and `net10.0`. `Opc.Ua.Types` and `Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core` still also target `netstandard2.0`, but only because the Roslyn source generators load them. There is no general netstandard2.0 support. **Preprocessor directives** (112 files) - Every `#if`/`#elif` mentioning `NETSTANDARD2_1*`, `NET472*`, `NET_STANDARD_TESTS`, `SKIP_ECC_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SIGNING` or `NETSTANDARD*` was evaluated against the remaining TFM set (net48, net8/9/10, plus netstandard2.0 inside `Opc.Ua.Types`/`tools`) and simplified. Dead branches were removed. - Example: `NETSTANDARD2_1 || NET8_0_OR_GREATER` → `NET8_0_OR_GREATER`. - Example: `NET8_0_OR_GREATER || NET472_OR_GREATER` → removed (always true). - Netstandard-only code was removed: `UnixFileModeShim`, the CRDT reflection path in `ReplicatedGossipOptions.CreateReaderOptions`, and the netstandard2.1-only test variants. **Custom test logic** - `targets.props` drops the `net472`, `netstandard2.0` and `netstandard2.1` `CustomTestTarget` profiles, `NetStandardTests` and `SKIP_ECC_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SIGNING`. Supported values are now `net48`, `net8.0`, `net9.0`, `net10.0`. - The `NET_STANDARD_TESTS` define is removed from 29 test projects. - The "build netstandard shells as net10.0" overrides are removed from 18 projects. - `RestrictForLegacyTfm` now only applies to `net48`. - `tests/customtest.bat` is updated to the new values. **Build / packaging / CI** - MSBuild TFM conditions are simplified: Kestrel package choice, MQTTnet v4 (net48 only), BouncyCastle, Di/OpenUsd/Vision/Stress test excludes, and `System.IO.FileSystem.AccessControl` (dropped from Core). - The MigrationAnalyzer nuspec drops its net472/netstandard2.1 lib groups. The Azure signing lists are updated. - `get-ci-matrix.ps1` removes the net472/netstandard test profiles (including the PR-gating `linux-netstandard2.1`) and the matching build legs. **Breaking API change (2.0 preview):** removed `HttpsTransportListener.IsWssTransportSupported` and `ReplicatedGossipOptions.IsGossipStateDecodingSupported`. They only returned `false` on netstandard2.1 and are now always `true`. The test guards that used them were removed as well. **Docs** - NuGet READMEs, `README.md`, `DeveloperGuide.md`, `PubSub.md`, the certificate/ECC/identity docs and the 2.0 migration guide (plus its `.agents` skill mirror) are updated. - The migration guide notes that 4.7.2 consumers must move to 4.8 and netstandard2.1 consumers to net8.0+. ### Reviewer notes - The `System.IO.FileSystem.AccessControl` `PackageVersion` pin is left in `Directory.Packages.props`. It has no direct reference any more, but transitive pinning is on, so it was kept to avoid shifting resolved versions. - The `#if` rewrite was done mechanically by a truth-table evaluator. The diff in the `.cs` files is limited to directive lines, removed dead branches, and stale-comment updates. ### Verified locally - `dotnet build UA.slnx -p:CustomTestTarget=net48`: 0 errors. - `dotnet build UA.slnx -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0`: 0 errors. - Default multi-target builds (no `CustomTestTarget`) of Opc.Ua.Types, Bindings.Https, PubSub.Mqtt and Redundancy.Server succeeded. - net10.0 tests: - Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server.Tests: 840/840 passed. - Opc.Ua.Types.Tests: 11363 passed, 1 skipped. - ModelDependencyScanner tests: 20/20 passed. - The full test suite was **not** run locally. ## Related Issues - None ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [ ] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-02 17:09:49 +02:00
romanett	a0d569d756	Fix Server and GDS audit findings, review findings and spec-conformance gaps (#4571) ... ## Summary Fixes the findings of a bug audit of `Opc.Ua.Server`, `Opc.Ua.Gds.Server` and `Opc.Ua.Gds.Client`. Rebased on master after #4516. What went in: - **Audit:** 93 findings, each checked against the OPC UA specification. - **Code review of those fixes:** 35 further findings. - **Spec grounding of every fix commit:** 18 conformance gaps, now closed. Commits are one per finding, named `Fix <ID>`, `Fix review <ID>` or `Fix spec gap <name>`. The IDs refer to the audit report (S = Server areas, G1 = GDS server, G2 = GDS client). Validation: - Each finding was traced in code and checked against OPC 10000 (parts 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 20). - Every fix commit was checked against the spec text again afterwards: 0 non-conformant, remaining gaps fixed. - Regression tests were added for most fixes. - Suites run on net10.0 before the rebase: Server, GDS, History, Configuration, Features, Core.Security, DI, Redundancy, LDS, InformationModel, PubSub.Server, Client, Sessions and the three Subscriptions suites, all green. The same suites on the rebased branch are still running; results will be posted as a comment. ## Behaviour and user-facing changes ### Secure defaults - **`Historize()` / `HistorianBuilder`** grant HistoryRead only. History writes need an explicit `historyAccessLevel: HistoryRead | HistoryWrite`. - **File-system mount:** - Anonymous sessions can no longer create, delete, move or open files for writing (`Bad_UserAccessDenied`). - UserWritable and UserExecutable now reflect the user. - `AllowAnonymousWrite` restores the old behaviour; the ReferenceServer sample turns it on. - **Default PKI root** for the hosted server, hosted GDS, hosted LDS and `OpcUaApplicationConfigurationProvider`: - Moved from the shared temp directory to `{LocalApplicationData}/OPC Foundation/{ApplicationName}/pki`, and startup fails if no per-user directory exists. - When certificate stores of an earlier version still exist under temp, a warning names both paths. Existing deployments that relied on the default get a new application certificate (and the hosted GDS a new CA) unless `PkiRoot` is set to the old path. - **GDS:** - `GdsServerOptions.AutoApprove` defaults to `false`. - The default KeyCredential store grants no roles unless `AuthorizeRoles` allows them. - Certificate requests (StartSigningRequest, StartNewKeyPairRequest, FinishRequest) need an encrypted channel. - **Hosted server anonymous logins:** - Anonymous is rejected (`Bad_IdentityTokenRejected`) when the default authenticator options disable it. - A custom `AddIdentityAuthenticator<T>()` on its own no longer disables anonymous. - With anonymous disabled and no configured token policies, the endpoint advertises the authenticators' token types instead of Anonymous. - **Runtime-added roles:** their properties and methods need SecurityAdmin over an encrypted channel, like the well-known roles. - **Disabled users:** users disabled through Part 18 UserManagement can no longer log in through `RegisterDefaultAuthenticators(IUserDatabase)`. ### GDS server (Part 12) - **Certificate requests:** - FinishRequest / ReadRequest with another application's RequestId returns `Bad_InvalidArgument`. - Every Start*Request returns a new RequestId. - A CSR without the ApplicationUri is rejected (`Bad_CertificateUriInvalid`). - An abstract or unsupported certificate type is rejected at Start (`Bad_InvalidArgument`). - **Private-key password:** no longer persisted in the JSON applications database. A password saved by an earlier version is read into memory once and dropped on the next save. - **CheckRevocationStatus:** validates offline against the GDS's own trust lists and CRLs. It returns Good for good GDS-issued certificates and `Bad_CertificateInvalid` for input that is not a certificate. - **Certificate-group trust lists:** - Writes need CertificateAuthorityAdmin; SecurityAdmin and application admins are read-only. - Writes are validated with the Part 4 certificate validation. - **AuthorizationService:** - The legacy RequestAccessToken applies `AccessControl` and issues the token for the session identity. - StartRequestToken passes the session identity to every identity-aware provider. - Unknown ResourceIds return `Bad_NotFound`. - Expired token requests and refresh tokens are pruned, with at most 10 000 pending requests (`Bad_TooManyOperations`). - **KeyCredential:** requests with PublicKey + SecurityPolicyUri are rejected with `Bad_SecurityPolicyRejected` (secret encryption is not implemented); a PublicKey without SecurityPolicyUri is rejected with `Bad_InvalidArgument`. - **Audit events:** access-token audit events no longer contain the password or token data. - **RegisterTickets / UnregisterTickets:** need the RegistrarAdmin role when called from a session. - **Managed application nodes:** moved from namespace 0 to their own namespace (`ManagedApplicationsNamespaceUri`); the NodeId is the ApplicationUri, and the mandatory child properties exist. - **Hosted GDS:** - New `GdsServerOptions.CertificateGroups` (`GdsCertificateGroupOptions`), bindable from configuration. - The mandatory DefaultApplicationGroup is always present. - The default CA subject uses the resolved application name. - **JSON applications database:** - A corrupt file throws instead of being silently replaced by an empty database. - Saves are atomic and write in place on bind mounts; on net8+ builds they also follow symlinks and keep the Unix file mode. - Issued certificates and trust-list links survive a reload. ### GDS client - **Trust-list download:** - Reads until an empty chunk (Part 20 short reads). - A size-limit rejection of the final end-of-file read, as sent by released servers, counts as end of file. - **Default certificate group:** a null group means DefaultApplicationGroup, and vendor groups in other namespaces are no longer mistaken for well-known groups. - **Status codes and errors:** - Missing directory proxies report `Bad_ServerNotConnected`. - Short or wrongly typed method outputs throw `BadUnexpectedError` / `BadTypeMismatch`. - **GdsAccessTokenProvider:** no longer caches a failed client task, and one caller's cancellation no longer fails other callers. ### Trust lists, push and ConfigurationFile (Part 12 / Part 20) - **AddCertificate:** - `IsTrustedCertificate=false` returns `Bad_CertificateInvalid`. - Added certificates are validated (Part 4), and a certificate revoked by a current CRL returns `Bad_CertificateRevoked`. - **CloseAndUpdate:** validates the uploaded list against its own certificates and CRLs, not the stores it replaces. Validation failures are no longer recorded in the server's Rejected store. - **RemoveCertificate:** removing a trusted or issuer CA that other certificates still need returns `Bad_CertificateChainIncomplete`. - **Handles:** - Several read handles may be open at once. - Any open while a write handle exists returns `Bad_NotReadable` / `Bad_NotWritable`. - A write open while any handle is open returns `Bad_NotWritable`. - Handles of closed sessions are released. - Idle handles close after ActivityTimeout (default 60 s). - **Status codes:** - Read clamps to the remaining bytes and no longer enforces the size limit. - Oversized Write / AddCertificate returns `Bad_RequestTooLarge`. - Unsupported open modes return `Bad_NotSupported`. - **ConfigurationFile.CloseAndUpdate:** - Empty Targets return `Bad_InvalidArgument`. - The ConfigurationUpdatedAuditEvent is raised with the configuration owner as source. - With the new `IApplicationConfigurationFileTargetProvider`, providers receive the Targets, a bad target returns Uncertain with per-target results, and session-interrupting updates are applied after RestartDelayTime. - **Default namespace permissions:** namespaces registered after the first permission lookup now get their NamespaceMetadata default RolePermissions and AccessRestrictions (no stale negative cache). ### Sessions, identity and roles (Part 18) - **Session timeouts:** a failure closing one timed-out session no longer stops the session-timeout monitor. - **ChangePassword:** an empty old password returns `Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid`. - **Removing or disabling a user:** closes only that user's UserName-token sessions. - **Role configuration changes:** roles granted by an `ImpersonateUser` mapping are kept. - **X509Subject rules:** a certificate subject value containing a quote never matches an X509Subject rule. - **`ImpersonateUser` callback:** no longer runs under the global session lock. - **Session diagnostics:** LocaleIds are kept as the client sent them, while null LocaleIds are ignored for translation. ### Subscriptions and monitored items (Part 4) - **Acknowledgements:** a failing acknowledgement returns a per-entry Bad status instead of failing the whole Publish. - **`DiscardedMessageCount`:** counts messages dropped from the retransmission queue and unsent overflow messages. - **Durable subscriptions:** transferring a restored anonymous subscription works (no NullReferenceException). - **Transferred subscriptions:** sampling and permission checks use the item's current owner session. - **Access denied:** a monitored item whose user may no longer read the attribute gets a `Bad_UserAccessDenied` notification instead of going silent. Non-Value attributes need Browse permission (RolePermissions needs ReadRolePermissions), and User* attributes are evaluated per subscriber. - **ModifyMonitoredItems:** a SamplingInterval of -1 uses the subscription's publishing interval. - **AggregateFilter priming:** needs HistoryRead / ReadHistory permission and is bounded (100 000 values, bounded page size). - **Resource leak:** event monitored items no longer leak a consumer task per create/delete cycle. ### Node management services (Part 3 / Part 4) - **Reference types:** AddNodes, AddReferences, DeleteReferences and Browse reject ids that are not ReferenceTypes with `Bad_ReferenceTypeIdInvalid`. AddNodes, AddReferences and DeleteReferences also reject abstract ReferenceTypes; Browse still accepts them (e.g. `HierarchicalReferences` with includeSubtypes). - **Concurrent AddNodes:** duplicate BrowseNames under one parent get `Bad_BrowseNameDuplicated`. - **TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds:** - Requires Browse permission on intermediate nodes and final targets (RolePermissions and AccessRestrictions). - A long RelativePath no longer rejects the whole request. - **SemanticChangeEvent:** - Raised once per actual change of a semantic property, whether or not it is monitored. - Also raised for properties with the SemanticChange access-level bit. - Reports the owning node's TypeDefinition as AffectedType. - **Localized diagnostics:** operation-level text is translated when OperationLocalizedText is requested. ### History and aggregates (Part 11 / Part 13) - **DeleteRawModified:** an unspecified or reversed range returns `Bad_InvalidTimestampArgument`, and StartTime == EndTime deletes the value at StartTime for every provider. - **ReadAtTime fallback:** reads only the values around each requested time. A time whose bound is not found within the search limit returns `Bad_BoundNotSupported` instead of failing the request. - **ReadProcessed:** a ProcessingInterval shorter than one tick returns `Bad_AggregateInvalidInputs`. - **Delta / DeltaBounds:** widen to the next larger signed type when the result does not fit the source type (e.g. a decreasing unsigned counter, or an Int16 overflow). - **Range / Range2:** return the source data type. ### Alarms and fluent API (Part 9) - **Suppression:** an alarm stays suppressed while any suppression group is active, and re-evaluation without a state change does not move TransitionTime. - **`MonitorVariable(variable)`:** sets SourceNode, SourceName and InputNode to the variable and makes it a ConditionSource (HasCondition to the alarm, HasEventSource from the object). - **Fluent input/output arguments:** InputArguments / OutputArguments added through the fluent API to a registered method are readable. - **Root notifiers:** a failed root-notifier registration no longer leaves an orphaned event worker. - **State-machine handlers:** exceptions are logged at Error. ### File system (Part 20) - **Delete / MoveOrCopy:** - Only act on direct children of the directory. - A NodeId whose kind does not match the entry returns `Bad_NotFound` (a file NodeId can no longer delete a directory). - Copying a directory into its own subtree returns `Bad_InvalidArgument`. - **Locking:** - An open file, or a directory containing one, cannot be deleted or moved (`Bad_InvalidState`). - The check is atomic with opens. - While a Delete or Move runs, read opens get `Bad_NotReadable` and write opens `Bad_InvalidState`. - **Open:** - Reserved mode bits or EraseExisting without Write return `Bad_InvalidArgument`. - Read+Write returns `Bad_NotSupported`. - Read while a writer is open returns `Bad_NotReadable`. - **Client `FileSystemErrors`:** maps `Bad_NotReadable` to `IOException`. - **RuntimeNodeSet:** well-formed NodeSets with a stray `Model` element, or two models in one file where one requires the other, now load. ### Server core, hosting and lifecycle - **`SessionEstablishmentQueueLimit` > 0:** CreateSession/ActivateSession now queue for a permit. The permit is acquired before the request is registered, and a waiting handshake releases its worker through the request-parking policy. - **Node manager lifecycle:** - Add, reload and remove no longer wait for parked Publish requests. - A Migrate reload racing with CreateMonitoredItems no longer blocks later lifecycle operations. - Late items on retired or removed managers get `Bad_NodeIdUnknown`. - **HistoryUpdate:** a batch mixing data and event details is bounded by both limits. - **Server stop/start:** stopping the server disposes the configuration watcher and certificate subscription; starting recreates them. - **Monitored-item queue factory:** a factory supplied by the caller or the DI container is no longer disposed by the server. - **Audit events:** each certificate validation error raises its own AuditCertificate event. A failed OpenSecureChannel without a service result is audited as failed. ## New public API (additive) - `IQueuedSessionEstablishmentLimiter` - `StandardServer.OwnsMonitoredItemQueueFactory` (protected virtual) - `DefaultPkiRoot.Get` (Opc.Ua.Configuration) - `TrustList.SetCertificateValidation` - `NamespaceMetadataRegistry.Invalidate` - `IApplicationConfigurationFileTargetProvider` and `ApplicationConfigurationUpdatePlan` - `GdsServerOptions.CertificateGroups` / `GdsCertificateGroupOptions` - `InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore.AuthorizeRoles` - `DefaultManagedApplicationsNodeManager.ManagedApplicationsNamespaceUri` - `AuthorizationServiceManager.RequestAccessTokenAsync(..., IUserIdentity?, ...)` - `AllowAnonymousWrite` on the file-system node manager and its factory - `IFileSystemHost.TryBeginMutation` / `EndMutation`, replacing `HasOpenHandles` ## Not fixed / known limitations - **KeyCredential:** secret encryption with the client's PublicKey (requests needing it are rejected). - **CSR SAN restriction:** restricting subject / SAN values copied from a CSR (CA policy). - **Ticket signatures:** ticket signature verification (needs a trusted-signer configuration). - **FileType Read+Write open:** needs a read/write stream contract in `IFileSystemProvider`. - **Custom `IUserDatabase` implementations:** the disabled-user check still scans all users per login. The built-in stores do a single lookup. - **64-bit Delta precision:** limited by the calculator's double arithmetic. ## Tests with changed expectations Existing tests were updated where they asserted the old behaviour: - File-system status codes - Trust-list handle eviction - `DiscardedMessageCount` - Localized diagnostics bits - Delta on unsigned sources - SourceNode of fluent alarms - ReferenceServer transfer permission test (now expects `Bad_UserAccessDenied` notifications) - `UserDeactivationShutdownReviewTests` (the revoked session is a UserName login) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 07:26:05 +02:00
Marc Schier	138086863b	Fix audit findings and review regressions across the OPC UA stack (#4503) ... ## Scope Audit fixes and review follow-ups across the OPC UA Core, Client, Server, transport, and redundancy components. This includes implemented Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 work; it does not claim that every item in the 244-finding audit backlog is complete. The review batch fixes mandatory full-key record protection and owned plaintext buffers; transactional pending-certificate claims; shared-channel nonce and certificate ownership; discovery and token-policy validation; reconnect/callback ordering without changing unbounded buffering defaults; server permissions, filters, monitored-item lifetime, and alarm topology; historian paging, retention, and annotations; atomic user/password metadata; and canonical file identities with bounded alias and role refresh workers. ## Review-batch verification at `ab686ccae` The following results come from fresh test builds using `dotnet test`, `--no-restore`, `-m:1`, and an explicit `CustomTestTarget`. They replace the earlier description's library-build/`--no-build` totals, which did not establish the state of the merged test sources. | Scope | Target | Passed | Skipped | |---|---|---:|---:| | Core review regressions | net10.0 | 827 | 0 | | Client and lifecycle regressions | net10.0 | 630 | 0 | | Server review regressions | net10.0 | 1970 | 0 | | Redundancy Server / Client / PubSub | net10.0 | 276 / 10 / 11 | 0 | | Sessions / file-and-alias / streaming / HTTPS-WSS integration | net10.0 | 8 / 21 / 30 / 20 | 0 | | Core review regressions | net48 | 786 | 39 | | Client recovery and policy regressions | net48 | 54 | 0 | | Server ownership, aliases, queues, and user-state regressions | net48 | 137 | 0 | Every listed run exited successfully. The 39 net48 skips are existing platform/capability cases. New key-agreement tests assert unavailable-policy behavior on unsupported targets rather than adding skips or pretending those targets performed an unsupported handshake. Additional exact node/permission/filter/alarm checks passed 13 Core and 46 Server cases. The PR-scoped formatter verification covers 26 projects and 389 non-generated C# files. A Roslyn syntax audit covers 53 changed interfaces and 263 members, with no missing parameter/type-parameter/return contracts and a 120-column limit for their declarations and documentation. No full-solution, all-target-framework, or NativeAOT matrix is claimed from these local runs; the new CI run must establish its own result. ## CI follow-up at `e1bc3ac3b` The follow-up fixes the failures reported by Azure build 18400. TLS certificates retain configured DNS names, including mixed-case URI schemes, without relaxing hostname validation. Reverse-WSS fixtures use the DNS identity in the client certificate. Reconnect completion is published only after cycle cleanup, so a subsequent reconnect cannot join an old completed cycle and retain old certificates. Certificate-alarm roots now support event subscriptions. The pump sample has one continuous notifier path, with no duplicate shortcut. Historian and aggregate fixtures share the provider's retention clock. Alarm collection lets the server expire idle Publish requests rather than canceling only the client wait. The corrected server, WoT, and managed-session fixtures exercise valid requests and initialized lifecycle contracts. Downlevel crypto tests preserve real credential and key-ownership assertions without enabling unsupported raw-ECDH policies or adding skips. Fresh local evidence after integration includes: | Scope | Target | Passed | Skipped | |---|---|---:|---:| | Client lifecycle / channel ownership / builder fixtures | net10.0 and net48, each | 96 / 103 / 123 | 0 | | Combined server lifecycle, events, aggregates, crypto, and contracts | net48 | 358 | 0 | | Full lifecycle plus certificate-alarm and aggregate fixtures | net10.0 | 116 | 0 | | Final server-contract and history-routing delta | net10.0 and net48, each | 84 | 0 | | Subscription / XRegistry / WoT event regressions | net10.0 | 7 / 2 / 3 | 0 | | Full Sessions project | net10.0 | 780 | 379 | | Full ComplexTypes project / downlevel resolver fixtures | net10.0 / net48 | 2854 / 15 | 0 | | Full WoT project / downlevel structured-write fixtures | net10.0 / net48 | 1496 / 27 | 0 | | TLS domain-name regressions | net10.0 and net48, each | 21 | 0 | All listed runs exited 0. The Sessions skips come from existing endpoint and policy capability guards; they are not counted as passes. No skip was added. Worker validation also covered full DI (426 passes), full History (540 passes, 21 existing skips), 38 exact downlevel event/history failures, and 60 repeated certificate-rotation race cases. The final crypto fixtures passed 73 cases on each target with the unchanged leak detector; a temporary premature-disposal mutation made all three borrower tests fail and was then removed. All 29 C# files in this follow-up pass included-file formatting at info severity across 12 projects. The complete PR interface audit now covers 54 interfaces and 271 members with zero missing contracts or line-width findings. No full-solution or NativeAOT matrix is claimed. New-head CI has started and remains authoritative for the remote result. ## Test-result gate follow-up at `4b6e1203a` Azure build 18401 reported the net48 Client job as successful despite a test-host crash after only 264 passing tests. Its old evaluator counted per-test failures but ignored the failed run verdict. This was a partial run, not a benign exit after the suite had completed. The shared result evaluator now rejects aborted, errored, incomplete, malformed, or inconsistent TRX reports. Each file must describe a completed run, so a passing file cannot mask another file's failure. It retains support for completed runs followed by a benign nonzero host exit, existing skipped-result conventions, and no-TRX MTP jobs. All 78 regression cases pass after integration using Windows PowerShell 5.1. Real completed Sessions and Client reports also pass. The process-test fixture follows the existing NET10_0-only tools-test pattern; its net48 build is not counted as a test run. Formatting passes for the added test file. The Client host crash itself has not reproduced locally. The isolated fixture passed 59 tests, and two fresh full fast-CI selections each completed with 2,392 passes and three existing skips, including a run with crash collection enabled. The CI merge tree is identical to the tested source tree. No speculative runtime change was made, and the original partial CI run is not claimed as a full-suite pass. Azure build 18402 has now completed the full net48 Client run: 2,392 passed, three existing console skips, and a successful test-host exit. The corrected evaluator independently validated outcome=Completed. Across the matrix, 119 test-project jobs succeeded; Sessions net10.0 was canceled when the remote provider deprovisioned its runner, so the overall Azure pipeline was canceled. That cancellation is not claimed as a code failure or a successful run. CodeQL and three Docker image jobs were still running at the latest check. The migration discovery failure remains separate. ## Documentation follow-up at `57ed02bea` The environment blocker has been removed by the maintainer. The three bundled migration references now exactly match the canonical documents after deterministic link rewriting; all 15 bundled documents pass `validate-migration-plugin.ps1`. The canonical migration prose was not rewritten. `FileSystemClient.md` now documents that extended Windows roots preserve literal trailing-dot names, completing the filesystem review follow-up. The filesystem thread has been replied to and resolved after publication. The review pass now has 108 of 110 threads resolved. The two explanation-only threads remain open as requested; no unfinished change request is being represented as resolved. ## Cross-platform follow-up at `0d9d936a8` With migration discovery restored, the Linux and macOS test matrix exposed two stale durable-subscription expectations. The expected value 83,442 encoded the old 32-bit overflow when converting 3,600 hours to milliseconds. The existing overflow-safe server correctly returns 14,400,000 lifetime intervals at a 900 ms publishing interval. Only those two expected constants changed; production behavior, negotiated-hour checks, and all other assertions remain unchanged. The exact local lifetime selection reproduced both failures before the correction. The full durable suite now passes 36 cases with 11 existing skips on each of net10.0 and net48. All four lifetime cases executed and passed on both targets, and included-file info-severity formatting passes. ## Session shutdown follow-up at `8daf7f091` A late net48 Sessions failure exposed a shutdown race. Canceling an in-flight keepalive read can produce a transport `ServiceResultException`. The retiring worker treated its own cancellation as proof that the peer was unavailable, so `CloseAsync` or `DisposeAsync` could skip the server-side `CloseSession` request. The worker now ignores that service error only when its own token is canceled; genuine peer errors still update liveness. The full integration fixture reproduced the original error-code mismatch. Four deterministic mock-transport cases then produced three failures and one passing genuine-error control before the fix. They verify successful close, returned server error, asynchronous disposal, and unchanged behavior for a real keepalive failure. Fresh related runs pass 75 client and 101 integration cases on each of net48 and net10.0, with no skips. Ten repetitions of the formerly flaky full net48 fixture pass all 1,010 cases. All three changed files pass info-severity formatting, and temporary diagnostic instrumentation was removed. ## Atomic listener snapshot follow-up at `82dc22b5d` Ubuntu Core CI exposed an unsafe formatter rewrite in TCP listener disposal: `ConcurrentDictionary.ToArray()` had become a collection spread. A concurrent channel removal between the spread's count and copy operations could leave a default entry, causing a null dereference during disposal. The listener now uses the dictionary's atomic `Values` snapshot and disposes those channels outside the listener lock. Deterministic regressions close zero, one, or all channels at the copy boundary. Before the fix, the one/all-removal cases reproduced the exact null dereference; the unchanged-count control passed. All 23 admission/listener cases now pass on net10.0 and net48, and the full fast Core net10.0 suite passes 5,267 cases with 88 existing platform skips. Both changed files pass info-severity formatting. A bounded audit of the formatter's other snapshot rewrites found no further verified unsafe concurrent-registry copies. ## Shutdown-test observation follow-up at `58403ee8b` The net48 shutdown-order test raced its own observation: it read `m_publishWorkerTask` after starting shutdown, which can legitimately drain the worker and clear that field immediately. The test now captures the worker before shutdown starts and confirms it is initially running. It still requires the worker to finish while shutdown remains blocked by the held manager semaphore. Production behavior is unchanged. A temporary scheduling perturbation reproduced the exact null-field failure. The corrected capture passed 100 perturbed iterations; both the temporary repeat and yield were then removed. The final 126 subscription/lifecycle cases pass on each of net48 and net10.0, and formatting passes. A complete local Sessions net10.0 run also passed 780 cases with 379 existing capability skips in 7m20s after the earlier keepalive correction. ## Retirement and alias-startup follow-up at `1a048ff39` The shadow-generation test now observes its documented asynchronous cleanup through the existing bounded helper. Removing the replacement does not join a background drain that already claimed the retired generation. The test still checks live-registration removal immediately and requires the old node to disappear; no timeout or production lifecycle behavior changed. All 81 lifecycle cases pass on each of net10.0 and net48. Initial alias-node materialization now retries one timed-out, read-only snapshot query before creating nodes for that root. The retry is logged through source-generated logging. Each query retains the original shared 100 ms deadline; repeated timeouts, other errors, and cancellation still abort startup. Client searches and live refresh do not gain this immediate retry. Fault-injection tests cover success after one timeout, a persistent timeout, a different store failure, and cancellation. All 187 related alias/hosting cases and the original certificate-rotation integration case pass on each target; the positive test records exactly one retry warning. The alias documentation now accurately describes the shared request budget. All changed C# files pass formatter checks, and the complete 54-interface/271-member documentation audit passes. Fresh CI is running on `1a048ff39`; the previous completed matrix exposed only the two failures corrected in this batch and their dependent summaries. ## Sample endpoint allocation follow-up at `d08a94925` The strong-cluster test harness allocated OPC UA and Raft endpoints in separate released-port batches. Uniqueness was enforced only inside each batch, so the same OS-assigned port could appear in both protocol groups. The harness now requests one distinct batch for both groups and splits it before launching any replicas. Deterministic one- and three-replica allocation cases reproduced overlapping groups with the old plan and pass with the corrected plan. The complete 17-case short-haul sample suite passes without skips; all failover, historian-continuation, and service assertions remain unchanged. Both changed files pass info-severity formatting. This prevents intra-cluster self-collisions but does not claim to reserve released ports against unrelated external processes. ## Code-review follow-up at `085fd9636` A review of the complete branch diff found five defects this PR introduced. All are now fixed, each in its own commit. `RelatedTo`'s recursive-to-iterative rewrite defaulted the optional `includeTypeDefinitionSubtypes` and `includeReferenceTypeSubtypes` operands to `false`. Part 4 §7.7.4 specifies both default to `true`, so a filter that omitted them silently stopped matching subtypes. Dynamically created key-credential nodes derived their namespace from the containing folder, which is the standard `i=18155` node in namespace 0 — the namespace reserved for the OPC UA standard address space; they now resolve the server-owned namespace and fail with `BadInternalError` rather than guessing index 1. The retained audience-less `CreateTokenData` overload produced tokens that verification always rejects, so it is now `[Obsolete]` and throws instead. A failed reference to a remote parent left the new node registered with a one-sided inverse reference, and is now rolled back. An existing `.pfx` is restricted before it is rewritten, rather than after its new key bytes are on disk. One further reported finding was rejected after investigation. `JwksIssuerKeyResolver` deliberately does not dispose retired key snapshots: `RetiredKeysAreCollectibleWhileResolverRemainsAliveAsync` proves the resolver retains no retired snapshot, and `ReturnedKeysSurviveRepeatedRefreshAndResolverDisposalAsync` requires already-returned keys to keep verifying across refreshes and resolver disposal. Adding disposal would have broken that tested contract, so the exploratory change was reverted. Validated on net10.0 and net48: 256 Core and 633 Server cases pass, with one pre-existing net48 skip. The build reports zero compiler and analyzer diagnostics, all eight included-file info-format checks pass, the contract audit covers 58 interfaces and 310 members with no findings, and the 15 bundled migration documents validate. All 122 review threads are resolved; the key-credential namespace thread was reopened to retract an earlier incorrect answer and then resolved against the real fix. ## Review-body follow-up at `da0d59cfb` The re-review at `8daf7f091 + 82dc22b5d` listed four items in its summary that had no inline thread of their own, so they had not been picked up. All four are now fixed. Both event-dispatch permission gates had been tightened from not-Bad to `IsGood`, which silently dropped events whose permission verdict is Uncertain; the data-change path in the same file still treated Uncertain as deliverable, so the two had diverged. `EventSourceRegistry` only cleared `ConsecutiveFailures` when a source was deactivated, so a source that had backed off to the 30-second cap kept that delay for the rest of the process even after starting successfully. `UserNameIdentityTokenHandler` built a temporary issuer chain whose `Add` calls take independent certificate references, and never released them. The fourth was the receiver-side sequence rollover, which the reviewer had correctly re-flagged as still open despite its thread being resolved. `m_sequenceRollover` was set permanently, so the second legal wrap on a long-lived channel was rejected and faulted the channel along with the transport-reconnect OPN. OPC 10000-6 does not cap a SecureChannel at one wrap. The flag is now cleared once an accepted number has traversed the normal range, which keeps rejecting a replayed low number that never left the rollover window. Validated on net10.0 and net48: 636 / 593 Core cases and 135 / 134 Server cases pass, including the new `UaSCBinaryChannelSequenceRolloverTests` and the Uncertain-permission delivery cases. The build reports zero compiler and analyzer diagnostics and the changed files pass included-file info-format checks on both targets. The previous head `085fd9636` was fully green: 279 checks passed and Azure build 18414 succeeded with 137 of 137 jobs, after the platform automatically retried a job whose NuGet tool download had hit a transient TLS error. ## Reported issues #4508 and #4509 at `6ad1ecf16` **#4508 (V2 subscription recreate deadlocks against a faulted transport) was not yet fixed and is now closed by `bac260a06`.** Both drain sites the report identifies were still unbounded. A publish worker that started its request before the quiesce parks inside the service call on the channel ready gate while holding an active publish request; the recreate that would make the channel ready is the very operation awaiting the drain, so the wait never ends. The drain now cancels in-flight attempts through a per-attempt token linked to the worker token. An aborted worker rolls its acknowledgements back, releases the request and returns to the paused park instead of terminating, so it resumes when the caller leaves the quiesce. Publish ingress stays quiesced for the caller's operation, so `DropPendingForSubscription` keeps the guarantee the report asks to preserve and no blind timeout is added. The new regression parks a worker on a cancellable gate that never completes on its own: it reproduces the hang for the full 30-second budget before the change and passes after it. **#4509 (identity provider fails the initial connect) was already fixed for its primary symptom.** `HandleConnectAsync` materializes the provider's identity through `CreateIdentitySelectionContext` before the first `CreateAsync`, so Anonymous is no longer substituted against a UserName-only endpoint. `6ad1ecf16` adds the two remaining details from the report: the enabled-policy set now includes the negotiated channel policy, so a client cannot reject the policy it already accepted as `NotEnabledByClient`; and when discovery has not populated the endpoint's token policies the connect keeps the configured identity so the attempt fails at the transport layer for the reconnect policy to retry, instead of failing at the identity layer. Validated on net10.0 and net48: 477 / 473 client session and subscription cases pass, the build is free of compiler and analyzer diagnostics, and the changed files pass included-file info-format checks on both targets. The full `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` suite also passes locally on net10.0 with 782 passed and 379 pre-existing capability skips. GitHub checks are green on this head: Build and Test .NET 10.0, Docker Sample Images CI, and NuGet Publish all succeeded. Azure build 18417 completed 134 of its 135 jobs successfully; its net10.0 Sessions job was cancelled by the hosted-agent provider ("Received request to deprovision"), the same infrastructure flake that hit build 18409 earlier on a head predating these changes. That job is not claimed as passing, and the local full-suite run above covers the same project. The previous head `da0d59cfb` completed Azure build 18415 with every job succeeded. ## Review follow-up at `a08f0c12b` Eleven new review threads arrived, nearly all documentation. Before acting on each "this is new in 2.0" remark I checked the API against `master378` rather than assuming, because a genuine 1.5 API still needs its migration entry. `ManagedSession`'s server-redundancy refresh had two hard-coded two-second bounds. The new `ServerRedundancyOptions` exposes `RefreshTimeout` for the metadata read and `PeerDiscoveryTimeout` for each peer lookup, defaults both to the previous two seconds, validates that a bound is positive or `Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan`, and flows through `ManagedSessionOptions`, `ManagedSession.CreateAsync`, the fluent builder, and `DefaultServerRedundancyHandler`. `AsyncCustomNodeManager` and `KeyCredentialBridgeAuthenticator` are both absent from `master378`, so their obsolete members had no compatibility constraint and are removed rather than carried: `AsyncCustomNodeManager.ReadInitialValue`, the audience-less `CreateTokenData` that only threw, and the audience-less `CreateProof` that produced a proof no server accepts. `CustomNodeManager2.ReadInitialValue` and the `MonitoredNode2` migration section are genuine 1.5 APIs and are untouched. The documentation now states master's behaviour instead of the delta from 1.5.378, with each moved item already covered under `docs/migrate/2.0.x/`. `IHistorianAnnotationProvider` is described by its annotation-time key rather than as "legacy" — it is new in 2.0, so the label implied a compatibility constraint that does not exist. The KeyCredential bridge payload's `"version"` field is explained as a vendor-extension format version with no OPC UA counterpart, and its version-1 upgrade narrative is gone. `CertificateManager.md`'s migration walkthrough is replaced by the resolver API it targets. `NodeManagers.md`, `Sessions.md`, `AsyncServerSupport.md`, `Certificates.md`, and `Profiles.md` no longer announce features relative to 1.5. `Benchmarks.md`, `WhatsNewIn2.0.md`, `DeveloperGuide.md`, and `docs/migrate/` keep their 1.5.378 references, which are their subject. CI then exposed a defect this batch introduced: five fixtures resolve `ManagedSession`'s private constructor by its exact positional parameter types, so the added parameter compiled cleanly but made `GetConstructor` return `null` at run time. `7df1d5c40` updates every site; `Redundancy.Client` passes 126 of 126 and the affected client fixtures 112 of 112. The BouncyCastle question is answered and tracked in #4510: `Opc.Ua.Core` already project-references `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates`, which already carries the conditional BouncyCastle reference, so the raw-ECDH polyfill belongs there rather than as a new Core dependency. The `IUserDatabase` metadata question is addressed to another maintainer and is deliberately left open. ## Reported issue #4509 follow-up at `5d4d13d63` The reporter verified `6ad1ecf16` and found one case still failing, correctly. The empty-token-policies branch kept the configured identity so a server that is down surfaces a transport failure rather than an identity error. A provider-only configuration has no configured identity, so it kept `null`: `OpenCoreAsync` turned that into Anonymous and `OpenValidateIdentity` rejected it with `BadIdentityTokenInvalid`, silently ignoring the configured provider. The branch now requires a configured identity to defer to. Without one the provider is consulted, so its own `BadIdentityTokenRejected` names the offered and rejected policy set instead. Two regression tests cover both configurations; the first fails against the previous behaviour by reaching the session factory with a `null` identity, which is the exact step that produced the reported error. That branch had shipped without a test, which is why the case was missed. ## Review and CI status at `5d4d13d63` **All actionable review threads are resolved: 132 of 133.** The single open thread is a question the reviewer addressed to another maintainer about moving user metadata into `IUserDatabase`; it is left open for them rather than resolved silently. Every resolved thread carries a reply naming its fix commit. **Latest-head CI is green on `5d4d13d63`: 279 checks passed, zero failed, zero pending**, with one conditional signed-package publishing job skipped. Local validation for this batch: the full `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` suite passes 2,430 of 2,430 on net10.0, `Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Client.Tests` 126 of 126, and `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` 590 of 590 for the affected selections. Both net10.0 and net48 build clean for `Opc.Ua.Client`, `Opc.Ua.Server`, and the changed test projects, and all changed files pass included-file info-severity formatting on both targets. The PR remains open; no merge was performed. As stated at the top, this does not claim that every item in the 244-finding audit backlog is complete. ## Latest CI follow-up at `b6f2dfa43` Azure build 18442 exposed a net48 compile regression in the Kafka adapter: `RuntimeHelpers.GetUninitializedObject` is unavailable on .NET Framework. Commit `2cf1e0eed` now uses normal `ProducerMessage` construction on `NETFRAMEWORK` while retaining reflection-based construction for modern targets that can load a different Dekaf runtime asset. The exact net48 CI selection passes 92 of 92 tests, and the netstandard2.1 adapter guard selection passes 11 of 11. After merging the latest `master`, GitHub Actions run 35643592139 is green. The initial Ubuntu Core.Schema job built successfully and passed 160 of 160 tests, then hit an external 403 while finalizing its test-result artifact; its failed-job rerun completed successfully. Azure build 18451 was canceled when its remote provider deprovisioned the net10.0 Sessions runner (`Received request to deprovision: The request was cancelled by the remote provider`). Azure attached no test task log or source error, and the canceled parent left that child check stale as in-progress. No source workaround, test skip, or check relaxation was made for either infrastructure failure. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 68f26810-22b8-476f-abcd-0a8c82d6e208	2026-09-22 09:10:58 +02:00
Marc Schier	aad8350bc1	Pluggable symmetric cryptography, an awaitable asymmetric path, registrable security policies, and PubSub crypto offboarding (#4206, #4207, #4208, #4210) (#4232) ... # Description Closes the three crypto-offboarding follow-ups split out of #4192. Each was recorded there as knowingly *not* done, with the reason and what would justify revisiting it. Those conditions are met, and where one of them turned out to be unachievable that is written down rather than worked around. The safety property throughout: **every seam is opt-in and null-checked, and in the default software configuration the added code is observably inert.** No interface dispatch on the per-message path, and the asynchronous paths complete synchronously — so channel locking order, buffer ownership and error sequencing are unchanged for a deployment that configures nothing. ## #4207 — symmetric, key-derivation and RNG provider seams `ISymmetricCryptoProvider`, `IKeyDerivationProvider` and `ISecureRandomSource`, added on the terms #4207 set: only once a concrete requirement arrived (a validated module that must perform *every* operation, not just the asymmetric ones), behind a fast path, with `SymmetricChannelCryptoBenchmarks` as the gate. They are **facets discovered by type test**, not members of `ICryptoProvider`, so providers written against the shipped interface still compile. `PlatformCryptoProvider` implements all three, which answers the "an interface nothing implements" objection recorded in the issue. `CryptoProviderFacets` returns `null` both when no registry is configured *and* when resolution lands on the platform, because the platform facets are the inline code. Resolution happens once, in `CalculateSymmetricKeySizes`, and is held for the life of the channel. `CryptoCompliance.GetUnservedOperationPurposes` closes the failure the seam would otherwise introduce: a provider bound to `ChannelSymmetric` without implementing the facet is silently replaced by the platform, so a deployment could believe its validated module performed the per-message cryptography while the platform did. Under `FipsOnly` that now refuses to start. ## #4208 — the asymmetric path is awaitable `RSA` and `ECDsa` are .NET's contracts and cannot be replaced without making every ready-made hardware and cloud implementation unusable. Instead an implementation may **also** declare `IAsyncRsaKey` / `IAsyncEcdsaKey`, which the stack finds by type test. Now asynchronous: the secure channel open and renew path, user identity token signing and decryption, and session activation. A software key declares neither facet, so those paths complete synchronously and nothing about their ordering changes. `ReadAsymmetricMessage` is refactored into shared helpers rather than duplicated — adding an `await` was not worth two hundred cloned lines of signature, padding and endpoint-selection logic. `AsymmetricMessage` / `AsymmetricWriteResult` exist because an asynchronous method cannot have `out` parameters. The channel no longer serialises its state on a monitor. A monitor cannot be held across an `await`, and a plain `SemaphoreSlim` was not an option at the time: the code relied on re-entrancy in eight places (`HandleIncomingMessage` holds the lock and calls `ForceChannelFault`, which takes it again; `ForceReconnect` and `Shutdown` do the same). `ChannelGate` replaces it at 32 sites and `DataLock` is `[Obsolete]`. That reliance has since been removed as well — see [Removing the gate's re-entrancy](#removing-the-gates-re-entrancy) below. ### Defects this surfaced, all fixed and regression-tested **Detached work started inline.** Writes were started with `_ = WriteBuffersAsync(...)`. An async method runs its prologue on the caller's stack, so `LeaveInheritedContext` — which exists to stop *detached* work inheriting the right to re-enter the gate — was stripping the **caller's own** entitlement; when the send then completed synchronously, the completion blocked on a gate that very thread was holding. The client sent its OpenSecureChannel request and never processed the response. Writes are now queued. **A synchronous gate handle held across an `await`.** `Enter()` records the acquiring thread so an inline completion callback can re-enter — `ChannelAsyncOperation` invokes its callback both inline and detached. That record is only sound while the holder is synchronously on that thread; the token renewal path held it across an await, so a reused pool thread was recognised as the holder. **`SignAsync` rejected the policy that signs nothing.** It validated the certificate before the algorithm, so `SecurityPolicies.None` — which carries no certificate — threw where the synchronous `Sign` returns `null`. **`EnterAsync` lost the holder when contended** *(found in review)*. The `AsyncLocal` recording ownership was written inside the awaiting method, and .NET restores the caller's execution context when an async method completes, so the write was discarded. The caller returned owning the semaphore while `IsHeldByCurrentContext` reported `false` — and any nested `Enter()` then blocked forever on a gate its own context held. Reachable remotely: `HandleIncomingMessageAsync` → error path → `ForceChannelFault`. The holder is now published from the caller's frame before the wait, and only its depth is raised in the continuation. **Queued writes lost their order** *(found in review)*. Sequence numbers are assigned under the gate, but independently queued work items reach the transport's FIFO send lock in arbitrary order, so a peer could reject a chunk with `BadSequenceNumberInvalid`. Writes are now appended to a chain: still off the caller's stack, but a write cannot start before its predecessor finishes. ### Four more this surfaced in CI, on paths only the integration suites reach Queuing the writes to fix the deadlock above turned out to have moved three implicit guarantees, and the gate had one more liveness bug. Each was reproduced locally against a clean baseline before it was changed. **A faulting channel's error message never reached the peer.** A listener channel sends a UASC `Error` describing why it faulted and closes the transport as its next statement. That worked only because the write started on the caller's stack, so the bytes reached the socket first; queued, the close discarded them and the client saw `BadConnectionClosed` instead of the certificate status it was told to expect. Nine `SecurityCertValidationTests` cases assert exactly that status. The terminal error is written inline again, on a path that touches the gate only to disclaim what it inherited and reports nothing — a channel that is already faulted is owed nothing beyond its buffer. **The certificate of a rejected sender leaked.** An asynchronous method cannot have `out` parameters, so the asymmetric read returns a record instead. That silently dropped an ownership guarantee: an `out` parameter reaches the caller even when the method goes on to throw, so the caller's `catch` disposed the sender certificate and reported it to the audit. A return value does not — nine leaked certificates, one per rejection case, which the leak detector fails the run on. The parsed certificate is now handed to the caller before anything that can reject the message, restoring both the disposal and the audit. **The gate could strand its own permit.** It released only when the holder's depth returned to zero, but that depth lives in an `AsyncLocal` and is therefore shared with every context forked from the owner's — a timer callback whose timer was created inside the region, for instance. Such a context entering the gate raised the shared depth, so the owner's own exit saw a non-zero depth and returned without releasing, and nothing afterwards could: the nested exit is not the owner. Every later entry on that channel blocked forever. `Opc.Ua.Features.Tests` hung after its tests had finished, with a receive loop waiting on the gate and the server unable to stop. The owner now releases when it leaves; depth still gates re-entrancy, but liveness no longer depends on a count another context can move. **Write completion throttled the writer.** Reporting a completed write sat inside the ordering chain, and the client channel implements that callback by entering the gate — so every write queued behind a gate the receive loop contends for on each incoming chunk. A session with fifty subscriptions publishing continuously had its publish requests throttled enough that the client kept topping them up past its own limit, which `Subscriptions.Classic` asserts against. Completion is now reported off the chain, which covers only what ordering actually requires. ### Still synchronous, and why Certificate, certificate request and revocation list signing cannot be made asynchronous at all: `X509SignatureGenerator.SignData` is invoked by .NET's own builders. Service faults and the `Reconnect` override are reached from synchronous call sites (`SendServiceFault` alone has eight) and are left as they are behind scoped, commented suppressions. All three are documented rather than left to be rediscovered. ## #4210 — PubSub This one produced a finding rather than the API the issue asked for, and the finding is the point: > **With a standard Security Key Service the key necessarily exists in process memory.** `GetSecurityKeys` (Part 14 §8.3.2) returns raw key bytes over the wire, so the "key never leaves the device" property #4192 achieved for client and server **cannot** be achieved for PubSub through the SKS pull profile. That is a property of the specification, not of this stack. A wrapped-key envelope would change what is on the wire and break interoperability with third-party key services and publishers, so it was rejected rather than built. What is achievable is delivered: the per-message AES-CTR and HMAC route through `ISymmetricCryptoProvider`, so a validated module performs them. `IPubSubSecurityPolicy` is **not** modified — new members would break every implementation of it; the provider is supplied through the policy constructor. `PlatformSymmetricCryptoProvider` gained AES counter mode, which the seam should have covered anyway since the algorithm enum names it. Key lifetime is also tightened: unpacking an SKS response copied key material into intermediates that `ByteString.Create` then copied again, leaving plain keys in the heap for the lifetime of the process. Those are now zeroed. ### Two wiring gaps this depended on, both found in review The registrations above were **inert**, so this section originally claimed more than the code did: - `CryptoProviderConfiguration` was applied nowhere outside tests, so `AddCryptoProvider(configure)` never reached the registry in a real host. The registry now applies every registered configuration when it is first resolved — which also affects #4207's DI story. - `PubSubSecurityWrapperResolver` selected `PubSubAes256CtrPolicy.Instance`, the provider-less static singleton, ignoring the provider-backed bundles registered for it. A `FipsOnly` deployment therefore certified while the platform did the work. The resolver now selects from the registered policies; the container and `PubSubApplicationBuilder` both supply theirs. A third, smaller one: `CryptoProviderBuilder.Use` published a **policy-scoped** random source as the process-wide nonce source, so `.For(purpose, policyUri).Use(hsm)` redirected nonce generation for every other policy too. Only an unscoped binding does that now. ## #4206 — a provider can contribute a security policy Added in review: the policy set was fixed at compile time, so a provider could contribute key custody but not a *profile*. It is now table-driven and open, and the blockers #4206 listed are gone. ```csharp using IDisposable registration = SecurityPolicies.Register( new SecurityPolicyInfo("urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile", "CustomProfile") { PlatformSupport = () => true, SupportedCertificateTypes = [ObjectTypeIds.RsaSha256ApplicationCertificateType], IsDefault = true }); services.AddOpcUa() .AddCryptoProvider(crypto => crypto .For(CryptoPurpose.ChannelSymmetric, "urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile").Use(module)) .AddSecurityPolicy(customPolicy); ``` - **The reflection is gone.** Four lookup tables were built by reflecting over the fields of `SecurityPolicies` and `SecurityPolicyInfo`. They are one explicit table now, which removes the **last reflection in `Security/Constants`** — so this is a trimming and Native AOT improvement as much as a feature. - **`SecurityPolicyInfo` is constructible from another assembly** and carries the metadata the helpers need, so `IsPlatformSupportedName`, `GetDefaultUris`, `MapSecurityPolicyToCertificateTypes` and `GetCurveFromCertificateTypeId` read that table instead of each being hand-written. Adding a policy is one entry rather than five edits. - **The dead `#if CURVE25519` conditional is deleted** from `Security/Constants`. - Registration is copy-on-write, so the read path stays lock-free. Shadowing a built-in policy requires `replaceExisting: true` and is reversible by disposing the registration. `RegisterLightsUpCurvePoliciesFromOutsideCore` is the acceptance test the issue asked for: it registers `ECC_curve25519` and `ECC_curve448` from the test project and asserts they become discoverable through the public API. **Registering a policy makes it advertised and resolvable; it does not supply the cryptography behind it.** For those two curve profiles the in-tree key agreement is still behind a compile symbol no project defines plus a BouncyCastle dependency, so a deployment lighting them up provides the operations through a provider. That division is the point: the policy set says *what* is offered, the provider says *who* performs it. ## Removing the gate's re-entrancy Folded in from #4242, which was merged into this branch. `ChannelGate` was re-entrant, and that forced the design behind most of the defects above. A holder that awaits releases its thread, so ownership could not be tracked by thread identity — it had to live in an `AsyncLocal<Holder?>`. A logical context is *inherited*, so anything started while the gate was held inherited the right to re-enter and ran inside the guarded region alongside whatever started it, unless it opted out by hand via `LeaveInheritedContext()` at each of eight sites, enforced by review alone. Five of the defects listed above trace to that mechanism, including both CI hangs. So the *requirement* was removed rather than the mechanism, and the `AsyncLocal` then deleted itself. Every path that re-entered now calls a lock-free `Core` method (`ForceChannelFaultCore`, `ShutdownCore`, `ForceReconnectCore`, `CompleteConnectCore`), and three regions stopped running foreign code under the lock: the `RequestReceived` dispatch is deferred until the gate is released, `OnTransportError` no longer wraps the `HandleSocketError` virtual, and the callback setters and `EndpointDescription` publish a single reference with a volatile write instead of locking — the last is load-bearing, because `AsyncResultBase.OperationCompleted` invokes the reverse-hello callback inline while the gate is held. `ChannelGate` is now a `SemaphoreSlim(1,1)` behind a `Releaser`; `Holder`, the thread-identity fallback, `LeaveInheritedContext`, `IsHeldByCurrentContext` and all eight disclaimer calls are gone, with the call shape at all 32 sites unchanged. `SaveIntermediateChunk`, `GetSavedChunks` and `DoMessageLimitsExceeded` gained a `gateHeld` argument, because the client reaches them both with and without the gate and must pick the matching teardown — without it an oversized `OpenSecureChannel` response deadlocked the receive loop against itself. The remaining paths were not found by reading the code, since that is what missed them originally. A temporary strict mode made every re-entrant acquisition throw with its stack, the suite was run under it until clean, and it was deleted with the re-entrancy it measured. It caught two sites review had missed: the `EndpointDescription` **property getter** taking the gate, and the `RequestReceived` dispatch to application code happening inside the guarded region. Two deliberate residuals are documented for reviewers: `Dispose` no longer takes the gate (unavoidable — it is reached from `ChannelFaulted` with the gate held, where the old re-entrant acquisition excluded nothing anyway), and the deferred request dispatch builds `SecureChannelContext` just after gate release rather than under it. ## Testing New: the three seams and their platform implementations, facet discovery and resolution precedence, `FipsOnly` refusing a provider that cannot serve what it was bound to, AES counter mode (including a non-block-aligned round trip and a check that the counter carries, since one that did not would silently reuse key stream), `ChannelGate` (exclusion, re-entrancy across an await, re-entrancy on a reused thread, and the deadlocks above), the asynchronous channel paths, and the PubSub policy provider. Each review finding got a test that fails without its fix: - `ContendedEntryStillRecordsTheHolderAsync` — established contention deterministically, then re-entered; failed on the pre-fix gate. Removed with the re-entrancy it covered; `ChannelGateTests` now asserts the non-re-entrant contract instead. - `SecureClientAndTcpListenerKeepChunkOrderUnderConcurrentRequestsAsync` — 60 concurrent multi-chunk `SignAndEncrypt` requests over a real loopback listener; failed 3 runs out of 3 with the previous dispatch, passes 3 out of 3 with the chain. - `DependencyInjectionRoutesPubSubCryptoThroughTheRegisteredProviderAsync` — builds a container, registers a counting provider, wraps a message and asserts the provider actually performed the encryption and the signature. This is the assertion the PubSub claim above now rests on. - `PolicyScopedRandomBindingDoesNotEscapeItsPolicy`. Two further assertions are the ones that would catch a silent defect: a provider and the platform must produce **byte-identical** output — a validated module that disagreed could not interoperate — and with a software key the returned `ValueTask` must report `IsCompletedSuccessfully`, which is what makes "ordering is unchanged" checkable rather than merely asserted. `SymmetricChannelCryptoBenchmarks` gains a provider-registered variant beside the existing baseline, so the cost of the indirection is measured rather than assumed. Verified locally, every suite at or above its recorded baseline: `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` **0 warnings, 0 errors on all six target frameworks**; Core **4413** (net10.0); Core.Security **617**, with its certificate-leak detector clean; PubSub **1350** plus PubSub.Diagnostics **54** and PubSub.Udp **233**; Features **156**; Subscriptions.Classic **32**; Server integration **4053**; Client integration **2123**; MigrationAnalyzer **151** and MigrationAnalyzer.Core **13**. Zero failures in each. Core moved from 4388 to 4381 when the gate change landed — eight re-entrancy tests were removed along with the behaviour they covered, and one deadlock regression test added — and has since grown to 4413 with the registry isolation, provider-output and security-review tests. `ChannelGateTests` was rewritten around the new contract — exclusion across both entry modes, an uncontended asynchronous entry not suspending, re-entry blocking by contract, and the property that used to be the hazard: work started while the gate is held is excluded without having to opt out. Every CI failure this PR produced was reproduced locally, diagnosed against a clean `origin/master` baseline in a second worktree, and fixed at the source. Two hangs were found from `--blame-hang-timeout` dumps read with `dotnet-dump`. One failure that looked like a candidate was confirmed **not** to be: an intermittent `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` connect failure, pre-existing on `origin/master` (5 of 8 baseline runs failed, versus 3 of 14 here). ### The publish request overshoot `Subscriptions.Classic.PublishRequestCountAsync` failed on the Windows net10.0 leg with **207** outstanding publish requests against a cap of `max(maxServerPublishRequest, subscriptions)` = 50. It failed in 2 of 6 pipeline builds on this branch, never on `master` in 13 sampled builds, and never locally in 12 attempts including under deliberate CPU contention. The mechanism is a genuine race. `ClassicSubscriptionEngine.QueueBeginPublish` was a **check-then-act**: it read `GoodPublishRequestCount`, compared it against `GetDesiredPublishRequestCount(false)`, and issued a publish if it was below. It runs on every publish completion, so *n* completions that overlap each read the same value, each conclude they are below the cap, and each issue — overshooting by up to *n* per round. The read also *lags*: a request only becomes visible to `GoodPublishRequestCount` once `AsyncRequestStarted` has recorded it, which happens after the request has already been sent. That code is pre-existing and was untouched by this PR. What this PR changed is how hard the race is hit: the server used to hold the channel gate across request processing, which serialised every request on a channel, so publish completions arrived one at a time. Dispatching `RequestReceived` outside the gate — an intended improvement, since a channel should not serialise on application request-processing time — lets them complete concurrently. Rather than change the publish pipeline blind, the race was first made reproducible. `ConcurrentPublishReEvaluationDoesNotExceedDesiredRequestCount` drives 64 barrier-released completions against a mocked context whose count lags the send exactly the way the session's does. It issued **64 requests where 5 were desired** — the same defect the CI leg hit, now deterministic and running in milliseconds. The engine now tracks the requests it has in flight and reserves a slot with a compare-exchange before sending, so the decision and the send are one atomic step. The reservation is released when the request completes, when the send is declined, or when it throws. The repro test then issues at most the desired count. `StartPublishing` is deliberately left **uncapped**. It is the recovery valve that refills a pipeline whose requests are outstanding but no longer expected to return, so gating it on the in-flight count would remove the only path out of a stalled pipeline. An earlier revision of this fix did gate it, and that is the one change here that could not be justified on the evidence — it was reverted. The assertion was **not** loosened, retried away, or marked flaky: it caught a real throttling regression earlier in this PR and is worth keeping sharp. Validated: the repro test red before the fix and green after; `Subscriptions.Classic` 32/32 **five** consecutive runs on net10.0 and once on net48; `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` 2124 on net10.0 across four consecutive runs and 2127 on net48; `Opc.Ua.Subscriptions.Tests` 604 passed with this fix in place. ### The SSH.NET advisory that turned CI red repo-wide Partway through this work every build job began failing with `NU1903: Package 'SSH.NET' 2025.1.0 has a known high severity vulnerability` ([GHSA-q939-rpr3-3284](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q939-rpr3-3284), `<= 2025.1.0` affected, first patched `2026.0.0`). Nothing in the dependency graph changed — the advisory was published. Build 17026 failed on it where build 17000, two hours earlier on an identical graph, had passed every build job. SSH.NET is not referenced anywhere in the repository; it arrives transitively through `Testcontainers.Kafka`. `master` landed the remediation independently while this was being investigated (a central transitive pin to `2026.0.0`, which `CentralPackageTransitivePinningEnabled` exists for). This branch briefly carried its own identical pin, which made the merge commit hold **two** `PackageVersion` entries for SSH.NET and fail restore with `NU1506`. The duplicate is removed and `master` is merged, so the pin now comes from one place only. The audit was **not** suppressed: `NuGetAudit` stays enabled and `NU1903` stays an error. Verified after the merge — `dotnet restore UA.slnx` reports neither NU1903 nor NU1506, and `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` is **0 warnings, 0 errors** with the audit live. The remaining red check in build 17026 was not from this change either. `aot-ubuntu-latest` is the intermittent `Opc.Ua.Aot.Tests` failure already noted above — `ReconnectSessionAsync` timed out at 30s with 135 of 136 passing. It remains below the `origin/master` baseline rate (4 of 15 sampled here against 5 of 8 on the baseline), and the managed reconnect paths are green throughout: `Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` 2124 across four consecutive runs and `Opc.Ua.Subscriptions.Tests` 604. ## Documentation `docs/CryptoProvider.md` gains sections on substituting the symmetric primitives, using a key served over a network, and PubSub — including what cannot be claimed and why, the scope rule for a random-source binding, and how to supply a provider-backed policy outside the container. `docs/MigrationGuide.md` covers the `[Obsolete]` channel virtuals and `DataLock`, and the non-re-entrant gate's contract for channel subclasses. `docs/WhatsNewIn2.0.md` is updated. `plans/cryptooffboard.md` is deleted now that the work it planned has landed. ## Note for reviewers This touches the secure channel handshake, which is the most security-critical code in the stack. Nine distinct concurrency and lifetime defects were found and fixed in it during this work — three during development, two in review, four from CI — so `ChannelGate`, the write path and the certificate ownership across the new suspension points deserve the closest reading. Five of those nine traced to the gate's `AsyncLocal`, which is why the re-entrancy was subsequently removed and the `AsyncLocal` deleted. The wrapper/`Core` split and the two documented residuals in that section are the parts most worth a second reading. The #4206 work removes the last reflection from `Security/Constants` and rewrites the policy lookup tables, so `SecurityConfiguration.SupportedSecurityPolicies` and the endpoint set it feeds are worth a second look: an earlier revision of it changed that set and broke six server tests, which is now covered by `SecurityConfigurationBuildsExpectedSupportedPolicySet`. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4206 - Fixes #4207 - Fixes #4208 - Fixes #4210 - Follow-up #4250 — this PR makes the security policy set injectable, but nothing in the stack resolves `ISecurityPolicyRegistry` from DI yet, so every production path still lands on the `Default` fallback. #4250 tracks threading it through `Session` and `UaSCBinaryChannel`, which is what makes the injection points already added here load-bearing. ## Checklist - [x] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [x] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: marcschier <11168470+marcschier@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 7a68ca72-83e8-496c-b2f5-3df4c718320b Copilot-Session: 3f5ab76a-c0ba-4f47-87ac-54d1f4182c6b	2026-08-15 05:23:20 -07:00
Marc Schier	5bc8a9d705	Reduce ISession: type the continuation points, delete the obsolete validate overload (#4199) ... ## Stacked on #4197 Base is `marcschier/server-bind-phase`. The full stack is **#4188 → #4193 → #4197 → this**. GitHub retargets each base automatically as the stack merges. **Review the earlier three first.** **#4217 has been merged into this branch** (squash `53dd4b618`), so the last remaining item from the issue — `ISession.SessionDiagnostics` — is now part of this PR. Closes #4187. Refs #4203 — **does not close it.** #4217 swapped `OnUpdateDiagnostics` onto `m_diagnosticsLock`, but it still calls `Variant.FromStructure(ServerDiagnostics)` with the default `copy: false`, which wraps the *live* structure in the `ExtensionObject`. The caller reads its fields after the lock is released, so the lock currently excludes nothing. #4222 adds `copy: true` and is what actually closes #4203. ## The finding that changed the approach `ISession` has **exactly one production adapter**: `src/Opc.Ua.Server/Session/Session.cs`. The other `ISession` implementations in the tree are the unrelated **client** interface (`src/Opc.Ua.Client/Session/Session.cs`, `RedundantClientSession`) and a migration-analyzer test stub. One adapter means the seam is hypothetical; two means it is real. The issue proposed splitting `ISession` into five concern-interfaces — that would turn one hypothetical seam into five. The interface earns its keep for testability and because node managers receive it through `OperationContext`, but that argues for making it **smaller**, not for multiplying it. **So: reduce, don't split.** Reasoning posted to the issue as [comment 5226712936](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/issues/4187#issuecomment-5226712936) so the five-way framing does not get re-proposed later. ## Measurement 38 members, 368 references. External production consumers are **4 files using 5 members**: | Consumer | Members used | |---|---| | `Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server/Sessions/DistributedSessionManager.cs` | `Id`, `InitializeAsync`, `Dispose` | | `Opc.Ua.Di.Server/Locking/DefaultLockService.cs` | `Id` | | `samples/ConsoleReferenceServer/UAServer.cs` | `Id`, `Identity`, `ReadDiagnostics` | | `samples/Quickstarts.Servers/.../DataChangeMonitoredItem.cs` | type reference only | Every production caller of the five continuation-point members is inside `Opc.Ua.Server` (`MasterNodeManager`, `NodeManagerLifecycle`, `HistorianDispatcher`). **`ISession` is 38 → 32 members.** ## Commits ### `882b2937` Type the history continuation point `ISession` leaked `object` twice, against the repository rule: ```csharp void SaveHistoryContinuationPoint(Guid id, object continuationPoint); object? RestoreHistoryContinuationPoint(ByteString continuationPoint); ``` The erasure was **not** hiding a genuinely opaque plugin token. `HistorianDispatcher` is the only production caller, it always passes a `HistorianContinuationState`, and it casts straight back to that type on restore. The `object` was a round trip through the type system that bought nothing. `HistorianContinuationState` is `internal`, so it cannot appear on a public interface. `IHistoryContinuationPoint` names the concept instead: it carries an `Id` and extends `IDisposable`. Two latent bugs fell out of typing it: - The session disposed only those points that **happened** to implement `IDisposable` and **silently leaked the rest**. Every point is now disposable by construction, and three `as IDisposable` probes are gone. - Carrying the `Id` on the point removes the separate `Guid` parameter, which could disagree with the payload it was filed under. The mock stores in the historian tests had the same latent inconsistency. ### `0d020b77` Delete the obsolete synchronous `ValidateBeforeActivate` **Zero production callers** — the nine references were all tests written for it. `[Obsolete]` since 1.5.378, which the repository rules allow removing in master. It is also the divergent-signature problem the runtime analysis flagged: the async form returns the validated handler and policy as a tuple, while the sync one took the same two values as trailing `out` parameters, so a caller had to learn two shapes for one operation. The overload could not verify a user token requiring decryption, so on a secure endpoint it failed closed and told the caller to use the async path anyway. The one test asserting that fail-closed behaviour goes with the method it described; the path it pointed at is already covered by `ActivationValidationDecodesBinaryEncodedUserIdentityToken`. The other eight tests are **converted, not deleted** — the channel, signature, security-policy and token-policy validation they cover is still asserted, now against the path the server actually uses. ### `821e8302` Route the continuation points behind one member Five `ISession` members were one-line pass-throughs to `SessionContinuationPoints`, a 419-line module that already owns the behaviour and already has its own `IContinuationPointStore` seam. The interface restated the module's surface without adding anything. ```csharp // was session.SaveContinuationPoint(cp); session.RestoreHistoryContinuationPoint(bytes); // now session.ContinuationPoints.SaveBrowse(cp); session.ContinuationPoints.RestoreHistory(bytes); ``` The holder is `internal sealed`, so `ISessionContinuationPoints` is what makes it addressable. **This is composition, not the service locator `IServerContext` refused to be.** A subsystem with an independent lifetime should be injected; continuation points belong to the session and cannot exist without it. `InvalidateContinuationPoints` called `RemoveBrowseForManager` and `RemoveHistoryForManager` in sequence, so the pair becomes `RemoveForManager` — the caller's intent is that a node manager is going away, not that two collections need visiting. ## Tests Three harnesses had hand-rolled a `Dictionary<Guid, object>` to stand in for the holder. They now use the **real** one, so the dispatcher and `BrowseNext` meet the eviction and disposal rules a live session actually applies. **One hazard worth recording for future interface work.** A Moq member that is never stubbed returns `null`. Where the old code called a method straight on `ISession`, that `null` was harmless. Reaching *through* a property means an unstubbed `ContinuationPoints` null-derefs instead. Three tests failed exactly that way; they are wired to a real holder, not restubbed. | Suite | net10.0 | net48 | |---|---|---| | `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` | 4032 passed, 1 failed | builds clean | | Touched areas (continuation points, historian, master node manager, session) | 898 passed | — | The single failure is `ConfigureApplicationBuildsSharedClientAndServerConfigurationAsync`, a local certificate-store problem verified to reproduce unchanged at HEAD with these changes stashed. Not caused by this PR. `Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Server`, `Opc.Ua.Di.Server`, `Quickstarts.Servers` and `ConsoleReferenceServer` all build clean. ## Docs `docs/MigrationGuide.md` gains a "Removed members on ISession" section covering the `ValidateBeforeActivate` removal with the async replacement, and the `IHistoryContinuationPoint` change with before/after. ## The SessionDiagnostics removal (folded in from #4217) `ISession.SessionDiagnostics` handed out the whole mutable `SessionDiagnosticsDataType` — the structure the session's diagnostics lock protects — so a caller could read a field while the owner was writing it. Every server-side reader wanted exactly one value out of it, so the interface now exposes those two values (`SessionName`, `ClientApplicationUri`) directly and the structure stays behind the lock. That work landed here as #4217 rather than as a separate PR, and it also fixes #4203: `OnUpdateDiagnostics` now takes `m_diagnosticsLock` instead of locking the diagnostics payload it was handed. ## Reviewer questions - `ISessionContinuationPoints` exposes `MaxBrowse` as read-only while the concrete holder keeps a setter (the test framework adjusts it to exercise limits). Should the setter be on the interface, or is test-only mutation better left to the concrete type? - `RemoveForManager` collapses two removal methods. The concrete `RemoveBrowseForManager`/`RemoveHistoryForManager` remain public on the holder — worth making them private now that nothing outside calls them individually? --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: e9c13dd0-a6e3-4ad2-8ad6-1c3fe6323041	2026-08-11 06:57:40 +02:00
Marc Schier	7cec2d614d	Move repository files to the consolidated layout	2026-07-16 06:25:54 +02:00