UA-.NETStandard/docs/CryptoProvider.md

Crypto provider

The stack performs its cryptography with the .NET platform by default. This document describes how to replace that: with another library, a remote service, or hardware such as a TPM, an HSM, a PKCS#11 token or a cloud key service — and how to keep private keys inside those devices so they never exist in process memory.

Nothing here changes behaviour until you configure it. A deployment that configures nothing behaves exactly as it did before the provider model existed.

Contents

• The short version
• Holding a private key in a device
• Selecting a provider per purpose and per policy
• Generating a key inside a device
• Certificate renewal with a device held key
• Validation status, compliance and audit
• What can and cannot be claimed about FIPS
• Substituting the symmetric primitives
• Using a key served over a network
• PubSub
• Contributing a security policy
• Limitations

The short version

System.Security.Cryptography.RSA and ECDsa are abstract classes, and the stack routes every private-key operation through them. Implementations backed by hardware and cloud services already exist — RSACng over a TPM key storage provider, Pkcs11Interop, Azure's RSAKeyVault. The stack therefore does not define its own signing interface, because doing so would make all of those unusable.

What the provider model adds is the part the platform does not express:

Concern	Type
Which operations a provider can serve	ICryptoProvider, CryptoCapability
Which provider serves which operation	ICryptoProviderRegistry, CryptoPurpose
The symmetric, derivation and random operations themselves	ISymmetricCryptoProvider, IKeyDerivationProvider, ISecureRandomSource
What may be said about the module behind it	CryptoValidationStatus
How strictly that is enforced	CryptoCompliancePolicy
Where a new key comes from	IKeyPairGenerator
Where a certificate and its key live	ICertificateStoreProvider, ICertificateStore

Holding a private key in a device

A device-held key is represented by a detached private key: the Certificate holds the key alongside the X509Certificate2 rather than inside it.

// The device generated the key and will not give it up. Only a handle is available.
RSA deviceKey = OpenKeyInDevice("app-instance");

using Certificate publicOnly = Certificate.FromRawData(certificateDer);
Certificate certificate = publicOnly.CopyWithDetachedPrivateKey(deviceKey);

// HasPrivateKey is true, GetRSAPrivateKey() returns the device key, and the
// stack signs and decrypts with it exactly as it would with a software key.

Using a PKCS#11 token

The optional OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Security.Pkcs11 package supplies a certificate store backed by a hardware token, smart card or HSM. It is never referenced by Opc.Ua.Core, so applications that do not use one are unaffected.

services.AddOpcUa()
    .AddPkcs11CertificateStore(new Pkcs11TokenOptions
    {
        ModulePath = "/usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so",
        TokenLabel = "opcua",
        PinProvider = () => secretStore.Read("token-pin")
    })
    .AddPkcs11CryptoProvider(CryptoPurpose.ApplicationInstanceKey);

Stores are then addressed with an RFC 7512 URI, so an existing configuration moves to a token by changing only the store path:

pkcs11:token=opcua;object=server?module-path=/usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so

The store binds the token key with CopyWithDetachedPrivateKey for the reason below. Signing supports PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS, decryption supports OAEP and PKCS#1 v1.5, and ECDSA is supported on the curves the token implements. Revocation lists are not held on a token, and objects are provisioned with the vendor's tools rather than through the store.

On Linux the module is loaded through DllImport("libdl"), and glibc 2.34 folded libdl into libc. Distributions that ship only the libdl.so.2 ABI stub need libc6-dev (or an equivalent libdl.so symlink) or the first call fails with DllNotFoundException. That is a property of the interop library rather than of this package.

Why not CopyWithPrivateKey?

X509Certificate2.CopyWithPrivateKey cannot be used for this. On Windows the certificate layer has fast paths only for RSACng and RSACryptoServiceProvider; for any other implementation it falls back to exporting the private parameters, which a non-extractable key refuses by definition:

Approach	Result on Windows
CopyWithPrivateKey(custom RSA)	CryptographicException
CopyWithPrivateKey(RSACng, ExportPolicy=None)	works
CopyWithDetachedPrivateKey(...)	works, on every platform

CertificateRequest.CreateSelfSigned is affected for the same reason, since it calls CopyWithPrivateKey internally.

A CNG-backed key may use either route. Everything else — PKCS#11, cloud key services, bespoke implementations — must use CopyWithDetachedPrivateKey.

Lifetime

The detached key is shared by every handle created with AddRef() and is disposed once, with the last handle, unless you pass ownsPrivateKey: false. Each call to GetRSAPrivateKey() returns an independent non-owning view, so the usual using around the returned object is safe and does not destroy the device key.

Exporting such a certificate as PKCS#12 throws rather than silently producing a file without a key.

Selecting a provider per purpose and per policy

Real deployments mix sources. Selection is therefore a resolution over three discriminators — purpose, security policy and certificate type — with the most specific registration winning:

(purpose, policy) → purpose → registered default → platform

services.AddOpcUa()
    .AddCryptoProvider(crypto => crypto
        .For(CryptoPurpose.ApplicationInstanceKey).Use(tpmProvider)
        .For(CryptoPurpose.KeyAgreement).Use(tpmProvider)
        .For(CryptoPurpose.UserIdentityKey).Use(keyVaultProvider)
        .For(CryptoPurpose.CertificateIssuance, SecurityPolicies.ECC_nistP384).Use(hsmProvider));

Purposes:

Purpose	Used for
ApplicationInstanceKey	Signing and decryption while a secure channel is opened
UserIdentityKey	Proving possession of a user certificate when a session is activated
KeyAgreement	Ephemeral key agreement for the elliptic curve policies
CertificateIssuance	Signing certificates, certificate requests and revocation lists
ChannelSymmetric	Per-message symmetric encryption and signing
KeyDerivation	Deriving the channel and session key material from a shared secret
RandomNumberGeneration	Nonces and other random material

CryptoPurpose is a value type with well-known instances, not an enum, so you can define your own.

A provider bound to a purpose it does not declare is skipped, and resolution falls through to the next candidate. A configuration mistake therefore fails close to its cause instead of deep inside a handshake.

Registration is explicit. There is no assembly scanning: it would make the effective security configuration depend on what happens to be loaded, and it is incompatible with trimming and ahead-of-time compilation.

Where resolution happens

Resolve when something is bound — a channel opening, a certificate loading, a key being generated — and hold the result. The registry is not meant to be consulted per message. ChannelQuotas.CryptoProviders carries the registry to a channel, which resolves once and keeps the result for its lifetime, in the same way it caches the security policy on its token.

Generating a key inside a device

IKeyPairGenerator decides where the key behind a new application instance certificate comes from:

var application = new ApplicationInstance { KeyPairGenerator = new TpmKeyPairGenerator() };

The builder arrives with the subject, subject alternative names and lifetime already set. An implementation only chooses where the key comes from and how the certificate is signed.

An implementation backed by hardware cannot call the parameterless CreateForRSA() or CreateForECDsa(), because those generate a key in software. It must supply the public key generated in the device with SetRSAPublicKey / SetECDsaPublicKey, and sign with an X509SignatureGenerator that calls back into the device.

For the Part 12 push flow the equivalent seam is IPushCertificateKeyGenerator, which is already registered through dependency injection and can be replaced the same way.

Certificate renewal with a device held key

Only one of the two Part 12 flows works with a key that cannot leave its device:

Flow	Compatible?
CreateSigningRequest(RegeneratePrivateKey = true) then UpdateCertificate with no private key	✅ the key is generated in the device and only a certificate request leaves it
UpdateCertificate with a private key supplied	❌ raw key material is pushed into the server

Between the two calls the regenerated key has to be staged. HardwarePendingCertificateKeyStore does this for device-held keys: there is nothing to export, because the device already is the durable store, so only the association between the pending certificate and its scope is kept. A software key is declined, so the caller falls back to a store that knows how to protect exportable material.

Validation status, compliance and audit

Every provider declares what may be said about the module behind it:

Level	Meaning
FipsValidated	The provider names a validation certificate for its module
FipsCapablePlatform	It defers to platform cryptography, which is validated when the OS is configured for it
Uncertified	It carries no validation — a third-party library or a bespoke implementation
Unknown	It declined to say. Treated as uncertified, and always reported

CryptoCompliancePolicy decides how strictly this is enforced:

Policy	Effect
Permissive (default)	Existing behaviour. Nothing is filtered and nothing is warned about
WarnOnUncertified	Every provider carrying no validation is reported
FipsOnly	Providers carrying no validation are refused and the server does not start

using var auditor = new CryptoProviderAuditor(registry, telemetry, CryptoCompliancePolicy.FipsOnly);
auditor.Report();              // writes the effective configuration to the log
auditor.ThrowIfNotCompliant(); // refuses to continue if anything is uncertified

Metrics are published regardless of policy, because they are pull-based and cost nothing when nobody reads them:

Instrument	Meaning
opc.ua.crypto.providers	One measurement per provider, tagged with name and validation level
opc.ua.crypto.providers.uncertified	How many providers in use carry no validation

What can and cannot be claimed about FIPS

.NET holds no cryptographic module validation certificate of its own. It calls through to the module the operating system supplies — CNG on Windows, OpenSSL on Linux, CoreCrypto on macOS. Whether that module is running in a validated mode is a property of how the machine is configured, not of this stack.

What can honestly be said: with FipsOnly, the stack performs no cryptography outside the platform modules, and those modules are validated when the operating system is configured for it.

What cannot be said: that the stack itself is validated.

These algorithms are not FIPS-approved and are enabled by default:

Algorithm	Note
ChaCha20-Poly1305	Not a NIST-approved algorithm
Brainpool P-256r1 / P-384r1	Not in SP 800-186
Curve25519 / X25519	Not an approved curve
SHA-1 and P-SHA1 (Basic128Rsa15, Basic256)	Deprecated for new signatures by SP 800-131A

net472 and net48 additionally use the BouncyCastle.Cryptography package for elliptic curve certificate building. That package is not validated — the validated Bouncy Castle product is a separate, commercially licensed distribution — so those target frameworks cannot make a FIPS claim at all.

What FipsOnly actually enforces at startup

CryptoProviderAuditor.ThrowIfNotCompliant() refuses to start when a provider bound to an operation would not perform it. Carrying the facet is necessary but not sufficient: Supports(algorithm) is consulted again at the point of use, and a provider that answers false there is bypassed in favour of the platform for that algorithm alone. So the audit checks the algorithms of every policy the application actually offers, and names what would fall through:

The compliance policy requires validated cryptography to perform every operation, but the
provider resolved for these cannot perform them and the platform would be used instead:
ChannelSymmetric (ChaCha20Poly1305) for ...#ECC_nistP256_ChaChaPoly, KeyDerivation (HkdfSha256) for ...

A module that covers AES-CBC but not ChaCha20-Poly1305 is therefore caught before it can run — where a facet-only check would have reported it fully compliant while the platform performed every message on any policy negotiating the algorithm it lacks. Nothing is reported when the platform provider is the one resolved: the platform performing the platform's work is not a shortfall.

Narrow the offered policy set, or extend the module, rather than lowering the compliance policy.

Output a provider did not produce is refused

IKeyDerivationProvider.DeriveKey and ISecureRandomSource.GetBytes return void, so a module that no-ops, fills part of the buffer, or swallows an internal failure is indistinguishable from one that succeeded — and the buffer it was handed becomes channel signing keys, encryption keys, initialization vectors and nonces. The platform paths these replace cannot fail this way: Utils.PSHA returns the array it built and RandomNumberGenerator throws.

That matters most for exactly the deployments this seam exists for. A network- or hardware-served module can be transiently offline, and because both ends of a channel usually run the same image, both would derive the same dead key material and the handshake would complete — traffic flowing with no confidentiality and forgeable integrity, invisible to the operator and to the peer.

So the buffer is stamped before the call and checked after it. Output left untouched or zeroed is rejected with BadSecurityChecksFailed rather than used. This cannot prove the output is good — no caller-side check can — it fails closed on output that is provably unusable. Implementations must fill the whole span or throw.

Substituting the symmetric primitives

The asymmetric operations are pluggable because RSA and ECDsa are already the right abstraction. The symmetric ones are not: the platform offers nothing that covers the block cipher, the authenticated cipher and the message authentication code together, so three interfaces declare those operations directly.

Facet	Covers
ISymmetricCryptoProvider	AES-CBC, AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305 and the HMAC signatures
IKeyDerivationProvider	P_SHA1, P_SHA256, HKDF-SHA256, HKDF-SHA384
ISecureRandomSource	Nonces and other random material

A provider opts in by implementing one alongside ICryptoProvider and declaring the matching purpose. They are separate interfaces rather than members of ICryptoProvider, so a provider written before they existed still compiles, and a provider that can serve only some of them says so.

public sealed class ValidatedModule : ICryptoProvider, ISymmetricCryptoProvider
{
    public string Name => "AcmeFIPS";

    public CryptoValidationStatus Validation => new(
        CryptoValidationLevel.FipsValidated, "Acme Cryptographic Module", "CMVP #1234");

    public ArrayOf<CryptoCapability> Capabilities { get; } =
        new(new[] { new CryptoCapability(CryptoPurpose.ChannelSymmetric) });

    // ... the operations
}

services.AddOpcUa()
    .AddCryptoProvider(crypto => crypto
        .For(CryptoPurpose.ChannelSymmetric).Use(module)
        .For(CryptoPurpose.KeyDerivation).Use(module)
        .For(CryptoPurpose.RandomNumberGeneration).Use(module));

The consumer this exists for is a validated software module that must perform every operation, not hardware offload. A device round trip per message would destroy throughput, and nothing here makes that viable.

RandomNumberGeneration is the one purpose with process-wide reach: nonces are created from many places that have no container in scope, so an unscoped binding also becomes the process's nonce source. A binding made for a single security policy — .For(purpose, policyUri).Use(module) — deliberately does not, because it would otherwise redirect nonce generation for every other policy as well.

What it costs when you do not use it

Nothing, by construction. CryptoProviderFacets returns null both when no registry is configured and when resolution lands on the platform provider, because the platform facets perform exactly the code the channel would otherwise run inline. A null facet tells the channel to take its existing path, so the per-message code has no interface dispatch at all unless a provider was registered.

Resolution happens once, in CalculateSymmetricKeySizes, and the result is held for the life of the channel. SymmetricChannelCryptoBenchmarks measures both paths — EncryptSignThenDecryptVerify is the baseline and EncryptSignThenDecryptVerifyThroughProvider is the same work through the seam — so the cost of the indirection is measured rather than assumed.

A provider that cannot do what it was bound to

Binding a provider to ChannelSymmetric without implementing ISymmetricCryptoProvider would otherwise be silent: resolution falls through to the platform and the channel keeps working, while a deployment believes its validated module performed the per-message cryptography.

CryptoCompliance.GetUnservedOperationPurposes reports exactly that case, and under FipsOnly CryptoProviderAuditor.ThrowIfNotCompliant() refuses to start rather than run on cryptography the operator did not ask for.

Using a key served over a network

RSA and ECDsa are synchronous contracts, and they are .NET's rather than this stack's, so a key backed by a cloud key service occupies a thread for the whole of every call. Rather than replace those contracts — which would make every ready-made hardware and cloud implementation unusable — an implementation may also declare an asynchronous path:

public sealed class KmsRsa : RSA, IAsyncRsaKey
{
    // The synchronous members are still implemented, and are what the paths
    // that are not yet asynchronous will use.

    public async ValueTask<byte[]> SignHashAsync(
        ReadOnlyMemory<byte> hash,
        HashAlgorithmName hashAlgorithm,
        RSASignaturePadding padding,
        CancellationToken ct = default)
        => await m_kms.SignAsync(hash, hashAlgorithm, padding, ct);

    public async ValueTask<byte[]> DecryptAsync(
        ReadOnlyMemory<byte> data,
        RSAEncryptionPadding padding,
        CancellationToken ct = default)
        => await m_kms.DecryptAsync(data, padding, ct);
}

The stack finds the facet by type test, so a key that does not implement it is unaffected and the asynchronous paths complete synchronously for it — ordering, and everything that depends on it, is unchanged.

Path	Asynchronous?
Secure channel open and renew	✅
User identity token signing and decryption, session activation	✅
Service faults, and the synchronous reconnect handoff	❌ both are reached from synchronous call sites
Certificate, certificate request and revocation list signing	❌ by construction — X509SignatureGenerator.SignData is called by .NET internals

PubSub

The per-message cryptography a publisher and subscriber apply — AES-CTR and HMAC-SHA-256, per Part 14 §7.2.4.4.3.1 — routes through ISymmetricCryptoProvider when one is registered, so a validated module performs it:

services.AddOpcUa()
    .AddCryptoProvider(crypto => crypto
        .For(CryptoPurpose.ChannelSymmetric).Use(module))
    .AddPubSub(...);

The policies resolve the provider once, when they are constructed, and hold it; nothing consults a registry per message. A provider that does not declare the algorithms a policy needs is ignored rather than used, so a configuration mistake does not stop publishing. IPubSubSecurityPolicy is unchanged — a provider is supplied through the constructor, so implementations of that interface outside this stack are unaffected.

The wrapper resolver selects the bundle it wraps with from the registered policies rather than from a static default, which is what makes the registration above take effect. Outside the container, PubSubApplicationBuilder does the same with the policies it holds, and WithSecurityPolicySelector overrides the choice per connection:

var module = new ValidatedModule();

new PubSubApplicationBuilder(telemetry)
    .WithSecurityPolicySelector(
        (_, _) => new PubSubAes256CtrPolicy(module))
    // ...
    .Build();

What device custody can and cannot mean here

With a standard Security Key Service the key necessarily exists in process memory. GetSecurityKeys (Part 14 §8.3.2) returns raw key bytes over the wire, so the property the client and server side achieve — the key never leaves the device — cannot be achieved for PubSub through the SKS pull profile. That is a property of the specification, not of this stack.

Introducing a wrapped-key envelope would change what is on the wire and break interoperability with third-party key services and publishers, so it is deliberately not done.

What is achievable, and is supported:

• The operations can be performed by a validated module, as above.
• The key material can come from somewhere other than the SKS. IPubSubSecurityKeyProvider is the seam; an implementation may derive per-token keys from a long-lived secret that stays in a device, so only the derived material is in memory.
• Its lifetime is bounded. PubSubSecurityKey zeroizes on disposal, the key ring disposes keys as it retires them, and the intermediate copies made while unpacking an SKS response are cleared rather than left in the heap.

Contributing a security policy

The policy set is no longer fixed at compile time. A provider that implements a profile this stack does not ship — a national or vendor profile, or one added by a later specification — can make it visible at runtime by constructing a SecurityPolicyInfo and registering it:

using IDisposable registration = SecurityPolicies.Register(
    new SecurityPolicyInfo("urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile", "CustomProfile")
    {
        PlatformSupport = () => true,
        SupportedCertificateTypes = [ObjectTypeIds.RsaSha256ApplicationCertificateType],
        IsDefault = true
    });

or through the builder, alongside the provider that performs its cryptography:

services.AddOpcUa()
    .AddCryptoProvider(crypto => crypto
        .For(CryptoPurpose.ChannelSymmetric, "urn:vendor:SecurityPolicy#CustomProfile").Use(module))
    .AddSecurityPolicy(customPolicy);

A registered policy is discoverable through the same API as a built-in one — GetInfo, GetUri, GetDisplayName, GetDisplayNames and the default-URI helpers — because those are now driven from one table rather than from reflection over the constants. Registering a URI or name that already exists throws unless replaceExisting: true is passed, which makes shadowing a built-in policy deliberate and reversible: disposing the returned registration restores what was there before.

Resolving the policy set

Those lookups are members of ISecurityPolicyRegistry, which is the object that owns the policy set. Resolve it to work against the policies this application registered:

public sealed class MyEndpointPicker(ISecurityPolicyRegistry policies)
{
    public string[] Offered => policies.GetDisplayNames();
}

AddSecurityPolicy registers the registry for you; call AddSecurityPolicyRegistry() when you want to resolve one without contributing a policy of your own.

The identity token handlers take one too, so a token's security policy URI resolves against the policies that application offers rather than the process-wide fallback:

var handler = new UserNameIdentityTokenHandler(username, password, policies);

Passing nothing keeps the previous behaviour and uses SecurityPolicies.Default.

The registry a container builds is its own. A policy registered by one application is not visible to another hosted in the same process, and it is not visible to SecurityPolicies.Default. That fallback carries exactly the built-in set and is what the paths that run before any container exists — configuration loading, most obviously — resolve their policies through:

string? uri = SecurityPolicies.Default.GetUri("Basic256Sha256");

Construct a registry directly when you want an isolated set, which is also what makes the policy set testable without touching process-wide state:

using var policies = new SecurityPolicies(telemetry);
using IDisposable registration = policies.Register(customPolicy);

The registry creates its logger from the ITelemetryContext it is given, which is why Encrypt, Decrypt and the signature helpers take no ILogger argument.

PlatformSupport is what decides whether the policy is offered on the machine it is running on, so a policy whose algorithms are unavailable is filtered out the same way the built-in ones are. The ECC_curve25519 and ECC_curve448 profiles are the worked example: they ship in the tree but are not advertised, and a consumer can light them up from outside without rebuilding the stack — which is what RegisterLightsUpCurvePoliciesFromOutsideCore asserts.

Registering a policy makes it advertised and resolvable; it does not by itself supply the cryptography behind it. For the two curve profiles above, the in-tree key agreement is still behind a compile-time symbol that no project defines and a BouncyCastle dependency, so a deployment that lights them up supplies the operations through a provider, exactly as the sections above describe. That is the intended division: the policy set says what is offered, the provider says who performs it.

Removing the reflection that used to build these tables also removed the last reflection in Opc.Ua.Core.Security.Constants, which is why this is also a trimming and Native AOT improvement.

Limitations

• HTTPS with a device-held key does not work on Windows or macOS. SChannel and the macOS Security framework require keys registered with a platform key storage provider. It works on Linux, where the TLS layer dispatches through the managed key. UA-TCP is unaffected on every platform.
• The per-message symmetric path is not offloaded to hardware. Session keys are symmetric and derived per channel token; a device round trip per message would destroy throughput. Hardware is used only for the operations that happen when a channel opens or a session is activated. Substituting a software implementation is supported — see above.
• Certificate issuance cannot be made asynchronous at all. X509SignatureGenerator.SignData is called by .NET's own CertificateRequest and CRL builders, so signing a certificate, a certificate request or a revocation list with a remote key occupies a thread by construction. Service faults and the synchronous reconnect handoff are in the same position, because both are reached from call sites that cannot become asynchronous without a contract break.

Related

• Certificates — how certificates are used in the certificate stores
• CertificateManager — certificate lifecycle and Part 12 push management
• ECC Certificates — the elliptic curve security policies
• Dependency Injection — how features are registered
• Diagnostics — telemetry, audit events and metrics
• Native AOT — why plugin discovery is registration-based