Files
UA-.NETStandard/src/Opc.Ua.Gds.Client/AuthorizationServiceClient.cs
romanett a0d569d756 Fix Server and GDS audit findings, review findings and spec-conformance gaps (#4571)
## Summary

Fixes the findings of a bug audit of `Opc.Ua.Server`,
`Opc.Ua.Gds.Server` and `Opc.Ua.Gds.Client`. Rebased on master after
#4516.

What went in:
- **Audit:** 93 findings, each checked against the OPC UA specification.
- **Code review of those fixes:** 35 further findings.
- **Spec grounding of every fix commit:** 18 conformance gaps, now
closed.

Commits are one per finding, named `Fix <ID>`, `Fix review <ID>` or `Fix
spec gap <name>`. The IDs refer to the audit report (S = Server areas,
G1 = GDS server, G2 = GDS client).

Validation:
- Each finding was traced in code and checked against OPC 10000 (parts
3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 20).
- Every fix commit was checked against the spec text again afterwards: 0
non-conformant, remaining gaps fixed.
- Regression tests were added for most fixes.
- Suites run on net10.0 before the rebase: Server, GDS, History,
Configuration, Features, Core.Security, DI, Redundancy, LDS,
InformationModel, PubSub.Server, Client, Sessions and the three
Subscriptions suites, all green. The same suites on the rebased branch
are still running; results will be posted as a comment.

## Behaviour and user-facing changes

### Secure defaults
- **`Historize()` / `HistorianBuilder`** grant HistoryRead only. History
writes need an explicit `historyAccessLevel: HistoryRead |
HistoryWrite`.
- **File-system mount:**
- Anonymous sessions can no longer create, delete, move or open files
for writing (`Bad_UserAccessDenied`).
  - UserWritable and UserExecutable now reflect the user.
- `AllowAnonymousWrite` restores the old behaviour; the ReferenceServer
sample turns it on.
- **Default PKI root** for the hosted server, hosted GDS, hosted LDS and
`OpcUaApplicationConfigurationProvider`:
- Moved from the shared temp directory to `{LocalApplicationData}/OPC
Foundation/{ApplicationName}/pki`, and startup fails if no per-user
directory exists.
- When certificate stores of an earlier version still exist under temp,
a warning names both paths. Existing deployments that relied on the
default get a new application certificate (and the hosted GDS a new CA)
unless `PkiRoot` is set to the old path.
- **GDS:**
  - `GdsServerOptions.AutoApprove` defaults to `false`.
- The default KeyCredential store grants no roles unless
`AuthorizeRoles` allows them.
- Certificate requests (StartSigningRequest, StartNewKeyPairRequest,
FinishRequest) need an encrypted channel.
- **Hosted server anonymous logins:**
- Anonymous is rejected (`Bad_IdentityTokenRejected`) when the default
authenticator options disable it.
- A custom `AddIdentityAuthenticator<T>()` on its own no longer disables
anonymous.
- With anonymous disabled and no configured token policies, the endpoint
advertises the authenticators' token types instead of Anonymous.
- **Runtime-added roles:** their properties and methods need
SecurityAdmin over an encrypted channel, like the well-known roles.
- **Disabled users:** users disabled through Part 18 UserManagement can
no longer log in through `RegisterDefaultAuthenticators(IUserDatabase)`.

### GDS server (Part 12)
- **Certificate requests:**
- FinishRequest / ReadRequest with another application's RequestId
returns `Bad_InvalidArgument`.
  - Every Start*Request returns a new RequestId.
- A CSR without the ApplicationUri is rejected
(`Bad_CertificateUriInvalid`).
- An abstract or unsupported certificate type is rejected at Start
(`Bad_InvalidArgument`).
- **Private-key password:** no longer persisted in the JSON applications
database. A password saved by an earlier version is read into memory
once and dropped on the next save.
- **CheckRevocationStatus:** validates offline against the GDS's own
trust lists and CRLs. It returns Good for good GDS-issued certificates
and `Bad_CertificateInvalid` for input that is not a certificate.
- **Certificate-group trust lists:**
- Writes need CertificateAuthorityAdmin; SecurityAdmin and application
admins are read-only.
  - Writes are validated with the Part 4 certificate validation.
- **AuthorizationService:**
- The legacy RequestAccessToken applies `AccessControl` and issues the
token for the session identity.
- StartRequestToken passes the session identity to every identity-aware
provider.
  - Unknown ResourceIds return `Bad_NotFound`.
- Expired token requests and refresh tokens are pruned, with at most 10
000 pending requests (`Bad_TooManyOperations`).
- **KeyCredential:** requests with PublicKey + SecurityPolicyUri are
rejected with `Bad_SecurityPolicyRejected` (secret encryption is not
implemented); a PublicKey without SecurityPolicyUri is rejected with
`Bad_InvalidArgument`.
- **Audit events:** access-token audit events no longer contain the
password or token data.
- **RegisterTickets / UnregisterTickets:** need the RegistrarAdmin role
when called from a session.
- **Managed application nodes:** moved from namespace 0 to their own
namespace (`ManagedApplicationsNamespaceUri`); the NodeId is the
ApplicationUri, and the mandatory child properties exist.
- **Hosted GDS:**
- New `GdsServerOptions.CertificateGroups`
(`GdsCertificateGroupOptions`), bindable from configuration.
  - The mandatory DefaultApplicationGroup is always present.
  - The default CA subject uses the resolved application name.
- **JSON applications database:**
- A corrupt file throws instead of being silently replaced by an empty
database.
- Saves are atomic and write in place on bind mounts; on net8+ builds
they also follow symlinks and keep the Unix file mode.
  - Issued certificates and trust-list links survive a reload.

### GDS client
- **Trust-list download:**
  - Reads until an empty chunk (Part 20 short reads).
- A size-limit rejection of the final end-of-file read, as sent by
released servers, counts as end of file.
- **Default certificate group:** a null group means
DefaultApplicationGroup, and vendor groups in other namespaces are no
longer mistaken for well-known groups.
- **Status codes and errors:**
  - Missing directory proxies report `Bad_ServerNotConnected`.
- Short or wrongly typed method outputs throw `BadUnexpectedError` /
`BadTypeMismatch`.
- **GdsAccessTokenProvider:** no longer caches a failed client task, and
one caller's cancellation no longer fails other callers.

### Trust lists, push and ConfigurationFile (Part 12 / Part 20)
- **AddCertificate:**
  - `IsTrustedCertificate=false` returns `Bad_CertificateInvalid`.
- Added certificates are validated (Part 4), and a certificate revoked
by a current CRL returns `Bad_CertificateRevoked`.
- **CloseAndUpdate:** validates the uploaded list against its own
certificates and CRLs, not the stores it replaces. Validation failures
are no longer recorded in the server's Rejected store.
- **RemoveCertificate:** removing a trusted or issuer CA that other
certificates still need returns `Bad_CertificateChainIncomplete`.
- **Handles:**
  - Several read handles may be open at once.
- Any open while a write handle exists returns `Bad_NotReadable` /
`Bad_NotWritable`.
  - A write open while any handle is open returns `Bad_NotWritable`.
  - Handles of closed sessions are released.
  - Idle handles close after ActivityTimeout (default 60 s).
- **Status codes:**
- Read clamps to the remaining bytes and no longer enforces the size
limit.
  - Oversized Write / AddCertificate returns `Bad_RequestTooLarge`.
  - Unsupported open modes return `Bad_NotSupported`.
- **ConfigurationFile.CloseAndUpdate:**
  - Empty Targets return `Bad_InvalidArgument`.
- The ConfigurationUpdatedAuditEvent is raised with the configuration
owner as source.
- With the new `IApplicationConfigurationFileTargetProvider`, providers
receive the Targets, a bad target returns Uncertain with per-target
results, and session-interrupting updates are applied after
RestartDelayTime.
- **Default namespace permissions:** namespaces registered after the
first permission lookup now get their NamespaceMetadata default
RolePermissions and AccessRestrictions (no stale negative cache).

### Sessions, identity and roles (Part 18)
- **Session timeouts:** a failure closing one timed-out session no
longer stops the session-timeout monitor.
- **ChangePassword:** an empty old password returns
`Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid`.
- **Removing or disabling a user:** closes only that user's
UserName-token sessions.
- **Role configuration changes:** roles granted by an `ImpersonateUser`
mapping are kept.
- **X509Subject rules:** a certificate subject value containing a quote
never matches an X509Subject rule.
- **`ImpersonateUser` callback:** no longer runs under the global
session lock.
- **Session diagnostics:** LocaleIds are kept as the client sent them,
while null LocaleIds are ignored for translation.

### Subscriptions and monitored items (Part 4)
- **Acknowledgements:** a failing acknowledgement returns a per-entry
Bad status instead of failing the whole Publish.
- **`DiscardedMessageCount`:** counts messages dropped from the
retransmission queue and unsent overflow messages.
- **Durable subscriptions:** transferring a restored anonymous
subscription works (no NullReferenceException).
- **Transferred subscriptions:** sampling and permission checks use the
item's current owner session.
- **Access denied:** a monitored item whose user may no longer read the
attribute gets a `Bad_UserAccessDenied` notification instead of going
silent. Non-Value attributes need Browse permission (RolePermissions
needs ReadRolePermissions), and User* attributes are evaluated per
subscriber.
- **ModifyMonitoredItems:** a SamplingInterval of -1 uses the
subscription's publishing interval.
- **AggregateFilter priming:** needs HistoryRead / ReadHistory
permission and is bounded (100 000 values, bounded page size).
- **Resource leak:** event monitored items no longer leak a consumer
task per create/delete cycle.

### Node management services (Part 3 / Part 4)
- **Reference types:** AddNodes, AddReferences, DeleteReferences and
Browse reject ids that are not ReferenceTypes with
`Bad_ReferenceTypeIdInvalid`. AddNodes, AddReferences and
DeleteReferences also reject abstract ReferenceTypes; Browse still
accepts them (e.g. `HierarchicalReferences` with includeSubtypes).
- **Concurrent AddNodes:** duplicate BrowseNames under one parent get
`Bad_BrowseNameDuplicated`.
- **TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds:**
- Requires Browse permission on intermediate nodes and final targets
(RolePermissions and AccessRestrictions).
  - A long RelativePath no longer rejects the whole request.
- **SemanticChangeEvent:**
- Raised once per actual change of a semantic property, whether or not
it is monitored.
  - Also raised for properties with the SemanticChange access-level bit.
  - Reports the owning node's TypeDefinition as AffectedType.
- **Localized diagnostics:** operation-level text is translated when
OperationLocalizedText is requested.

### History and aggregates (Part 11 / Part 13)
- **DeleteRawModified:** an unspecified or reversed range returns
`Bad_InvalidTimestampArgument`, and StartTime == EndTime deletes the
value at StartTime for every provider.
- **ReadAtTime fallback:** reads only the values around each requested
time. A time whose bound is not found within the search limit returns
`Bad_BoundNotSupported` instead of failing the request.
- **ReadProcessed:** a ProcessingInterval shorter than one tick returns
`Bad_AggregateInvalidInputs`.
- **Delta / DeltaBounds:** widen to the next larger signed type when the
result does not fit the source type (e.g. a decreasing unsigned counter,
or an Int16 overflow).
- **Range / Range2:** return the source data type.

### Alarms and fluent API (Part 9)
- **Suppression:** an alarm stays suppressed while any suppression group
is active, and re-evaluation without a state change does not move
TransitionTime.
- **`MonitorVariable(variable)`:** sets SourceNode, SourceName and
InputNode to the variable and makes it a ConditionSource (HasCondition
to the alarm, HasEventSource from the object).
- **Fluent input/output arguments:** InputArguments / OutputArguments
added through the fluent API to a registered method are readable.
- **Root notifiers:** a failed root-notifier registration no longer
leaves an orphaned event worker.
- **State-machine handlers:** exceptions are logged at Error.

### File system (Part 20)
- **Delete / MoveOrCopy:**
  - Only act on direct children of the directory.
- A NodeId whose kind does not match the entry returns `Bad_NotFound` (a
file NodeId can no longer delete a directory).
- Copying a directory into its own subtree returns
`Bad_InvalidArgument`.
- **Locking:**
- An open file, or a directory containing one, cannot be deleted or
moved (`Bad_InvalidState`).
  - The check is atomic with opens.
- While a Delete or Move runs, read opens get `Bad_NotReadable` and
write opens `Bad_InvalidState`.
- **Open:**
- Reserved mode bits or EraseExisting without Write return
`Bad_InvalidArgument`.
  - Read+Write returns `Bad_NotSupported`.
  - Read while a writer is open returns `Bad_NotReadable`.
- **Client `FileSystemErrors`:** maps `Bad_NotReadable` to
`IOException`.
- **RuntimeNodeSet:** well-formed NodeSets with a stray `Model` element,
or two models in one file where one requires the other, now load.

### Server core, hosting and lifecycle
- **`SessionEstablishmentQueueLimit` > 0:**
CreateSession/ActivateSession now queue for a permit. The permit is
acquired before the request is registered, and a waiting handshake
releases its worker through the request-parking policy.
- **Node manager lifecycle:**
  - Add, reload and remove no longer wait for parked Publish requests.
- A Migrate reload racing with CreateMonitoredItems no longer blocks
later lifecycle operations.
  - Late items on retired or removed managers get `Bad_NodeIdUnknown`.
- **HistoryUpdate:** a batch mixing data and event details is bounded by
both limits.
- **Server stop/start:** stopping the server disposes the configuration
watcher and certificate subscription; starting recreates them.
- **Monitored-item queue factory:** a factory supplied by the caller or
the DI container is no longer disposed by the server.
- **Audit events:** each certificate validation error raises its own
AuditCertificate event. A failed OpenSecureChannel without a service
result is audited as failed.

## New public API (additive)
- `IQueuedSessionEstablishmentLimiter`
- `StandardServer.OwnsMonitoredItemQueueFactory` (protected virtual)
- `DefaultPkiRoot.Get` (Opc.Ua.Configuration)
- `TrustList.SetCertificateValidation`
- `NamespaceMetadataRegistry.Invalidate`
- `IApplicationConfigurationFileTargetProvider` and
`ApplicationConfigurationUpdatePlan`
- `GdsServerOptions.CertificateGroups` / `GdsCertificateGroupOptions`
- `InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore.AuthorizeRoles`
-
`DefaultManagedApplicationsNodeManager.ManagedApplicationsNamespaceUri`
- `AuthorizationServiceManager.RequestAccessTokenAsync(...,
IUserIdentity?, ...)`
- `AllowAnonymousWrite` on the file-system node manager and its factory
- `IFileSystemHost.TryBeginMutation` / `EndMutation`, replacing
`HasOpenHandles`

## Not fixed / known limitations
- **KeyCredential:** secret encryption with the client's PublicKey
(requests needing it are rejected).
- **CSR SAN restriction:** restricting subject / SAN values copied from
a CSR (CA policy).
- **Ticket signatures:** ticket signature verification (needs a
trusted-signer configuration).
- **FileType Read+Write open:** needs a read/write stream contract in
`IFileSystemProvider`.
- **Custom `IUserDatabase` implementations:** the disabled-user check
still scans all users per login. The built-in stores do a single lookup.
- **64-bit Delta precision:** limited by the calculator's double
arithmetic.

## Tests with changed expectations
Existing tests were updated where they asserted the old behaviour:
- File-system status codes
- Trust-list handle eviction
- `DiscardedMessageCount`
- Localized diagnostics bits
- Delta on unsigned sources
- SourceNode of fluent alarms
- ReferenceServer transfer permission test (now expects
`Bad_UserAccessDenied` notifications)
- `UserDeactivationShutdownReviewTests` (the revoked session is a
UserName login)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 07:26:05 +02:00

351 lines
14 KiB
C#

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*
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using System;
using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Linq;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Opc.Ua.Client;
namespace Opc.Ua.Gds.Client
{
/// <summary>
/// Client surface for the OPC 10000-12 §9 AuthorizationService.
/// Wraps the generated <see cref="AuthorizationServiceTypeClient"/>
/// proxy and provides a session-connected experience.
/// </summary>
public sealed class AuthorizationServiceClient
{
private readonly ISession m_session;
private readonly NodeId m_serviceNodeId;
private readonly AuthorizationServiceTypeClient m_proxy;
private readonly ConcurrentDictionary<string, NodeId> m_methodIds = new(StringComparer.Ordinal);
/// <summary>
/// Creates a client targeting a specific AuthorizationService
/// instance on the connected session.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="session">A connected OPC UA session.</param>
/// <param name="serviceNodeId">
/// The NodeId of the AuthorizationService object instance.
/// </param>
public AuthorizationServiceClient(ISession session, NodeId serviceNodeId)
{
m_session = session;
m_serviceNodeId = serviceNodeId;
m_proxy = new AuthorizationServiceTypeClient(
session,
serviceNodeId,
session.MessageContext.Telemetry);
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns the service description.
/// </summary>
public ValueTask<(
string serviceUri,
ByteString serviceCertificate,
ArrayOf<UserTokenPolicy> userTokenPolicies)> GetServiceDescriptionAsync(
CancellationToken ct = default)
{
return m_proxy.GetServiceDescriptionAsync(ct);
}
/// <summary>
/// Requests an access token using the legacy single-call flow.
/// </summary>
[Obsolete("Use StartRequestTokenAsync + FinishRequestTokenAsync for Part 12 v1.05 compliance.")]
public ValueTask<string> RequestAccessTokenAsync(
UserIdentityToken identityToken,
string resourceId,
CancellationToken ct = default)
{
return m_proxy.RequestAccessTokenAsync(identityToken, resourceId, ct);
}
/// <summary>
/// Starts the Part 12 v1.05 two-phase token request flow.
/// </summary>
public async ValueTask<(ByteString serviceData, Guid requestId)> StartRequestTokenAsync(
string resourceId,
string policyId,
ByteString requestorData,
CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments = await CallInstanceMethodAsync(
"StartRequestToken",
2,
ct,
new Variant(resourceId),
new Variant(policyId),
new Variant(requestorData)).ConfigureAwait(false);
return (GetByteStringOutput(outputArguments, 0), GetGuidOutput(outputArguments, 1));
}
/// <summary>
/// Completes the Part 12 v1.05 two-phase token request flow.
/// </summary>
public async ValueTask<(
string accessToken,
DateTime accessTokenExpiryTime,
string? refreshToken,
DateTime refreshTokenExpiryTime)> FinishRequestTokenAsync(
Guid requestId,
ArrayOf<string> requestedRoles,
UserIdentityToken userIdentityToken,
SignatureData userTokenSignature,
CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments = await CallInstanceMethodAsync(
"FinishRequestToken",
4,
ct,
new Variant((Uuid)requestId),
new Variant(requestedRoles),
Variant.FromStructure(userIdentityToken),
Variant.FromStructure(userTokenSignature)).ConfigureAwait(false);
string refreshToken = GetOutput<string>(outputArguments, 2);
return (
GetOutput<string>(outputArguments, 0),
GetDateTimeOutput(outputArguments, 1),
string.IsNullOrEmpty(refreshToken) ? null : refreshToken,
GetDateTimeOutput(outputArguments, 3));
}
/// <summary>
/// Refreshes the access token using a previously-issued refresh token (RC).
/// </summary>
public async ValueTask<(
string accessToken,
DateTime accessTokenExpiryTime,
string? newRefreshToken,
DateTime newRefreshTokenExpiryTime)> RefreshTokenAsync(
string resourceId,
string currentRefreshToken,
CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments = await CallInstanceMethodAsync(
"RefreshToken",
4,
ct,
new Variant(resourceId),
new Variant(currentRefreshToken)).ConfigureAwait(false);
string newRefreshToken = GetOutput<string>(outputArguments, 2);
return (
GetOutput<string>(outputArguments, 0),
GetDateTimeOutput(outputArguments, 1),
string.IsNullOrEmpty(newRefreshToken) ? null : newRefreshToken,
GetDateTimeOutput(outputArguments, 3));
}
private async ValueTask<ArrayOf<Variant>> CallInstanceMethodAsync(
string browseName,
int expectedOutputCount,
CancellationToken ct,
params Variant[] inputArguments)
{
NodeId methodId = await GetMethodIdAsync(browseName, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
var request = new CallMethodRequest
{
ObjectId = m_serviceNodeId,
MethodId = methodId,
InputArguments = inputArguments
};
ArrayOf<CallMethodRequest> requests = [request];
CallResponse response = await m_session.CallAsync(null, requests, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
ClientBase.ValidateResponse(response.Results, requests);
ClientBase.ValidateDiagnosticInfos(response.DiagnosticInfos, requests);
if (StatusCode.IsBad(response.Results[0].StatusCode))
{
throw ServiceResultException.Create(
response.Results[0].StatusCode,
0,
response.DiagnosticInfos,
response.ResponseHeader.StringTable);
}
ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments = response.Results[0].OutputArguments;
if (outputArguments.Count < expectedOutputCount)
{
throw ServiceResultException.Create(
StatusCodes.BadUnexpectedError,
"AuthorizationService method '{0}' returned {1} output arguments, expected {2}.",
browseName,
outputArguments.Count,
expectedOutputCount);
}
return outputArguments;
}
private async ValueTask<NodeId> GetMethodIdAsync(string browseName, CancellationToken ct)
{
if (m_methodIds.TryGetValue(browseName, out NodeId methodId))
{
return methodId;
}
BrowseResponse response = await m_session.BrowseAsync(
null,
null,
0,
new BrowseDescription[] {
new() {
NodeId = m_serviceNodeId,
BrowseDirection = BrowseDirection.Forward,
ReferenceTypeId = ReferenceTypeIds.HierarchicalReferences,
IncludeSubtypes = true,
NodeClassMask = (uint)NodeClass.Method,
ResultMask = (uint)BrowseResultMask.All
}
}.ToArrayOf(),
ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
ArrayOf<BrowseDescription> browseDescriptions = new BrowseDescription[] {
new() { NodeId = m_serviceNodeId }
}.ToArrayOf();
ClientBase.ValidateResponse(response.Results, browseDescriptions);
ReferenceDescription[] references = response.Results[0].References.ToArray()!;
ReferenceDescription? method = references.FirstOrDefault(reference => string.Equals(
reference.BrowseName.Name,
browseName,
StringComparison.Ordinal));
if (method == null)
{
methodId = GetKnownMethodId(browseName);
m_methodIds[browseName] = methodId;
return methodId;
}
methodId = ExpandedNodeId.ToNodeId(method.NodeId, m_session.NamespaceUris);
if (methodId.IsNull)
{
throw ServiceResultException.Create(
StatusCodes.BadNodeIdInvalid,
"AuthorizationService method '{0}' could not be resolved.",
browseName);
}
m_methodIds[browseName] = methodId;
return methodId;
}
private NodeId GetKnownMethodId(string browseName)
{
ushort namespaceIndex = m_serviceNodeId.NamespaceIndex;
return browseName switch
{
"GetServiceDescription" => new NodeId(Methods.AuthorizationServiceType_GetServiceDescription, namespaceIndex),
"RequestAccessToken" => new NodeId(Methods.AuthorizationServiceType_RequestAccessToken, namespaceIndex),
"StartRequestToken" => new NodeId(Methods.AuthorizationServiceType_StartRequestToken, namespaceIndex),
"FinishRequestToken" => new NodeId(Methods.AuthorizationServiceType_FinishRequestToken, namespaceIndex),
"RefreshToken" => new NodeId(Methods.AuthorizationServiceType_RefreshToken, namespaceIndex),
_ => throw ServiceResultException.Create(
StatusCodes.BadNodeIdUnknown,
"AuthorizationService method '{0}' was not found.",
browseName)
};
}
private static T GetOutput<T>(ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments, int index)
{
object? boxed = outputArguments[index].AsBoxedObject(Variant.BoxingBehavior.Legacy);
if (boxed is T typed)
{
return typed;
}
if (boxed == null)
{
return default!;
}
try
{
return (T)Convert.ChangeType(boxed, typeof(T), CultureInfo.InvariantCulture)!;
}
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is InvalidCastException or FormatException or OverflowException)
{
throw ServiceResultException.Create(
StatusCodes.BadTypeMismatch,
ex,
"AuthorizationService output argument {0} has unexpected type {1}.",
index,
boxed.GetType().Name);
}
}
private static ByteString GetByteStringOutput(ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments, int index)
{
if (outputArguments[index].TryGetValue(out ByteString byteString))
{
return byteString;
}
object? boxed = outputArguments[index].AsBoxedObject(Variant.BoxingBehavior.Legacy);
return boxed switch
{
null => default,
byte[] bytes => ByteString.From(bytes),
_ => throw ServiceResultException.Create(
StatusCodes.BadTypeMismatch,
"AuthorizationService output argument {0} has unexpected type {1}.",
index,
boxed.GetType().Name)
};
}
private static Guid GetGuidOutput(ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments, int index)
{
if (outputArguments[index].TryGetValue(out Uuid requestId))
{
return requestId;
}
object? boxed = outputArguments[index].AsBoxedObject(Variant.BoxingBehavior.Legacy);
return boxed is Guid guid ? guid : GetOutput<Guid>(outputArguments, index);
}
private static DateTime GetDateTimeOutput(ArrayOf<Variant> outputArguments, int index)
{
if (outputArguments[index].TryGetValue(out DateTimeUtc dateTimeUtc))
{
return (DateTime)dateTimeUtc;
}
object? boxed = outputArguments[index].AsBoxedObject(Variant.BoxingBehavior.Legacy);
return boxed is DateTime dateTime ? dateTime : GetOutput<DateTime>(outputArguments, index);
}
}
}