Files
UA-.NETStandard/docs/EccProfiles.md
romanett 7fe7794a19 Enable AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 policies on net48 via BouncyCastle (stacked on #4703) (#4705)
> Follow-up to #4703 (now merged to master; this PR has been retargeted
to `master`).

Part of #4510. #4703 enabled the CBC ECC policies on net48 through a
BouncyCastle raw-ECDH polyfill. The AEAD policies were still unavailable
there because .NET Framework has no `AesGcm` or `ChaCha20Poly1305`. This
PR adds those ciphers the same way, so on net48 all of these are now
offered:
`ECC_{nistP256,nistP384,brainpoolP256r1,brainpoolP384r1}_AesGcm` /
`_ChaChaPoly`, `RSA_DH_AesGcm`, `RSA_DH_ChaChaPoly`.

## Changes
- **Polyfill**
`src/Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates/Org.BouncyCastle/AeadCiphers.cs`
(internal, `#if NETFRAMEWORK`, next to `EcdhRawAgreement`): `AesGcm` and
`ChaCha20Poly1305` types with the .NET 8 BCL surface. They wrap
BouncyCastle's `GcmBlockCipher(AesEngine)` and
`Org.BouncyCastle.Crypto.Modes.ChaCha20Poly1305`.
- A tag mismatch throws `CryptographicException`, never BC's
`InvalidCipherTextException`, so
`PlatformSymmetricCryptoProvider.DecryptAuthenticated` still returns
`false` and the channel still raises a protocol error.
- GCM releases plaintext blocks before it checks the tag, so plaintext
stays in a scratch buffer and is copied out only after the tag verifies.
On failure the destination is cleared, as the BCL does. Scratch buffers
and the key copy are zeroed.
- **Opc.Ua.Core**: aliases the polyfill types on `NETFRAMEWORK` and
removes the `NET8_0_OR_GREATER` gates in `SecurityPolicies`
(`SupportsAesGcmPolicy` / `SupportsChaCha20Poly1305Policy`),
`CryptoUtils` (`SymmetricEncryptAndSign` / `SymmetricDecryptAndVerify`,
AEAD helpers) and `PlatformSymmetricCryptoProvider`. The channel, the
provider facet and the encrypted ECC user tokens (`EncryptedSecret`,
through `CryptoUtils`) now run the same code on every target. .NET 8+
keeps the BCL ciphers.
- **FIPS** (requested by the #4703 session, after a2ecf13b1): under
`CryptoCompliancePolicy.FipsOnly`, `CryptoCompliance.IsPolicyPermitted`
now also withholds every AEAD policy on .NET Framework. That adds
`RSA_DH_AesGcm`, which is FIPS-approved and not ECC. The BouncyCastle
cipher runs outside any validated module and the user-token path
bypasses the provider registry, so the auditor cannot see it. Tests and
`docs/CryptoProvider.md` are updated to match.
- **Docs**: EccProfiles (Known Limitations), migration `certificates.md`
(and the bundled skill copy), ProductionChecklist, Profiles,
WhatsNewIn2.0, CryptoProvider. They state that on net48 these primitives
run in managed BouncyCastle, which is not a validated (FIPS) module and
not hardware-accelerated or hardened against cache-timing attacks like
CNG AES.

## Tests
- New `AeadPolyfillTests` (Core.Tests):
- Known answers: NIST GCM test cases 2/4 (AES-128) and 14/16 (AES-256),
plus RFC 8439 §2.8.2 for ChaCha20-Poly1305. They run through
`PlatformSymmetricCryptoProvider` on every TFM and through the polyfill
directly.
- Tampering with the tag, the ciphertext or the AAD gives `false` from
the provider, and `CryptographicException` with a cleared plaintext from
the polyfill.
  - Argument validation.
- **BCL cross-check:** on .NET 8+, Core.Tests also compiles
`AeadCiphers.cs` (`AEAD_POLYFILL_CROSSCHECK`, test-only
`BouncyCastle.Cryptography` reference). Polyfill and BCL must produce
identical ciphertext and tag, and each must decrypt the other's output:
3 algorithms × 8 message lengths (0 to 8192) × 3 AAD lengths.
- `CryptoProviderRegistryTests`: `RSA_DH_AesGcm` is permitted under
FipsOnly only off .NET Framework and withheld on it.
- Tests that `Assert.Ignore` when AEAD is unavailable now run on net48,
e.g. `EccSecretRejectsDifferentNegotiatedPolicyAsync` and the
`RSA_DH_AesGcm` server session tests.

### Local results
| Run | Result |
|---|---|
| Core.Tests net48, full (before the FIPS commit) | 6049 passed, 0
failed, 88 skipped |
| Core.Tests crypto/AEAD/ECC/EncryptedSecret/Nonce subset, net48 /
net10.0 | 278 / 343 passed, 0 skipped |
| Server.Tests session-security/ECC subset, net48 | 128 passed, 0
skipped |
| `EccInteropTests` net48 vs **open62541 1.5.8 (OpenSSL)** peer | all 16
AEAD cases pass, 4 of them two-renewal token-renewal runs
(`ECC_nistP256_AesGcm`/`_ChaChaPoly` × Sign/SignAndEncrypt ×
Anonymous/UserName, both directions). Remaining 8 failures are the
documented open62541 CBC Sign-only HKDF differences in
`expected-differences.json` |
| `EccInteropTests` net48 vs 1.5.378 LegacyPeer | unchanged 26 passed /
28 skipped |

Note on the acceptance criterion: the 1.5.378 LegacyPeer does not
implement the AEAD policies, so its
`_AesGcm`/`_ChaChaPoly`/`*AeadTokenRenewalAsync` cases skip on every TFM
("The peer (UA-.NETStandard) does not declare …"). Before this PR they
skipped on the 2.0 side; now they get past it and stop at the peer
check. The open62541 peer is the real cross-stack check of the net48
AEAD path against a non-BouncyCastle implementation.

## PubSub DTLS on net48
The DTLS 1.3 transport (`src/Opc.Ua.PubSub.Udp/Dtls`) was compiled out
on .NET Framework, so net48 registered no DTLS profiles. It now reuses
the same polyfills (`Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates` gains
`InternalsVisibleTo Opc.Ua.PubSub.Udp`):
- The `NET8_0_OR_GREATER` gates in the handshake, ECDHE, record
protection and profile probe are removed.
- Two .NET 8 APIs get net48 fallbacks: the AES-ECB record-number mask
uses `CreateEncryptor`, and the handshake random uses
`RandomNumberGenerator.Create`.
- The HKDF probe now checks the managed `DtlsHkdf` that the key schedule
actually uses.
- The public `IsAeadSupported` / `IsRawSharedSecretSupported` probes are
kept and now return `true` everywhere.
- The DTLS tests now also run on net48. The net48 "registers no
profiles" test now asserts that the NIST AEAD profiles are registered.
The socket transport-peer tests and the benchmarks stay .NET 8-only
because they use .NET 8 socket APIs.
- `docs/PubSub.md` DTLS profile table: the net48 column is updated.

Results: PubSub.Udp.Tests net48, full suite: **229 passed, 0 skipped**.
It includes complete NIST AEAD, brainpool and integrity-only handshakes
and ChaCha20 records. The DTLS subset is 76 on net48 vs 81 on net10.0;
the 5 still-gated socket-peer tests are the difference.

Note: DTLS profile selection does not consult `CryptoCompliancePolicy`
on any target. That is pre-existing and unchanged here.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-09 06:30:14 +02:00

18 KiB

Support for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Certificates in Server and Client Applications

Server and client applications support encrypted communication with RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) certificates. This guide explains how to configure both certificate types.

Contents

The previous configuration supports RSA certificates. The new configuration supports both RSA and ECC certificates. The guide also describes compatibility and ECC limitations.

Previous Client and Server application configuration supports only RSA certificates

Up to now, the configuration supported encrypted communication using only the RSA encryption algorithm. That means that the server and client certificates were RSA certificates and there was just one RSA certificate per application needed to be configured. The XML tag which contained the RSA certificate to be configured was <ApplicationCertificate>. This tag is still used for the RSA certificate configuration in backward compatibility mode as further described below:

<!-- The security configuration for the server. -->
<SecurityConfiguration>
 <!-- Where the application instance certificate is stored (MachineDefault) -->
 <ApplicationCertificate>
   <StoreType>Directory</StoreType>
   <StorePath>%LocalApplicationData%/OPC Foundation/pki/own</StorePath>
   <SubjectName>CN=Quickstart Reference Server, C=US, S=Arizona, O=OPC Foundation, DC=localhost</SubjectName>
 </ApplicationCertificate>
 ....
</SecurityConfiguration>

Previous Server application configuration supports only RSA certificates

For Server applications the configuration of the RSA certificate involves also specifying the SecurityPolicies to be supported by the server:

    <!-- The security configuration for the server. -->
<SecurityConfiguration>
    <!-- The security policy to use. -->
    <SecurityPolicies>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#Basic256Sha256</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>   
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>None_1</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#None</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>Sign_2</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri></SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri></SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
    ....
</SecurityConfiguration>

New Client and Server application configuration support both RSA and ECC certificates

With the newly introduced support for ECC certificates, the configuration of the server application has been extended to support both RSA and ECC certificates. The XML tag under which both the RSA and ECC certificates are configured is <ApplicationCertificates>.

The <ApplicationCertificate> tag is still used for the RSA certificate configuration in backward compatibility mode, meaning that old server configurations are still supported, but they cannot simultaneously coexist.

The new configuration of the server application is described below:

<!-- The security configuration for the server. -->
<SecurityConfiguration>
    <!-- Where the application instance certificate is stored (MachineDefault) -->
    <ApplicationCertificates>
        <CertificateIdentifier>
            <StoreType>Directory</StoreType>
            <StorePath>%LocalApplicationData%/OPC Foundation/pki/own</StorePath>
            <SubjectName>CN=Quickstart Reference Server, C=US, S=Arizona, O=OPC Foundation, DC=localhost</SubjectName>
            <CertificateTypeString>RsaSha256</CertificateTypeString>
        </CertificateIdentifier>
        <CertificateIdentifier>
            <!-- <TypeId>NistP256</TypeId> -->
            <StoreType>Directory</StoreType>
            <StorePath>%LocalApplicationData%/OPC Foundation/pki/own</StorePath>
            <SubjectName>CN=Quickstart Reference Server, C=US, S=Arizona, O=OPC Foundation, DC=localhost</SubjectName>
            <CertificateTypeString>NistP256</CertificateTypeString>
        </CertificateIdentifier>
        <CertificateIdentifier>
            <!-- <TypeId>NistP384</TypeId> -->
            <StoreType>Directory</StoreType>
            <StorePath>%LocalApplicationData%/OPC Foundation/pki/own</StorePath>
            <SubjectName>CN=Quickstart Reference Server, C=US, S=Arizona, O=OPC Foundation, DC=localhost</SubjectName>
            <CertificateTypeString>NistP384</CertificateTypeString>
        </CertificateIdentifier>
        <CertificateIdentifier>
            <!-- <TypeId>BrainpoolP256r1</TypeId> -->
            <StoreType>Directory</StoreType>
            <StorePath>%LocalApplicationData%/OPC Foundation/pki/own</StorePath>
            <SubjectName>CN=Quickstart Reference Server, C=US, S=Arizona, O=OPC Foundation, DC=localhost</SubjectName>
            <CertificateTypeString>BrainpoolP256r1</CertificateTypeString>
        </CertificateIdentifier>
        <CertificateIdentifier>
            <!-- <TypeId>BrainpoolP384r1</TypeId> -->
            <StoreType>Directory</StoreType>
            <StorePath>%LocalApplicationData%/OPC Foundation/pki/own</StorePath>
            <SubjectName>CN=Quickstart Reference Server, C=US, S=Arizona, O=OPC Foundation, DC=localhost</SubjectName>
            <CertificateTypeString>BrainpoolP384r1</CertificateTypeString>
        </CertificateIdentifier>
    </ApplicationCertificates>
....
</SecurityConfiguration>

This layout of the configuration file allows the server to support both RSA and ECC certificates and allows the server to generate certificates of different types. The <CertificateTypeString> tag is used to specify the type of the certificate.

The supported types are:

  • RsaSha256 for RSA certificates
  • NistP256 for ECC certificates with NIST P256 curve
  • NistP384 for ECC certificates with NIST P384 curve
  • BrainpoolP256r1 for ECC certificates with Brainpool P256r1 curve
  • BrainpoolP384r1 for ECC certificates with Brainpool P384r1 curve

Additionally, this layout enables the user to select a specific <SubjectName> for each certificate. This is useful when the user wants to generate certificates with different <SubjectName>s.

The Server applications can configure the supported SecurityPolicies in the same way as before, but now the SecurityPolicies can be configured for each ECC specific SecurityPolicyUri which is to be supported by the server:

<!-- The security configuration for the server. -->
<SecurityConfiguration>
    <!-- The security policy to use. -->
    <SecurityPolicies>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#Basic256Sha256</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>Sign_2</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri></SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri></SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>Sign_2</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_nistP256</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>Sign_2</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_nistP384</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>Sign_2</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_brainpoolP256r1</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>Sign_2</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_brainpoolP384r1</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_nistP256</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_nistP384</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_brainpoolP256r1<SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
        <ServerSecurityPolicy>
            <SecurityMode>SignAndEncrypt_3</SecurityMode>
            <SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_brainpoolP384r1</SecurityPolicyUri>
        </ServerSecurityPolicy>
    </SecurityPolicies>
    ....
</SecurityConfiguration>

With the introduction of ECC certificates, the <SecurityPolicies> section of the configuration file has been extended to support ECC specific SecurityPolicies. The ECC specific SecurityPolicies are the following:

  • http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_nistP256
  • http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_nistP384
  • http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_brainpoolP256r1
  • http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#ECC_brainpoolP384r1

For every ECC-specific policy in <SecurityPolicies>, the server must have a corresponding ECC certificate in <ApplicationCertificates>. Its CertificateTypeString must match the policy's curve. If a corresponding certificate is missing, the server cannot start.

The server encrypts each UserIdentityToken with the certificate selected by the active security policy or by the <SecurityPolicyUri> in its <UserTokenPolicy>. To explicitly list the policies supported for user identity tokens, configure them in <UserTokenPolicies>. They must also appear in <SecurityPolicies>.

The following example shows how the server can specify the supported <SecurityPolicy>s for the UserIdentityTokens:

<!-- The SDK expects the server to support the same set of user tokens for every endpoint. -->
<UserTokenPolicies>
    <!-- Allows anonymous users -->
    <ua:UserTokenPolicy>
        <ua:TokenType>Anonymous_0</ua:TokenType>
        <!-- <ua:SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#None</ua:SecurityPolicyUri> -->
    </ua:UserTokenPolicy>
        <!-- Allows username/password with password encrypted using the active security policy-->
    <ua:UserTokenPolicy>
        <ua:TokenType>UserName_1</ua:TokenType>
        <!-- passwords must be encrypted - this specifies what algorithm to use -->
        <!-- if no algorithm is specified, the active security policy is used -->
        <!-- <ua:SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#Basic256Sha256</ua:SecurityPolicyUri> -->
    </ua:UserTokenPolicy>
        <!-- Allows username/password with password encrypted using ECC security-->
    <ua:UserTokenPolicy>
        <ua:TokenType>UserName_1</ua:TokenType>
        <!-- passwords must be encrypted - this specifies what algorithm to use -->
        <!-- if no algorithm is specified, the active security policy is used -->
        <ua:SecurityPolicyUri>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#Basic256Sha256</ua:SecurityPolicyUri>
    </ua:UserTokenPolicy>
</UserTokenPolicies>

You can omit <SecurityPolicyUri> from <UserTokenPolicy>. In that case, the server uses the active security policy to encrypt the UserIdentityToken. Therefore, each policy listed in <UserTokenPolicies> must also appear in <SecurityPolicies>.

If <UserTokenPolicies> names a policy that <SecurityPolicies> does not include, the configuration is invalid.

"Old" Client and Server application configuration format VS "New" Client and Server application configuration format

Applications using the old configuration continue to use RSA certificates configured with <ApplicationCertificate>. The server must not list ECC policies in <SecurityPolicies>. These applications cannot communicate with peers that require ECC certificates.

Applications using the new configuration can support both RSA and ECC certificates. Configure both certificate types with <ApplicationCertificates>, then list the supported policies in <SecurityPolicies>, including any ECC policies.

Use <UserTokenPolicies> to configure the policies used to encrypt user identity tokens. These policies must also appear in <SecurityPolicies>.

Do not combine the old and new configuration formats. A configuration file cannot contain both <ApplicationCertificate> and <ApplicationCertificates>.

Configure GDS for use with ECC Certificates

To use ECC certificates with the Global Discovery Server (GDS), update its configuration as shown below.

  <Extensions>
    <ua:XmlElement>
      <GlobalDiscoveryServerConfiguration xmlns="http://opcfoundation.org/UA/GDS/Configuration.xsd">
        <CertificateGroups>
          <CertificateGroupConfiguration>
            <Id>Default</Id>
            <CertificateType>RsaSha256ApplicationCertificateType</CertificateType>

Replace the <CertificateType> node of the Default CertificateGroupConfiguration with the <CertificateTypes> node. This allows the Certificate Group to have multiple CA Certificates for the different Certificate types.

<Extensions>
    <ua:XmlElement>
      <GlobalDiscoveryServerConfiguration xmlns="http://opcfoundation.org/UA/GDS/Configuration.xsd">
        <CertificateGroups>
          <CertificateGroupConfiguration>
            <Id>Default</Id>
            <CertificateTypes>
              <ua:String>RsaSha256ApplicationCertificateType</ua:String>
              <ua:String>EccNistP256ApplicationCertificateType</ua:String>
              <ua:String>EccNistP384ApplicationCertificateType</ua:String>
            </CertificateTypes>

The old Configuration format is still supported but only supports either RSA or ECC Certificates for a single CertificateGroup. The GDS checks on startup if a valid configuration was supplied.

Known Limitations

Not all curves are supported by all OS platforms and not all .NET implementations offer cryptographic API support for all curve types. On .NET Framework 4.8 the ECDH agreement and the AEAD ciphers run in BouncyCastle. OPC UA Part 6 feeds the raw ECDH shared secret into HKDF. .NET Framework only offers ECDiffieHellman.DeriveKeyMaterial, which hashes the secret first, so the .NET Framework 4.8 build computes the raw agreement with the managed BouncyCastle.Cryptography implementation (ECDHBasicAgreement), which Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates already references on that target. The ephemeral keys, ECDSA signatures and HKDF stay on the platform (CNG) providers; only the agreement step is managed code. The AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 variants of the ECC policies (ECC_*_AesGcm, ECC_*_ChaChaPoly) and RSA_DH_AesGcm / RSA_DH_ChaChaPoly need authenticated ciphers that .NET Framework does not have, so on that target the stack runs AES-GCM (GcmBlockCipher over AesEngine) and ChaCha20-Poly1305 in BouncyCastle as well, also for the encrypted ECC user tokens. Deployments bound to FIPS-validated or other certified cryptographic modules should note that these steps are not performed by a validated module on .NET Framework, so CryptoCompliancePolicy.FipsOnly withholds the ECC and AEAD policies there, and that the managed AES is neither hardware accelerated nor hardened against cache-timing side channels like the CNG implementation; use the .NET 8+ build, or an RSA policy, where that matters. The .NET 8+ builds use ECDiffieHellman.DeriveRawSecretAgreement, AesGcm and ChaCha20Poly1305 from the BCL and do not load BouncyCastle for them.

All ECC policies (ECC_nistP256, ECC_nistP384, ECC_brainpoolP256r1, ECC_brainpoolP384r1 and their _AesGcm / _ChaChaPoly variants) are available on every target, subject to the OS supporting the curve. ECC certificate parsing and signing remain subject to OS curve support. The supported ECC curve types are the following:

  • NistP256 for ECC certificates with NIST P256 curve
  • NistP384 for ECC certificates with NIST P384 curve
  • BrainpoolP256r1 for ECC certificates with Brainpool P256r1 curve
  • BrainpoolP384r1 for ECC certificates with Brainpool P384r1 curve