Files
UA-.NETStandard/tests/Opc.Ua.Server.Tests/KeyCredential/KeyCredentialSecretRegressionTests.cs
romanett 9b034f8291 Enable nullable reference types centrally; migrate all unset and annotations-only projects (#4700)
# Description

Nullable reference types are now enabled once, in `common.props`, and
every project in the repository builds warning-clean with them.

**Configuration**
- `<Nullable>enable</Nullable>` lives in `common.props`. All per-project
`<Nullable>` settings are removed: 178 project files (enable,
annotations, and the `disable` in the three Aot test projects).
- 419 per-file `#nullable enable`/`restore` directives and the 4
`#nullable disable` directives are removed.
- Kept on purpose:
- The 5 `<auto-generated>` schema files (`UANodeSet.cs`, `UA Type
Dictionary.cs`, `OPCBinarySchema.cs`, `SecuredApplication.cs`,
`PInvokeHelper.cs`) keep `#nullable enable`. The compiler ignores the
project setting in generated code, so the directive is required there.
- `tests/Opc.Ua.Interop.LegacyPeer` keeps `disable`. It builds against
the 1.5.378 packages and does not import the repository props.
- `docs/DeveloperGuide.md` and `.github/copilot-instructions.md` now
describe the central setting.

**Migration** (the 43 unset and 13 annotations-only projects, roughly
10k diagnostics)
- **Production code: annotated at the declarations.** Covers
`tools/Opc.Ua.SourceGeneration.Core`, `src/Opc.Ua.Lds.Server` and the
LDS sample.
- Members, parameters and returns are nullable where null actually
flows.
- Null-check helpers carry `[NotNullWhen]` (`IsNull`, `IsValidXmlName`,
`IsMethodTypeDesign`).
- `CoreUtils.Format`, `Utils.Format`, `ITemplateWriter.WriteLine` take
`params object?[]`. `Template.AddReplacement` takes `string?` (rendering
already skips null replacements).
- `IRegisteredServerStore.RegisterAsync` returns
`Task<RegistrationEntry?>`: it returns null when a registration is
removed.
- Dereferences backed by an invariant (for example, the validated model)
use `!`, so runtime behaviour is unchanged.
- **Behavioural changes in production code** (small, deliberate):
- `NodeSetToModelDesign` throws `InvalidOperationException` when the
file is not a NodeSet. Before, it threw a NullReferenceException on the
next line.
- `ModelDesignValidator` starts its lookup tables empty instead of null.
A redundant `if (m_nodes == null) return;` guard is gone.
- **Test code: minimal annotations.**
  - `?` on values that can be null, `!` where the test asserts non-null.
  - `= null!` for fixture members assigned in SetUp.
- `TryGetStructure<T>(out T? x)` where the inferred `T?` broke the
`IEncodeable` constraint.
- A few redundant `== null` checks on structs (`NodeId`, `ArrayOf<T>`)
folded into the adjacent `IsNull`/`Count` checks.

**Notes for reviewers**
- The diff is large (~1,500 files) but almost entirely mechanical: `?`,
`!` and directive removal. The non-annotation changes are listed above.
- Known follow-up, not done here:
`IModelDesign.Namespaces/TargetNamespace/NamespaceUris` stay
non-nullable even though the validator returns null before it loads a
dictionary. Making them nullable would ripple through every generator
call site.

## Related Issues

- Fixes #4439

## Checklist

- [ ] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [x] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.

The "no new warnings" box covers net10.0 and net48: full non-incremental
builds of `UA.slnx`, `tools/SourceGeneration.slnx`,
`tools/MigrationAnalyzer.slnx` and the Aot test projects finished with 0
warnings and 0 errors under the repository's warnings-as-errors
settings. net9.0 and net8.0 also had no nullable diagnostics, but they
were not rebuilt after the final fixes. Tests have not been run locally
yet.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 08:48:13 +02:00

506 lines
25 KiB
C#

/* ========================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2005-2025 The OPC Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* OPC Foundation MIT License 1.00
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
* obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
* files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
* restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
* copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
* conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
* included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
* HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
* WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
* OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* The complete license agreement can be found here:
* http://opcfoundation.org/License/MIT/1.00/
* ======================================================================*/
// CA2000: test helpers intentionally transfer disposable ownership or use short-lived throwaway values.
#pragma warning disable CA2000
using System;
using System.Buffers.Binary;
using System.Linq;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Moq;
using NUnit.Framework;
using Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates;
using Opc.Ua.Server.Hosting;
using Opc.Ua.Tests;
namespace Opc.Ua.Server.Tests.KeyCredential
{
/// <summary>
/// Verifies credential secret decryption, policy admission, cancellation, and certificate-registry consistency.
/// </summary>
[TestFixture]
public sealed class KeyCredentialSecretRegressionTests
{
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that supported encrypted updates store usable plaintext without modifying the caller's envelope.
/// </summary>
[TestCase(SecurityPolicies.Basic256Sha256)]
[TestCase(SecurityPolicies.Aes128_Sha256_RsaOaep)]
[TestCase(SecurityPolicies.Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss)]
public async Task EncryptedUpdateStoresUsablePlaintextWithoutChangingTheCallerEnvelopeAsync(string policy)
{
using var harness = new Harness();
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
byte[] expected = [11, 22, 33, 44, 55];
byte[] encrypted = EncryptedSecret.CreateForRsa(harness.MessageContext, policy, harness.Certificate)
.Encrypt(expected, []);
byte[] original = [.. encrypted];
KeyCredentialUpdateMethodStateResult result = await harness.UpdateAsync(
encrypted, harness.Certificate.Thumbprint, policy).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(harness.StoreWrites, Is.EqualTo(1));
Assert.That(harness.Stored.Secret, Is.EqualTo(expected));
Assert.That(encrypted, Is.EqualTo(original));
Assert.That(harness.Node.CredentialId!.Value, Is.EqualTo("credential-1"));
}
[TestCase(32)]
[TestCase(64)]
[TestCase(128)]
public async Task PeerEncryptedUpdateAcceptsAnUncheckedNonceAsync(int nonceLength)
{
using var harness = new Harness();
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
byte[] expected = [11, 22, 33, 44, 55];
byte[] nonce = Nonce.CreateRandomNonceData(nonceLength);
byte[] envelope = CreatePeerRsaEnvelope(harness, expected, nonce);
byte[] original = [.. envelope];
KeyCredentialUpdateMethodStateResult result = await harness.UpdateAsync(
envelope, harness.Certificate.Thumbprint, SecurityPolicies.Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(harness.StoreWrites, Is.EqualTo(1));
Assert.That(harness.Stored.Secret, Is.EqualTo(expected));
Assert.That(envelope, Is.EqualTo(original));
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that invalid certificates, policies, or encrypted envelopes cannot write a credential.
/// </summary>
[TestCase("wrong-certificate")]
[TestCase("wrong-key")]
[TestCase("wrong-policy")]
[TestCase("corrupt-signature")]
[TestCase("truncated")]
[TestCase("unknown-policy")]
[TestCase("none-policy")]
[TestCase("ecc-policy")]
[TestCase("rsa-dh-policy")]
[TestCase("unexpected-clear-thumbprint")]
public async Task InvalidEncryptedUpdateNeverWritesTheStoreAsync(string error)
{
using var harness = new Harness();
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
const string policy = SecurityPolicies.Basic256Sha256;
string requestedPolicy = policy;
string thumbprint = harness.Certificate.Thumbprint;
byte[] bytes = EncryptedSecret.CreateForRsa(harness.MessageContext, policy, harness.Certificate)
.Encrypt([1, 2, 3, 4], []);
StatusCode expected = StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument;
switch (error)
{
case "wrong-certificate":
thumbprint = new string('0', 40);
expected = StatusCodes.BadCertificateInvalid;
break;
case "wrong-key":
using (Certificate other = DefaultCertificateFactory.Instance.CreateCertificate("CN=Other").CreateForRSA())
{
bytes = EncryptedSecret.CreateForRsa(harness.MessageContext, policy, other).Encrypt([1, 2, 3], []);
}
expected = StatusCodes.BadCertificateInvalid;
break;
case "wrong-policy":
requestedPolicy = SecurityPolicies.Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss;
expected = StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected;
break;
case "corrupt-signature":
bytes[^1] ^= 1;
break;
case "truncated":
bytes = bytes.AsSpan(0, 10).ToArray();
break;
case "unknown-policy":
requestedPolicy = "urn:unsupported-policy";
expected = StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected;
break;
case "none-policy":
requestedPolicy = SecurityPolicies.None;
expected = StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected;
break;
case "ecc-policy":
requestedPolicy = SecurityPolicies.ECC_nistP256;
expected = StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected;
break;
case "rsa-dh-policy":
requestedPolicy = "http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#RSA_DH";
expected = StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected;
break;
case "unexpected-clear-thumbprint":
requestedPolicy = string.Empty;
break;
}
KeyCredentialUpdateMethodStateResult result = await harness.UpdateAsync(bytes, thumbprint, requestedPolicy)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(expected));
Assert.That(harness.StoreWrites, Is.Zero);
Assert.That(harness.Node.CredentialId!.Value, Is.Null.Or.Empty);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that a plaintext update without encryption metadata stores an independent copy of the secret.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task ClearSecretRequiresNoPolicyAndRetainsTheSameBytesAsync()
{
using var harness = new Harness();
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
byte[] secret = [7, 8, 9];
KeyCredentialUpdateMethodStateResult result = await harness.UpdateAsync(secret, string.Empty, string.Empty)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(harness.Stored.Secret, Is.EqualTo(secret));
Assert.That(harness.Stored.Secret, Is.Not.SameAs(secret));
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that a cancelled credential update propagates cancellation without writing secret data.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task CancelledCredentialUpdateCannotPersistASecretAsync()
{
using var harness = new Harness();
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
using var cancellation = new CancellationTokenSource();
cancellation.Cancel();
Assert.That(() => harness.UpdateAsync([7, 8, 9], string.Empty, string.Empty, cancellation.Token),
Throws.InstanceOf<OperationCanceledException>());
Assert.That(harness.StoreWrites, Is.Zero);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that direct and dependency-injected subjects advertise the same registry certificate used to
/// decrypt.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task EncryptingKeyUsesTheSameConfiguredRegistryAsDecryptionAsync(
[Values] bool dependencyInjection)
{
using var harness = new Harness(dependencyInjection);
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
GetEncryptingKeyMethodStateResult key = await harness.GetKeyAsync(string.Empty).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(key.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(key.RevisedSecurityPolicyUri, Is.EqualTo(SecurityPolicies.Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss));
using var certificate = Certificate.FromRawData(key.PublicKey);
Assert.That(certificate.Thumbprint, Is.EqualTo(harness.Certificate.Thumbprint));
Assert.That(certificate.HasPrivateKey, Is.False);
byte[] encrypted = EncryptedSecret.CreateForRsa(
harness.MessageContext, key.RevisedSecurityPolicyUri, certificate).Encrypt([41, 42], []);
KeyCredentialUpdateMethodStateResult result = await harness.UpdateAsync(
encrypted, certificate.Thumbprint, key.RevisedSecurityPolicyUri).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(harness.Stored.Secret, Is.EqualTo(")*"u8.ToArray()));
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that policy restrictions apply both to encrypting-key discovery and credential updates.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task DisallowedPolicyIsNeitherAdvertisedNorAcceptedAsync()
{
using var harness = new Harness(options: new KeyCredentialPushOptions
{
AllowedSecurityPolicyUris = [SecurityPolicies.Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss]
});
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
GetEncryptingKeyMethodStateResult key = await harness.GetKeyAsync(SecurityPolicies.Basic256Sha256)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(key.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected));
byte[] encrypted = EncryptedSecret.CreateForRsa(
harness.MessageContext, SecurityPolicies.Basic256Sha256, harness.Certificate).Encrypt([7, 8, 9], []);
KeyCredentialUpdateMethodStateResult result = await harness.UpdateAsync(
encrypted, harness.Certificate.Thumbprint, SecurityPolicies.Basic256Sha256).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected));
Assert.That(harness.StoreWrites, Is.Zero);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that unsupported encryption policies are rejected without exposing an encrypting key.
/// </summary>
[TestCase(SecurityPolicies.None)]
[TestCase(SecurityPolicies.ECC_nistP256)]
[TestCase("urn:unknown")]
public async Task UnsupportedEncryptingKeyPolicyIsRejectedAsync(string policy)
{
using var harness = new Harness();
await harness.BindAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
GetEncryptingKeyMethodStateResult key = await harness.GetKeyAsync(policy).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(key.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.BadSecurityPolicyRejected));
Assert.That(key.PublicKey.IsEmpty, Is.True);
}
private static byte[] CreatePeerRsaEnvelope(Harness harness, byte[] secret, byte[] nonce)
{
using var aes = Aes.Create();
aes.KeySize = 256;
aes.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
aes.Padding = PaddingMode.None;
aes.GenerateKey();
aes.GenerateIV();
byte[] signingKey = Nonce.CreateRandomNonceData(32);
byte[] encryptionKey = aes.Key;
byte[] iv = aes.IV;
byte[]? keyData = null;
byte[]? payload = null;
try
{
using (var keys = new BinaryEncoder(harness.MessageContext))
{
keys.WriteByteString(null, signingKey);
keys.WriteByteString(null, encryptionKey);
keys.WriteByteString(null, iv);
keyData = keys.CloseAndReturnBuffer()!;
}
using RSA rsa = harness.Certificate.GetRSAPublicKey()!;
byte[] encryptedKeys = rsa!.Encrypt(keyData!, RSAEncryptionPadding.OaepSHA256);
using (var plaintext = new BinaryEncoder(harness.MessageContext))
{
plaintext.WriteByteString(null, nonce);
plaintext.WriteByteString(null, secret);
int padding = (16 - ((plaintext.Position + 2) % 16)) % 16;
for (int i = 0; i < padding; i++)
{
plaintext.WriteByte(null, (byte)padding);
}
plaintext.WriteUInt16(null, (ushort)padding);
payload = plaintext.CloseAndReturnBuffer()!;
}
using ICryptoTransform cipher = aes.CreateEncryptor();
byte[] encryptedPayload = cipher.TransformFinalBlock(payload!, 0, payload!.Length);
using var encoder = new BinaryEncoder(harness.MessageContext);
encoder.WriteNodeId(null, DataTypeIds.RsaEncryptedSecret);
encoder.WriteByte(null, (byte)ExtensionObjectEncoding.Binary);
int lengthPosition = encoder.Position;
encoder.WriteUInt32(null, 0);
encoder.WriteString(null, SecurityPolicies.Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss);
encoder.WriteByteString(null, Utils.FromHexString(harness.Certificate.Thumbprint));
encoder.WriteDateTime(null, DateTime.UtcNow);
encoder.WriteUInt16(null, checked((ushort)encryptedKeys.Length));
foreach (byte value in encryptedKeys)
{
encoder.WriteByte(null, value);
}
foreach (byte value in encryptedPayload)
{
encoder.WriteByte(null, value);
}
int signaturePosition = encoder.Position;
for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
encoder.WriteByte(null, 0);
}
byte[] envelope = encoder.CloseAndReturnBuffer()!;
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32LittleEndian(
envelope.AsSpan(lengthPosition, 4), checked((uint)(envelope!.Length - lengthPosition - 4)));
using var hmac = new HMACSHA256(signingKey);
byte[] signature = hmac.ComputeHash(envelope, 0, signaturePosition);
signature.CopyTo(envelope, signaturePosition);
return envelope;
}
finally
{
CryptoUtils.ZeroMemory(signingKey);
CryptoUtils.ZeroMemory(encryptionKey);
CryptoUtils.ZeroMemory(iv);
if (keyData != null)
{
CryptoUtils.ZeroMemory(keyData);
}
if (payload != null)
{
CryptoUtils.ZeroMemory(payload);
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Supplies an authorized credential node, observable store, and certificate registry for secret-update tests.
/// </summary>
private sealed class Harness : IDisposable
{
/// <summary>
/// Creates a credential subject directly or through dependency injection with a shared RSA certificate.
/// </summary>
public Harness(bool dependencyInjection = false, KeyCredentialPushOptions? options = null)
{
ITelemetryContext telemetry = NUnitTelemetryContext.Create();
Certificate = DefaultCertificateFactory.Instance.CreateCertificate("CN=Credential Server").CreateForRSA();
MessageContext = ServiceMessageContext.Create(telemetry);
var registry = new Mock<ICertificateRegistry>();
registry.Setup(value => value.SnapshotApplicationCertificates()).Returns(() =>
{
using CertificateEntry entry = CreateEntry();
return new CertificateEntryCollection([entry]);
});
registry.Setup(value => value.AcquireApplicationCertificateBySecurityPolicy(It.IsAny<string>()))
.Returns(CreateEntry);
var store = new Mock<IKeyCredentialStore>();
store.Setup(value => value.ListAsync(It.IsAny<CancellationToken>())).ReturnsAsync([]);
store.Setup(value => value.UpdateAsync(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<Server.KeyCredential>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Callback<string, Server.KeyCredential, CancellationToken>((_, value, _) =>
{
Stored = value;
StoreWrites++;
})
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
if (dependencyInjection)
{
var services = new ServiceCollection();
services.AddSingleton(registry.Object);
services.AddSingleton(store.Object);
services.AddOpcUa().AddServer(_ => { }).WithKeyCredentialPush();
m_services = services.BuildServiceProvider();
m_subject = m_services.GetRequiredService<KeyCredentialPushSubject>();
}
else
{
m_subject = new KeyCredentialPushSubject(store.Object, options, registry.Object);
}
var identity = new Mock<IUserIdentity>();
identity.SetupGet(value => value.TokenType).Returns(UserTokenType.UserName);
identity.SetupGet(value => value.GrantedRoleIds).Returns([ObjectIds.WellKnownRole_SecurityAdmin]);
var channel = new SecureChannelContext("keycredential-regression",
new EndpointDescription { SecurityMode = MessageSecurityMode.SignAndEncrypt }, RequestEncoding.Binary);
var operation = new OperationContext(
new RequestHeader(), channel, RequestType.Call, RequestLifetime.None, identity.Object);
Context = new SessionSystemContext(operation, telemetry)
{
NamespaceUris = new NamespaceTable(),
ServerUris = new StringTable()
};
}
/// <summary>
/// Gets the registry certificate whose private key decrypts accepted credential envelopes.
/// </summary>
public Certificate Certificate { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Gets the encoding context used to create encrypted secret envelopes.
/// </summary>
public IServiceMessageContext MessageContext { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Gets the encrypted session context with the security-administrator role.
/// </summary>
public SessionSystemContext Context { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Gets the credential node created after the subject is bound.
/// </summary>
public KeyCredentialConfigurationState Node { get; private set; } = null!;
/// <summary>
/// Gets the last credential passed to the backing store.
/// </summary>
public Server.KeyCredential Stored { get; private set; } = null!;
/// <summary>
/// Gets the number of credential updates accepted by the backing store.
/// </summary>
public int StoreWrites { get; private set; }
/// <summary>
/// Binds the subject to its standard folder and creates the credential node used by the tests.
/// </summary>
public async Task BindAsync()
{
var folder = new KeyCredentialConfigurationFolderState(null)
{
NodeId = KeyCredentialPushSubject.StandardConfigurationFolderNodeId
};
await m_subject.BindAsync(folder, Context).ConfigureAwait(false);
CreateCredentialMethodStateResult created = await folder.CreateCredential!.OnCallAsync!(
Context, folder.CreateCredential, folder.NodeId, "Service", "urn:service",
KeyCredentialBridgeOptions.DefaultProfileUri, [], CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
var children = new System.Collections.Generic.List<BaseInstanceState>();
folder.GetChildren(Context, children);
Node = children.OfType<KeyCredentialConfigurationState>().Single(value => value.NodeId == created.CredentialNodeId);
}
/// <summary>
/// Invokes the credential update method with the supplied secret and encryption metadata.
/// </summary>
public async Task<KeyCredentialUpdateMethodStateResult> UpdateAsync(
byte[] secret, string thumbprint, string policy, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
return await Node.UpdateCredential!.OnCallAsync!(
Context, Node.UpdateCredential, Node.NodeId, "credential-1",
new ByteString(secret), thumbprint, policy, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Releases dependency-injected services and the registry certificate.
/// </summary>
public void Dispose()
{
m_services?.Dispose();
Certificate.Dispose();
}
/// <summary>
/// Requests the credential's public encrypting certificate for the selected security policy.
/// </summary>
public async Task<GetEncryptingKeyMethodStateResult> GetKeyAsync(string policy)
{
return await Node.GetEncryptingKey!.OnCallAsync!(
Context, Node.GetEncryptingKey, Node.NodeId, "credential-1", policy, CancellationToken.None)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Acquires an application-certificate entry for the harness certificate and an empty issuer chain.
/// </summary>
private CertificateEntry CreateEntry()
{
using var chain = new CertificateCollection();
return new CertificateEntry(Certificate, chain, ObjectTypeIds.RsaSha256ApplicationCertificateType);
}
/// <summary>
/// Coordinates the credential push and its owned secret material.
/// </summary>
private readonly KeyCredentialPushSubject m_subject;
/// <summary>
/// Retains the injectable credential services until the harness is disposed.
/// </summary>
private readonly ServiceProvider m_services = null!;
}
}
}