mirror of
https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard.git
synced 2026-10-22 01:26:20 +08:00
e8afa4237b
Addresses 25 of 39 findings from a branch security review (assessment 5). CRITICAL: F1 gate MCP key-disclosure tools, F2 0600 keylog/pcap files, F3 per-user BaseFolder, F16 ChannelKeyMaterial IDisposable + ZeroMemory, F17 PcapFileReader MaxPacketBytes (64MB) bound, F18 FlowBuffer MaxBufferBytes (256MB) cap, F19 NodeSet export path validation, F20 ReplaySession listenPort range. HIGH: F4 IPcapAuditSink + LoggerPcapAuditSink + rate-limited frame-capture audit, F5 AES-256-GCM EncryptedKeyLogStream + SessionKeyManager (sibling .key file 0600), F14 IKeyEscrowProvider abstraction + DiskKeyEscrowProvider default (DI TryAddSingleton so consumers can route to KMS), F21 ChannelManagerOptions.MaxChannels (256) cap, F22 CaptureSessionManager.SessionFolder path-traversal guard, F23 PacketDecodeTools pcapPath/keyLogPath validation, F24 replay_pcap speed validation (NaN/Inf/<=0), F25 explicit permissions blocks on .github/workflows. MEDIUM: F6 OnTokenActivated [EditorBrowsable(Never)] + key-disclosure doc, F7 IDiagnosticsChannelMutation accessor + stack-walk caller guard (replaces internal OfflineLoadTokens), F8 PcapOptions.AllowMockClientReplay + AllowedReplayEndpoints, F9 PcapFileWriter / UaKeyLog*Writer rotation (.NNN suffix) with MaxBytes / MaxArtifactsPerSession, F13 keylog-isolation gap acknowledgment doc, F15 HashChainedAuditFileSink (HMAC-chained JSONL ledger, VerifyChain), F11 replay URL scheme allow-list (opc.tcp/opc.tcps/opc.https). LOW/INFO: F10 SBOM/CVE governance comments on PacketDotNet/SharpPcap + Docs/PacketCapture.md, F12 Security model section at top of PacketCapture.md. Tests: 100+ new NUnit tests across Audit/, Capture/, Frame/, KeyLog/, McpServerTools/, Replay/, Stack/Tcp/, DependencyInjection/. All file-mode/HMAC-chain/encryption tests are [Platform(Linux,MacOSX)]-gated where Unix-specific. Build: 0 warnings / 0 errors on Stack/Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap for net8.0 and net9.0. net10.0 build is environmentally blocked by a corrupted local SDK 10.0.300 workload manifest (microsoft.net.workload.mono.toolchain.net6 10.0.108 requires Emscripten.net6 >=10.0.108, only 9.0.17 installed); requires 'dotnet workload repair' from an elevated shell to validate the third TFM. No tests were run pending the SDK fix. 5 CA1508/CA2000 false positives suppressed with documented #pragma blocks (ownership transfer in escrow factory / IAsyncEnumerable iterator / unreachable catch path). Deferred to follow-up GitHub issues: 9 MEDIUM (M-SEC-07/09/10/11/12/13/16/22/31 — exception sanitization, reconnect defaults, cert-rotation races, nonce-suppress deprecation, parser hardening) and 10 LOW/INFO (L-SEC-14/15/17/23/24/33/34/35/36/37 — handler cleanup, EventSource endpoint masking, key-log schema validation, EOL deps, SAST). Full reasoning in session plan.md Round 10.
396 lines
17 KiB
C#
396 lines
17 KiB
C#
/* ========================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2005-2026 The OPC Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.
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*
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* OPC Foundation MIT License 1.00
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*
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
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* obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
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* files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
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* restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
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* copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
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* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
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* conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
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* included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
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* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
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* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
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* HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
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* WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
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* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
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* OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
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*
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* The complete license agreement can be found here:
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* http://opcfoundation.org/License/MIT/1.00/
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* ======================================================================*/
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using System;
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using System.Buffers.Binary;
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using System.Collections.Generic;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
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using Opc.Ua.Bindings;
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using Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap.Capture;
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using Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap.KeyLog;
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namespace Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap.Dissection
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{
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/// <summary>
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/// Offline decoder that reuses the stack's own
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/// <see cref="UaSCUaBinaryChannel"/> to decrypt and verify captured
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/// OPC UA UA-SC chunks using the channel key material recorded in a
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/// keylog. Because the actual decrypt path is the stack's own
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/// <see cref="UaSCUaBinaryChannel.ReadSymmetricMessage"/>, every
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/// security profile the stack supports works automatically with no
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/// per-profile code in the diagnostics library.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// One instance corresponds to one secure channel (one
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/// <see cref="ChannelKeyMaterial.ChannelId"/>). Token renewals are
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/// supported by calling <see cref="LoadKeyMaterial"/> for each new
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/// token in the order they were observed. Sequence-number state is
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/// tracked per direction since client- and server-sent messages use
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/// disjoint counters.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// The decoder is not thread-safe; callers should walk a single
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/// channel's traffic sequentially.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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public sealed class OfflineSecureChannel : IDisposable
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{
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private readonly ChannelDecoderShim m_clientToServer;
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private readonly ChannelDecoderShim m_serverToClient;
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private readonly Dictionary<uint, ChannelKeyMaterial> m_tokens;
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private readonly ILogger m_logger;
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private readonly uint m_channelId;
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private uint m_currentTokenId;
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/// <summary>
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/// Constructs an offline decoder for the channel described by
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/// <paramref name="firstToken"/>. Additional tokens (renewals) can
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/// be added with <see cref="LoadKeyMaterial"/>.
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/// </summary>
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/// <exception cref="ArgumentNullException">
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/// <paramref name="firstToken"/> is <c>null</c>.
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/// </exception>
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/// <exception cref="PcapDiagnosticsException">
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/// The token's security policy URI is not recognised by the
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/// stack.
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/// </exception>
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public OfflineSecureChannel(ChannelKeyMaterial firstToken)
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: this(firstToken, NullLoggerFactory.Instance)
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{
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Constructs an offline decoder with explicit logger factory.
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/// </summary>
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/// <exception cref="ArgumentNullException">
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/// Either argument is <c>null</c>.
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/// </exception>
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/// <exception cref="PcapDiagnosticsException">
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/// The token's security policy URI is not recognised by the
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/// stack.
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/// </exception>
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public OfflineSecureChannel(
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ChannelKeyMaterial firstToken,
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ILoggerFactory loggerFactory)
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{
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ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(firstToken);
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ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(loggerFactory);
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m_logger = loggerFactory.CreateLogger<OfflineSecureChannel>();
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m_channelId = firstToken.ChannelId;
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m_currentTokenId = firstToken.TokenId;
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m_tokens = new Dictionary<uint, ChannelKeyMaterial>();
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var telemetry = NoopTelemetryContext.Instance;
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m_clientToServer = new ChannelDecoderShim(firstToken, telemetry);
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m_serverToClient = new ChannelDecoderShim(firstToken, telemetry);
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LoadKeyMaterial(firstToken);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// The secure-channel id this decoder handles.
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/// </summary>
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public uint ChannelId => m_channelId;
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/// <summary>
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/// Adds (or updates) the key material for a token observed on
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/// this channel. Subsequent decodes whose
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/// <c>TokenId</c> matches <paramref name="material"/> use the
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/// supplied keys.
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/// </summary>
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/// <exception cref="ArgumentNullException">
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/// <paramref name="material"/> is <c>null</c>.
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/// </exception>
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/// <exception cref="PcapDiagnosticsException">
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/// The token belongs to a different channel than the one this
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/// decoder was constructed for.
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/// </exception>
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public void LoadKeyMaterial(ChannelKeyMaterial material)
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{
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ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(material);
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if (material.ChannelId != m_channelId)
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{
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throw new PcapDiagnosticsException(
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"ChannelKeyMaterial.ChannelId " +
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$"(0x{material.ChannelId:X8}) does not match this " +
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$"OfflineSecureChannel (0x{m_channelId:X8}).");
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}
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m_tokens[material.TokenId] = material;
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if (material.TokenId > m_currentTokenId)
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{
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m_currentTokenId = material.TokenId;
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}
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Decodes a single OPC UA UA-SC chunk. The chunk's encoded
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/// <c>tokenId</c> selects which previously-loaded key material to
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/// use. AsymmetricMessage chunks (OpenSecureChannel) are returned
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/// undecoded with <see cref="OfflineDecodedChunk.Body"/> set to
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/// the raw payload after the asymmetric security header - the
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/// caller is expected to look up the matching token via the
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/// keylog.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="chunkBytes">
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/// The full OPC UA chunk including the 8-byte message header.
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/// </param>
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/// <param name="fromClient">
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/// <c>true</c> when the chunk was sent by the client; <c>false</c>
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/// when sent by the server. The direction determines which key
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/// set (client or server) is used to decrypt.
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/// </param>
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/// <exception cref="PcapDiagnosticsException">
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/// The chunk's channel id does not match the channel this decoder
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/// was constructed for; or the chunk is shorter than the minimum
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/// OPC UA framing length; or the chunk's token id has not been
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/// loaded.
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/// </exception>
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public OfflineDecodedChunk ReadChunk(
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ReadOnlySpan<byte> chunkBytes,
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bool fromClient)
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{
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if (chunkBytes.Length < TcpMessageLimits.SymmetricHeaderSize +
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TcpMessageLimits.SequenceHeaderSize)
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{
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throw new PcapDiagnosticsException(
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$"Chunk too short ({chunkBytes.Length} bytes; minimum " +
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$"is {TcpMessageLimits.SymmetricHeaderSize + TcpMessageLimits.SequenceHeaderSize}).");
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}
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uint messageType = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32LittleEndian(chunkBytes);
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uint chunkType = messageType & TcpMessageType.ChunkTypeMask;
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uint baseType = messageType & TcpMessageType.MessageTypeMask;
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if (baseType == TcpMessageType.Open)
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{
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return ReadAsymmetricChunkUnverified(chunkBytes);
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}
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uint channelId = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32LittleEndian(chunkBytes[8..]);
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if (channelId != m_channelId)
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{
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throw new PcapDiagnosticsException(
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$"Chunk channel id (0x{channelId:X8}) does not match " +
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$"this OfflineSecureChannel (0x{m_channelId:X8}).");
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}
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uint tokenId = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32LittleEndian(chunkBytes[12..]);
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if (!m_tokens.TryGetValue(tokenId, out ChannelKeyMaterial? material))
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{
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throw new PcapDiagnosticsException(
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$"No key material loaded for token id 0x{tokenId:X8} on " +
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$"channel 0x{channelId:X8}. Did you forget to load the keylog?");
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}
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ChannelDecoderShim shim = fromClient ? m_clientToServer : m_serverToClient;
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shim.UpdateForToken(material);
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byte[] mutable = new byte[chunkBytes.Length];
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chunkBytes.CopyTo(mutable);
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var segment = new ArraySegment<byte>(mutable);
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ArraySegment<byte> body = shim.Decode(
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segment,
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isRequest: fromClient,
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out uint requestId,
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out uint sequenceNumber);
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ReadOnlyMemory<byte> bodyMemory = body.Array is null
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? ReadOnlyMemory<byte>.Empty
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: new ReadOnlyMemory<byte>(body.Array, body.Offset, body.Count);
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return new OfflineDecodedChunk(
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messageType: messageType,
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channelId: channelId,
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tokenId: tokenId,
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sequenceNumber: sequenceNumber,
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requestId: requestId,
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isFinal: chunkType == TcpMessageType.Final,
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isAbort: chunkType == TcpMessageType.Abort,
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body: bodyMemory);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Disposes the underlying decoder shims and zeroes the in-memory
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/// key material as best-effort.
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/// </summary>
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public void Dispose()
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{
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m_clientToServer.Dispose();
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m_serverToClient.Dispose();
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m_tokens.Clear();
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}
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private static OfflineDecodedChunk ReadAsymmetricChunkUnverified(
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ReadOnlySpan<byte> chunkBytes)
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{
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// Asymmetric chunks are OpenSecureChannel; their bodies are
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// encrypted with the receiver's RSA / ECC private key which is
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// not part of the keylog. We surface a partial decode so the
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// caller can extract metadata (channel id, security policy URI,
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// sequence header) without claiming we decrypted the body.
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uint messageType = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32LittleEndian(chunkBytes);
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uint chunkType = messageType & TcpMessageType.ChunkTypeMask;
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uint channelId = chunkBytes.Length >= 12
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? BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32LittleEndian(chunkBytes[8..])
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: 0;
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ReadOnlyMemory<byte> body = chunkBytes.Length > TcpMessageLimits.SymmetricHeaderSize
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? new ReadOnlyMemory<byte>(chunkBytes[TcpMessageLimits.SymmetricHeaderSize..].ToArray())
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: ReadOnlyMemory<byte>.Empty;
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return new OfflineDecodedChunk(
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messageType: messageType,
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channelId: channelId,
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tokenId: 0,
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sequenceNumber: 0,
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requestId: 0,
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isFinal: chunkType == TcpMessageType.Final,
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isAbort: chunkType == TcpMessageType.Abort,
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body: body);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Thin <see cref="UaSCUaBinaryChannel"/> subclass whose only
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/// purpose is to give us access to the protected
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/// <see cref="UaSCUaBinaryChannel.ReadSymmetricMessage"/> entry
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/// point and the protected <see cref="UaSCUaBinaryChannel.ChannelId"/>
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/// setter. All other behaviour is left to the base.
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/// </summary>
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private sealed class ChannelDecoderShim : UaSCUaBinaryChannel
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{
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private uint m_loadedTokenId;
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public ChannelDecoderShim(
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ChannelKeyMaterial firstToken,
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ITelemetryContext telemetry)
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: base(
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contextId: "offline",
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bufferManager: new BufferManager(
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"offline",
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TcpMessageLimits.DefaultMaxBufferSize,
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telemetry),
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quotas: new ChannelQuotas(ServiceMessageContext.CreateEmpty(telemetry)),
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serverCertificates: null,
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endpoints: null,
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securityMode: firstToken.SecurityMode,
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securityPolicyUri: firstToken.SecurityPolicyUri,
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telemetry: telemetry)
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{
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ChannelId = firstToken.ChannelId;
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UpdateForToken(firstToken);
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}
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public void UpdateForToken(ChannelKeyMaterial material)
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{
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if (material.TokenId == m_loadedTokenId && CurrentToken != null)
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{
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return;
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}
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// Build the ChannelToken in-place from the snapshot. Use
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// a very large lifetime so the live IsExpired check
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// tolerates traces captured days ago.
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// CA2000: ownership is transferred to the channel via IDiagnosticsChannelMutation below.
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// TODO: add an ownership-transfer helper when ChannelToken lifetime management is refactored.
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#pragma warning disable CA2000
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var token = new ChannelToken
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{
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ChannelId = material.ChannelId,
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TokenId = material.TokenId,
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CreatedAt = material.CreatedAt,
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Lifetime = int.MaxValue,
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SecurityPolicy = SecurityPolicies.GetInfo(material.SecurityPolicyUri),
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ClientNonce = material.ClientNonce,
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ServerNonce = material.ServerNonce,
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ClientSigningKey = material.ClientSigningKey,
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ClientEncryptingKey = material.ClientEncryptingKey,
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ClientInitializationVector = material.ClientInitializationVector,
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ServerSigningKey = material.ServerSigningKey,
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ServerEncryptingKey = material.ServerEncryptingKey,
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ServerInitializationVector = material.ServerInitializationVector
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};
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#pragma warning restore CA2000
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if (token.SecurityPolicy is null)
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{
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throw new PcapDiagnosticsException(
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$"Unsupported SecurityPolicyUri '{material.SecurityPolicyUri}'.");
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}
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ChannelToken? previous = CurrentToken;
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((IDiagnosticsChannelMutation)this).LoadTokensForOfflineDecode(token, previous);
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OfflineResetRemoteSequenceNumber(0);
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m_loadedTokenId = material.TokenId;
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}
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public ArraySegment<byte> Decode(
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ArraySegment<byte> buffer,
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bool isRequest,
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out uint requestId,
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out uint sequenceNumber)
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{
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return ReadSymmetricMessage(
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buffer,
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isRequest,
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out _,
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out requestId,
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out sequenceNumber);
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}
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Minimal <see cref="ITelemetryContext"/> implementation that
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/// hands out <see cref="NullLogger.Instance"/> for everything.
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/// Used so the offline channel never emits diagnostic logs.
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/// </summary>
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private sealed class NoopTelemetryContext : ITelemetryContext
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{
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public static NoopTelemetryContext Instance { get; } = new();
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private static readonly System.Diagnostics.ActivitySource s_activitySource
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= new("Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap.OfflineSecureChannel");
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private NoopTelemetryContext()
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{
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}
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public ILoggerFactory LoggerFactory => NullLoggerFactory.Instance;
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public System.Diagnostics.ActivitySource ActivitySource => s_activitySource;
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public System.Diagnostics.Metrics.Meter CreateMeter()
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{
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return new System.Diagnostics.Metrics.Meter(
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"Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap.OfflineSecureChannel");
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}
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}
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}
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}
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