# Description **Server/core audit fixes with regression tests. Latest review-fix validation, merge validation and earlier acceptance results are distinguished below.** This addresses a 95-finding server/core report. Every finding was reviewed with the OPC UA specification knowledge base or, where the standard does not prescribe a C# implementation, the corresponding ownership/configuration contract. Incorrect or withdrawn subclaims remain qualified rather than being presented as additional fixes. The original checkpoint covers session identity/certificate validation and revocation; certificate/key ownership and transactional updates; TCP reconnect, receive/admission and buffer lifetime; HTTP quotas; subscription admission, durability and pooled payloads; file-operation lifecycle; historian aggregates; fluent/state-machine behavior; and related utilities. It includes targeted regressions and directly related documentation. The approved acceptance cleanup is separate in the commit history: | Cleanup | Verified result | | --- | --- | | Invalid identity-policy and KeyCredential fixture inputs | Fixtures explicitly advertise Username and use its generated policy ID. Credential persistence uses valid clear mode inside the existing encrypted admin context. Original permission, lockout and negative encryption assertions remain. | | Native GDS lifetime and concurrent connection failures | Retain ApplicationInstance until client teardown. A deterministic native reproducer proved the test-only channel cap of 10 was exhausted; removing that override restores the existing bounded default of 1000. No global serialization or production quota change. | | Stress certificate ownership and close accounting | Balance two helper references and the fake transport's server-certificate ownership. Replace the invalid event-count bound with exactly-once physical disposal, opens = closes, zero active entries and one logical entry lifetime. | | Participant deadlines | Use the injected TimeProvider with the existing cross-framework WaitAsync overload. Tests pin one tick before, exact expiry, terminal notification, recovery and timely completion. | | Reproducibility and platform assertions | Preserve canonical WoT bytes/hashes, explicit display-culture contracts and exact numeric-vector assertions. Accept Apple's CryptographicException subtype without weakening disposal balance. | | Missing user-signature proof | Reject null/empty proofs before OS crypto. Return BadUserSignatureInvalid per Part 4, 5.7.3.3. None-policy and valid-signature controls remain. A CI-only test nullable-context error was corrected without changing production behavior. | | Durable sample restore and shared test storage | Dequeue waits for actual batch residency instead of treating failed restore completion as success, and restored files close before deletion. Five deterministic regressions failed before the fix. The two fixtures that clear the shared batch directory are isolated; all original 3,000-item assertions remain unchanged. | ## Latest review follow-up Commit `828856850219518970e8e2f580b8f94b3c1fc748` fixes the deferred robotics disposal reported in the latest review. `RobotIntentNodeManager.DisposeAsync` now joins a shared controller-host drain and then explicitly awaits base node-manager disposal. A controller's bounded shutdown wait may defer its cleanup, but no longer lets the node-manager override finish early. Concurrent callers, including an asynchronous call after synchronous `Dispose`, cannot bypass the drain after the host list has been detached. Synchronous disposal remains nonblocking for deferred work. Deferred initialization failures are logged and retained, and base cleanup failures propagate to asynchronous callers. The existing controller-level bounded disposal contract is unchanged; the node-manager contract is documented in `docs/Robotics.md`. | Regression requirement | Evidence | | --- | --- | | Wait for deferred hosts; preserve synchronous compatibility and concurrent joins | `NodeManagerAsyncDisposalWaitsForDeferredHostsAsync`: four cases covering both entry-point orders and zero/positive host shutdown waits. All four failed before the fix. | | Wait through base cleanup and observe failures | `NodeManagerDisposalWaitsForBaseCleanupAndReportsItsFailureAsync`: four cases hold the actual base-resource semaphore, verify pending callers after the host finishes, then check success or the same propagated exception and exactly-once cleanup. | The focused `IntentHostingCoverageTests` and `IntentControllerHostTests.Dispose` selection passed **30/30 on net10.0 and 30/30 on net48**, with no failures or skips. The final net10 solution build passed with zero errors and only the four previously documented CA2249 warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. No new warnings, analyzer suppressions, dependencies, or weakened assertions were added. The review thread received a commit-specific reply and was explicitly resolved. This verification is scoped to the robotics feedback; the earlier full Subscriptions-run limitation remains recorded in the merge section below. ## Documentation review follow-up (2026-09-14) Commit `f9a9686fcc5d3cfd19cbbc8c2d826e20f5c7e72f` addresses the six follow-up threads on documentation and implementation rationale. Each has an in-thread reply citing the commit and an explicit resolution. Multiline XML documentation now covers the declarations introduced or modified throughout the entire PR, including internal contracts, samples, tests, and public members of related private helpers. A syntax-aware inventory checked **2,031 declarations across all 256 PR C# paths with zero documentation gaps**. A supplementary check also covers **75 previously unchanged public members** of private helpers involved in the changed code. Token comparison across the conditional-compilation branches proves this follow-up changes **no executable C# or test assertions**. Project-file changes are rationale comments only. The implementation questions are documented at their source: | Question | Resolution | | --- | --- | | Certificate assembly friendship | Server Push configuration reuses the internal explicit-subject CSR helper with the existing key; no public crypto API was added. | | Core.Types assembly friendship | Server builders use internal transition callbacks/revision guards; Server.Tests checks the revision deterministically without creating a public compatibility contract. | | Always-single-reader notifications | One dequeuer preserves event order; optional concurrency fans out within one event and joins before the next event. | | Asynchronous disposal completion | `DisposeAsync` already joins the completion published after admitted operations and all cleanup attempts. The compatibility `Dispose` remains nonblocking to avoid deadlocking an admitted callback against its own drain. | The requested detailed review disposition follows. It distinguishes actual fixes from confirmed policies and incorrect subclaims rather than counting every comment as a new runtime change. ### Detailed disposition of review 5191795284 The [SDK review](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/pull/4477#pullrequestreview-5191795284) was submitted against `1c4a9df6c`, before the subsequent merge and feedback fixes. Its **15 inline threads** have each received an action-specific reply and an explicit resolution. A fresh GraphQL query verified those replies and resolution states; the fixes in `b8a59990f` remain ancestors of the current branch. | Review concern | Action and disposition | Concrete regression evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | Injected certificate-store providers bypassed | **Fixed.** Registration, configuration snapshots, and validation use the injected providers. Explicit custom types remain authoritative; the built-in Directory catch-all is deferred so native X509 paths and later custom providers are not captured. Failed store opens dispose the created store. | `InjectedProviderResolvesRegisteredAndConfiguredTrustStores` covers default-provider ordering and both registration paths; provider validation/open-failure cases and the unchanged `TrustedCertificateInjectedViaIndependentX509StoreIsObservedAsync` cover real use and independent-store visibility. | | Unguarded timer-thread leadership callbacks | **Fixed.** Each subscriber's exception is logged independently and cannot suppress subsequent subscribers or fail lease operations. `IsLeader` reads the deadline without invoking application callbacks. | `ThrowingLeadershipSubscriberDoesNotFailAcquireOrDisposeAsync`, `ExpiryNotifiesOtherSubscribersWhenOneThrowsAsync`, and `IsLeaderDoesNotDispatchExpiryNotificationsAsync` were all demonstrated failing before the fix. | | Legacy pending-key provider accepts an unfinishable regenerated CSR | **Fixed by explicit capability validation.** A provider implementing only `IPendingCertificateKeyStore` receives `BadNotSupported` before key generation or persistence when regeneration is requested. Existing-key CSR/update remains supported. Regeneration requires matching-only consumption; no unsafe destructive probing was introduced. | `LegacyPendingProviderRejectsRegenerationBeforeCreatingOrSavingAKeyAsync` checks no key or store mutation; `LegacyPendingProviderCompletesExistingKeySigningAndUpdateAsync` proves the supported flow completes. | | Shutdown waits behind user deactivation | **Fixed.** Accepted deactivations drain before the master's lifecycle gate is taken. Configuration retains its binding until the shared drain completes, including concurrent shutdown callers and direct master disposal. | Four cases of `ShutdownDrainsDeactivationOutsideTheSessionClosingGateAsync` exercise real configuration/binding/ServerInternalData/master reentry, retained address space, exact session/subscription closure, and no production cancellation shortcut. | | Subclass cleanup runs under the operation-lifetime lock | **Fixed.** Cleanup starts outside that lock. A pre-published completion joins all disposers, and only the active asynchronous teardown context may use guarded helpers. Captured contexts lose that privilege when the callback exits. | `SynchronousOwnedCleanupLetsSamplingWorkerReachClosedAdmissionAsync`, `DisposeCoreCanUseGuardedMembersWithoutReopeningCallerAdmissionAsync`, captured-context rejection, and exact cleanup-failure/ownership assertions cover both synchronous and suspended cleanup. | | Discovery requestId-zero chunk read after pool return | **Fixed by the earlier merge.** Discovery validation precedes `SaveIntermediateChunk`; no read occurs after that path can return the buffer. The ordering is retained. | `DiscoveryChannelReadsTheFirstChunkBeforeItIsReturnedAsync` uses a poisoning pool and the requestId-zero path. | | T1.8 OPN cleanup misses post-decryption throws | **Fixed by the earlier merge and pinned with new regressions.** Both sequence rejection and certificate mismatch release the decrypted body and input ownership. | `OpenSecureChannelRejectionAfterDecryptionReturnsEveryRentalAsync` checks the exact audit status and pool conservation. Omitting either corresponding release in an isolated snapshot made its case fail; no mutation remains. | | T1.2 mount-root protection depends on the provider | **Fixed at the host boundary.** Separator-only aliases resolve to the protected root. Traversal, empty/whitespace segments, backslashes, and drive/stream qualifiers are rejected before arbitrary providers are invoked. Valid nested paths and root destinations remain supported. | A deliberately permissive provider is used by `NonCanonicalObjectPathsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyAsync` and invalid-target cases; exact zero-call checks are paired with legitimate nested-path/root-destination controls. | | Inline trusted/issuer entries now face CRL checks | **Intentional strict behavior, documented and tested.** A configured backing store with strict unknown-status rejection requires current revocation information. Explicit-only lists without a store retain their no-store behavior. Actual revocation cannot be suppressed; a matching store entry's policy takes precedence. | `InlineIssuerWithStoreHonorsStrictUnknownRevocationPolicyAsync`, `InlineIssuerRevocationIsNeverSuppressedAsync`, store-precedence cases, and explicit-only controls preserve the missing-information versus actual-revocation distinction in Part 4 6.1.3. | | RSA minimum applied to unspecified ECC identifiers | **Fixed at the application-certificate check.** The RSA minimum is compared only with an actual RSA public key. An unspecified ECC identity is not replaced simply because its key size is below an RSA threshold. | `SilentCertificateCheckPreservesUnspecifiedEccIdentityAsync` checks DER, thumbprint, store contents, and private-key retention; explicit RSA and HTTPS minimum controls remain. | | Failed directory refresh wedges corrective mutations | **Fixed.** Recoverable automatic pre-refresh failures are logged and leave reconciliation pending, but do not block corrective provider mutations. Explicit refresh errors, capacity admission, caller cancellation, and actual provider denials remain enforced. | `CorrectiveDeleteRecoversAfterPersistentOverLimitRefreshFailureAsync` converges an externally over-limit directory back to its exact allowed contents. Capacity, cancellation/token, and six refresh-error controls check negative paths. | | Timed-transition rejection logs at 10 Hz | **Fixed.** Repeated `(state, revision, status)` warnings are deduplicated without changing the retry cadence. A different status or state entry permits another warning. | `RepeatedTimedRejectionLogsOnceAndRecoversAsync` checks one warning over eleven rejections and success on the next attempt. Status-change and same/different-state reentry controls pin reset behavior. | | Bad unsubscribe strands retired-generation bookkeeping | **Fixed.** Retired all-event bookkeeping completes even when unsubscribe reports Bad; the first Bad is still returned to the caller. | Good and BadCommunicationError cases of `RetiredAllEventsDeletionCompletesBookkeepingAndReleasesGenerationAsync` check event/snapshot removal, generation release, and exactly one unsubscribe without finalization replay. | | CSR subject parsing and fallback | **Fixed for existing and regenerated keys.** Omitted subjects fall back to the actual stored certificate. Regeneration resolves the public certificate's subject before creating a key. Malformed or unresolvable subjects return `BadInvalidArgument` before pending-key mutation. | Store-only fallback, real-generator null/empty cases, and missing-subject/malformed-DN controls verify the signed CSR, matching fresh pending key, unchanged active identity, and no destructive side effects. | | Committed RemoveUser change reported as failed | **Fixed for RemoveUser and ModifyUser.** Accepted cleanup is still awaited and close failures remain logged, but cannot replace the committed mutation result. Precommit failures retain their original result and side effects. | `CommittedUserChangeKeepsResultAndPublishedUsersWhenCloseFailsAsync` checks published Users, Good result, logging, and continued closes. `FailedUserChangeKeepsPublishedUsersAndDoesNotCloseSessionsAsync` checks BadNotFound with no publication or close. | | Alleged pooled decoded-request aliasing | **No runtime redesign needed; reviewer rebuttal confirmed.** The decoder copies the relevant input data. Misleading ownership comments were corrected rather than introducing a new dispatch model. | `DecodedRequestRetainsValuesAfterInputBuffersAreReturnedAsync` checks the exact decoded NodeId and ByteString after returned arrays are poisoned. | The current documentation-only follow-up rechecked **104 Core, 473 Server, and 4 Configuration cases** covering these concerns: **581 passed, zero failed or skipped**. The final net10 solution build also passed with **zero warnings and errors**. The complete earlier Core/Server/Configuration and net48 results remain listed separately rather than being presented as rerun current-head acceptance. ## Earlier review follow-up Commit `b8a59990fe2e8e967a12ffd5d9158beed7831143` addresses all 19 review threads. Each thread has an in-thread reply naming this commit and was explicitly resolved after verification; the final paginated query found 19 resolved and zero unresolved threads. The follow-up fixes injected certificate-store selection (including default provider ordering and native X509 paths), actual-RSA minimum enforcement, and CSR capability/subject validation before key mutation. Node-manager teardown uses simpler scoped ownership and drains accepted user revocation outside the master gate; committed user results and retired-event cleanup remain correct when cleanup reports failure. File mutations can recover after failed refresh without bypassing capacity or cancellation, provider paths protect mount roots, and repeated timed rejections no longer flood logs. Leadership subscriber failures are isolated without callbacks from `IsLeader`. Regressions also pin the already-merged OPN/discovery buffer fixes and prove decoded request values do not borrow returned input buffers. The strict inline issuer revocation policy is documented and tested, not weakened. Existing tests were changed only for the reviewed behavior: the incorrect committed-user result was corrected, and inline-issuer/root-alias controls were expanded. ### Review-fix validation | Suite | Scope | Framework | Passed | Existing TRX NotExecuted | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | Core | Complete project | net10.0 | 4,970 | 88 | | Server | Complete project | net10.0 | 6,414 | 69 | | Configuration | Complete project | net10.0 | 231 | 0 | | Core | Certificate, lease and buffer compatibility slice | net48 | 153 | 0 | | Server | Reviewed lifecycle, user, file, timer and CSR compatibility slice | net48 | 692 | 0 | | Configuration | Complete project | net48 | 231 | 0 | | CSR provider regressions | Final portable-mock follow-up | net10.0 | 11 | 0 | All runs exited successfully with normal concurrency and leak detection. The Server console reports 5 skips; its TRX additionally records existing assumption/explicit cases, hence the 69-record count above. The Framework build caught two modern-only `ValueTask.CompletedTask` usages in new mock setup; only those expressions changed to the equivalent portable `default(ValueTask)`. The complete modern suites precede that test-only correction; all production files remained byte-identical, and the corrected fixture passed on both targets. The final net10 solution build succeeded with 0 errors and the same 4 CA2249 warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. Diff checks and changed-line whitespace checks are clean; whole-file formatting still identifies 10 unchanged baseline lines, which were not reformatted outside the feedback scope. The committed 35-file tree was hash-verified against the validation inputs. This is the review-feedback verification scope, not a rerun or sign-off of the historical complete platform/native/soak acceptance campaign below. ## Latest upstream merge Merge `9d9bf679f317164c5b2b90924cd3cdc27a86d451` integrates `master` through `162fc5ebb` (#4486), including the AddNodes child-name index, shared certificate-error reporting, CTT sample-data corrections, and the accompanying regressions and documentation. The CreateSession conflict preserves this branch's certificate ownership, required certificate, application-URI, and channel-certificate checks. The validation result now retains nested errors through `ThrowIfInvalid`, allowing the upstream shared reporting helper to mask trust, policy, and revocation failures consistently without losing audit detail. The new indexed AddNodes regression initially attempted to reuse a deterministic NodeId after renaming its existing node. Renaming frees the BrowseName, not that NodeId. `IndexedBrowseNameReusePreservesExistingNodeIdentityAsync` now proves both contracts: the derived-ID collision leaves the original node intact, then a fresh explicitly requested ID can reuse the old name while the new name remains protected against duplicates. No production identity rule was relaxed. The incoming seeded random-index test uses the existing `UnsecureRandom` wrapper with the same seed and sequence; no new analyzer suppression was added. | Local merge validation | Framework | Passed | Existing exclusions | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | Core, complete project | net10.0 | 5,081 | 88 | | NodeState / BaseInstanceState | net10.0 | 579 | 0 | | Server node management, certificate and session-security selection | net10.0 | 112 | 0 | | InformationModel node-management services | net10.0 | 29 | 1 | | NodeState / BaseInstanceState | net48 | 578 | 0 | | Core certificate validation, error reporting and TCP buffers | net48 | 111 | 0 | | Server node management, certificate and session-security selection | net48 | 112 | 0 | All selected runs exited successfully at normal concurrency: **6,602 passing test executions**. Modified test assemblies were explicitly rebuilt, and the combined name/identity regression was verified by name in both net10 and net48 results. No skips or weakened assertions were introduced. The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release --no-restore -m:1` with `CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded with **zero warnings and zero errors**. The resolved source and adjusted tests pass whitespace verification, and their source hashes match the validation inputs. This is merge-specific verification. Earlier review results and the previously reported incomplete full Subscriptions runs below remain scoped to their own commits; they were not reopened or relabeled as passing by this operation. ## Previous upstream merge (2026-09-15 morning) Merge `c4694e20ab089c555af233642042133ff3a03ac8` integrates `master` through `484d6c887`, retaining #4481's shared Like parser/GDS query fixes, #4488's RequestHandle recovery in ServiceFaults, and #4487's expired-session and durable-transfer corrections. Three conflict resolutions preserve both sides: - Alias searches now use the shared `LikePattern` implementation, including upstream malformed-list validation. A timeout overload retains this branch's 100 ms per-alias deadline and `BadTimeout` reporting without keeping a second wildcard translator. The shared matcher's original unlimited overload remains unchanged for existing GDS/ContentFilter callers. New regressions cover bounded prefix/list scans, reuse after timeout, and the alias service result. - Expired activation closes outside the session-manager gate using upstream's once-only timeout claim, audit, and diagnostic accounting. This branch's original-channel and security-policy checks remain in place. - TCP buffer tests retain this branch's ownership, poisoning-pool and post-decryption checks alongside the upstream RequestHandle/fault overload tests; neither set was discarded. The upstream HTTPS binary behavior is intentionally retained: a decoder `ServiceResultException` produces HTTP 200 with an OPC UA ServiceFault carrying the decoder status, response timestamp, and recoverable RequestHandle, rather than the previous HTTP 500 text response. Other exceptions retain their existing HTTP error handling. | Local validation | Framework | Passed | TRX NotExecuted | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | Core, complete project | net10.0 | 5,054 | 88 | | Sessions, complete project | net10.0 | 780 | 610 | | Server aliases, expiry/security and subscriptions | net10.0 | 288 | 0 | | GDS database, paging and live directory calls | net10.0 | 263 | 0 | | Shared Like patterns and bounded evaluation | net10.0 | 109 | 0 | | Subscriptions transfer/durability/service selection | net10.0 | 23 | 1 | | HTTPS WebApi, complete project | net10.0 | 346 | 0 | | InformationModel aliases | net10.0 | 54 | 5 | | Shared Like patterns and bounded evaluation | net48 | 109 | 0 | | Core fault handles, TCP/HTTPS and filters | net48 | 268 | 0 | | Server aliases, expiry/security and subscriptions | net48 | 288 | 0 | These selected runs exited successfully with normal test concurrency: **7,582 passing test executions**. Sessions' console reports 379 skips; the TRX also contains conditional/assumption exclusions, so the table uses the actual 610 NotExecuted records. No skips or weakened assertions were added. The new `EvaluationTimeoutBoundsWorkAndPreservesPatternReuse` and `SharedPatternTimeoutRemainsAnAliasServiceError` tests passed on both targets. **Validation limitation:** two unfiltered Subscriptions runs did not produce a final result and were stopped, including a retry with a hang guard. They are not counted as passing. The isolated failover fixture passed 2/2, and the transfer/durability/service selection above passed. The stall's cause was not established; no unrelated code or test was changed to conceal it. The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release --no-restore -m:1` with `CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded with **0 warnings and 0 errors**. Whitespace verification passed for all hand-reconciled files, and staged source hashes match the validation inputs. These are merge-specific checks, not a new full platform/native/soak acceptance sign-off. Earlier review and acceptance evidence below remains dated to its own commit. ## Previous upstream merge (2026-09-14) Merge `c3e09553e4d1509502d4ba751960d58491bea2cf` integrates `master` through `6313e38a0` (#4478), including the CTT-driven Part 13 aggregate corrections and FindAlias argument validation. The upstream tests and CTT documentation are retained. The single conflict in `AliasNameWildcardMatcher` is reconciled through the branch's shared regex compiler: upstream malformed-pattern rejection and `IsValidPattern` coexist with OPC UA character escaping, whole-string/newline matching, the 100 ms timeout, and service-level error reporting. The upstream ReferenceTypeFilter checks and chronological aggregate behavior are preserved. Local merge verification: | Suite / selection | Framework | Passed | Existing skips | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | Server aliases, aggregates and historian | net10.0 | 1,011 | 0 | | Server aliases, aggregates and historian | net48 | 1,011 | 0 | | InformationModel aliases | net10.0 | 54 | 5 | | Features aliases | net10.0 | 11 | 0 | | Client aliases | net10.0 | 28 | 0 | | History aggregate/historical-access consumers | net10.0 | 265 | 0 | All selected tests passed at normal concurrency. The final net10 solution build passed with 0 errors and 0 warnings. The resolved file's whitespace check and the staged diff check passed. These are merge-specific checks, not a new full platform/native/soak acceptance claim. ## Previous upstream merges Integrates `master` through `8e874d073`, including the Client, Types, Core and source-generator audit fixes in #4471, #4473, #4474 and #4475, plus the event queue-size revision from #4480. The merge commits are `150ea0439` (26 conflict resolutions) and `a0e17c07c` (the base update that arrived during validation). The overlapping fixes are reconciled rather than replacing either branch: - **Rejected-certificate retention follows this branch, as explicitly requested:** zero means unlimited history; negative values disable new storage while preserving existing backend trimming behavior (Directory clears prior history; shared key/value leaves it intact). The processor and manager policy are not redefined, and documentation/tests describe the distinction. - Preserve owned certificate snapshots and borrowed validation-core lifetimes alongside upstream cache invalidation, store-first CRL checks and `BadCertificateRevocationUnknown` for unsupported revocation lookup. - Combine exactly-once chunk ownership, receive-loop cancellation, stale-epoch rejection and detach-before-adoption with upstream signature-before-padding verification and secret cleanup. - Preserve pooled `HttpClient` per-request configuration together with bounded response reads and deadlines that remain active through body consumption. Regression cases exercise already-used clients and both timeout precedence cases. - Retain the binary-compatible channel-key constructor and normalize omitted profiles; preserve exact profile filtering and upstream binary-first HTTPS/WSS endpoint ordering. - Preserve monotonic lease expiry and stale-confirmation fencing while adding ordered, non-reentrant leadership notifications outside the state lock. ## Validation Local validation of the conflict-resolution merge: | Suite | Framework | Passed | Existing skips | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | Core | net10.0 | 4,940 | 88 | | Client | net10.0 | 2,278 | 0 | | Server | net10.0 | 6,088 | 5 | | Types | net10.0 | 10,394 | 1 | | SourceGeneration.Core | net10.0 | 3,940 | 8 | | SourceGeneration | net10.0 | 185 | 0 | | Core | net48 | 4,855 | 104 | After the subsequent four-file #4480 update, the related Server slice passed 811 tests with 5 existing skips, the real durable queue-size cases passed 6/6, and EventManager's 21 cases passed again after analyzer-only expected-array cleanup. The final `dotnet build UA.slnx -c Release` with `CustomTestTarget=net10.0` succeeded: 0 errors and 4 pre-existing CA2249 warnings in unchanged fuzz-test code. Whitespace verification passed for the resolved files and the follow-up. Merge-specific proof includes `RequestTimeoutRemainsActiveWhileReadingTheOpenApiBodyAsync` on already-used shared clients with either the request or HttpClient timeout shorter, the existing ownership/expiry regressions from both branches, and both branches' retention tests adjusted only to the explicitly chosen zero/negative contract. Earlier acceptance at `1c4a9df6c` passed hosted Linux/macOS CI, CodeQL, image builds and the canonical coverage gate (87.15% line, 77.27% branch, 92.14% patch). Both Framework project matrices, all three Windows native suites (183 cases), and the unfiltered net10 stress project (230 cases, including full 60-minute chaos and 30-minute memory soaks) also passed. Those are **pre-merge results**, not a claim that the full framework/platform/native/soak matrix has been rerun on this merge. The previous acceptance workflow remains separate from this review-feedback operation. Security checks, meaningful assertions, leak detection, default native concurrency, full soak durations and coverage thresholds remain intact. The user-set ready-for-review state is unchanged. No architectural or complete merged-head acceptance sign-off is claimed. ## Related Issues - Fixes #4476 ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.
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Sessions, Reconnection, and Subscription Engines
This document describes how the OPC UA client stack composes the building
blocks that turn a configured endpoint into a running, fault-tolerant OPC
UA session: the raw Session and its reconnect helper, the
ManagedSession facade, the pluggable subscription engines, and how to
choose between them.
Quick reference
| Type | Creates | Reconnect | Subscription engine | Recommended for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Session |
itself (via constructor or Session.Create...Async) |
none — caller drives via Session.ReconnectAsync / SessionReconnectHandler |
ClassicSubscriptionEngine by default; pass ISubscriptionEngineFactory to opt in to V2 |
callers that own session lifecycle and existing reconnect code |
DefaultSessionFactory |
raw Session |
none — caller drives reconnect | configurable via SubscriptionEngineFactory init property |
drop-in ISessionFactory for the legacy flow |
SessionReconnectHandler |
nothing (drives an existing session) | yes, against a Session (only) |
inherited from the wrapped Session |
legacy callers that already own a Session |
ManagedSession |
itself (via CreateAsync) |
yes — built-in ConnectionStateMachine + ReconnectPolicy |
DefaultSubscriptionEngine (V2) by default |
new code; long-lived clients that need reconnect / failover |
ManagedSessionFactory |
ManagedSession |
inherited from ManagedSession |
inherited from ManagedSession |
drop-in ISessionFactory that yields managed sessions |
ChannelManagerSessionFactory |
raw Session |
channel-level reconnect through IClientChannelManager |
classic engine | raw sessions that share channels and coordinate transport reconnect centrally |
ManagedSessionBuilder |
ManagedSession |
inherited from ManagedSession |
configurable via UseSubscriptionEngine |
fluent / DI scenarios |
IClientChannelManager |
IManagedTransportChannel leases (shared) |
channel-level reconnect, coalesced and notified to participants | n/a (channel-only) | central transport-channel sharing & reconnect for sessions / discovery clients |
Everything below explains how these pieces fit together.
1. Session — the OPC UA session primitive
Session (src/Opc.Ua.Client/Session/Session.cs) is the lowest-level
client object that maps directly to a UA secure-channel + session pair on
the server. It implements ISession and exposes the full surface of the
OPC UA service set (Read, Write, Browse, Call, AddNodes, etc.) plus
session-level concerns: keep-alive, namespace tables, the type tree, the
node cache, and a publish pipeline.
A Session is bound to:
- An
ApplicationConfiguration(security policies, certificates, transport quotas, telemetry). - A
ConfiguredEndpoint(URL, security mode, security policy URI). - An
ITransportChannelcreated against that endpoint.
On secured endpoints, CreateSession validates the client certificate
chain independently of the supplied ApplicationUri, then requires that
URI to match the certificate. UA-TCP and UA Secure Conversation over
WebSockets also require the session certificate's leaf to match the
channel certificate; supplying the same leaf with an issuer chain is
allowed. HTTPS may use a distinct, separately validated TLS certificate,
as specified by Part 4 §6.1.8. A SecurityPolicyUri of None ignores the
optional client application certificate.
Lifecycle transitions on a Session are explicit and synchronous-looking
from the caller's perspective:
Session.ReconnectAsync()re-uses the existing channel where possible and re-establishes the activated session.ISessionFactory.RecreateAsync(...)builds a freshSessionthat inherits the previous session's identity, subscriptions, and node cache, swapping in a new channel.
Session does not run a background reconnect state machine. If the
keep-alive callback raises a bad status, the caller decides whether to
reconnect, recreate, or abandon the session.
Operation limits and MaxArrayLength
Session.FetchOperationLimitsAsync() reads the server's OperationLimits
(MaxNodesPerRead, MaxNodesPerBrowse, MaxMonitoredItemsPerCall, ...) along
with the MaxArrayLength server capability. Each operation limit governs the
length of the operations array of its corresponding request, and the server
also rejects any request whose array is longer than MaxArrayLength. The client
therefore caps every operation limit to the effective MaxArrayLength, which
is min(server MaxArrayLength, client TransportQuotas.MaxArrayLength) where 0
means no limit (a 0 side does not constrain). Each server-reported operation
limit is then adjusted against that effective MaxArrayLength:
- if the server reports
0(unlimited), the operation limit becomes the effectiveMaxArrayLength; - if the server reports a value larger than the effective
MaxArrayLength, the operation limit becomes the effectiveMaxArrayLength; - otherwise the operation limit is honored.
If there is no effective MaxArrayLength (both the server capability and the
client transport quota are 0), the operation limits are left unchanged.
SessionClientBatched then batches Read/Write/Browse/… calls using these capped
limits, so a single request never exceeds what the server will accept.
Plugging in a subscription engine
Session accepts an optional ISubscriptionEngineFactory at
construction. The factory creates an ISubscriptionEngine that owns the
publish loop and the live subscription set. Two implementations ship in
the box:
ClassicSubscriptionEngineFactory.Instance(default when no factory is supplied) — the historical fire-and-forget publish engine that drivesSubscriptionandMonitoredItemdirectly fromSession.DefaultSubscriptionEngineFactory.Instance— wraps the new options-basedSubscriptionManager(the V2 subscription pipeline) inside anISubscriptionEngineadapter so even a rawSessioncan expose theISubscriptionManagerAPI.
The engine is selected once, at construction. It is then reused across reconnect / recreate cycles. See section 4 for the engine architecture.
DefaultSessionFactory
DefaultSessionFactory (src/Opc.Ua.Client/Session/DefaultSessionFactory.cs)
is the drop-in ISessionFactory that builds raw Session instances. It
exposes a single tunable knob beyond ITelemetryContext:
var factory = new DefaultSessionFactory(telemetry)
{
SubscriptionEngineFactory = DefaultSubscriptionEngineFactory.Instance, // optional; null => classic
ReturnDiagnostics = DiagnosticsMasks.SymbolicId,
};
ISession session = await factory.CreateAsync(...);
When SubscriptionEngineFactory is null, Session falls back to
ClassicSubscriptionEngineFactory — preserving the historical default.
2. SessionReconnectHandler — legacy reconnect driver
SessionReconnectHandler (src/Opc.Ua.Client/Session/SessionReconnectHandler.cs)
is the original reconnect helper that ships with Session. It implements
the timer-driven retry loop, picks between
Session.ReconnectAsync and ISessionFactory.RecreateAsync, handles
endpoint refreshes when the server certificate changes, and cooperates
with ReverseConnectManager.
using var handler = new SessionReconnectHandler(
telemetry,
reconnectAbort: true,
maxReconnectPeriod: 30000);
session.KeepAlive += (_, e) =>
{
if (e.Status != null && ServiceResult.IsNotGood(e.Status))
{
handler.BeginReconnect(session, 1000, OnReconnectComplete);
}
};
Supported session types
SessionReconnectHandler drives Session.ReconnectAsync and
ISessionFactory.RecreateAsync directly, and replaces the channel on the
underlying object. It therefore only supports the concrete Session
class (or types derived from it). Passing any other ISession
implementation — most notably ManagedSession — throws
NotSupportedException, because those facades already run their own
reconnect state machine and exposing two reconnect drivers on the same
session would race.
// OK: raw Session
ISession raw = await new DefaultSessionFactory(telemetry).CreateAsync(...);
handler.BeginReconnect(raw, 1000, callback);
// Throws NotSupportedException
ISession managed = await new ManagedSessionFactory(telemetry).CreateAsync(...);
handler.BeginReconnect(managed, 1000, callback);
SessionReconnectHandler is retained as a supported entry point for callers that
own raw Session instances. New code should prefer ManagedSession or — for raw
Session usage — wire an IClientChannelManager (see
section 4
below) so that reconnect is handled transparently by the channel manager.
3. ManagedSession — the connection-state-machine facade
ManagedSession (src/Opc.Ua.Client/Session/ManagedSession.cs) is
an ISession facade that wraps a raw Session and adds:
- A connection state machine (
ConnectionStateMachine) that owns transitions betweenDisconnected,Connecting,Connected,Reconnecting,Closing,Closed. - A reconnect policy (
ReconnectPolicy/ReconnectPolicyOptions) with pluggable backoff strategies (Exponential,Linear,Constant), jitter, max-retry caps, bounded delays, and a sharedMaxTotalReconnectTimebudget. - A server-redundancy handler (
IServerRedundancyHandler, default:DefaultServerRedundancyHandler) that reads the server'sServerRedundancyobject and can fail over to a backup endpoint. - A service gate (
m_serviceLock) that pauses caller-issued service calls (Read/Write/Browse/Call/...) for the duration of a reconnect or failover, so consumers see one transparent retry rather than a torn state. - A default V2 subscription engine so the new options-based
subscription API (
ISubscriptionManager) is available viaISession.TryGetSubscriptionManager(out var manager)out of the box.
ManagedSession session = await ManagedSession.CreateAsync(
configuration,
endpoint,
sessionFactory: new DefaultSessionFactory(telemetry),
reconnectPolicy: new ReconnectPolicy(new ReconnectPolicyOptions
{
Strategy = BackoffStrategy.Exponential,
InitialDelay = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
MaxDelay = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
MaxRetries = 0, // unlimited
JitterFactor = 0.1,
MaxTotalReconnectTime = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5)
}),
redundancyHandler: new DefaultServerRedundancyHandler(),
telemetry: telemetry);
Failure of the initial connect
CreateAsync returns only once the session is actually connected. When the
first connect attempt fails, the state machine treats it like any other
connection loss and retries it under the configured reconnect policy — a
reconnect that finds no inner session runs a full connect rather than
reactivating one. If the policy, the MaxTotalReconnectTime budget and the
redundancy failover are all exhausted, CreateAsync disposes the half-built
session and throws a ServiceResultException carrying the error of the last
failed attempt (for example BadCertificateUntrusted), not a generic
BadNotConnected. It never returns a ManagedSession without a live inner
session.
Callers that want to give up sooner than the policy does should cap the policy
(MaxRetries, MaxTotalReconnectTime) or pass a cancellation token, which
surfaces as an OperationCanceledException.
ManagedSessionFactory
ManagedSessionFactory (src/Opc.Ua.Client/Session/ManagedSessionFactory.cs)
is the ISessionFactory that produces ManagedSession (cast as
ISession to satisfy the interface). Internally it composes a
DefaultSessionFactory to build the raw inner Session, then wraps it.
The factory is the drop-in replacement for code that currently calls
DefaultSessionFactory.CreateAsync(...) and wants managed reconnect for
free:
ISessionFactory factory = new ManagedSessionFactory(telemetry);
ISession session = await factory.CreateAsync(...); // actually a ManagedSession
Naming note.
ManagedSessionFactorycreatesManagedSessioninstances.DefaultSessionFactorycreates rawSessioninstances. The two factories are siblings underISessionFactory;ManagedSessionFactoryuses an innerDefaultSessionFactoryonly as an implementation detail for building the underlying transport+session pair.
ManagedSessionBuilder
ManagedSessionBuilder (src/Opc.Ua.Client/ClientBuilder/ManagedSessionBuilder.cs)
is the fluent / DI-friendly entry point. Build() returns an immutable
ManagedSessionOptions snapshot; ConnectAsync() wraps Build() plus
ManagedSession.CreateAsync(...):
ManagedSession session = await new ManagedSessionBuilder(configuration, telemetry)
.UseEndpoint(endpoint)
.WithSessionName("MyClient")
.WithSessionTimeout(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60))
.WithReconnectPolicy(p => p with
{
Strategy = BackoffStrategy.Exponential,
InitialDelay = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
MaxDelay = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30)
})
.WithServerRedundancy()
.UseSubscriptionEngine(DefaultSubscriptionEngineFactory.Instance) // optional; V2 by default
.ConnectAsync(ct);
The builder is also the integration point for
OpcUaClientBuilderExtensions.AddClient — DI consumers
inject a Func<CancellationToken, Task<ManagedSession>> that lazily
connects on first use and caches the resulting session.
Reconnect semantics on ManagedSession
When the underlying session's keep-alive fires a bad status, the
connection state machine transitions Connected → Reconnecting and:
- Pauses the service gate so all in-flight and incoming service calls wait.
- Drives the configured
ReconnectPolicyto compute the next delay (with jitter), bounded byInitialDelay/MaxDelay, capped byMaxRetries(where0means unlimited), and constrained by the sharedMaxTotalReconnectTimeretry budget. - Calls
Session.ReconnectAsync(channel reuse path) and on failureISessionFactory.RecreateAsync(channel rebuild path), updating the inner session reference atomically. - If the redundancy handler is enabled and the active server is
unreachable, it consults
IServerRedundancyHandler.GetNextEndpointAsyncand recreates the session against the failover endpoint. - On success, transitions
Reconnecting → Connectedand releases the service gate, replaying any deferred calls. - On exhaustion (
MaxRetriesreached), transitions toClosedand surfaces aServiceResultExceptionto outstanding callers.
When a ManagedSession is backed by IClientChannelManager, participant reactivation uses the
manager's IChannelReconnectPolicy. The default ExponentialBackoffChannelReconnectPolicy
bounds each participant callback with a ParticipantTimeout of 30 seconds.
Because all of this is driven internally, callers must not wrap a
ManagedSession with SessionReconnectHandler; doing so throws
NotSupportedException.
Closing a ManagedSession
CloseAsync requests the close on the connection state machine, which
cancels the connect, reconnect or failover attempt in flight before it
closes the inner session. Without that cancellation a close issued while
the session is reconnecting would have to wait out the current attempt,
which runs to the endpoint's OperationTimeout against a peer that
accepts the connection but never answers.
// Bounded close: returns BadTimeout when the close does not settle in
// time, and closes the transport channel as well.
StatusCode status = await session.CloseAsync(
timeout: 10_000,
closeChannel: true,
ct);
Both overloads close through the state machine and report the status of
the inner CloseSession call; CloseAsync(ct) is equivalent to
CloseAsync(0, closeChannel: true, ct), where a timeout of 0 leaves
the wait unbounded (other than by ct). Passing closeChannel: false
tears down the session but leaves the transport channel open and owned by
the caller, so it can be reused for another session.
Server retry-after backpressure
When a server sheds load it can tell the client how long to wait before
retrying — independently of ReturnDiagnostics — and the reconnect loop
honors that hint as a lower bound on its next delay. Two carriers are
emitted on by default:
ResponseHeader.additionalHeader(all UA transports): aBadServerTooBusyServiceFaultcarries a machine-readableRetryAfterMsvalue (a whole-millisecondInt64in the standardAdditionalParametersType), attached by the server inEndpointBase.CreateFault(viaRetryAfterHeader/ServerBusyException) and read by the client inClientBase.ValidateResponse— the choke point the source-generated clients call for every service. It is delivered regardless ofReturnDiagnostics.- HTTP
Retry-After(HTTPS transport): theAddHttpsRateLimitergate sets the header on its HTTP 429, and the client'sHttpsTransportChannelmaps a 429/503 carryingRetry-AftertoBadServerTooBusywith the hint.
In addition, the UA-TCP client honors a RetryAfterMs=N token in a
transient server-busy Error (ERR) message reason as a lower bound on
channel-reconnect backoff. The reference server sheds a connection
cheaply by dropping the accepted socket rather than emitting an ERR, so
this interoperates with any server that does send one. The reference
server also computes a load-based Server.ServiceLevel (255 at low load,
scaling toward a floor as sessions approach MaxSessionCount, with
hysteresis) as a proactive capacity signal a client can read or
subscribe to.
All reactive hints reach IReconnectPolicy.TryGetNextDelay, surviving
the diagnostics gate and client exception re-wrapping; the legacy
RetryAfterMs=N AdditionalInfo token remains a best-effort
compatibility hint. See Rate Limiting and Admission
Control for the server limiters that produce these
signals.
4. IClientChannelManager — centralised channel sharing and reconnect
IClientChannelManager
(src/Opc.Ua.Core/Stack/Client/IClientChannelManager.cs) is the new
central registry of client-side transport channels introduced by issue
#3288. It
sits below Session / ManagedSession and is concerned with the
underlying ITransportChannel, not with sessions or subscriptions. It
adds three behaviours that the previous one-channel-per-client model
could not support:
- Channel sharing — multiple sessions (or discovery / registration
clients) whose
ConfiguredEndpointand (optional) reverse-connect handle match share one underlying secure channel. The shared channel stays open until the last lease is released. - Coalesced reconnect — concurrent reconnect triggers (e.g. from
multiple sessions on the same channel observing a keep-alive
failure) collapse into a single reconnect cycle. Each attached
participant is notified once via
IReconnectParticipant.OnReconnectAsyncin parallel. - Transparent gating — service calls through an
IManagedTransportChannelblock until the channel isReady(gate released after both transport open AND participant reactivation complete). Internal reactivation traffic (e.g.ActivateSessionissued by a participant insideOnReconnectAsync) bypasses the gate via anAsyncLocalscope managed by the manager.
Session factory choices
Code that accepts an ISessionFactory can choose the session and
reconnect model without changing the consuming client:
DefaultSessionFactorycreates a rawSession. It does not run a reconnect state machine; the caller owns reconnect / recreate.ManagedSessionFactorycreatesManagedSession, which wraps the raw session in the built-in reconnect state machine.ChannelManagerSessionFactorycreates a rawSessionwhose transport channel comes from anIClientChannelManager. Multiple compatible sessions share channels and channel-level reconnect is coordinated centrally by the manager.
IClientChannelManager channelManager = new ClientChannelManager(config, telemetry);
ISessionFactory factory = new ChannelManagerSessionFactory(
channelManager,
telemetry,
DiagnosticsMasks.SymbolicId);
ISession session = await factory.CreateAsync(
config,
endpoint,
updateBeforeConnect: true,
sessionName: "SharedChannelSession",
sessionTimeout: 60_000,
identity: null,
preferredLocales: default,
ct);
Use ChannelManagerSessionFactory when the desired surface is still a
raw Session, but the transport should be shared with other sessions or
channel-only clients such as discovery and registration clients.
Channel identity (ManagedChannelKey)
Two participants share a channel only when their ManagedChannelKey
values are equal. The key is composed of:
- Endpoint URL.
- Security policy URI and message security mode.
- Server-certificate SHA-1 thumbprint (matches X.509 thumbprint conventions; used only as a stable hash, not for security).
- A stable hash of the
EndpointConfigurationvalue properties (timeouts, encoding, message-size limits). - Client instance-certificate thumbprint.
- Reverse-connect identity (the
ITransportWaitingConnectioninstance used to acquire the channel;nullfor forward connections).
Forward and reverse channels to the same server are never shared:
forward keys carry null for the reverse identity while reverse keys
carry the waiting-connection instance.
State model
IManagedTransportChannel.State follows a three-stage gate model:
| State | Service calls allowed | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
Disconnected |
no (BadSecureChannelClosed) |
Initial, or after graceful close. |
TransportConnecting / TransportReconnecting |
no (queue with cancellation) | Underlying transport is being opened. |
TransportConnectedSessionReactivating |
only via the internal reactivation bypass | Transport up; participants running OnReconnectAsync. |
Ready |
yes | Fully usable. |
Faulted |
no | Manager's retry policy exhausted. |
Closed |
no | Manager teardown. |
Only Ready releases the public service-call gate. Discovery and
session-service requests are not generally exempted; only the
internal reactivation bypass crosses the gate during
TransportConnectedSessionReactivating.
Participant model — IReconnectParticipant
Clients that want to react to channel reconnect implement
IReconnectParticipant. Session implements it: when a channel
manager is wired into a session, the manager invokes
Session.OnReconnectAsync after each successful transport reconnect.
The session runs the ActivateSession slice and returns one of:
| Result | Meaning |
|---|---|
Reactivated |
Session is alive on the reconnected channel. |
RequiresSessionRecreate |
Channel is OK; this participant's server-side session was lost (e.g. BadSessionIdInvalid) — the manager dispatches participant recreation out of band. |
TransientFailure |
Transient channel-level failure; manager retries per policy. |
FatalForParticipant |
Authentication / cert problem specific to this participant — detach only this participant. |
FatalForChannel |
Fatal channel error; transition to Faulted. |
When a participant returns RequiresSessionRecreate, the manager invokes
IReconnectParticipant.RecreateAsync(ct) fire-and-forget and does not block the channel's
transition to Ready on that work. Session implements the callback by recreating its
server-side session in place. On target frameworks without default interface method support,
participants opt in with IRecreateAwareReconnectParticipant.
Retry policy — IChannelReconnectPolicy
The default ExponentialBackoffChannelReconnectPolicy mirrors the
historical SessionReconnectHandler backoff defaults:
500 ms → 30 s with unlimited attempts. It also sets ParticipantTimeout
to 30 seconds, bounding each participant's OnReconnectAsync callback. A
participant timeout is treated as TransientFailure; retry exhaustion still
transitions the channel to Faulted. The IChannelReconnectPolicy default
interface member remains Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan for custom-policy
backward compatibility, and older TFMs can opt in with IParticipantTimeoutPolicy.
The policy is configurable on the ClientChannelManager constructor.
Participant deadlines use the manager's injected TimeProvider, including on
.NET Framework, so they follow the same clock as reconnect backoff and retry budgets.
HTTPS resilience vs channel-mgr reconnect
On .NET 8 and later, HTTPS endpoints have two independent resilience layers:
- HTTP resilience pipeline — the named
HttpClientcreated throughIOpcUaHttpClientFactoryusesAddStandardResilienceHandlerfrom theMicrosoft.Extensions.Http.Resiliencepackage. The standard handler applies request-level rate limiting, a total request timeout, retries, circuit breaking, and per-attempt timeouts. Current package defaults are: 3 retries with exponential backoff and jitter, a 30 s total request timeout, a 10 s attempt timeout, a circuit breaker that opens after a 10% transient-failure ratio over a 30 s sample with at least 100 requests, and a 1,000-request concurrency limit with no queue. - Channel manager reconnect —
IChannelReconnectPolicyruns per managed channel after the request has escaped the HTTP layer. Its defaultExponentialBackoffChannelReconnectPolicyis500 ms → 30 swith unlimited attempts.
Use the HTTP pipeline for transient failures of one HTTPS call: the call is retried or timed out, then the channel remains usable. Use the channel manager for failures that require the full OPC UA channel to be torn down and opened again, such as a server reboot, a closed TLS connection, or a TLS rehandshake requirement.
With the DI defaults, an HTTPS request fails through the HTTP pipeline
first. If all HTTP retries are exhausted (or the timeout / circuit
breaker rejects the call), the resulting HttpRequestException, timeout,
or equivalent transport exception bubbles up to the OPC UA channel. The
channel manager then treats that as a channel-level failure and starts
its reconnect policy.
Avoid making both layers aggressive. The channel-manager MaxAttempts
should be sized assuming the HTTP layer already retried the individual
request. For HTTPS deployments, prefer a bounded channel policy such as
MaxAttempts <= 5, or use a shared IRetryBudget when the HTTP layer
participates in one so a single end-to-end retry budget caps both layers.
DI registration wires the standard handler automatically:
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddClient(opt =>
{
opt.Configuration = config;
opt.Session.Endpoint = endpoint;
});
To replace the DI default with custom HTTP resilience, configure the same named client and remove the default handler before adding your own:
services.AddHttpClient("Opc.Ua.Client")
.RemoveAllResilienceHandlers()
.AddStandardResilienceHandler(opts =>
{
opts.Retry.MaxRetryAttempts = 5;
opts.AttemptTimeout.Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
});
For direct builder usage on .NET 8 and later, call
ManagedSessionBuilder.WithHttpsResilience(...):
ManagedSession session = await new ManagedSessionBuilder(config, telemetry)
.UseEndpoint(endpoint)
.WithHttpsResilience(opts =>
{
opts.Retry.MaxRetryAttempts = 5;
opts.AttemptTimeout.Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
})
.ConnectAsync(ct);
HTTPS factory + OPC UA cert validation: secure-by-default fallback
HttpsTransportChannel.CreateHttpClient chooses between two HttpClient
construction paths:
- Direct path (
CreateDirectHttpClient) — builds anHttpClientHandlerconfigured with:ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallbackwired to the OPC UAICertificateValidatorEx/CertificateValidator(validates against the OPC UA trust list / issuer chain).- The OPC UA application instance certificate attached as a client certificate (mutual TLS using the OPC UA application identity).
AllowAutoRedirect = falseso an attacker-controlled redirect cannot silently move the OPC UA call to a different host.MaxConnectionsPerServerandMaxRequestContentBufferSizequotas enforced at the HTTP layer.
- Factory path — calls
IOpcUaHttpClientFactory.CreateClient(...)and uses the returned namedHttpClient(its primary handler is owned byIHttpClientFactoryand CANNOT be reconfigured byHttpsTransportChannelafter the fact).
When an OPC UA CertificateValidator is configured for a channel — the
normal case for any non-SecurityPolicies.None HTTPS profile —
HttpsTransportChannel.CanUseHttpClientFactory() returns false and
the direct path is always taken. This is the secure default: it
guarantees that the OPC UA trust list, OPC UA mTLS, and the redirect
lock are in effect on every OPC UA HTTPS connection. If a non-Shared
factory was supplied but bypassed for security reasons,
CreateHttpClient emits a one-time LogWarning so operators see that
the named HttpClient pipeline (Polly resilience handler, etc.) is NOT
applied to this OPC UA HTTPS channel.
To keep BOTH Polly resilience AND OPC UA cert validation on the same
channel, register the named Opc.Ua.Client HttpClient with a
configured primary handler that wires OPC UA validation in yourself.
The handler must be re-buildable per channel from the configuration
because the OPC UA validator and client certificate are channel-bound,
not process-bound:
services.AddHttpClient(OpcUaHttpClientDefaults.ClientName)
.ConfigurePrimaryHttpMessageHandler(sp =>
{
// Resolve the per-application validator and client cert from
// your DI container, then build a handler the same way
// CreateDirectHttpClient does.
ApplicationConfiguration config = sp.GetRequiredService<ApplicationConfiguration>();
ICertificateValidatorEx validator = config.CertificateValidator;
return new HttpClientHandler
{
ClientCertificateOptions = ClientCertificateOption.Manual,
AllowAutoRedirect = false,
ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback = (_, cert, chain, _) =>
{
// … delegate to `validator.ValidateAsync(...)` synchronously.
},
// … and attach the OPC UA client instance certificate.
};
})
.AddStandardResilienceHandler();
Without that explicit primary-handler configuration, OPC UA HTTPS channels deliberately ignore the named-client pipeline and use the direct path — preserving OPC UA security at the cost of Polly resilience on those channels.
Shared retry budget with ManagedSession
When ManagedSession is constructed with WithChannelManager(...),
the manager owns channel-level retry while
ManagedSession.ConnectionStateMachine + IReconnectPolicy owns
session-level retry on top. The two are sequenced, not concurrent, and
share a single IRetryBudget for each outer reconnect cycle:
- Channel-level retry runs first. A keep-alive failure on the
inner
SessiontriggersIClientChannelManager.ReconnectAsync(channel, ct). The manager coalesces concurrent triggers from multiple sessions on the same channel, retries the transport open according to itsIChannelReconnectPolicy, then notifies attached sessions viaOnReconnectAsync. - Outer state stays
Connectedwhile the manager handles it.ManagedSessionsubscribes toIManagedTransportChannel.StateChanged; while the manager is inTransportReconnecting/TransportConnectedSessionReactivating,ManagedSessionsuppresses the keep-alive-driven outer state-machine churn. - Outer retry shares its deadline with channel retry. When the
channel transitions to
Faulted,ManagedSession.StateChangedraisesConnectionState.Reconnecting. The outerIReconnectPolicyschedulesSession.ReconnectAsync(ct)and passes the same retry budget intoIClientChannelManager.ReconnectAsync(channel, budget, ct). Both layers cap their delays to the remaining time and stop scheduling retries when the budget is exhausted.
ReconnectPolicyOptions.MaxTotalReconnectTime defaults to five
minutes. Set it to the end-to-end reconnect window your application
expects; channel-manager delays are automatically shrunk to fit inside
that window instead of receiving a fresh budget on every outer attempt.
For example, with MaxTotalReconnectTime = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
a channel-manager reconnect that spends 27 seconds reopening transport
and reactivating participants leaves about three seconds for any outer
ManagedSession retry / failover decision. The channel manager clamps
its next scheduled delay to the remaining time and transitions to
Faulted once the shared budget is exhausted; the outer state machine
then fails over or closes instead of starting another 30-second channel
retry window. The result is one roughly 30-second reconnect cycle (plus
any already in-flight attempt), not 30 seconds per layer or per outer
attempt.
ManagedSession session = await new ManagedSessionBuilder(configuration, telemetry)
.UseEndpoint(endpoint)
.WithChannelManager(channelManager)
.WithReconnectPolicy(p => p with
{
MaxTotalReconnectTime = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30)
})
.ConnectAsync(ct);
For migration notes on the budget-aware APIs, see the migration guide.
Diagnostics surface contract — what tags and structured log fields carry
The channel manager emits diagnostics through three independent channels: System.Diagnostics.Activity tags (distributed tracing), structured ILogger logs under the Opc.Ua.ChannelManager category, and System.Diagnostics.Metrics instruments. The channel manager previously emitted its own Opc.Ua.ChannelManager EventSource (ETW / dotnet-trace); that provider is removed. The structured logs are the replacement — same category name, same event identities — routed through Microsoft.Extensions.Logging / OpenTelemetry logging instead of ETW.
Each event kept its original EventId and EventName on the [LoggerMessage] replacement, so tooling matching on the numeric id or name keeps working:
| EventId | EventName | Level | Message template |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ChannelOpened |
Information | Channel opened. Endpoint={Endpoint}, Reverse={Reverse}, Refcount={Refcount}, Participants={ParticipantCount} |
| 2 | ChannelClosed |
Information | Channel closed. Endpoint={Endpoint}, Reason={Reason}, Refcount={Refcount}, Participants={ParticipantCount} |
| 3 | StateChanged |
Information | State changed. Endpoint={Endpoint}, Previous={PreviousState}, New={NewState}, Attempt={ReconnectAttempt}, Status={StatusCode}, ErrorMessage={ErrorMessage} |
| 4 | ReconnectStarted |
Information | Reconnect started. Endpoint={Endpoint}, AttemptCount={AttemptCount} |
| 5 | ReconnectCompleted |
Information | Reconnect completed. Endpoint={Endpoint}, AttemptCount={AttemptCount}, Outcome={Outcome} |
| 6 | ReconnectFailed |
Warning | Reconnect failed. Endpoint={Endpoint}, Attempt={Attempt}, Outcome={Outcome}, Status={StatusCode}, ErrorMessage={ErrorMessage} |
| 7 | ParticipantAttached |
Information | Participant attached. Endpoint={Endpoint}, Participant={ParticipantId}, Refcount={Refcount}, Participants={ParticipantCount} |
| 8 | ParticipantDetached |
Information | Participant detached. Endpoint={Endpoint}, Participant={ParticipantId}, Refcount={Refcount}, Participants={ParticipantCount} |
Tag and structured-field values surfaced through Activity tags or these logs are restricted to OPC UA-protocol-level fields only:
StatusCode(numeric / symbolic), e.g.BadSecureChannelClosedServiceResult.SymbolicIdServiceResult.LocalizedText.Text— the operator-facing message
Notably, the following are never sent to Activity tags or to the Opc.Ua.ChannelManager structured logs above:
- The full
ServiceResult.ToString()serialization ServiceResult.AdditionalInfo— typically carries inner-exception messages, file paths, internal IDsException.StackTrace,Exception.Message, or any other inner .NET exception detailInnerrecursion intoServiceResult.InnerResult
This keeps internal client/server diagnostics out of distributed tracing and logging backends where operators with telemetry-read access (but no production-debug access) should not be able to read internal failure detail. Full failure context — including stack traces and AdditionalInfo — flows only through a separate, local ILogger.LogDebug call on the manager, where it stays under the host's log-access controls; it is never folded into the Opc.Ua.ChannelManager-category events listed above.
The metric tag set is also bounded for routine operation:
| Instrument | Tag keys |
|---|---|
opc.ua.channel.open / opc.ua.channel.close |
endpoint, reverse (+ reason on close) |
opc.ua.channel.active / opc.ua.channel.refcount / opc.ua.channel.participants |
endpoint |
opc.ua.channel.reconnect.attempts / opc.ua.channel.reconnect.duration |
endpoint, outcome |
opc.ua.channel.gate.wait |
endpoint |
opc.ua.channel.participant.timeout.count / opc.ua.channel.participant.recreate.count |
endpoint, participant (+ success on recreate) |
outcome is one of success, transient-failure, policy-exhausted, fatal-channel. reason is one of lease-released, manager-disposed, faulted. endpoint cardinality is bounded by the number of distinct OPC UA endpoint URLs the application connects to.
The
participanttag carries the kind prefix of the participant identifier (e.g."Session","Client"), not the per-instance suffix. This keeps cardinality bounded by the small set of participant kinds rather than growing with every session / reconnect-storm participant ever created. The full per-instanceIReconnectParticipant.Idis preserved on Activity tags and on theOpc.Ua.ChannelManagerstructured logs above so individual sessions remain correlatable in distributed traces. Custom participants that don't use the "kind---instance" naming convention contribute their full id to the tag, so prefer the prefix-then-suffix shape for new participant types.
For the removal of the old EventSource providers (including this one) and migration guidance for EventListener / dotnet-trace consumers, see migrate/2.0.x/telemetry.md.
DI registration
builder.AddClient(...) registers IClientChannelManager as a
singleton resolved from OpcUaClientOptions.Configuration. The
ManagedSessionBuilder produced by AddClient automatically wires
the DI-resolved channel manager into every new ManagedSession. To
override, call WithChannelManager(...) on the builder explicitly.
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddClient(opt =>
{
opt.Configuration = config;
opt.Session = new ManagedSessionOptions
{
Endpoint = endpoint,
SessionName = "MyApp",
};
});
// Single channel manager + multiple sessions sharing channels per endpoint:
var sp = services.BuildServiceProvider();
var managedFactory = sp.GetRequiredService<Func<CancellationToken, Task<ManagedSession>>>();
ManagedSession s1 = await managedFactory(ct);
ManagedSession s2 = await managedFactory(ct); // shares s1's underlying channel
Migrating from AttachChannel / DetachChannel
IClientBase.AttachChannel(ITransportChannel) and DetachChannel()
are marked [Obsolete] but remain functional. Migration path:
// Old: manually managed channel
ITransportChannel ch = await UaChannelBase.CreateUaBinaryChannelAsync(...);
var session = new Session(ch, config, endpoint);
await session.OpenAsync(...);
// New: channel manager owns the channel; sessions share it
var manager = new ClientChannelManager(config, telemetry);
Session session = await Session.CreateAsync(manager, config, endpoint, ...);
For reverse-connect:
ITransportWaitingConnection conn = await reverseConnectManager
.WaitForConnectionAsync(serverUrl, serverUri, ct);
IManagedTransportChannel ch = await manager.GetAsync(participant, conn, ct);
Testing the channel manager
The channel manager is covered by a layered stress and chaos test suite in
tests/Opc.Ua.Stress.Tests/:
- L1 Contract — fast deterministic fake-based tests for coalescing, participant result aggregation, retry budgets, hung participants, recreate dispatch, lease lifecycle, gate + bypass, key equivalence, certificate rotation, and leak accuracy. These run in every PR.
- L2 Integration — live in-process server tests for server outage recovery, live certificate rotation, participant timeout, session recreate dispatch, and failover lease swap. These run in every PR.
- L3 ChaosTCP — TCP proxy chaos tests for transparent reconnect under load, subscription survival, accept-but-stall, and mixed drop / block-accept failures. These run nightly.
- L4 Soak — long-running randomized soak, combinatorial matrix, and memory-stability runs. These are manual or nightly only.
# Contract + Integration (default PR CI):
dotnet test tests/Opc.Ua.Stress.Tests --filter "Category=Contract|Category=Integration"
# ChaosTCP (nightly):
dotnet test tests/Opc.Ua.Stress.Tests --filter "Category=ChaosTCP" --TestRunParameters.Parameter(Seed=<n>)
# Soak (manual):
dotnet test tests/Opc.Ua.Stress.Tests --filter "Category=Soak"
Every chaos test prints its seed at the start of the run. Failed chaos runs can be reproduced by passing the same
seed back to the test host with --TestRunParameters.Parameter(Seed=<n>).
5. Subscription engines
The ISubscriptionEngine abstraction
(src/Opc.Ua.Client/Session/ISubscriptionEngine.cs) decouples the
publish pipeline from Session. Each Session owns exactly one engine
chosen at construction; the engine manages the publish workers, ack
queues, keep-alive timers, and dispatch to subscriptions.
ClassicSubscriptionEngine
The historical engine. Owns:
- The
SubscriptionandMonitoredItemclasses insrc/Opc.Ua.Client/Subscription/Classic. - A fire-and-forget publish loop driven from
Session.BeginPublish/OnPublishComplete. - The
Subscriptionscollection onISessionandManagedSession.
This is the default when no SubscriptionEngineFactory is supplied to
Session directly. It is also what ManagedSession exposes via the
classic Subscriptions property regardless of which engine is active —
an internal SubscriptionBridge forwards classic subscriptions onto the
V2 engine when one is in use, so existing classic-API code keeps
working.
DefaultSubscriptionEngine (V2)
The new engine wraps the options-based SubscriptionManager
(src/Opc.Ua.Client/Subscription/SubscriptionManager.cs) inside
the ISubscriptionEngine contract. It owns:
- The
Subscriptions.Subscription/Subscriptions.MonitoredItems.MonitoredItemrecords consumed viaIOptionsMonitor<T>. - A worker-pool publish loop with adaptive worker count.
- The full subscription-service-set lifecycle:
CreateSubscription,ModifySubscription,SetPublishingMode,Republish, plusCreateMonitoredItems,ModifyMonitoredItems,DeleteMonitoredItems,SetMonitoringMode,Call,SetTriggering— all routed back through theSession's service-set client methods. - An
ISubscriptionNotificationHandlercallback contract forOnDataChangeNotificationAsync/OnEventDataNotificationAsync/OnKeepAliveNotificationAsync.
DefaultSubscriptionEngine.SubscriptionManager exposes the
ISubscriptionManager API; on any ISession it is surfaced through
TryGetSubscriptionManager(out var manager), which returns true and the
manager for V2-engine sessions and false for classic-engine sessions.
// V2 engine is the default for ManagedSession
ManagedSession session = await new ManagedSessionBuilder(configuration, telemetry)
.UseEndpoint(endpoint)
.ConnectAsync(ct);
var handler = new MyNotificationHandler(); // : ISubscriptionNotificationHandler
ISubscription subscription = session.AddSubscription(handler,
new Opc.Ua.Client.Subscriptions.SubscriptionOptions
{
PublishingInterval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(500),
KeepAliveCount = 10,
LifetimeCount = 100
});
subscription.TryAddMonitoredItem(
"ServerStatus_CurrentTime",
VariableIds.Server_ServerStatus_CurrentTime,
o => o with
{
SamplingInterval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(250),
QueueSize = 10
},
out IMonitoredItem _);
Unbounded monitored items (default)
The V2 ISubscription returned from Add(...) transparently splits
monitored items across multiple server-side partition subscriptions
when the server's per-subscription cap would be exceeded. Single-
partition workloads pay zero overhead because the composite
collection short-circuits to the primary partition. Pin items into
the same partition with MonitoredItemOptions.Affinity so per-
subscription features like SetTriggering keep working across the
group; opt out of partitioning entirely with
SubscriptionOptions.DisableUnboundedItemMode = true. Full
developer guide: Subscriptions § Unbounded monitored items.
V2 notification pooling (opt-in)
The V2 subscription engine supports activator-level pooling of
notification payload instances to reduce GC pressure on
high-throughput publish loops. Pooling is opt-in and disabled by
default. Enable it via ManagedSessionBuilder.WithPoolNotifications(),
the ManagedSessionOptions.PoolNotifications init property, or by
setting ISubscriptionManager.PoolNotifications = true directly on
the V2 manager:
ManagedSession session = await new ManagedSessionBuilder(configuration, telemetry)
.UseEndpoint(endpoint)
.WithPoolNotifications() // opt in
.ConnectAsync(ct);
How it works:
- Types that opt in to pooling implement
IPooledEncodeable(a subinterface ofIEncodeable) and provide aReuse()method that resets fields and returns the instance to its activator's pool. The activator derives fromPooledEncodeableType<T>instead ofEncodeableType<T>and owns a bounded, lock-free pool. - When
PoolNotificationsistrue, the V2 subscription dispatcher walks eachDataChangeNotification/EventNotificationListin afinallyblock after the handler await completes, callingReuse()on every payload item that implementsIPooledEncodeable. Types that do not implement the interface are skipped silently — the walk is universally safe. - The walk runs on the subscription's single-reader
ProcessMessageAsyncloop, so it never races the channel decode that produced the payload.
Handler contract — retain by copy
When PoolNotifications is enabled, handlers must not retain a
reference to a DataChangeNotification / EventNotificationList /
MonitoredItemNotification / EventFieldList past the await of
the dispatch call. The pool may re-rent those instances to the next
publish immediately after Reuse() runs. Handlers that need to
keep values must copy them out before returning:
public ValueTask OnDataChangeNotificationAsync(
ISubscription subscription, uint sequenceNumber,
DateTime publishTime,
ReadOnlyMemory<DataValueChange> notification,
PublishState publishStateMask, IReadOnlyList<string> stringTable)
{
foreach (DataValueChange change in notification.Span)
{
// OK: DataValueChange is a struct, captured by value.
// Value (DataValue) and DiagnosticInfo are not themselves
// pooled in this design, so storing them past the call is
// safe.
m_history.Add(new MyHistoryEntry(
change.MonitoredItem?.NodeId,
change.Value, // safe to retain
change.DiagnosticInfo));
}
return default;
}
The DataValueChange and EventNotification projection structs
are designed not to surface a reference to a pooled instance —
they project the inner DataValue / ArrayOf<Variant> directly,
which are not themselves pooled. Handlers can safely copy
DataValueChange / EventNotification by value and continue to
use them after the await.
What is not safe under pooled mode:
- Retaining the outer
DataChangeNotification/EventNotificationListreference past the await. - Retaining individual
MonitoredItemNotification/EventFieldListreferences past the await. - Calling
Reuse()on a retained reference after the framework has already done so —Reuse()is idempotent against accidental double-call (it uses a per-instance sentinel), but the pool may have already re-rented the instance, in which case the lateReuse()steals it from its current consumer.
The dispatcher is the only framework-initiated Reuse() caller.
Handler code that follows the retain-by-copy rule never reaches
the unsafe pattern.
Server-side request/response pooling
On the server side, decoded IServiceRequest and IServiceResponse
objects are automatically returned to their activator pools after the
service handler completes and the response is encoded to the wire.
This is unconditional — no opt-in flag is required — because the
server framework owns the full lifecycle of both objects:
- The request is decoded by the channel, consumed by the service handler, and never exposed to application code by reference.
- The response is constructed by the handler, encoded by the channel's
WriteSymmetricMessage/BinaryEncoder.EncodeMessagepath, and then has no further consumers.
The reuse calls are placed in finally blocks in
TcpTransportListener.OnRequestReceivedAsync (UA-TCP transport) and
EndpointBase.InvokeServiceAsync (HTTPS transport), ensuring both
objects are released regardless of success or failure.
Server-side node managers and service handlers do not need any code changes to benefit from this pooling — it is transparent at the channel/transport layer.
Choosing an engine
| Scenario | Engine |
|---|---|
Existing code using session.AddSubscription(new Subscription(...)) and the classic event-driven API |
ClassicSubscriptionEngine (the default for raw Session) |
| New code, options-based subscriptions, DI / Microsoft.Extensions.Options friendly | DefaultSubscriptionEngine (the default for ManagedSession) |
| Migrating a managed session but you still need a classic subscription you cannot rewrite | ManagedSession with UseSubscriptionEngine(ClassicSubscriptionEngineFactory.Instance); TryGetSubscriptionManager then returns false and you keep using Subscriptions |
The two engines can co-exist on a ManagedSession:
ManagedSession.Subscriptions (classic API) keeps working alongside
the V2 subscription manager obtained via
ISession.TryGetSubscriptionManager(out var manager) when the V2 engine is
active. Internally, classic subscriptions are bridged onto the V2
publish pipeline.
6. The INodeCache surface
Session.NodeCache (and ManagedSession.NodeCache) returns
INodeCache, the unified client-side cache contract. As of 2.0 it is
the single contract — the previous ILruNodeCache parallel interface
has been merged into it and removed.
The interface deliberately exposes two complementary lookup families:
Find*/Fetch*— take anExpandedNodeId, return a nullable result, may fetch from the server.Find*consults the cache first;Fetch*always re-reads from the server and updates the cache.Get*— take a localNodeId, return a non-nullable result (throws when the node cannot be resolved). LRU-style direct hit; cheaper for in-process callers that already hold a localNodeIdand a known namespace index.
Both families coexist on INodeCache because the lifecycle and error
semantics differ. All async methods return ValueTask /
ValueTask<T>; only void Clear() is synchronous (pure local-state
mutation).
For migration details see 2.0 migration guide — Node States and INodeCache.
7. Putting it all together
Pick the entry point that best matches your call site:
- Already have a
Sessionand an existing reconnect helper. KeepSession+SessionReconnectHandler. They are first-class APIs in 2.0 and not deprecated. You may opt into the V2 subscription engine by passingSubscriptionEngineFactory = DefaultSubscriptionEngineFactory.InstancetoDefaultSessionFactory. - New service / ASP.NET Core / generic-host application. Use
services.AddOpcUa().AddClient(...)and resolveFunc<CancellationToken, Task<ManagedSession>>from DI. - New code without DI. Use
ManagedSessionBuilder.ConnectAsync(...). - Drop-in replacement for
DefaultSessionFactorythat wants managed reconnect. Switch toManagedSessionFactory— the public surface (ISessionFactory) is identical. - Need to share a single underlying
Sessionacross two reconnect drivers, or wrap aManagedSessionwithSessionReconnectHandler. Don't. The reconnect drivers race, andSessionReconnectHandlerwill throwNotSupportedExceptionto enforce this.
Server session lifecycle
Channel and security-policy association failures are rejected before authentication-failure accounting. Requests from another channel cannot lock out the application owning an unactivated session; genuine invalid signatures and identity credentials still count toward that application's lockout threshold.
Certificate user tokens require proof of possession when their token policy
requires signing, even on a None SecureChannel. A missing, empty or incorrect
user-token signature is rejected with BadUserSignatureInvalid, as specified
by OPC UA Part 4, 5.7.3.3. Only a policy without signing accepts an absent signature.
Closed sessions do not accept browse continuation points. A pending
continuation remains caller-owned until its mirror write and local
admission succeed. If the session closes during persistence, the late
mirror entry is removed and BadSessionClosed is returned without
transferring or disposing the caller's resource twice.
Replacing or resetting a session's ephemeral user-token key retires the previous key. A key already borrowed by credential decryption remains valid until the final decrypt operation returns or fails, then its cryptographic resources are released.
Reloading configured reverse connections removes a snapshot of the configured entries while preserving dynamically added connections, including on .NET Framework.
Discovery registration runs as tracked, cancellable work. Server stop cancels and drains an in-flight registration before releasing server resources. Consumed or stopped timer callbacks cannot schedule another attempt or replace a newer timer; active registrations retain their configured success interval and bounded failure backoff.
See also
- 2.0 migration guide — ManagedSession and Automatic Reconnection
- 2.0 migration guide — Sessions, GDS Client, and Subscriptions — V2 subscription engine, fluent builder, and DI integration are covered alongside ManagedSession.
- TransferSubscription — server-driven session-handoff support.
- Diagnostics — telemetry plumbed through
ITelemetryContexton every factory and session type. - Reverse Connect — works with both
SessionandManagedSession. - Diagnostics — Packet capture, dissection, and replay —
Opc.Ua.Core.Diagnosticscomposes withIClientChannelManagervia the globalTransportBindings.Channelsregistry; channel sharing, transparent reconnect, and faulted-entry swap all flow through to one continuous capture session perManagedChannelKey.