# Description Fix incomplete-message buffering, channel cleanup, session resource accounting, and enforcement of existing transport admission settings. - Share a targeted `ChunkReassemblyBudget` across server listeners. The reference default is 64 MiB, with a 32 MiB global occupancy threshold for sessionless intermediate chunks. This is priority headroom for activated sessions, not a guaranteed bootstrap partition. Single/final chunks and unrelated response/client buffers remain outside this budget. - Retain precise incoming/final payload quotas, valid Abort handling without channel teardown, terminal late-final rejection, and exactly-once buffer/reservation cleanup. - Use one assembly timer per quota/clock scope, asynchronous cleanup, a fixed deadline, a 30-second fallback for non-positive lifetimes, and best-effort ERR `BadTimeout` before closure. - Apply negotiated TCP/WebSocket/Pipe receive limits and size pipe rentals to actual chunks. - Add the optional `ISessionBindingProvider` and immutable `SessionBindingContext` seam. Managed membership counts distinct committed sessions, not responses, and handles reactivation, transfer, closure, expiry, restoration and shutdown. Read-only snapshots require token/channel/security validation and never replace service authorization. - Wire default and explicitly injected binding providers through raw TCP, Kestrel and UACP WebSockets; preserve existing callback/manager interfaces and direct construction. - Enforce existing `ConnectionRateLimiter` and channel capacity settings on Kestrel TCP and UACP WebSocket admission, with physical-transport leases surviving reverse handoff and releasing on cancellation, close, failed attachment and stop. HTTP/JSON requests are not treated as UASC channels. - Add regression coverage and documentation. Stabilize the CI cancellation test by waiting for the resolver to enter before canceling. This is the foundation only. New Balanced/FairShare/TrustedReservations policies, tenant isolation and guaranteed bootstrap reserves belong in the separate stacked follow-up, not this PR. ## Related Issues Fixes #4521. ## Validation | Scope | Result | | --- | --- | | Core transport, budget, binding-context and DI tests, net10.0 | 717 passed | | Core transport, budget, binding-context and DI tests, net48 | 664 passed, 6 platform-specific skips | | Session bindings, transfer/security/expiry/restore and hosted DI, net10.0 | 69 passed | | Same focused Server suite, net48 | 69 passed | | ServerRedundancyHandlerTests, Release/net48 | 39 passed | | ConsoleReferenceServer net10.0 | Build succeeded, zero warnings/errors | | Server and HTTPS binding netstandard2.1 | Both builds succeeded, zero warnings/errors | The new admission fixtures also passed five repeated runs after correcting asynchronous connection-context disposal. Full-solution validation, coverage comparison and CI for this update remain pending. ## Checklist - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.
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Rate limiting and admission control
The server applies deterministic, configurable admission control so it sheds a connection or session-establishment storm with a fast, standard "busy" signal instead of collapsing (see Server Session Scalability for the underlying analysis). Clients react to that signal by backing off adaptively rather than retrying blindly. The primitives are built on System.Threading.RateLimiting, so the algorithm is pluggable and configurable through dependency injection.
Rate limiting is on by default with conservative limits sized so normal and bulk-but-well-behaved load is unaffected; only a storm is shed. Tune or disable it per deployment, or replace the whole limiter provider via DI.
Server side
What is limited
- Inbound connections (
opc.tcplistener): a per-second token bucket (with a burst) admits new connections; beyond the burst a connection is shed cheaply so the CPU-bound secure-channel handshake is protected. The listener socket backlog is configurable and defaults to 512 (raised from the previous hard-coded 10) so a burst of simultaneous connects is absorbed rather than dropped by the OS. - Session establishment (
CreateSession/ActivateSession): a concurrency limiter bounds the number of in-flight establishment operations so a connect storm cannot saturate every core and starve steady-state publish delivery. When at capacity the server returnsBadServerTooBusywith a retry-after hint in the fault, before doing the expensive certificate validation / signing. - Incomplete messages: one
ChunkReassemblyBudgetbounds retained intermediate-message buffers across the server's UA-TCP, Kestrel TCP, and UA Secure Conversation WebSocket listeners. This capacity limit is independent ofServerRateLimitOptions.Enabled.
Status codes
| Situation | Status code |
|---|---|
| Session establishment at capacity | BadServerTooBusy (transient — the client should back off and retry) |
Hard session cap reached (MaxSessionCount) |
BadTooManySessions |
| Connection shed at the listener | the connection is dropped; the client sees a transport error and, together with any subsequent BadServerTooBusy, backs off |
| Incomplete-message budget exhausted | BadTcpNotEnoughResources followed by channel closure; if the error cannot be sent, the client observes closure |
Configuration
The deterministic limits live in ServerRateLimitOptions:
| Option | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
Enabled |
true |
Master switch for all rate limiting. |
ListenBacklog |
512 | Listener socket pending-connection backlog. |
ConnectionRateLimitEnabled |
true |
Whether inbound connections are rate limited. |
ConnectionsPerSecond |
500 | Sustained connection admission rate. |
ConnectionBurst |
1000 | Connection burst capacity (token-bucket size). |
SessionRateLimitEnabled |
true |
Whether session establishment is limited. |
MaxConcurrentSessionEstablishment |
max(ProcessorCount * 8, 128) |
Concurrent in-flight CreateSession/ActivateSession. |
SessionEstablishmentQueueLimit |
0 | Waiters before rejecting with BadServerTooBusy (0 = reject immediately). |
Configure it through the DI hosting options:
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options =>
{
options.ApplicationName = "MyServer";
options.ConfigureRateLimits = limits =>
{
limits.ConnectionsPerSecond = 200;
limits.MaxConcurrentSessionEstablishment = 64;
};
});
To plug in a completely different algorithm, register a custom IServerRateLimiterProvider in DI (it takes precedence over ConfigureRateLimits):
services.AddSingleton<IServerRateLimiterProvider>(sp =>
new MyCustomRateLimiterProvider(...));
Without dependency injection, set the options or provider directly on the server before it starts:
var server = new StandardServer(telemetry);
server.RateLimitOptions = new ServerRateLimitOptions { ConnectionsPerSecond = 200 };
// or: server.RateLimiterProvider = new DefaultServerRateLimiterProvider(options);
Raw TCP, Kestrel TCP, and UACP WebSocket listeners consume the
IConnectionRateLimiter supplied through TransportListenerSettings, injected
by StandardServer.ConfigureTransportListenerSettings. A custom server can
override that hook to supply its own limiter. The default
TokenBucketConnectionRateLimiter wraps a System.Threading.RateLimiting.TokenBucketRateLimiter.
Kestrel and UACP WebSocket listeners also enforce their configured channel cap
across concurrent admissions and release capacity with the physical connection,
including reverse handoff. The raw listener retains its existing admission and
unused-channel reclamation behavior.
Incomplete messages
ChunkReassemblyBudget (Opc.Ua.Bindings) counts the backing-array length of
each retained intermediate chunk, including pool rounding and metadata. All
listeners of a server share the same budget. Completing, replacing, aborting,
faulting, or closing a partial message releases its reservation.
The budget applies only while messages await further chunks, not to the whole process heap, socket buffers, final chunks, decoded requests, or outgoing responses. A request that fits in one chunk can still be served while the reassembly budget is full. A chunk that exceeds available capacity is rejected without waiting; the partial message is discarded and its channel is closed.
The default is sixteen times TransportQuotas.MaxMessageSize, clamped to
64 MiB through 1 GiB, then raised if necessary to accommodate four maximum-sized
messages. A configuration with unlimited message size receives a 1 GiB budget.
Both the stack's 2 MiB and the reference server's 4 MiB message limits select
64 MiB. ChunkReassemblyBudget.GetDefaultMaxBytes(maxMessageSize) returns
this value, and ChunkReassemblyBudget.CreateDefault(configuration) creates a
budget from an EndpointConfiguration using the same sizing policy.
Channels without an activated session may reserve only while total usage stays
at or below MaxBytesWithoutSession, which defaults to half of MaxBytes.
Channels with activated sessions can use the remaining headroom. This is a
capacity policy, not an authentication boundary: an activated anonymous session
also qualifies. The two-argument constructor sets the sessionless threshold
explicitly, including the entire budget for sessionless workloads.
The threshold is not reserved space for new clients. For example, with a 100 MiB total and 50 MiB sessionless threshold, 60 MiB retained by activated sessions prevents further sessionless intermediate chunks. Single-chunk requests are still processed, but a large multi-chunk OpenSecureChannel, CreateSession, or ActivateSession may be refused until occupancy drops. Per-caller fairness and guaranteed bootstrap reservations require a separate isolation policy; the shared budget alone does not provide them.
Configure the hosted server through its fluent builder:
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options => options.ApplicationName = "MyServer")
.WithChunkReassemblyBudget(256L * 1024 * 1024);
For direct construction, assign the budget before startup:
var server = new StandardServer(telemetry)
{
ChunkReassemblyBudget = new ChunkReassemblyBudget(256L * 1024 * 1024)
};
The same instance can be shared by several servers. A host that opens listeners
itself passes it through TransportListenerSettings.ChunkReassemblyBudget;
otherwise each standalone listener creates its own appropriately sized budget.
For Dependency Injection (DI), the two-argument builder overload sets the
sessionless threshold and validates both limits immediately:
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options => options.ApplicationName = "MyServer")
.WithChunkReassemblyBudget(256L * 1024 * 1024, 64L * 1024 * 1024);
A directly constructed ChunkReassemblyBudget(maxBytes, maxBytesWithoutSession)
can also be registered as a singleton when several servers should share it.
Server channels also enforce a fixed assembly deadline using ChannelLifetime.
Continuation traffic cannot restart it. A shared quota/clock timer schedules
asynchronous cleanup independently of listener inactivity sweeps. Non-positive
lifetimes use the 30-second default for assembly, and expiration reports
BadTimeout before closure when possible; see
incomplete-message resource limits.
HTTPS / Kestrel transport
The HTTPS/WSS transport is Kestrel-hosted and can use the ASP.NET Core rate limiter middleware. Because that listener builds its own isolated web host, attach the limiter through the stack's DI with AddHttpsRateLimiter (net8+):
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddHttpsTransport()
.AddHttpsRateLimiter(); // default: global 100 req/s fixed window, rejects with HTTP 429
Pass an Action<RateLimiterOptions> to fully configure the limiter with any System.Threading.RateLimiting policy. This registers a contributor that calls services.AddRateLimiter(...) and app.UseRateLimiter() on the listener's isolated Kestrel host; rejected requests return HTTP 429.
Client side
A client that gets a "server busy" signal must not hammer the server with retries — that is exactly what amplifies a connect storm. The default ReconnectPolicy (used by ManagedSession) is server-signal-aware: when the previous attempt failed with an overload signal (BadServerTooBusy, BadTcpServerTooBusy, BadTooManySessions, BadTooManyOperations, BadTooManyPublishRequests, or a transient timeout) it backs off more aggressively (4× the computed delay, capped at MaxDelay) and honors a server-provided retry-after hint as a lower bound.
This is exposed through IReconnectPolicy.TryGetNextDelay, which adapts the backoff to the previous attempt's status code and any server-provided retry-after hint. The connection state machine calls it automatically; a policy that returns false opts out of adaptive behavior and the state machine falls back to the basic attempt-based GetNextDelay, so a minimal custom policy only has to implement the plain delay. Because a failed initial connect funnels into the same reconnect loop, the adaptive backoff applies to both initial connects and reconnects.
ReconnectPolicy.IsServerBusySignal(StatusCode) classifies whether a status code is an overload signal, for use in custom policies.
To keep a bulk connect from bursting, a client-wide connect admission gate ramps concurrent initial connects: ManagedSessionBuilder.WithConnectRateLimiter(maxConcurrency) (or a shared RateLimiter / IClientConnectGate) bounds how many ManagedSession.CreateAsync calls establish at once; the excess wait in an unbounded queue rather than being rejected, so many sessions to one server ramp up smoothly instead of stampeding. It is off by default; through DI use the ConnectRateLimiterMaxConcurrency client option.
Server backpressure signals
- Structured retry-after: the server carries a machine-readable retry-after to the client independently of diagnostics — as a
RetryAfterMsvalue inResponseHeader.additionalHeaderon aBadServerTooBusyServiceFault, and as the standard HTTPRetry-Afterheader on the HTTPS 429. The client honors both viaIReconnectPolicy.TryGetNextDelay. The UA-TCP client also honors aRetryAfterMs=Ntoken in a transient server-busyErrormessage reason as a lower bound on channel-reconnect backoff. The legacyRetryAfterMs=NAdditionalInfotoken remains a best-effort compatibility hint. See Server retry-after backpressure for how the client honors these signals during reconnect. - Load-based
Server.ServiceLevel: the reference server computesServer.ServiceLevelfrom session-establishment headroom (255 at low load, scaling toward a floor as sessions approachMaxSessionCount, with hysteresis), so a client can read/subscribe to it as a proactive capacity signal.
See also
- Server Session Scalability — the analysis motivating this work.
- Performance Benchmarks — the session-scalability load test.
- Sessions, Reconnection, and Subscription Engines —
ManagedSessionand reconnect architecture.