Files
UA-.NETStandard/docs/Transports.md
T
Marc SchierandCopilot 138086863b Fix audit findings and review regressions across the OPC UA stack (#4503)
## Scope

Audit fixes and review follow-ups across the OPC UA Core, Client,
Server, transport, and redundancy components. This includes implemented
Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 work; it does not claim that every item in
the 244-finding audit backlog is complete.

The review batch fixes mandatory full-key record protection and owned
plaintext buffers; transactional pending-certificate claims;
shared-channel nonce and certificate ownership; discovery and
token-policy validation; reconnect/callback ordering without changing
unbounded buffering defaults; server permissions, filters,
monitored-item lifetime, and alarm topology; historian paging,
retention, and annotations; atomic user/password metadata; and canonical
file identities with bounded alias and role refresh workers.

## Review-batch verification at `ab686ccae`

The following results come from fresh test builds using `dotnet test`,
`--no-restore`, `-m:1`, and an explicit `CustomTestTarget`. They replace
the earlier description's library-build/`--no-build` totals, which did
not establish the state of the merged test sources.

| Scope | Target | Passed | Skipped |
|---|---|---:|---:|
| Core review regressions | net10.0 | 827 | 0 |
| Client and lifecycle regressions | net10.0 | 630 | 0 |
| Server review regressions | net10.0 | 1970 | 0 |
| Redundancy Server / Client / PubSub | net10.0 | 276 / 10 / 11 | 0 |
| Sessions / file-and-alias / streaming / HTTPS-WSS integration |
net10.0 | 8 / 21 / 30 / 20 | 0 |
| Core review regressions | net48 | 786 | 39 |
| Client recovery and policy regressions | net48 | 54 | 0 |
| Server ownership, aliases, queues, and user-state regressions | net48
| 137 | 0 |

Every listed run exited successfully. The 39 net48 skips are existing
platform/capability cases. New key-agreement tests assert
unavailable-policy behavior on unsupported targets rather than adding
skips or pretending those targets performed an unsupported handshake.
Additional exact node/permission/filter/alarm checks passed 13 Core and
46 Server cases.

The PR-scoped formatter verification covers 26 projects and 389
non-generated C# files. A Roslyn syntax audit covers 53 changed
interfaces and 263 members, with no missing
parameter/type-parameter/return contracts and a 120-column limit for
their declarations and documentation. No full-solution,
all-target-framework, or NativeAOT matrix is claimed from these local
runs; the new CI run must establish its own result.

## CI follow-up at `e1bc3ac3b`

The follow-up fixes the failures reported by Azure build 18400. TLS
certificates retain configured DNS names, including mixed-case URI
schemes, without relaxing hostname validation. Reverse-WSS fixtures use
the DNS identity in the client certificate. Reconnect completion is
published only after cycle cleanup, so a subsequent reconnect cannot
join an old completed cycle and retain old certificates.

Certificate-alarm roots now support event subscriptions. The pump sample
has one continuous notifier path, with no duplicate shortcut. Historian
and aggregate fixtures share the provider's retention clock. Alarm
collection lets the server expire idle Publish requests rather than
canceling only the client wait. The corrected server, WoT, and
managed-session fixtures exercise valid requests and initialized
lifecycle contracts. Downlevel crypto tests preserve real credential and
key-ownership assertions without enabling unsupported raw-ECDH policies
or adding skips.

Fresh local evidence after integration includes:

| Scope | Target | Passed | Skipped |
|---|---|---:|---:|
| Client lifecycle / channel ownership / builder fixtures | net10.0 and
net48, each | 96 / 103 / 123 | 0 |
| Combined server lifecycle, events, aggregates, crypto, and contracts |
net48 | 358 | 0 |
| Full lifecycle plus certificate-alarm and aggregate fixtures | net10.0
| 116 | 0 |
| Final server-contract and history-routing delta | net10.0 and net48,
each | 84 | 0 |
| Subscription / XRegistry / WoT event regressions | net10.0 | 7 / 2 / 3
| 0 |
| Full Sessions project | net10.0 | 780 | 379 |
| Full ComplexTypes project / downlevel resolver fixtures | net10.0 /
net48 | 2854 / 15 | 0 |
| Full WoT project / downlevel structured-write fixtures | net10.0 /
net48 | 1496 / 27 | 0 |
| TLS domain-name regressions | net10.0 and net48, each | 21 | 0 |

All listed runs exited 0. The Sessions skips come from existing endpoint
and policy capability guards; they are not counted as passes. No skip
was added. Worker validation also covered full DI (426 passes), full
History (540 passes, 21 existing skips), 38 exact downlevel
event/history failures, and 60 repeated certificate-rotation race cases.
The final crypto fixtures passed 73 cases on each target with the
unchanged leak detector; a temporary premature-disposal mutation made
all three borrower tests fail and was then removed.

All 29 C# files in this follow-up pass included-file formatting at info
severity across 12 projects. The complete PR interface audit now covers
54 interfaces and 271 members with zero missing contracts or line-width
findings. No full-solution or NativeAOT matrix is claimed. New-head CI
has started and remains authoritative for the remote result.

## Test-result gate follow-up at `4b6e1203a`

Azure build 18401 reported the net48 Client job as successful despite a
test-host crash after only 264 passing tests. Its old evaluator counted
per-test failures but ignored the failed run verdict. This was a partial
run, not a benign exit after the suite had completed.

The shared result evaluator now rejects aborted, errored, incomplete,
malformed, or inconsistent TRX reports. Each file must describe a
completed run, so a passing file cannot mask another file's failure. It
retains support for completed runs followed by a benign nonzero host
exit, existing skipped-result conventions, and no-TRX MTP jobs.

All 78 regression cases pass after integration using Windows PowerShell
5.1. Real completed Sessions and Client reports also pass. The
process-test fixture follows the existing NET10_0-only tools-test
pattern; its net48 build is not counted as a test run. Formatting passes
for the added test file.

The Client host crash itself has not reproduced locally. The isolated
fixture passed 59 tests, and two fresh full fast-CI selections each
completed with 2,392 passes and three existing skips, including a run
with crash collection enabled. The CI merge tree is identical to the
tested source tree. No speculative runtime change was made, and the
original partial CI run is not claimed as a full-suite pass. Azure build
18402 has now completed the full net48 Client run: 2,392 passed, three
existing console skips, and a successful test-host exit. The corrected
evaluator independently validated outcome=Completed. Across the matrix,
119 test-project jobs succeeded; Sessions net10.0 was canceled when the
remote provider deprovisioned its runner, so the overall Azure pipeline
was canceled. That cancellation is not claimed as a code failure or a
successful run. CodeQL and three Docker image jobs were still running at
the latest check. The migration discovery failure remains separate.

## Documentation follow-up at `57ed02bea`

The environment blocker has been removed by the maintainer. The three
bundled migration references now exactly match the canonical documents
after deterministic link rewriting; all 15 bundled documents pass
`validate-migration-plugin.ps1`. The canonical migration prose was not
rewritten. `FileSystemClient.md` now documents that extended Windows
roots preserve literal trailing-dot names, completing the filesystem
review follow-up.

The filesystem thread has been replied to and resolved after
publication. The review pass now has 108 of 110 threads resolved. The
two explanation-only threads remain open as requested; no unfinished
change request is being represented as resolved.

## Cross-platform follow-up at `0d9d936a8`

With migration discovery restored, the Linux and macOS test matrix
exposed two stale durable-subscription expectations. The expected value
83,442 encoded the old 32-bit overflow when converting 3,600 hours to
milliseconds. The existing overflow-safe server correctly returns
14,400,000 lifetime intervals at a 900 ms publishing interval. Only
those two expected constants changed; production behavior,
negotiated-hour checks, and all other assertions remain unchanged.

The exact local lifetime selection reproduced both failures before the
correction. The full durable suite now passes 36 cases with 11 existing
skips on each of net10.0 and net48. All four lifetime cases executed and
passed on both targets, and included-file info-severity formatting
passes.

## Session shutdown follow-up at `8daf7f091`

A late net48 Sessions failure exposed a shutdown race. Canceling an
in-flight keepalive read can produce a transport
`ServiceResultException`. The retiring worker treated its own
cancellation as proof that the peer was unavailable, so `CloseAsync` or
`DisposeAsync` could skip the server-side `CloseSession` request. The
worker now ignores that service error only when its own token is
canceled; genuine peer errors still update liveness.

The full integration fixture reproduced the original error-code
mismatch. Four deterministic mock-transport cases then produced three
failures and one passing genuine-error control before the fix. They
verify successful close, returned server error, asynchronous disposal,
and unchanged behavior for a real keepalive failure. Fresh related runs
pass 75 client and 101 integration cases on each of net48 and net10.0,
with no skips. Ten repetitions of the formerly flaky full net48 fixture
pass all 1,010 cases. All three changed files pass info-severity
formatting, and temporary diagnostic instrumentation was removed.

## Atomic listener snapshot follow-up at `82dc22b5d`

Ubuntu Core CI exposed an unsafe formatter rewrite in TCP listener
disposal: `ConcurrentDictionary.ToArray()` had become a collection
spread. A concurrent channel removal between the spread's count and copy
operations could leave a default entry, causing a null dereference
during disposal. The listener now uses the dictionary's atomic `Values`
snapshot and disposes those channels outside the listener lock.

Deterministic regressions close zero, one, or all channels at the copy
boundary. Before the fix, the one/all-removal cases reproduced the exact
null dereference; the unchanged-count control passed. All 23
admission/listener cases now pass on net10.0 and net48, and the full
fast Core net10.0 suite passes 5,267 cases with 88 existing platform
skips. Both changed files pass info-severity formatting. A bounded audit
of the formatter's other snapshot rewrites found no further verified
unsafe concurrent-registry copies.

## Shutdown-test observation follow-up at `58403ee8b`

The net48 shutdown-order test raced its own observation: it read
`m_publishWorkerTask` after starting shutdown, which can legitimately
drain the worker and clear that field immediately. The test now captures
the worker before shutdown starts and confirms it is initially running.
It still requires the worker to finish while shutdown remains blocked by
the held manager semaphore. Production behavior is unchanged.

A temporary scheduling perturbation reproduced the exact null-field
failure. The corrected capture passed 100 perturbed iterations; both the
temporary repeat and yield were then removed. The final 126
subscription/lifecycle cases pass on each of net48 and net10.0, and
formatting passes. A complete local Sessions net10.0 run also passed 780
cases with 379 existing capability skips in 7m20s after the earlier
keepalive correction.

## Retirement and alias-startup follow-up at `1a048ff39`

The shadow-generation test now observes its documented asynchronous
cleanup through the existing bounded helper. Removing the replacement
does not join a background drain that already claimed the retired
generation. The test still checks live-registration removal immediately
and requires the old node to disappear; no timeout or production
lifecycle behavior changed. All 81 lifecycle cases pass on each of
net10.0 and net48.

Initial alias-node materialization now retries one timed-out, read-only
snapshot query before creating nodes for that root. The retry is logged
through source-generated logging. Each query retains the original shared
100 ms deadline; repeated timeouts, other errors, and cancellation still
abort startup. Client searches and live refresh do not gain this
immediate retry. Fault-injection tests cover success after one timeout,
a persistent timeout, a different store failure, and cancellation. All
187 related alias/hosting cases and the original certificate-rotation
integration case pass on each target; the positive test records exactly
one retry warning. The alias documentation now accurately describes the
shared request budget.

All changed C# files pass formatter checks, and the complete
54-interface/271-member documentation audit passes. Fresh CI is running
on `1a048ff39`; the previous completed matrix exposed only the two
failures corrected in this batch and their dependent summaries.

## Sample endpoint allocation follow-up at `d08a94925`

The strong-cluster test harness allocated OPC UA and Raft endpoints in
separate released-port batches. Uniqueness was enforced only inside each
batch, so the same OS-assigned port could appear in both protocol
groups. The harness now requests one distinct batch for both groups and
splits it before launching any replicas.

Deterministic one- and three-replica allocation cases reproduced
overlapping groups with the old plan and pass with the corrected plan.
The complete 17-case short-haul sample suite passes without skips; all
failover, historian-continuation, and service assertions remain
unchanged. Both changed files pass info-severity formatting. This
prevents intra-cluster self-collisions but does not claim to reserve
released ports against unrelated external processes.

## Code-review follow-up at `085fd9636`

A review of the complete branch diff found five defects this PR
introduced. All are now fixed, each in its own commit.

`RelatedTo`'s recursive-to-iterative rewrite defaulted the optional
`includeTypeDefinitionSubtypes` and `includeReferenceTypeSubtypes`
operands to `false`. Part 4 §7.7.4 specifies both default to `true`, so
a filter that omitted them silently stopped matching subtypes.
Dynamically created key-credential nodes derived their namespace from
the containing folder, which is the standard `i=18155` node in namespace
0 — the namespace reserved for the OPC UA standard address space; they
now resolve the server-owned namespace and fail with `BadInternalError`
rather than guessing index 1. The retained audience-less
`CreateTokenData` overload produced tokens that verification always
rejects, so it is now `[Obsolete]` and throws instead. A failed
reference to a remote parent left the new node registered with a
one-sided inverse reference, and is now rolled back. An existing `.pfx`
is restricted before it is rewritten, rather than after its new key
bytes are on disk.

One further reported finding was rejected after investigation.
`JwksIssuerKeyResolver` deliberately does not dispose retired key
snapshots: `RetiredKeysAreCollectibleWhileResolverRemainsAliveAsync`
proves the resolver retains no retired snapshot, and
`ReturnedKeysSurviveRepeatedRefreshAndResolverDisposalAsync` requires
already-returned keys to keep verifying across refreshes and resolver
disposal. Adding disposal would have broken that tested contract, so the
exploratory change was reverted.

Validated on net10.0 and net48: 256 Core and 633 Server cases pass, with
one pre-existing net48 skip. The build reports zero compiler and
analyzer diagnostics, all eight included-file info-format checks pass,
the contract audit covers 58 interfaces and 310 members with no
findings, and the 15 bundled migration documents validate. All 122
review threads are resolved; the key-credential namespace thread was
reopened to retract an earlier incorrect answer and then resolved
against the real fix.
## Review-body follow-up at `da0d59cfb`

The re-review at `8daf7f091 + 82dc22b5d` listed four items in its
summary that had no inline thread of their own, so they had not been
picked up. All four are now fixed.

Both event-dispatch permission gates had been tightened from not-Bad to
`IsGood`, which silently dropped events whose permission verdict is
Uncertain; the data-change path in the same file still treated Uncertain
as deliverable, so the two had diverged. `EventSourceRegistry` only
cleared `ConsecutiveFailures` when a source was deactivated, so a source
that had backed off to the 30-second cap kept that delay for the rest of
the process even after starting successfully.
`UserNameIdentityTokenHandler` built a temporary issuer chain whose
`Add` calls take independent certificate references, and never released
them.

The fourth was the receiver-side sequence rollover, which the reviewer
had correctly re-flagged as still open despite its thread being
resolved. `m_sequenceRollover` was set permanently, so the second legal
wrap on a long-lived channel was rejected and faulted the channel along
with the transport-reconnect OPN. OPC 10000-6 does not cap a
SecureChannel at one wrap. The flag is now cleared once an accepted
number has traversed the normal range, which keeps rejecting a replayed
low number that never left the rollover window.

Validated on net10.0 and net48: 636 / 593 Core cases and 135 / 134
Server cases pass, including the new
`UaSCBinaryChannelSequenceRolloverTests` and the Uncertain-permission
delivery cases. The build reports zero compiler and analyzer diagnostics
and the changed files pass included-file info-format checks on both
targets.

The previous head `085fd9636` was fully green: 279 checks passed and
Azure build 18414 succeeded with 137 of 137 jobs, after the platform
automatically retried a job whose NuGet tool download had hit a
transient TLS error.
## Reported issues #4508 and #4509 at `6ad1ecf16`

**#4508 (V2 subscription recreate deadlocks against a faulted transport)
was not yet fixed and is now closed by `bac260a06`.** Both drain sites
the report identifies were still unbounded. A publish worker that
started its request before the quiesce parks inside the service call on
the channel ready gate while holding an active publish request; the
recreate that would make the channel ready is the very operation
awaiting the drain, so the wait never ends.

The drain now cancels in-flight attempts through a per-attempt token
linked to the worker token. An aborted worker rolls its acknowledgements
back, releases the request and returns to the paused park instead of
terminating, so it resumes when the caller leaves the quiesce. Publish
ingress stays quiesced for the caller's operation, so
`DropPendingForSubscription` keeps the guarantee the report asks to
preserve and no blind timeout is added. The new regression parks a
worker on a cancellable gate that never completes on its own: it
reproduces the hang for the full 30-second budget before the change and
passes after it.

**#4509 (identity provider fails the initial connect) was already fixed
for its primary symptom.** `HandleConnectAsync` materializes the
provider's identity through `CreateIdentitySelectionContext` before the
first `CreateAsync`, so Anonymous is no longer substituted against a
UserName-only endpoint. `6ad1ecf16` adds the two remaining details from
the report: the enabled-policy set now includes the negotiated channel
policy, so a client cannot reject the policy it already accepted as
`NotEnabledByClient`; and when discovery has not populated the
endpoint's token policies the connect keeps the configured identity so
the attempt fails at the transport layer for the reconnect policy to
retry, instead of failing at the identity layer.

Validated on net10.0 and net48: 477 / 473 client session and
subscription cases pass, the build is free of compiler and analyzer
diagnostics, and the changed files pass included-file info-format checks
on both targets. The full `Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` suite also passes
locally on net10.0 with 782 passed and 379 pre-existing capability
skips.

GitHub checks are green on this head: Build and Test .NET 10.0, Docker
Sample Images CI, and NuGet Publish all succeeded. Azure build 18417
completed 134 of its 135 jobs successfully; its net10.0 Sessions job was
cancelled by the hosted-agent provider ("Received request to
deprovision"), the same infrastructure flake that hit build 18409
earlier on a head predating these changes. That job is not claimed as
passing, and the local full-suite run above covers the same project. The
previous head `da0d59cfb` completed Azure build 18415 with every job
succeeded.
## Review follow-up at `a08f0c12b`

Eleven new review threads arrived, nearly all documentation. Before
acting on each "this is new in 2.0" remark I checked the API against
`master378` rather than assuming, because a genuine 1.5 API still needs
its migration entry.

`ManagedSession`'s server-redundancy refresh had two hard-coded
two-second bounds. The new `ServerRedundancyOptions` exposes
`RefreshTimeout` for the metadata read and `PeerDiscoveryTimeout` for
each peer lookup, defaults both to the previous two seconds, validates
that a bound is positive or `Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan`, and flows
through `ManagedSessionOptions`, `ManagedSession.CreateAsync`, the
fluent builder, and `DefaultServerRedundancyHandler`.

`AsyncCustomNodeManager` and `KeyCredentialBridgeAuthenticator` are both
absent from `master378`, so their obsolete members had no compatibility
constraint and are removed rather than carried:
`AsyncCustomNodeManager.ReadInitialValue`, the audience-less
`CreateTokenData` that only threw, and the audience-less `CreateProof`
that produced a proof no server accepts.
`CustomNodeManager2.ReadInitialValue` and the `MonitoredNode2` migration
section are genuine 1.5 APIs and are untouched.

The documentation now states master's behaviour instead of the delta
from 1.5.378, with each moved item already covered under
`docs/migrate/2.0.x/`. `IHistorianAnnotationProvider` is described by
its annotation-time key rather than as "legacy" — it is new in 2.0, so
the label implied a compatibility constraint that does not exist. The
KeyCredential bridge payload's `"version"` field is explained as a
vendor-extension format version with no OPC UA counterpart, and its
version-1 upgrade narrative is gone. `CertificateManager.md`'s migration
walkthrough is replaced by the resolver API it targets.
`NodeManagers.md`, `Sessions.md`, `AsyncServerSupport.md`,
`Certificates.md`, and `Profiles.md` no longer announce features
relative to 1.5. `Benchmarks.md`, `WhatsNewIn2.0.md`,
`DeveloperGuide.md`, and `docs/migrate/` keep their 1.5.378 references,
which are their subject.

CI then exposed a defect this batch introduced: five fixtures resolve
`ManagedSession`'s private constructor by its exact positional parameter
types, so the added parameter compiled cleanly but made `GetConstructor`
return `null` at run time. `7df1d5c40` updates every site;
`Redundancy.Client` passes 126 of 126 and the affected client fixtures
112 of 112.

The BouncyCastle question is answered and tracked in #4510:
`Opc.Ua.Core` already project-references `Opc.Ua.Security.Certificates`,
which already carries the conditional BouncyCastle reference, so the
raw-ECDH polyfill belongs there rather than as a new Core dependency.
The `IUserDatabase` metadata question is addressed to another maintainer
and is deliberately left open.

## Reported issue #4509 follow-up at `5d4d13d63`

The reporter verified `6ad1ecf16` and found one case still failing,
correctly. The empty-token-policies branch kept the configured identity
so a server that is down surfaces a transport failure rather than an
identity error. A provider-only configuration has no configured
identity, so it kept `null`: `OpenCoreAsync` turned that into Anonymous
and `OpenValidateIdentity` rejected it with `BadIdentityTokenInvalid`,
silently ignoring the configured provider.

The branch now requires a configured identity to defer to. Without one
the provider is consulted, so its own `BadIdentityTokenRejected` names
the offered and rejected policy set instead. Two regression tests cover
both configurations; the first fails against the previous behaviour by
reaching the session factory with a `null` identity, which is the exact
step that produced the reported error. That branch had shipped without a
test, which is why the case was missed.

## Review and CI status at `5d4d13d63`

**All actionable review threads are resolved: 132 of 133.** The single
open thread is a question the reviewer addressed to another maintainer
about moving user metadata into `IUserDatabase`; it is left open for
them rather than resolved silently. Every resolved thread carries a
reply naming its fix commit.

**Latest-head CI is green on `5d4d13d63`: 279 checks passed, zero
failed, zero pending**, with one conditional signed-package publishing
job skipped. Local validation for this batch: the full
`Opc.Ua.Client.Tests` suite passes 2,430 of 2,430 on net10.0,
`Opc.Ua.Redundancy.Client.Tests` 126 of 126, and `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests`
590 of 590 for the affected selections. Both net10.0 and net48 build
clean for `Opc.Ua.Client`, `Opc.Ua.Server`, and the changed test
projects, and all changed files pass included-file info-severity
formatting on both targets.

The PR remains open; no merge was performed. As stated at the top, this
does not claim that every item in the 244-finding audit backlog is
complete.
## Latest CI follow-up at `b6f2dfa43`

Azure build 18442 exposed a net48 compile regression in the Kafka
adapter: `RuntimeHelpers.GetUninitializedObject` is unavailable on .NET
Framework. Commit `2cf1e0eed` now uses normal `ProducerMessage`
construction on `NETFRAMEWORK` while retaining reflection-based
construction for modern targets that can load a different Dekaf runtime
asset. The exact net48 CI selection passes 92 of 92 tests, and the
netstandard2.1 adapter guard selection passes 11 of 11.

After merging the latest `master`, GitHub Actions run 35643592139 is
green. The initial Ubuntu Core.Schema job built successfully and passed
160 of 160 tests, then hit an external 403 while finalizing its
test-result artifact; its failed-job rerun completed successfully. Azure
build 18451 was canceled when its remote provider deprovisioned the
net10.0 Sessions runner (`Received request to deprovision: The request
was cancelled by the remote provider`). Azure attached no test task log
or source error, and the canceled parent left that child check stale as
in-progress. No source workaround, test skip, or check relaxation was
made for either infrastructure failure.

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot-Session: 68f26810-22b8-476f-abcd-0a8c82d6e208
2026-09-22 09:10:58 +02:00

25 KiB

Transport Profiles

This document is the practical companion to Profiles.md and describes how the OPC UA .NET Standard stack ships each of the transport profiles defined in OPC UA Part 6 §7. It is aimed at developers who need to host or connect to OPC UA servers over something other than the default opc.tcp:// transport — for example to traverse firewalls or to integrate with web-based tooling.

Transport profile matrix

Profile URL scheme Wire format UA Secure Conversation Security modes
uatcp-uasc-uabinary opc.tcp:// UA Binary yes None, Sign, SignAndEncrypt
https-uabinary opc.https://, https:// UA Binary in HTTP body (application/octet-stream) yes (one chunk per POST) None, Sign, SignAndEncrypt
https-uajson opc.https://, https:// UA JSON in HTTP body (application/opcua+uajson) no — TLS only None only
https-uajson-openapi opc.https://, https:// OpenAPI Mapping (Part 6 §G.3): per-service POST /<service> with body = <Service>Request JSON (application/json; encoding=compact|verbose) no — TLS only None only
wss-uasc-uabinary opc.wss://, wss:// UA Binary in WebSocket binary frame (sub-protocol opcua+uacp) yes None, Sign, SignAndEncrypt
wss-uajson opc.wss://, wss:// UA JSON in WebSocket text frame (sub-protocol opcua+uajson) no — TLS only None only
wss-uajson-openapi opc.wss://, wss:// OpenAPI Mapping over WebSocket text frame (sub-protocol opcua+openapi / opcua+openapi+<accesstoken>) no — TLS only None only

The JSON / OpenAPI profiles do not negotiate a UA SecureChannel; transport security is provided exclusively by the surrounding TLS connection. Servers MUST advertise these endpoints with MessageSecurityMode.None and SecurityPolicyUri = None. The https-uajson and WSS JSON profiles use the Compact (reversible) flavour mandated by Part 6 §5.4.9 (JsonEncoderOptions.Compact). The OpenAPI profiles select between Compact (default, mandatory) and Verbose via the application/json; encoding=compact|verbose media-type parameter on Content-Type / Accept — see WebApi.md for the full mapping table.

The OPC UA Profiles surface exposes the two OpenAPI profile URIs as Profiles.HttpsOpenApiTransport (profile/2338) and Profiles.WssOpenApiTransport (profile/2339); the HttpsServiceHost emits the HTTPS twin as a discovery-only EndpointDescription alongside each SecurityMode.None HTTPS-binary endpoint so discovery clients see the OpenAPI route without hard-coding the URL.

Discovery retains binary, JSON and OpenAPI endpoints even when their URL and security settings are identical. GetEndpoints profile filters select only the requested profiles, including when translating an alternate hostname. Managed client channels likewise include the effective transport profile in their sharing key: equal URLs do not allow different wire encodings to share an underlying channel.

The managed channel manager retains its own client certificate and chain. Open attempts borrow independent snapshots, and each installed transport has separate references until it is closed. Closing or rotating one channel does not retire keys still used by another channel or an in-flight open. Managed sessions prefer the active certificate registry over an older configured store entry; unmanaged sessions retain explicit configured-store selection. A session opened on a managed transport uses that transport's owned certificate snapshot, including during recreation after rotation; a later registry update cannot substitute a different key into that handshake. Reconnects recheck certificate generations before reactivating sessions and reporting readiness. Publishing identical certificate/issuer material does not force another transport replacement; a changed issuer chain still does. Rotation that supersedes successful work does not consume the failed-attempt retry allowance. Reconnect time budgets and shutdown cancellation still apply.

UA-TCP reconnect hands the new connection to the retained channel without closing it when the temporary handshake channel is retired. ECC and RSA-DH handoffs move the owned ephemeral nonce objects, including the private key; public nonce bytes cannot reconstruct them. The retained token's secret is used when deriving the replacement keys. Continued sequence numbers are checked against the retained channel, not treated as a new secure channel. A rejected or failed handoff closes the new connection and releases its unadopted token rather than restarting an orphaned receive loop. The peer certificate remains available through failure auditing. Receive loops have separate cancellation lifetimes; a retiring connection cannot stop its replacement. Connection admission reserves capacity before invoking channel callbacks, retires idle channels outside the listener lock, and closes rejected sockets. Invalid response sequences fail pending requests promptly with BadSecurityChecksFailed; diagnostics retain BadSequenceNumberInvalid.

Assembly layout

  • Opc.Ua.Core (this is what every Server / Client application references):
    • IUaSCByteTransport — the runtime transport boundary used by the UA Secure Conversation channel pipeline.
    • TcpByteTransport, TcpByteTransportFactory — TCP implementation.
    • TcpTransportChannel + TcpTransportChannelFactory — client-side channel for opc.tcp://.
    • HttpsTransportChannel + HttpsTransportChannelFactory, OpcHttpsTransportChannelFactory — polymorphic client-side channel that handles both https-uabinary and https-uajson based on the endpoint's TransportProfileUri.
  • Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https (Kestrel-dependent; pulled in automatically when an HTTPS or WSS endpoint is configured):
    • HttpsTransportListener — Kestrel-hosted listener that dispatches requests on (Upgrade, ContentType) to the binary / JSON / WSS handlers.
    • HttpsTransportListenerFactory, OpcHttpsTransportListenerFactory — listener factories for https:// and opc.https://.
    • WssTransportListenerFactory, OpcWssTransportListenerFactory — listener factories for wss:// and opc.wss://.
    • WebSocketClientByteTransport + WebSocketClientByteTransportFactory, WssTransportChannel, WssTransportChannelFactory, OpcWssTransportChannelFactory — client-side WSS+uacp.
    • WssJsonTransportChannel, WssJsonTransportChannelFactory — client-side WSS+uajson (per-request ClientWebSocket).
    • JsonRequestMapper — shared JSON encode / decode helper used by both server handlers.

For both WSS variants the HTTPS / WSS factories live in Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https; consumers register them via the AddHttpsTransport() / AddWssTransport() DI extensions on IOpcUaBuilder or a specialized server builder, or by constructing a DefaultTransportBindingRegistry and calling RegisterListenerFactory / RegisterChannelFactory directly for non-DI hosts. Applications must reference OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https directly; Server and GDS packages do not pull the optional binding transitively.

AddHttpsTransport(options => ...) is available as a one-shot registration for the Kestrel HTTPS stack. It registers HTTPS and WSS by default and can attach the WebApi binding and authentication callbacks in the same fluent chain. AddWebApiTransport() and AddKestrelOpcTcpTransport() are order-independent with the underlying HTTPS/TCP registrations.

Server-side configuration

Servers declare endpoints via ApplicationConfiguration → ServerConfiguration → BaseAddresses. Each base address yields a single listener for its scheme. If a discovery or hosted server has a non-TCP base address but the matching transport binding has not been registered, startup throws a clear error that names the missing scheme and suggested Add*Transport() method.

<BaseAddresses>
  <ua:String>opc.tcp://localhost:62541/MyServer</ua:String>
  <ua:String>opc.https://localhost:62540/MyServer</ua:String>
  <ua:String>opc.wss://localhost:62543/MyServer</ua:String>
</BaseAddresses>
  • The opc.tcp listener uses the lightweight raw-socket TcpTransportListener by default (no ASP.NET Core dependency). An opt-in alternative shipped in Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https (net8.0+) is described below.
  • The opc.https and opc.wss listeners both share a single HttpsTransportListener per (host, port) — Kestrel routes the inbound HTTP request to the right handler based on the Upgrade / Content-Type headers. Concretely:
    • POST with Content-Type: application/octet-stream → https-uabinary handler.
    • POST with Content-Type: application/opcua+uajson → https-uajson handler.
    • HTTP Upgrade with Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: opcua+uacp → full UASC WebSocket session.
    • HTTP Upgrade with Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: opcua+uajson → request/response JSON WebSocket session.

Security configuration

The HTTPS and WSS listeners share the same TLS configuration via HttpsConnectionAdapterOptions. By default the listener serves SecurityMode.None; setting ServerConfiguration.HttpsMutualTls = true requires the client to present a TLS certificate which is matched against the ClientCertificate field of the UASC OpenSecureChannelRequest.

The JSON sub-profiles (https-uajson and the WSS opcua+uajson sub-protocol) only accept SecurityMode.None regardless of the configured security policies — see Part 6 §7.4.5 / §7.5.2 for the spec rationale.

All HTTPS and WSS client bindings, including WebApi, require the TLS certificate to match the endpoint hostname before invoking a configured OPC UA certificate validator. Trusting a certificate or its issuer does not bypass hostname verification. This also applies to TLS-only JSON bindings.

All HTTP, WebSocket and WebApi dispatch paths forward the observed remote IP address for authentication lockout accounting. Unsecured clients cannot reset that bucket by opening a new connection or changing their ApplicationUri. When a transport cannot supply a peer address, the fallback bucket is session-local, never shared by every client of a listener.

Client-side usage

The client API is the standard Session + EndpointDescription flow; the transport is selected automatically from EndpointDescription.TransportProfileUri:

ITelemetryContext telemetry = NUnitTelemetryContext.Create();
var application = new ApplicationInstance(telemetry)
{
    ApplicationName = "MyClient",
    ApplicationType = ApplicationType.Client
};
ApplicationConfiguration configuration = await application
    .Build("urn:localhost:MyClient", "urn:localhost:product")
    .AsClient()
    .AddSecurityConfiguration("CN=MyClient")
    .Create()
    .ConfigureAwait(false);

// 1) Direct connect to a known opc.wss endpoint (binary UASC):
EndpointDescription wssEndpoint = CoreClientUtils.SelectEndpoint(
    application,
    "opc.wss://server.example.com:62543/MyServer",
    useSecurity: true);
ISession session = await Session.CreateAsync(
    configuration, new ConfiguredEndpoint(null, wssEndpoint), false,
    "WssSession", 60_000, null, null).ConfigureAwait(false);

// 2) HTTPS-JSON endpoint (Security Mode None):
var jsonEndpoint = new EndpointDescription
{
    EndpointUrl = "opc.https://server.example.com:62540/MyServer",
    SecurityMode = MessageSecurityMode.None,
    SecurityPolicyUri = SecurityPolicies.None,
    TransportProfileUri = Profiles.HttpsJsonTransport
};
ISession jsonSession = await Session.CreateAsync(
    configuration, new ConfiguredEndpoint(null, jsonEndpoint), false,
    "JsonSession", 60_000, null, null).ConfigureAwait(false);

A few notes:

  • The opc.wss:// scheme is the OPC UA alias; the stack normalises it to wss:// (the IETF scheme) and falls back to Utils.UaWebSocketsDefaultPort (4843) when no explicit port is supplied.
  • The WSS client requires the server to select the requested WebSocket sub-protocol. If the server returns anything else the connection fails with BadNotConnected.
  • The WSS-JSON client opens a fresh ClientWebSocket per request (simplest correct behaviour). A pooled / persistent-WebSocket variant can be added without changing the public shape.
  • The HTTPS client (binary or JSON) reuses a single HttpClient per channel; the encoding is selected from EndpointDescription.TransportProfileUri at request time.

HTTPS binary, JSON, and OpenAPI clients obtain response headers before buffering the body. A positive MaxMessageSize limits the actual body bytes, including chunked responses or misleading Content-Length values. An oversized response fails with BadResponseTooLarge; the reader consumes at most one byte beyond the limit to detect the overflow. HTTP error responses are disposed without buffering their bodies.

The request deadline and caller cancellation remain active while the response body is being read. The binary/JSON transport reports socket connection failures as BadNotConnected, socket or request timeouts as BadRequestTimeout, and other HTTP failures as BadUnknownResponse, while preserving the original exception for diagnostics. HTTP 429/503 retain their BadServerTooBusy and Retry-After handling.

Discovery

GetEndpoints and FindServers return the EndpointDescription list declared by the listener for each base address. For TCP, HTTPS-binary, and WSS+uacp the description includes the correct TransportProfileUri (uatcp-uasc-uabinary, https-uabinary, wss-uasc-uabinary respectively). The JSON sub-protocols are reachable on the same URL as their binary counterparts and clients select them explicitly via the Content-Type header (HTTPS) or the Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header (WSS). The HTTPS / WSS service hosts also emit a discovery-only JSON-twin EndpointDescription (TransportProfileUri = Profiles.HttpsJsonTransport / Profiles.UaWssJsonTransport, SecurityMode = None) for every SecurityMode = None binary endpoint, so JSON-aware clients see the profile in GetEndpoints without needing to construct the description themselves. The twin is discovery-only (no separate listener) — the existing binary listener handles content negotiation.

Opt-in: Kestrel-hosted opc.tcp

By default the stack ships two listener implementations for opc.tcp://:

Package Listener When to use
Opc.Ua.Core (default) TcpTransportListener Raw Socket + SocketAsyncEventArgs. No ASP.NET Core dependency. The right choice for trimmed / AOT deployments and for environments that already avoid pulling in Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.
Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https (opt-in, net8.0+) KestrelTcpTransportListener Hosts opc.tcp:// on Kestrel via Microsoft.AspNetCore.Connections.ConnectionHandler. Lets a single IHost serve opc.tcp, opc.https, and opc.wss so consumers manage one HTTP-style runtime, share TLS plumbing, and share observability middleware.

The Kestrel-TCP listener uses the same IUaSCByteTransport runtime boundary as the raw-socket listener, so the UASC channel pipeline is unchanged. It supports the full feature set the raw-socket listener does, including:

  • forward (server) and reverse-connect listener modes,
  • per-listener TLS certificate hot-update via ITransportListenerCertificateRotation,
  • discovery (EndpointDescription emission via the shared TcpServiceHost base).

Swap it in by registering the factory through the DI container before opening any opc.tcp listener (typically at application startup):

// Standalone non-DI consumers:
DefaultTransportBindingRegistry registry =
    DefaultTransportBindingRegistry.WithDefaultTcp();
registry.RegisterListenerFactory(new KestrelTcpTransportListenerFactory());
// Pass to ServerBase (via ctor / TransportBindings setter) before StartAsync.

// Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection consumers:
services
    .AddOpcUa()
    .AddOpcTcpTransport()           // raw-socket opc.tcp default
    .AddKestrelOpcTcpTransport();   // last-writer-wins: overrides with Kestrel

AddKestrelOpcTcpTransport() installs an ITransportBindingConfigurator that runs after AddOpcTcpTransport(), so the registry resolves the Kestrel listener factory for opc.tcp://. The same pattern applies to AddHttpsTransport() / AddWssTransport() (HTTPS / WSS) and any custom binding registered via AddCustomTransport<TListener, TChannel>().

AddOpcTcpTransport() is optional. AddOpcUa() already seeds the mandatory raw-socket opc.tcp listener and channel factories into the transport binding registry, so clients and servers reach opc.tcp:// without it. Call it only to be explicit; the Add*Transport() extensions above still override the seeded defaults (last-writer-wins per URI scheme) whether or not it was called.

The package targets net8.0+ only (the ASP.NET Core ConnectionContext API surface used to bridge Socket-like semantics — LocalEndPoint, RemoteEndPoint, ConnectionClosed — is not consistently available on older TFMs). Consumers on net472 / netstandard2.x continue to use the raw-socket default.

Implementing a custom byte transport

The OPC UA Secure Conversation (UASC) binary channel pipeline talks to the wire through a narrow byte-level abstraction — IUaSCByteTransport. It is the public extension point for plugging in custom transports beyond the built-in TCP and WebSocket implementations.

When you need this

Use cases that are good fits for a custom byte transport:

  • Named pipes / Unix domain sockets for fast loopback IPC.
  • QUIC / HTTP/3 to replace the TCP transport's congestion behaviour.
  • In-process bridges for unit tests or co-located server/client pairs that want to skip the network stack entirely.
  • Tunnels (SSH, custom L4) that wrap the UASC chunks in another framing.

Use cases that should NOT use this:

  • A new sub-protocol that changes UASC framing — that lives inside the channel implementation, not the transport.
  • HTTPS-binary or HTTPS-JSON variants — those are handled in Opc.Ua.Bindings.Https outside the UASC pipeline.

Contract summary

public interface IUaSCByteTransport
{
    string Implementation { get; }                  // diagnostic id
    TransportChannelFeatures Features { get; }      // optional capabilities
    EndPoint? LocalEndpoint { get; }                // may be null
    EndPoint? RemoteEndpoint { get; }               // may be null

    ValueTask ConnectAsync(Uri url, CancellationToken ct);
    ValueTask SendChunkAsync(ReadOnlyMemory<byte> chunk, CancellationToken ct);
    ValueTask SendChunkAsync(BufferCollection buffers, CancellationToken ct);
    ValueTask<ArraySegment<byte>> ReceiveChunkAsync(CancellationToken ct);
    void Close();
}

public interface IUaSCByteTransportFactory
{
    string Implementation { get; }
    IUaSCByteTransport Create(
        BufferManager bufferManager,
        int receiveBufferSize,
        ITelemetryContext telemetry);
}

Each Send / Receive operates on exactly one complete UASC MessageChunk (Part 6 §6.7.2). The channel pipeline above the transport owns chunk-level framing — your job is to move chunk bytes across the wire.

Implementation checklist

  • Buffer ownership. Buffers returned by ReceiveChunkAsync are rented from the supplied BufferManager; the caller (the UASC channel) returns them via BufferManager.ReturnBuffer once the chunk has been processed. Do not pool or reuse the same array across receives.
  • Idempotent Close. The channel may dispose a transport from multiple paths (normal shutdown, fatal error, channel-state race); every implementation MUST treat Close() as a no-op when already closed.
  • Cancellation. ReceiveChunkAsync should observe the cancellation token while awaiting peer data — long-lived sessions rely on this to tear down cleanly.
  • Error mapping. Map transport-layer errors to ServiceResultException with the matching StatusCodes.BadXxx (BadConnectionClosed, BadTcpMessageTypeInvalid, BadTcpMessageTooLarge, …) so the channel can route them through normal UA fault paths.
  • Vectored Send. The BufferCollection overload is called by the channel for chunks that span multiple buffers (typical for the asymmetric handshake). If your transport does not support vectored writes, concatenate the segments into a single buffer before sending (this is what WebSocketByteTransportBase does).
  • Client vs server. Client transports implement ConnectAsync to dial outbound; server transports built from an already-accepted connection should throw NotSupportedException from ConnectAsync (this is the contract enforced by UaSCUaBinaryClientChannel).

Wiring the transport into the channel pipeline

Client side

Implement IUaSCByteTransportFactory and hand the factory to a subclass of UaSCUaBinaryTransportChannel:

internal sealed class MyTransportFactory : IUaSCByteTransportFactory
{
    public string Implementation => "UA-MY";
    public IUaSCByteTransport Create(BufferManager bm, int rxSize, ITelemetryContext tel)
        => new MyByteTransport(bm, rxSize, tel);
}

public sealed class MyTransportChannel : UaSCUaBinaryTransportChannel
{
    public MyTransportChannel(ITelemetryContext telemetry)
        : base(new MyTransportFactory(), telemetry)
    {
    }
}

public sealed class MyTransportChannelFactory : ITransportChannelFactory
{
    public string UriScheme => "opc.my";
    public ITransportChannel Create(ITelemetryContext telemetry)
        => new MyTransportChannel(telemetry);
}

If your transport needs channel-level state (TLS validator, client cert, custom credentials) plumbed in, override UaSCUaBinaryTransportChannel.OnSettingsSaved(TransportChannelSettings, ChannelQuotas) — that hook fires after the channel binds settings but before it tries to connect. The WSS implementation uses this pattern; see WssTransportChannel.OnSettingsSaved for a reference.

Server side

Implement ITransportListener plus an ITransportListenerFactory. For each accepted connection, construct your transport directly (not through the IUaSCByteTransportFactory, which is client-side only), then hand it to a TcpServerChannel via Attach(channelId, transport). The WSS server path in HttpsTransportListener.AcceptWebSocketAsync is the canonical template.

Registering by URL scheme

Install your custom listener and channel factories into the host's ITransportBindingRegistry. The simplest path uses the DI extension:

services
    .AddOpcUa()
    .AddCustomTransport<MyCustomListenerFactory, MyCustomChannelFactory>();

Both factories are resolved from the IServiceProvider (so they may have constructor-injected dependencies) and installed under the URI scheme reported by MyCustomListenerFactory.UriScheme. Non-DI consumers construct a DefaultTransportBindingRegistry and call RegisterListenerFactory / RegisterChannelFactory directly, then hand the registry to ServerBase (via TransportBindings) or to ReverseConnectManager.TransportBindings.

Worked example

InProcessTransport is the public reference implementation that ships in Opc.Ua.Core. It uses only public API: two paired transports communicate over a pair of in-memory System.Threading.Channels.Channel<byte[]> (one per direction). Use it directly for unit tests or co-located client/server pairs that want to skip the network stack entirely, or as a copy-paste starting point for a custom transport.

using Opc.Ua.Bindings;

var buffers = new BufferManager("inproc", 8192, telemetry);
(InProcessTransport client, InProcessTransport server) =
    InProcessTransport.CreatePair(buffers, receiveBufferSize: 8192, telemetry);

await client.SendChunkAsync(payload, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
ArraySegment<byte> received = await server.ReceiveChunkAsync(ct).ConfigureAwait(false);

Note that InProcessTransport.ConnectAsync throws NotSupportedException — the pair is created up front via CreatePair. A real network transport would implement ConnectAsync to dial the wire.

See also

  • Profiles.md — supported profiles, security policies, message encodings.
  • MigrationGuide.md — note on the breaking removal of IMessageSocket and the new IUaSCByteTransport contract.
  • OPC UA Part 6 §7.4 (HTTPS) / §7.5 (WebSockets) for the wire-format specification.