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# Description Remove stock phrasing and correct misleading or inconsistent technical documentation. The initial two passes covered 367 Markdown files, followed by an interactive review of 169 editorial flags. The U5 interpretation originally deferred in that review has since received the upstream Mantis answer recorded by #4843; remaining server/spec follow-ups stay explicit in the CTT log. - Correct package responsibilities, migration steps, API names, ownership, protocol descriptions and links. Keep bundled migration guides synchronized. Preserve historical conclusions as historical records with separate re-check notes. - Provide at least two rendered TOC levels throughout `docs/`. Convert appropriate architecture figures to Mermaid without changing code examples, transcripts or historical quotations. - Address the October 19 feedback with concrete setup/migration instructions, corrected certificate paths and PubSub names, shorter repeated caveats, consistent XML comments, and a full review of the Concepts guide. Retain #4839's API corrections. - Integrate #4841's runtime/performance guidance and review incoming/recent prose. Preserve dated measurements rather than claiming new benchmark runs; clarify allocation ratios, startup-only processor settings, JIT warm-up and the benchmark commit's scope. Missing raw measurement artifacts and repeat ranges remain tracked by #4842. - Merge master through `e8c5d800a` in `32c6394b7`. Resolve the CTT log conflict using the updated Mantis states and OPC answers, retaining historical framing and re-checks for C28/C32/C43. - Address the latest naming/index feedback in `adb5bf693`: rename the guides to `docs/WotCon.md` and `docs/WotNodeSetConversion.md`; move the provider and DataType-declaration contracts into the conversion guide and remove `docs/WoT.md`. Rename `samples/DI` to `samples/Di` and `samples/Isa95` to `samples/ISA95`. Add content-index READMEs to Di, FluentApi, ISA95, Lds and PubSub; update solution entries, project references, Docker/CI paths, test fixture paths and documentation links with exact casing. **WoT guide scope.** This branch retains the detailed conversion guide that #4758 had replaced with an anchor stub. Conversion limits, verified document sets, preservation rules and provider ownership now live together in `WotNodeSetConversion.md`; binding/runtime guidance remains in `WotBindings.md` and `WotCon.md`. The design-rationale/test-ledger prose was shortened, the oversized argument-table cell moved into its section, and existing anchors preserved. **SDK policy is a separate, explicit user-directed change.** `global.json` sets a stable minimum of `10.0.400`, `rollForward: latestMajor`, and `allowPrerelease: false`. Newer major SDKs are permitted; CI's explicit SDK pins are unchanged. README, GettingStarted, DeveloperGuide and Recycling instructions reflect the possible analyzer differences. The image-contract regression fix accepts compatible stable SDK images instead of requiring exact equality with the floor. The latest four rename/index threads are resolved after publication. Three older threads remain open: universal obsolete-removal timing, unconditional nonce-strength wording, and a blanket Vision NativeAOT claim. Existing implementation/evidence constraints are explained in their inline replies. The two-level TOCs remain as requested. ## Validation - `git diff --check` and staged diff checks: passed. The untouched upstream AutoID NodeSet retains its provenance bytes, including two existing license-header trailing spaces. - `.\.azurepipelines\validate-migration-plugin.ps1`: passed; 15 bundled migration documents and manifests synchronized. - Documentation/path validation: **101** documents retain two rendered TOC levels (**2,228** entries), with idempotent formatting. **52** new relative links and their anchors passed exact-case checks. No tracked references to the old guide/sample paths remain. Both relocated provider-contract sections are preserved in the destination. - `dotnet sln UA.slnx list`: passed; shows the renamed Di/ISA95 projects and the existing FluentApi/Lds/PubSub projects. Updated solution and pump ProjectReference paths also passed exact-case existence checks. - Latest focused commands, run from the repository root: ```powershell # Passed: 61 channel send-order and reconnect tests. dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Core.Tests\Opc.Ua.Core.Tests.csproj -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 --filter 'FullyQualifiedName~UaSCBinaryChannelSendOrderTests|FullyQualifiedName~TcpReconnectKeyAgreementTests' --verbosity minimal # Passed: 5 pump datasheet tests; builds the renamed pump sample. dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Di.Tests\Opc.Ua.Di.Tests.csproj -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 --filter 'FullyQualifiedName~PumpDatasheetConformanceTests' --verbosity minimal # Passed: 4 repository NodeSet path/round-trip tests, including the moved pump models. dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Types.Tests\Opc.Ua.Types.Tests.csproj -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 --filter 'FullyQualifiedName~RepositorySourceSurvivesSerializedLinkedPartitionsAsync' --verbosity minimal # Passed: build, zero warnings/errors. dotnet build samples\ISA95\MinimalIsa95Server\MinimalIsa95Server.csproj -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 -f net10.0 --verbosity minimal # Passed: dependent sample-test project build, zero warnings/errors. dotnet build tests\Opc.Ua.WotCon.Samples.Tests\Opc.Ua.WotCon.Samples.Tests.csproj -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 -f net10.0 --verbosity minimal ``` Earlier focused integration checks passed 2,620 tests across AutoID, event queues/scheduling, source generation, MCP/package profiles and WoT. Both reviewed Mermaid diagrams rendered locally without network access. These checks are not a full solution run. The full solution has **not** been rerun for this review. Earlier `dotnet test UA.slnx -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 --verbosity quiet` did not pass: three AOT projects rejected VSTest and 20 Vision tests failed during graphics initialization with `OutOfMemoryException`. Remaining long-running tests were stopped at the user's request. A focused Vision rerun passed 558 tests and reproduced those 20 failures. The earlier `dotnet test UA.slnx -p:CustomTestTarget=net48 --verbosity quiet` was blocked by the former SDK pin and was not retried after the policy change. The user approved proceeding with those limitations documented; current remote CI is not claimed green. ## Related Issues - Follow-up #4842 tracks the requested 2.0.2+ benchmark/tuning and diagnostic-tool documentation refresh. #4841 supplies documentation and earlier results, not all newly requested measurements. - #4758 explains the conversion guide's earlier consolidation; the current provider contracts are now consolidated into `WotNodeSetConversion.md`. - #4839 supplies the reviewed API corrections; #4843 supplies the updated CTT issue record. - The original prose cleanup and SDK policy were user-requested without a source issue. No new runtime architecture is introduced by these documentation edits. ## Checklist _Put an `x` in the boxes that apply. You can complete these step by step after opening the PR._ - [ ] I have signed the [CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf) and read the [CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) doc. - [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works and increased code coverage. - [x] I have added all necessary documentation. - [ ] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or analyzer warnings. - [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. - [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and **all** CodeQL warnings. - [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received. --------- Co-authored-by: Roman Ettlinger <romanett98@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
399 lines
16 KiB
Markdown
399 lines
16 KiB
Markdown
# KeyCredentialService Developer Guide
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OPC 10000-12 §8 defines the **KeyCredentialService**. A Global Discovery
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Server (GDS) uses it to issue and manage credentials, such as usernames and
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passwords, API keys, or tokens, for applications that authenticate to
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services outside OPC UA. Examples include Message Queuing Telemetry
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Transport (MQTT) brokers and REST APIs.
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> **Scope note:** This service issues credentials for resources outside
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> **OPC UA**, such as MQTT brokers and REST APIs. See `ResourceUri`
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> and `ProfileUris` on `KeyCredentialServiceType`. The optional bridge
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> authenticator described below is **EXPERIMENTAL** under the vendor URI
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> `urn:opcfoundation:netstandard:profile:authentication:keycredential`;
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> it is **not** an OPC UA Part 6 §6.5.3 conformance claim. For
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> standards-conformant OPC UA session authentication, use
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> [AuthorizationService](AuthorizationService.md) with JSON Web Tokens
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> (JWT) and the [Identity Providers](IdentityProviders.md) infrastructure.
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## Contents
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- [Architecture](#architecture)
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- [Client API](#client-api)
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- [KeyCredentialServiceClient](#keycredentialserviceclient)
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- [Discovering the Service NodeId](#discovering-the-service-nodeid)
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- [Server-Side: Implementing a Provider](#server-side-implementing-a-provider)
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- [IKeyCredentialRequestStore](#ikeycredentialrequeststore)
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- [Built-in Implementation](#built-in-implementation)
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- [Writing a Custom Implementation](#writing-a-custom-implementation)
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- [Wiring into the GDS Server](#wiring-into-the-gds-server)
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- [Decision matrix: Push vs Pull vs Bridge](#decision-matrix-push-vs-pull-vs-bridge)
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- [Hybrid (Push + Pull)](#hybrid-push--pull)
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- [Resource Server Push Binding](#resource-server-push-binding)
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- [Experimental KeyCredential Issued-Token Bridge](#experimental-keycredential-issued-token-bridge)
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- [Audit Events](#audit-events)
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- [End-to-End Example](#end-to-end-example)
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## Architecture
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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client["OPC UA Client<br/>(or application)"]
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subgraph gds["GDS Server"]
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manager["ApplicationsNodeManager"]
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requests["IKeyCredentialRequestStore"]
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secrets["ISecretStore"]
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manager --> requests --> secrets
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end
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client -->|StartRequest| manager
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manager -->|request ID| client
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client -->|FinishRequest| manager
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manager -->|credential when ready| client
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client -->|Revoke| manager
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```
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## Client API
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### KeyCredentialServiceClient
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A thin client proxy for the three KeyCredentialService methods. Requires
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an active `ISession` and the `NodeId` of the KeyCredentialService
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instance in the server's address space.
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```csharp
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using Opc.Ua.Gds.Client;
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// After connecting a session to the GDS server:
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var kcClient = new KeyCredentialServiceClient(session, serviceNodeId);
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// 1. Request a new credential
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NodeId requestId = await kcClient.StartRequestAsync(
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applicationUri: "urn:my-app",
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publicKey: myPublicKey,
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securityPolicyUri: null, // server chooses
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requestedRoles: default); // server chooses
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// 2. Finish (collect) the credential
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var (credentialId, credentialSecret, thumbprint, policyUri, grantedRoles)
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= await kcClient.FinishRequestAsync(requestId, cancelRequest: false);
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// Use credentialId + credentialSecret to authenticate to the
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// target service (MQTT broker, REST API, etc.)
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// 3. Revoke when no longer needed
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await kcClient.RevokeAsync(credentialId);
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```
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### Discovering the Service NodeId
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The KeyCredentialService instance is typically found under the
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server's `Directory` or `ServerConfiguration` node. Browse for
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objects of type `KeyCredentialServiceType` (namespace 0):
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```csharp
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// Browse the server for KeyCredentialServiceType instances
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var browser = new Browser(session);
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// ... or use the well-known NodeId if your GDS exposes one.
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```
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## Server-Side: Implementing a Provider
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### IKeyCredentialRequestStore
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The server-side abstraction for the credential lifecycle:
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```csharp
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public interface IKeyCredentialRequestStore
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{
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// Begin a new credential request. Returns a request ID.
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NodeId StartRequest(
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string applicationUri,
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ByteString publicKey,
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string? securityPolicyUri,
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ArrayOf<NodeId> requestedRoles);
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// Complete or cancel a request. Returns issued credential data.
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KeyCredentialRequestState FinishRequest(
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NodeId requestId,
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bool cancelRequest,
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out string? credentialId,
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out ByteString credentialSecret,
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out string? certificateThumbprint,
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out string? securityPolicyUri,
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out ArrayOf<NodeId> grantedRoles);
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// Revoke a previously issued credential.
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void Revoke(string credentialId);
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}
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```
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### Built-in Implementation
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`InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore` provides a ready-to-use
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in-process implementation. It auto-approves requests and generates
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random 32-byte secrets.
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**With ISecretStore integration** — credential secrets are persisted
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through any `ISecretStore` backend (Key Vault, DPAPI, etc.):
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```csharp
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// Use the default in-memory secret store
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var store = new InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore();
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// Or plug in a production secret store
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ISecretStore vault = new MyKeyVaultSecretStore("KeyCredential");
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var store = new InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore(vault);
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```
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### Writing a Custom Implementation
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For production systems with approval workflows:
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```csharp
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public class DatabaseKeyCredentialStore : IKeyCredentialRequestStore
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{
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private readonly IDbConnection _db;
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public NodeId StartRequest(
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string applicationUri,
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ByteString publicKey,
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string? securityPolicyUri,
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ArrayOf<NodeId> requestedRoles)
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{
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// 1. Insert a pending request into the database
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// 2. Return the generated request ID
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// 3. Optionally notify an admin for approval
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var id = _db.InsertPendingRequest(applicationUri, publicKey);
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return new NodeId(id);
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}
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public KeyCredentialRequestState FinishRequest(
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NodeId requestId,
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bool cancelRequest,
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out string? credentialId, ...)
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{
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var record = _db.GetRequest(requestId);
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if (record.State == "Pending")
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{
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// Still awaiting approval
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credentialId = null;
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// ... set other out params to defaults
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return KeyCredentialRequestState.New;
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}
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// Return the approved credential
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credentialId = record.CredentialId;
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// ...
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return KeyCredentialRequestState.Completed;
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}
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public void Revoke(string credentialId)
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{
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_db.RevokeCredential(credentialId);
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// Optionally notify the target service to invalidate
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}
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}
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```
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### Wiring into the GDS Server
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Set the `KeyCredentialRequestStore` property on the
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`ApplicationsNodeManager` (done via `GlobalDiscoverySampleServer`
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or a custom server):
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```csharp
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// In your INodeManagerFactory or server setup:
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var appNodeManager = new ApplicationsNodeManager(server, configuration, ...);
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appNodeManager.KeyCredentialRequestStore =
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new InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore(mySecretStore);
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```
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## Decision matrix: Push vs Pull vs Bridge
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| Model | Primary actor | Use when | Standard / conformance posture |
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| Pull (`KeyCredentialServiceType`) | Client/application asks a GDS to issue a credential. | The GDS owns approval and issuance; the caller later retrieves the issued secret with `FinishRequest`. | OPC 10000-12 §8 KeyCredentialService. |
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| Push (`KeyCredentialConfigurationFolderType`) | Administrator or provisioning agent writes credentials to a resource server. | A resource server must store, rotate, or delete credentials locally through `CreateCredential`, `UpdateCredential`, and `DeleteCredential`. | OPC 10000-12 §8 Push model; enabled with `WithKeyCredentialPush()`. |
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| Bridge (`KeyCredentialBridgeAuthenticator`) | OPC UA client presents a KeyCredential proof as an issued identity token. | Closed deployments need an interim bridge between GDS-issued secrets and UA session authentication. | **Experimental vendor extension only; not a Part 6 §6.5.3 conformance claim.** |
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### Hybrid (Push + Pull)
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- Enable both models when a GDS issues credentials (Pull) and hosts the Push subject. Admin tools can push
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freshly issued credentials to target resource servers in one round-trip.
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- For wiring in the same process, use `services.AddOpcUa().AddGdsServer(...).WithKeyCredentialPush()`.
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The Pull side stays on the GDS, and the Push side is enabled on the same node so admin clients write
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credentials directly to the GDS's resource-server view.
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- For wiring across processes, the GDS uses the default Pull path (`InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore`),
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while each resource server enables Push with `WithKeyCredentialPush()`. The admin tool reads from the
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GDS and writes to each resource server.
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- The bridge authenticator is independent of Push/Pull: it lets the resource server accept KeyCredential
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blobs as a UA identity. The hybrid model addresses issuance and distribution; the bridge addresses
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consumption.
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## Resource Server Push Binding
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A regular OPC UA resource server can opt in to the Part 12 §8 Push model
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with `WithKeyCredentialPush()`. The binding mounts on the standard
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`ServerConfiguration/KeyCredentialConfiguration` folder by default and
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stores secrets through `IKeyCredentialStore` (default:
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`InMemoryKeyCredentialStore` backed by `ISecretStore`).
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```csharp
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using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
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using Opc.Ua;
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using Opc.Ua.Server.Hosting;
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services.AddOpcUa()
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.AddServer(options =>
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{
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options.ApplicationUri = "urn:my-resource-server";
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options.ProductUri = "uri:my-company:resource-server";
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options.EndpointUrls.Add("opc.tcp://localhost:4840");
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})
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.WithKeyCredentialPush();
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```
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Production deployments should register an `IKeyCredentialStore` backed by
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a durable secret store before calling `WithKeyCredentialPush()`.
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The standard folder remains in namespace 0. Created and restored credential
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instances use a nonstandard namespace owned by the binding node manager
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(the diagnostics namespace for `ConfigurationNodeManager`), so their
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properties and methods are addressable through Read, Browse, and Call.
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Descendant NodeIds are allocated per instance through the configured factory,
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so creating another credential does not alias an existing credential's properties.
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Use the returned `CredentialNodeId` and browse its children rather than
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assuming a namespace index. A custom folder keeps its own namespace;
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standalone bindings using `KeyCredentialPushSubject.NamespaceUri` must
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register that namespace with their hosting node manager.
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`GetEncryptingKey` returns an application certificate from the server's active
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certificate registry. `UpdateCredential` decrypts a UA Binary
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`RsaEncryptedSecret` before passing the usable secret to `IKeyCredentialStore`.
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It verifies the declared policy, certificate thumbprint, envelope, signature
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and timestamp; invalid input never reaches the store. Both methods require
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the SecurityAdmin role and an encrypted SecureChannel.
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The envelope nonce is deliberately not compared with a session nonce:
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outside `ActivateSession`, OPC UA Part 4 Table 185 requires the receiver not
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to check it.
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The push binding accepts `Basic256Sha256`, `Aes128_Sha256_RsaOaep` and
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`Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss`. Restrict or reorder these through
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`KeyCredentialPushOptions.AllowedSecurityPolicyUris`; the first entry is the
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default for `GetEncryptingKey`. ECC/RSA-DH policies are explicitly rejected
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with `BadSecurityPolicyRejected`: this binding does not provide the required
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ephemeral-key exchange. Omitting the policy **and** certificate thumbprint
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retains the standard clear-secret-over-encrypted-channel mode. Supplying a
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policy never causes ciphertext to be stored as if it were a plaintext secret.
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For direct construction, the original constructor remains available and
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`ConfigurationNodeManager.BindKeyCredentialPushAsync` supplies the server's
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registry. A standalone caller can instead pass an `ICertificateRegistry`
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and `ISecurityPolicyRegistry` to the additional constructor. Temporary decode
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buffers are cleared; the credential record handed to a custom store remains
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valid if that store retains it.
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## Experimental KeyCredential Issued-Token Bridge
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> **WARNING — EXPERIMENTAL**: `KeyCredentialBridgeAuthenticator` is a
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> vendor extension under
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> `urn:opcfoundation:netstandard:profile:authentication:keycredential`.
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> It is **not** a Part 6 §6.5.3 conformance claim. Deployments that
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> claim OPC UA conformance **MUST NOT** use this bridge as their
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> standards-conformant user-token mechanism. Use it only in closed
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> deployments where the GDS, resource server, and clients are controlled
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> by the same operator.
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The bridge lets a server validate a JSON issued-token payload containing
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a `credentialId`, nonce timestamp, and HMAC proof. The server looks up
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the credential in `IKeyCredentialStore`, validates the proof with the
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stored secret, and returns an identity populated from the credential's
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subject claims.
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Client-side, `GdsKeyCredentialAccessTokenProvider` adapts a
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`KeyCredentialServiceClient` to `IAccessTokenProvider`, so the standard
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`IssuedTokenIdentityProvider` can materialize a UA `IssuedIdentityToken`
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for the bridge profile.
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The bridge token payload carries a `"version"` field. It versions this vendor
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extension's own JSON payload, and has no OPC UA counterpart: Part 6 §6.5.3 and
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the GDS KeyCredential services define neither this payload nor a version field.
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The server accepts `"version": 2` only, whose HMAC proof covers a non-empty
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`aud` that must exactly match the resource server's `ApplicationUri`, so a proof
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minted for one server is rejected by another.
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The provider implements `IEndpointAccessTokenProvider`. Normal identity
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selection forwards the selected endpoint automatically, including for the
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vendor bridge profile. The audience is the first non-blank value of metadata
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`Audience`, metadata `ResourceUri`, or `endpoint.Server.ApplicationUri`.
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Thus a policy containing only `{"authorityUri":"urn:example:gds"}` still binds
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the proof to the target resource server, never to the GDS authority or client
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application. Explicit audience/resource metadata must identify that same server.
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```csharp
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var identities = new IssuedTokenIdentityProvider(
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keyCredentialProvider, GdsKeyCredentialAccessTokenProvider.ProfileUri);
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// Direct acquisition outside normal identity selection also supplies the target.
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using AccessToken token = await keyCredentialProvider.AcquireAsync(
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metadata, targetEndpoint, cancellationToken);
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```
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The metadata-only acquisition overload requires an explicit non-blank audience
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or resource URI. If none is available, acquisition fails before requesting or
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reading credential secrets instead of emitting an unusable unbound token.
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## Audit Events
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All KeyCredentialService operations emit audit events automatically:
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| Operation | Audit Event Type |
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|-----------|-----------------|
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| StartRequest | `KeyCredentialRequestedAuditEventType` |
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| FinishRequest | `KeyCredentialDeliveredAuditEventType` |
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| Revoke | `KeyCredentialRevokedAuditEventType` |
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Credential secrets are **never** included in audit payloads.
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## End-to-End Example
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```csharp
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// ── Server Side ──────────────────────────────────────
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|
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|
// 1. Create the credential store
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|
var secretStore = new InMemorySecretStore("KeyCredentials");
|
|
var kcStore = new InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore(secretStore);
|
|
|
|
// 2. Create the GDS server with credential support
|
|
var gdsServer = new GlobalDiscoverySampleServer(
|
|
database, requestStore, certGroup, userDb, telemetry);
|
|
|
|
// 3. After server starts, wire the store
|
|
// (done automatically by ApplicationsNodeManager when
|
|
// KeyCredentialRequestStore is set before CreateAddressSpace)
|
|
|
|
// ── Client Side ──────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
// 1. Connect to the GDS
|
|
var gdsClient = new GlobalDiscoveryServerClient(config);
|
|
await gdsClient.ConnectAsync(gdsEndpointUrl);
|
|
|
|
// 2. Find the KeyCredentialService node
|
|
// (browse or use a well-known NodeId)
|
|
|
|
// 3. Create the client proxy
|
|
var kcClient = new KeyCredentialServiceClient(
|
|
gdsClient.Session, serviceNodeId);
|
|
|
|
// 4. Request → Finish → Use → Revoke
|
|
NodeId reqId = await kcClient.StartRequestAsync(
|
|
"urn:my-mqtt-bridge", default, null, default);
|
|
|
|
var (credId, secret, _, _, _) =
|
|
await kcClient.FinishRequestAsync(reqId, false);
|
|
|
|
// Use credId/secret to connect to MQTT broker...
|
|
|
|
// When done:
|
|
await kcClient.RevokeAsync(credId);
|
|
```
|