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Marc Schier e8afa4237b Security hardening: 25-finding pass against SFI / SDL / OPC UA Part 2 baseline
Addresses 25 of 39 findings from a branch security review (assessment 5).

CRITICAL: F1 gate MCP key-disclosure tools, F2 0600 keylog/pcap files, F3 per-user BaseFolder, F16 ChannelKeyMaterial IDisposable + ZeroMemory, F17 PcapFileReader MaxPacketBytes (64MB) bound, F18 FlowBuffer MaxBufferBytes (256MB) cap, F19 NodeSet export path validation, F20 ReplaySession listenPort range.

HIGH: F4 IPcapAuditSink + LoggerPcapAuditSink + rate-limited frame-capture audit, F5 AES-256-GCM EncryptedKeyLogStream + SessionKeyManager (sibling .key file 0600), F14 IKeyEscrowProvider abstraction + DiskKeyEscrowProvider default (DI TryAddSingleton so consumers can route to KMS), F21 ChannelManagerOptions.MaxChannels (256) cap, F22 CaptureSessionManager.SessionFolder path-traversal guard, F23 PacketDecodeTools pcapPath/keyLogPath validation, F24 replay_pcap speed validation (NaN/Inf/<=0), F25 explicit permissions blocks on .github/workflows.

MEDIUM: F6 OnTokenActivated [EditorBrowsable(Never)] + key-disclosure doc, F7 IDiagnosticsChannelMutation accessor + stack-walk caller guard (replaces internal OfflineLoadTokens), F8 PcapOptions.AllowMockClientReplay + AllowedReplayEndpoints, F9 PcapFileWriter / UaKeyLog*Writer rotation (.NNN suffix) with MaxBytes / MaxArtifactsPerSession, F13 keylog-isolation gap acknowledgment doc, F15 HashChainedAuditFileSink (HMAC-chained JSONL ledger, VerifyChain), F11 replay URL scheme allow-list (opc.tcp/opc.tcps/opc.https).

LOW/INFO: F10 SBOM/CVE governance comments on PacketDotNet/SharpPcap + Docs/PacketCapture.md, F12 Security model section at top of PacketCapture.md.

Tests: 100+ new NUnit tests across Audit/, Capture/, Frame/, KeyLog/, McpServerTools/, Replay/, Stack/Tcp/, DependencyInjection/. All file-mode/HMAC-chain/encryption tests are [Platform(Linux,MacOSX)]-gated where Unix-specific.

Build: 0 warnings / 0 errors on Stack/Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap for net8.0 and net9.0. net10.0 build is environmentally blocked by a corrupted local SDK 10.0.300 workload manifest (microsoft.net.workload.mono.toolchain.net6 10.0.108 requires Emscripten.net6 >=10.0.108, only 9.0.17 installed); requires 'dotnet workload repair' from an elevated shell to validate the third TFM. No tests were run pending the SDK fix. 5 CA1508/CA2000 false positives suppressed with documented #pragma blocks (ownership transfer in escrow factory / IAsyncEnumerable iterator / unreachable catch path).

Deferred to follow-up GitHub issues: 9 MEDIUM (M-SEC-07/09/10/11/12/13/16/22/31 — exception sanitization, reconnect defaults, cert-rotation races, nonce-suppress deprecation, parser hardening) and 10 LOW/INFO (L-SEC-14/15/17/23/24/33/34/35/36/37 — handler cleanup, EventSource endpoint masking, key-log schema validation, EOL deps, SAST). Full reasoning in session plan.md Round 10.
2026-06-11 13:10:09 +02:00

285 lines
11 KiB
C#

/* ========================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2005-2026 The OPC Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* OPC Foundation MIT License 1.00
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
* obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
* files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
* restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
* copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
* conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
* included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
* HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
* WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
* OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* The complete license agreement can be found here:
* http://opcfoundation.org/License/MIT/1.00/
* ======================================================================*/
using System;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using Opc.Ua.Bindings;
namespace Opc.Ua.Bindings.Pcap.KeyLog
{
/// <summary>
/// Immutable snapshot of the key material associated with a single
/// <see cref="ChannelToken"/> activation. Decoupled from
/// <see cref="ChannelToken"/> so it can be serialized to and from a
/// keylog file and used to drive an offline <c>OfflineSecureChannel</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The snapshot contains both the client- and server-side derived keys
/// because we need to be able to decrypt traffic in both directions
/// regardless of whether the tap that produced the snapshot was on
/// the client or the server side.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// All byte arrays are defensive copies of the originals so the
/// snapshot is safe to keep alive long after the originating
/// <see cref="ChannelToken"/> has been disposed.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class ChannelKeyMaterial : IDisposable
{
/// <summary>
/// Constructs an immutable snapshot. Pass <c>null</c> for any
/// key/iv/nonce that is not present (e.g. when the security mode is
/// <see cref="MessageSecurityMode.None"/>).
/// </summary>
/// <exception cref="ArgumentNullException">
/// <paramref name="securityPolicyUri"/> is <c>null</c>.
/// </exception>
public ChannelKeyMaterial(
uint channelId,
uint tokenId,
string securityPolicyUri,
MessageSecurityMode securityMode,
DateTime createdAt,
int lifetime,
byte[]? clientNonce,
byte[]? serverNonce,
byte[]? clientSigningKey,
byte[]? clientEncryptingKey,
byte[]? clientInitializationVector,
byte[]? serverSigningKey,
byte[]? serverEncryptingKey,
byte[]? serverInitializationVector)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(securityPolicyUri);
ChannelId = channelId;
TokenId = tokenId;
SecurityPolicyUri = securityPolicyUri;
SecurityMode = securityMode;
CreatedAt = createdAt;
Lifetime = lifetime;
ClientNonce = Copy(clientNonce);
ServerNonce = Copy(serverNonce);
ClientSigningKey = Copy(clientSigningKey);
ClientEncryptingKey = Copy(clientEncryptingKey);
ClientInitializationVector = Copy(clientInitializationVector);
ServerSigningKey = Copy(serverSigningKey);
ServerEncryptingKey = Copy(serverEncryptingKey);
ServerInitializationVector = Copy(serverInitializationVector);
}
/// <summary>
/// The OPC UA secure-channel id this token belongs to.
/// </summary>
public uint ChannelId { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The token id within the channel.
/// </summary>
public uint TokenId { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The security policy URI in effect for this token (e.g.
/// <c>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss</c>).
/// </summary>
public string SecurityPolicyUri { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The message security mode in effect for this token.
/// </summary>
public MessageSecurityMode SecurityMode { get; }
/// <summary>
/// When the token was created (UTC, server clock).
/// </summary>
public DateTime CreatedAt { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The lifetime of the token in milliseconds.
/// </summary>
public int Lifetime { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The nonce provided by the client during OpenSecureChannel.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ClientNonce { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The nonce provided by the server during OpenSecureChannel.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ServerNonce { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The key used to sign messages sent by the client.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ClientSigningKey { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The key used to encrypt messages sent by the client.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ClientEncryptingKey { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The initialization vector used by the client when encrypting.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ClientInitializationVector { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The key used to sign messages sent by the server.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ServerSigningKey { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The key used to encrypt messages sent by the server.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ServerEncryptingKey { get; }
/// <summary>
/// The initialization vector used by the server when encrypting.
/// </summary>
public byte[]? ServerInitializationVector { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Creates a snapshot from a live <see cref="ChannelToken"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <exception cref="ArgumentNullException">
/// <paramref name="token"/> is <c>null</c>.
/// </exception>
public static ChannelKeyMaterial From(ChannelToken token)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(token);
return new ChannelKeyMaterial(
channelId: token.ChannelId,
tokenId: token.TokenId,
securityPolicyUri: token.SecurityPolicy?.Uri ?? SecurityPolicies.None,
securityMode: InferSecurityMode(token),
createdAt: token.CreatedAt,
lifetime: token.Lifetime,
clientNonce: token.ClientNonce,
serverNonce: token.ServerNonce,
clientSigningKey: token.ClientSigningKey,
clientEncryptingKey: token.ClientEncryptingKey,
clientInitializationVector: token.ClientInitializationVector,
serverSigningKey: token.ServerSigningKey,
serverEncryptingKey: token.ServerEncryptingKey,
serverInitializationVector: token.ServerInitializationVector);
}
/// <summary>
/// Securely clears all key, nonce, and IV byte arrays held by
/// this instance using
/// <see cref="CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory(Span{byte})"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Call this as soon as the material is no longer needed. After
/// disposal the properties continue to point to the (now zeroed)
/// arrays; subsequent reads will see only zero bytes.
/// </remarks>
public void Dispose()
{
if (m_disposed)
{
return;
}
ZeroIfNotNull(ClientNonce);
ZeroIfNotNull(ServerNonce);
ZeroIfNotNull(ClientSigningKey);
ZeroIfNotNull(ClientEncryptingKey);
ZeroIfNotNull(ClientInitializationVector);
ZeroIfNotNull(ServerSigningKey);
ZeroIfNotNull(ServerEncryptingKey);
ZeroIfNotNull(ServerInitializationVector);
m_disposed = true;
GC.SuppressFinalize(this);
}
private static byte[]? Copy(byte[]? value)
{
if (value is null)
{
return null;
}
byte[] copy = new byte[value.Length];
Buffer.BlockCopy(value, 0, copy, 0, value.Length);
return copy;
}
private static void ZeroIfNotNull(byte[]? buffer)
{
if (buffer is { Length: > 0 })
{
CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory(buffer);
}
}
private static MessageSecurityMode InferSecurityMode(ChannelToken token)
{
// ChannelToken doesn't carry the security mode directly. We infer
// it from the presence of derived encryption keys: None when no
// signing key is present at all, Sign when only signing keys are
// present, SignAndEncrypt when encryption keys are present.
if (token.ClientSigningKey is null && token.ServerSigningKey is null)
{
return MessageSecurityMode.None;
}
if (token.ClientEncryptingKey is null && token.ServerEncryptingKey is null)
{
return MessageSecurityMode.Sign;
}
return MessageSecurityMode.SignAndEncrypt;
}
private bool m_disposed;
#if DEBUG
/// <summary>
/// Debug-only finalizer that warns through
/// <see cref="System.Diagnostics.Trace.TraceWarning(string)"/> when a
/// <see cref="ChannelKeyMaterial"/> instance is collected without
/// <see cref="Dispose"/> having been called. Helps catch leaks
/// in tests; the finalizer is a no-op in Release builds.
/// </summary>
~ChannelKeyMaterial()
{
if (!m_disposed)
{
System.Diagnostics.Trace.TraceWarning(
"ChannelKeyMaterial finalized without Dispose; " +
"key material may have persisted in heap. " +
"Always Dispose ChannelKeyMaterial instances when done.");
}
}
#endif
}
}