Files
UA-.NETStandard/docs/ResourceIsolation.md
Marc Schier 7c965fd636 Capture metadata images and generation-bound session clients (#4752)
# Description

- Add isolated NodeState reference images, TypeTable graph snapshots,
EncodeableFactory registration forks/views, StringTable mutation
versions/private copies, and ServiceMessageContext mapping-holder
generation tracking. Reference images are lazy for empty nodes;
selected-image clones own independent storage and publication ownership.
- Add the complete generic NodeBrowser continuation-dependency
capability. This does not implement server browse-history retention,
NodeManager read images, or server batch/readiness admission.
- Add optional client binding capture for SessionClient, native Session
and ManagedSession, with managed-lease/native-channel generation
composition. Bindings capture authenticated-session identity, mapping
holders/versions and owned endpoint/policy/configuration observations.
Replacement, reconnect, mapping ABA and disposal permanently invalidate
stale bindings; disposing a binding does not dispose its owner.
- Preserve cancellation and master pooled-response ownership: a rejected
pooled response is released exactly once; an accepted response remains
caller-owned. Keep native transport submission under its replacement
gate and completion outside the gate, without routing ordinary unbound
requests through binding machinery.
- Rename the existing server lookup interface and all actual consumers
with minimal hunks; add focused fixtures, generated FileTypeClient usage
guidance, and package/transport documentation.

**Breaking preview type identity:** the existing 2.0-preview server
lookup `Opc.Ua.ISessionBindingProvider` becomes
`Opc.Ua.IServerSessionBindingProvider`. Server lookup consumers must
update their referenced type and rebuild. This is neither
source-compatible nor binary-additive for that preview type. The new
client capability is optional and adds no mandatory members to existing
ISession/ISessionClient/ITransportChannel contracts. This
preview-to-preview rename is documented in SessionBindings/Transports,
not in the 1.5-to-2.0 MigrationGuide.

**Ownership boundary:** no RequestLifetime changes,
certificate-manager/channel-entry adoption, BaseVariableState changes,
Method-result feature extraction, NodeManager batch/readiness or
browse-history retention, session restoration, registry federation, WoT
conversion, or WoT runtime/planners/events.
DependencyInjection/ResourceIsolation/index changes are lookup/link
closure only. SessionManager's PR hunk changes only its implemented
lookup-interface name; newer master public diagnostic masking is not
replaced.

## Related Issues

_Reference all GitHub issues this PR addresses. If there is no issue
yet, open one and link it here._

_If this is a relatively large or complex change, a design must have
been discussed in the related tracking issue and signed off (which
becomes the Architectural Decision Record (ADR))._

- Part of #4511: user-approved combined groups 5+6 Wave A extraction.
This PR does not close the umbrella or publish Wave B.

## Checklist

_Put an `x` in the boxes that apply. You can complete these step by step
after opening the PR._

- [ ] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [x] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [x] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.

### Review qualification

Review fixes are published at
**`6b0eb1d5c32a439300fbcaff974b9af8b909161b`**, changing eight
already-owned files. All five received review threads were replied to
and resolved after verification. Factory selector installation and
target-selection-plus-commit share the root publication gate, with
consistent root→image release/capture ordering. TypeTable selector
installation and final mutation routing share its existing gate. Native
bound channel validity uses volatile observations; the two owned XML
defects are corrected.

| Requirement | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Selector installation must not hide TypeTable mutations |
`SelectorInstalledDuringNodePreparationReceivesMutation`: old Add
routing failed on both TFMs; corrected routing passes on both within
**148/148** factory/TypeTable controls |
| Selector installation must not race factory commit routing | Static
common-root-gate/order proof plus baseline-GREEN
`BuilderCapturedBeforeOwnershipUsesSelectedFactory`,
`ViewOwnerReleasePreservesRegistrationsAndAllowsReuse`,
`ViewOwnerReleaseCanRetryAfterPendingPublication`,
`PublicationProtectsPendingAndRetiredFactoryImages` |
| Lock-free validity must observe owner transitions | Static
volatile-read reasoning plus native
`BoundRequestCannotDispatchWhileNativeReplacementIsPendingAsync`,
`BoundResponseRejectsInvalidationAfterNativeDispatchAsync`,
`BoundClientCannotRetryAcrossFaultedManagedEntryReplacementAsync`:
**12/12 each TFM**; Core binding/pooled ownership controls **17/17 each
TFM** |
| Correct owned XML documentation | “an unmanaged” and one multiline
`ReferenceUpdate.Next` summary; scoped whitespace/INFO and build
evidence below |

Factory controls are **not** claimed as a deterministic factory RED, and
public transport controls are **not** claimed as a deterministic
weak-memory RED. No private-lock reflection, artificial production seam,
or source-name assertion was added. The TypeTable RED uses the real
`ILocalNode.NodeClass` callback during node preparation, and both
expected RED receipts/TRX were retained.

All accepted review runs use the unchanged admitted SDK wrapper, normal
project references, sole mutex, one node/no shared compiler, finite
resource guards and canonical short-C build outputs. Source hashes were
frozen per command and matched the committed bytes afterward. SDK
ownership was released **before** commit/push/review replies. No
automatic merge was requested.

Scoped whitespace passed across the four affected projects. Review INFO
classification is **0 owned findings / 13 untouched baseline findings
excluded** (whole-file formatter exits 1,1,0,0); no baseline
RCS1140/RCS0055 expansion or suppression. The final normal net10 public
Client/Core/Types trim/AOT-analyzer closure passed **0 warnings / 0
errors**. This is not a NativeAOT publish/run.

<details>
<summary>Accepted review command payloads and results</summary>

These exact argument payloads were executed through the unchanged
guarded SDK wrapper. `$proof` expands to the protected results-directory
below. Successful explicit builds of the same source preceded the
`--no-build` runs.

```powershell
$proof = 'C:\Users\mschier\.copilot\session-state\a3b74048-c52f-4c87-8773-7a46c9ab0087\files\qualification-review-4752'

# Exit 0: 148 passed, 0 failed
dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Types.Tests\Opc.Ua.Types.Tests.csproj -f net48 -p:CustomTestTarget=net48 -p:UseArtifactsOutput=true -p:ArtifactsPath=C:\cp56-a3b7-v2 -nr:false --no-restore --verbosity minimal --filter "FullyQualifiedName~EncodeableFactorySnapshotTests|FullyQualifiedName~TypeTableTests" --logger "trx;LogFileName=review-types-green-net48.trx" --results-directory $proof

# Exit 0: 148 passed, 0 failed
dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Types.Tests\Opc.Ua.Types.Tests.csproj -f net10.0 --no-restore --no-build --filter "FullyQualifiedName~EncodeableFactorySnapshotTests|FullyQualifiedName~TypeTableTests" --logger "trx;LogFileName=review-types-green-net10.trx" --results-directory $proof -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 -p:UseArtifactsOutput=true -p:ArtifactsPath=C:\cp56-a3b7-v2 -nr:false --verbosity minimal

# The following two per-TFM payloads each exited 0:
# Core: 17/17 net48 and 17/17 net10.0; Client: 12/12 net48 and 12/12 net10.0
foreach ($tfm in @('net48', 'net10.0')) {
    dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Core.Tests\Opc.Ua.Core.Tests.csproj -f $tfm --no-restore --no-build --filter "FullyQualifiedName~SessionBindingResponseTests|FullyQualifiedName~SessionBindingContextTests" --logger "trx;LogFileName=review-actual-core-green-$tfm.trx" --results-directory $proof -p:CustomTestTarget=$tfm -p:UseArtifactsOutput=true -p:ArtifactsPath=C:\cp56-a3b7-v2 -nr:false --verbosity minimal
    dotnet test tests\Opc.Ua.Client.Tests\Opc.Ua.Client.Tests.csproj -f $tfm --no-restore --no-build --filter "FullyQualifiedName~BoundRequestCannotDispatchWhileNativeReplacementIsPendingAsync|FullyQualifiedName~BoundResponseRejectsInvalidationAfterNativeDispatchAsync|FullyQualifiedName~BoundClientCannotRetryAcrossFaultedManagedEntryReplacementAsync" --logger "trx;LogFileName=review-actual-client-green-$tfm.trx" --results-directory $proof -p:CustomTestTarget=$tfm -p:UseArtifactsOutput=true -p:ArtifactsPath=C:\cp56-a3b7-v2 -nr:false --verbosity minimal
}

# Exit 0: 0 warnings, 0 errors
dotnet build src\Opc.Ua.Client\Opc.Ua.Client.csproj -f net10.0 -p:CustomTestTarget=net10.0 -p:UseArtifactsOutput=true -p:ArtifactsPath=C:\cp56-a3b7-v2 -nr:false --no-restore --verbosity minimal
```

The six expanded GREEN commands, exact results/TRX hashes and two
expected RED commands are retained in
`qualification-review-4752\qualification-summary.json`, SHA256
`C5E71A4D8D37BAC8803F6DF38B6BCE2B70F3D0AFD5DEC8493FAE9DB440DCFB5A`.
Committed/qualified byte identity is in `publication-identity.json`,
SHA256
`CD9515FE96703F8B241F2B7B9B71F73EF0FF2626C2C8BCCE40307971A8F8E809`.
Per-command raw exits, guards, hashes and reports are retained outside
disposable build roots.

For each record in the protected `format-inputs.json` (Types/Core/Client
libraries and Types.Tests), the recorded Project/Include values expand
these exact payloads:

```powershell
# Workspace properties recorded with the formatter receipts:
$env:CustomTestTarget = 'net10.0'
$env:UseArtifactsOutput = 'true'
$env:ArtifactsPath = 'C:\cp56-a3b7-v2'

# All four exit 0
dotnet format whitespace $Project --no-restore --verify-no-changes --verbosity minimal --include $Include

# Exits 1,1,0,0 due only to untouched baseline findings; owned=0, baseline=13
dotnet format $Project --no-restore --severity info --verify-no-changes --verbosity minimal --report "$proof\formats\review-info-$i" --include $Include
```

Initial fresh matrix evidence remains separately identified and
unchanged: Types274/Core119/Client151/server137 net10;
Types274/Core119/Client151/server135 net48, all passing. Qualification
base remains `0dff94bd378e79b8cf1a47e1aaf340f9b4b40048`; the initial
published head was `9fee4583`. All 16 initial exact command
arrays/results/TRX hashes remain in protected
`qualification-v2\qualification-summary.json`, SHA256
`88E10240C20049B59A3401BE007C6528A85DF2F3DCFAF9D11D908CEF2946DA4E`.

Failures/incidents remain retained rather than relabeled as success:
original disappeared-root historical counts are invalidated; the
large-TRX controller DOM-parser failure is preserved separately from
accepted streaming receipts; the review argument-array
defect/default-D-output controls are preserved but excluded from
canonical review qualification. Correctly separated argument rechecks
produced the accepted short-C Core/Client receipts. The sole SDK wrapper
was not changed.

Full UA.slnx, measured coverage increase, CLA verification, NativeAOT
publication and current-head/master CI/CodeQL remain unclaimed. Actual
merge—not resolved review threads—unlocks Wave B.

</details>
2026-10-13 06:25:43 +02:00

902 lines
47 KiB
Markdown

# Server resource isolation
Resource isolation limits how many connections and requests one server accepts,
how much incomplete-message data it retains, and how it shares request execution
between callers. The listeners and request dispatcher enforce the same policy.
It complements message-size and connection-rate limits. Use it to keep a busy
client or group of clients from consuming resources needed by other workloads.
It does not cap all memory used by your application or protect the network
link from being saturated.
`StandardServer.ResourceIsolationOptions` selects the policy. Hosted servers
use `OpcUaServerOptions.ResourceIsolation` or the fluent configuration below.
**Balanced is the default**, for both direct and hosted `StandardServer`
instances. A host can instead supply an `IServerResourceIsolationProvider`.
## Contents
- [Terms](#terms)
- [Profiles](#profiles)
- [SharedOnly](#sharedonly)
- [FairShare](#fairshare)
- [Balanced (default)](#balanced-default)
- [TrustedReservations](#trustedreservations)
- [Configuration](#configuration)
- [JSON configuration](#json-configuration)
- [Providers and startup ownership](#providers-and-startup-ownership)
- [Startup validation and sizing](#startup-validation-and-sizing)
- [Sessions, channels, and reserved capacity](#sessions-channels-and-reserved-capacity)
- [Reserve sizes and explicit opt-outs](#reserve-sizes-and-explicit-opt-outs)
- [View effective limits at startup](#view-effective-limits-at-startup)
- [Running in a container](#running-in-a-container)
- [Inspect the plan in application code](#inspect-the-plan-in-application-code)
- [Accounting and lifetime](#accounting-and-lifetime)
- [Publish requests that wait for notifications](#publish-requests-that-wait-for-notifications)
- [Letting a custom handler release its worker while waiting](#letting-a-custom-handler-release-its-worker-while-waiting)
- [What happens when a limit is reached](#what-happens-when-a-limit-is-reached)
- [Configuring request and caller limits](#configuring-request-and-caller-limits)
- [Memory for clients that already have a Session](#memory-for-clients-that-already-have-a-session)
- [Requests without a Session](#requests-without-a-session)
- [Trust, anonymous clients and NAT](#trust-anonymous-clients-and-nat)
- [Before a caller is authenticated](#before-a-caller-is-authenticated)
- [After application or Session authentication](#after-application-or-session-authentication)
- [Repeated requests and cached information](#repeated-requests-and-cached-information)
- [Example: dedicated trusted ingress](#example-dedicated-trusted-ingress)
- [Transport behavior and overload signals](#transport-behavior-and-overload-signals)
- [Limitations](#limitations)
## Terms
These terms describe resource accounting, not permission to access OPC UA data.
| Term | Meaning here |
| --- | --- |
| Admission | Checking available capacity before accepting a connection, retaining data, or starting work. Refusal means that check failed. |
| Classifier / provider | The host's classifier maps verified evidence to a caller group. The provider applies resource limits to that group. Neither replaces service authorization. |
| Physical connection checks | The listener checks capacity before allocating state for an actual network connection. This does not mean that each HTTP request needs another connection slot. Several requests can use the same connection. |
| Isolation refusal | A rejection by the resource-isolation provider, for example because capacity or a per-caller limit is exhausted. A rate limiter or normal service authorization can reject work independently. |
| Owner | The accounting group charged for work: an observed address, a verified application or Session identity, or an explicitly configured group. It is not necessarily one person or one client process. |
| Stage | One separately counted resource, such as connections, queued requests, or retained bytes. The API names are listed under [Accounting and lifetime](#accounting-and-lifetime). |
| Floor / reservation | Capacity kept for a particular class of work or configured owner. Other classes cannot borrow it, even when it is unused. Floors are inside the existing total, except at the RequestQueue, RequestQueueBytes and ParkedRequest stages, where the default total adds them on top of the configured queue (see [Configuring request and caller limits](#configuring-request-and-caller-limits)). |
| Shared capacity / work-conserving | Capacity available to all classes. If only one owner has work, it can use the unused shared capacity up to its hard limit. The server does not divide it into fixed equal shares. Reserved capacity is excluded. |
| Lease | The provider's record of capacity in use. Disposing the lease releases that charge. It is not a time-limited Session or credential. |
| Bootstrap / reconnect | Initial startup or recovery of a connection or Session. Protected access requires a trusted ingress mapping or, where applicable, an authoritative live Session binding. A request's name alone is not evidence. |
| Control work | Recovery or maintenance requests, classified using a verified Session or an explicit trusted mapping rather than the service name alone. |
| Weighted fairness | Selecting queued requests in turns between eligible owners, with more turns for a higher configured weight. It is not a CPU-time share or a response-time guarantee. |
| Allocation cost | A conservative charge used before retaining a decoded request or HTTP body, not a measurement of actual managed-heap allocation. |
| Protected ingress | A network entry path whose access restrictions are enforced by the deployment, so a classifier can identify protected traffic before OPC UA authentication. An IP address alone does not establish identity. |
| UASC | UA Secure Conversation, the OPC UA secure-channel protocol. Its incomplete multi-chunk messages retain arrays until completion or cleanup. |
## Profiles
### SharedOnly
Choose `SharedOnly` to let callers share the configured limits without
per-caller reservations or weighted request scheduling. The server does not
install the default isolation provider. Connection-rate limits, message-size
limits, and the shared reassembly budget still apply, and requests are
dispatched in the order they enter the queue.
Use it when shared limits are the intended policy, or when a deployment needs
zero/unlimited settings or totals that cannot accommodate the other
profiles. For example, a controlled set of clients can continue sharing a
reassembly budget without reserving separate startup capacity:
```csharp
server.ResourceIsolationOptions.Mode = ServerResourceIsolationMode.SharedOnly;
```
Avoid it if competing callers need request scheduling by owner or protected
capacity. Under saturation, earlier callers can occupy the shared resource and
later callers are refused: an over-budget intermediate UASC chunk results in
`BadTcpNotEnoughResources` and channel closure. A full decoded-request queue
results in `BadServerTooBusy`. Zero/unlimited settings retain their defined
meaning. This mode does not disable all limits.
### FairShare
`FairShare` adds bounded owner accounting, optional per-owner hard limits, and
weighted scheduling of decoded requests. It reserves no capacity for startup,
reconnect, control work, or trusted owners. All stage capacity is shared.
Use it for competing applications that need turns at request execution but
do not need protected reserves. For example, two owners with queued reads take
turns as workers become available, while a lone active owner can use idle
shared capacity. Configure a hard limit if one owner should not occupy all
execution slots:
```csharp
server.ResourceIsolationOptions = new ServerResourceIsolationOptions
{
Mode = ServerResourceIsolationMode.FairShare,
Stages =
[
new ResourceIsolationStageOptions
{
Stage = ResourceIsolationStage.RequestExecution,
OwnerHardLimit = 8
}
]
};
```
Avoid it when recovery must have reserved resources, or when configuration
cannot meet the finite bounds described below. Nonzero reservations and
`TrustedOwners` are invalid in this profile. At saturation, already queued work
can wait for execution, but new work that cannot fit in the bounded queue is
refused with `BadServerTooBusy`. Retained chunks never wait for fairness:
insufficient bytes produce `BadTcpNotEnoughResources`. No existing charge is
revoked to let a new owner in.
### Balanced (default)
`Balanced` adds separate startup and reconnect reserves to FairShare, plus
control-work reserves at decoded-request stages. Ordinary traffic cannot use
those reserves. Eligible protected traffic uses its own reserve first and can
also use available shared capacity, subject to its hard limit.
Keep the default for finite-capacity servers that need to prevent ordinary
traffic from occupying every resource needed for recovery. For example, a
verified live Session's recovery request can use reconnect capacity when the
shared request queue is full. A new physical connection still needs protected
ingress classification to use connection reserves.
**Reserving capacity does not make every new client eligible for it.** Without
an ingress classifier, unknown connections use shared capacity even when the
bootstrap and reconnect reserves are idle. Startup does not require a
classifier for Balanced, and it does not silently remove those reserves.
Ordinary callers can receive `BadServerTooBusy` for decoded requests or
`BadTcpNotEnoughResources` for intermediate chunks while protected capacity is
still free. A connection rejected before protocol startup may simply close.
The [configuration example](#configuration) uses Balanced. Do not use an
undersized configuration and expect the server to reduce reserves or raise
totals automatically. If reserved capacity is not the intended policy, select
FairShare. If unlimited or otherwise unsupported totals are required, select
SharedOnly.
### TrustedReservations
`TrustedReservations` adds a separate reserve and scheduling weight for each
owner listed in `TrustedOwners`, in addition to Balanced's class reserves.
Other owners cannot borrow that owner's reserve. Use
`TrustedResourceOwnerOptions.Reservations` to override the reserved amount and
hard limit for each resource. Omitted resources receive enough reserved
capacity for one operation or one maximum-message charge.
Use it when a bounded, known group, such as plant-control applications, needs
capacity that reporting applications cannot occupy. For example, the
[trusted-ingress example](#example-dedicated-trusted-ingress) gives that group
its own resources and more request-dispatch turns. At shared saturation it can
still use its free reserve. If its reserve, available shared capacity, or hard
limit is exhausted, it receives the same busy/resource errors as other callers.
Being trusted does not bypass limits.
A list of owner names is not enough, regardless of whether it comes from code,
JSON, or another configuration source. Your application must also register an
`IResourceIsolationClassifier` that identifies which callers belong to those
owners. The server rejects a TrustedReservations configuration without owner
definitions or a classifier. If the classifier returns a trusted-owner key
that is not configured, the provider rejects the mapping instead of granting
unrestricted access.
## Configuration
This hosted example chooses finite limits explicitly. Its values illustrate
sizing, not a required configuration for every server. The connection hard
limit of 16 is per owner, even though the server permits 100 Sessions in total.
```csharp
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options =>
{
options.ApplicationName = "MyServer";
options.MaxMessageSize = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
options.ConfigureBuilder = configuration => configuration
.SetMaxSessionCount(100)
.SetMaxChannelCount(200);
})
.WithChunkReassemblyBudget(64L * 1024 * 1024)
.ConfigureResourceIsolation(options =>
{
options.Mode = ServerResourceIsolationMode.Balanced;
options.MaxTrackedOwners = 4096;
options.HandshakeTimeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
options.Stages =
[
new ResourceIsolationStageOptions
{
Stage = ResourceIsolationStage.RequestExecution,
OwnerHardLimit = 8
},
new ResourceIsolationStageOptions
{
Stage = ResourceIsolationStage.Connection,
OwnerHardLimit = 16
}
];
});
```
For direct construction, assign options before starting the server with its
`ApplicationConfiguration`. Here `telemetry` is the application's
`ITelemetryContext`:
```csharp
var server = new StandardServer(telemetry)
{
ResourceIsolationOptions = new ServerResourceIsolationOptions
{
Mode = ServerResourceIsolationMode.Balanced
},
ChunkReassemblyBudget = new ChunkReassemblyBudget(64L * 1024 * 1024)
};
```
### JSON configuration
The hosting section is `OpcUa:Server:ResourceIsolation`. Load it through the
server builder, for example
`services.AddOpcUa().AddServer(configuration.GetSection("OpcUa:Server"))`.
The binder parses these options explicitly, without reflection-based binding:
```json
{
"OpcUa": {
"Server": {
"ResourceIsolation": {
"Mode": "Balanced",
"MaxTrackedOwners": 4096,
"HandshakeTimeout": "00:00:30",
"Stages": [
{ "Stage": "RequestExecution", "OwnerHardLimit": 8 }
]
}
}
}
}
```
The same section also accepts `MaxOwnerKeyLength`, `DefaultWeight`,
`MaxRetainedMessageBytes`, `BootstrapReservedBytes`, `ReconnectReservedBytes`,
and `TrustedOwners`. Each trusted owner has `Key`, `Weight`, and `Reservations`.
Each reservation has `Stage`, `Reserved`, and optional `HardLimit`.
Using JSON configuration does not allow you to implement or register a
classifier. Register your application's classifier in code with
`AddResourceIsolationClassifier<T>()`.
### Providers and startup ownership
At startup, `StandardServer` creates and validates a runtime plan, constructs
the default provider, and supplies it to its listeners and request dispatcher.
It disposes the provider it creates. The exceptions are SharedOnly and an
explicitly supplied provider: neither causes installation or validation of a
default provider.
A host can assign `ServerBase.ResourceIsolationProvider` directly or register
`IServerResourceIsolationProvider` in DI. That provider takes precedence even
when the options select SharedOnly. `StandardServer` does not dispose it.
Its creator or DI container owns its lifetime. The same ownership rule applies
to an explicitly supplied classifier.
If you implement a custom provider, make its limits agree with the listeners
and request dispatcher that use it. For example, a provider cannot guarantee
20 queued requests when the dispatcher allows only 10. The lower dispatcher
limit still rejects excess work. The next section explains the checks performed
for the default provider. A custom provider must perform equivalent checks for
the promises it makes.
An installed provider checks decoded-request capacity whether it selects
weighted scheduling or FIFO. `UseFairScheduling = false` selects one queue in
arrival order, not an exemption from request-count, retained-data, execution,
or parked-request limits. If the request at the front cannot obtain execution
capacity, later requests do not overtake it.
## Startup validation and sizing
`ServerResourceIsolationOptions.CreateRuntimePlan` validates FairShare,
Balanced, and TrustedReservations during default-provider startup. Invalid
values cause configuration exceptions rather than silent reserve removal or
hidden increases to configured totals. The JSON binder also rejects malformed
numbers and unknown enum values when options are loaded.
| Check | Available settings and corrective action |
| --- | --- |
| Finite resource bounds | Set positive `ServerConfiguration.MaxSessionCount`, `MaxChannelCount`, and `TransportQuotas.MaxMessageSize` / `MaxBufferSize`. Use SharedOnly if existing unlimited settings are intentional. |
| Connection space after reservations | Adjust `MaxChannelCount`, the intended `MaxSessionCount`, or `Stages` entries for `Connection`. Shared connection capacity must still hold Sessions plus one, as explained below. |
| Every stage can hold work | A `Stages[].Capacity` override can only lower its existing total. After all reservations, shared capacity must hold at least one operation or maximum-message charge. |
| Valid reserves and owner limits | Each nonzero reserve must hold at least one operation/message. `OwnerHardLimit` and trusted `HardLimit` must fit the stage and its applicable reserves. Reduce requested reserves, explicitly raise the underlying total, or choose a different profile. |
| Retained-message space | Size `ChunkReassemblyBudget` through `WithChunkReassemblyBudget(...)` or direct assignment. Reduce `MaxMessageSize` only if the workload permits it. A custom `MaxRetainedMessageBytes` must be a real upper bound, not a value chosen to pass validation. |
| Bounded accounting | `MaxTrackedOwners`, `MaxOwnerKeyLength`, and `DefaultWeight` must be positive. The owner table needs room for shared traffic, each protected class in use, and every trusted owner. |
| Valid profile entries | Duplicate stages/owner keys, invalid stages, arithmetic overflow, incompatible reservations, or trusted owners outside TrustedReservations are rejected. |
| Startup deadline | `HandshakeTimeout` must be positive and at most two minutes. Two minutes is the default. |
The server validates `HandshakeTimeout` even in SharedOnly mode and when a
custom isolation provider is supplied, before replacing an existing policy.
Listener-settings creation rechecks the value in case configuration changed
after initialization. Failures name `HandshakeTimeout`. Protected rate-limit
failures identify `ConnectionsPerSecond` or `ConnectionBurst` and the minimum
required by the configured reservations.
Slot totals come from `MaxChannelCount` for Connection/Handshake,
`ServerRateLimitOptions.MaxConcurrentSessionEstablishment` for SessionEstablishment
(its default applies to nonpositive values), and the existing request-dispatch
limits for queued, executing, and parked work. The dispatcher already uses at
least 100 queue slots and 100 execution slots. The plan mirrors those
minimums. Apart from the decoded-request queue stages described under
[Configuring request and caller limits](#configuring-request-and-caller-limits),
it does not raise configured totals to make reservations fit.
`Stages[].Capacity` can apply a smaller isolation limit.
For Balanced and TrustedReservations with the default connection rate limiter
enabled, startup also checks the rate and burst. Each must accommodate one
bootstrap token, one reconnect token, one per trusted owner, and at least one
shared token. For example, Balanced needs effective `ConnectionsPerSecond` and
`ConnectionBurst` of at least 3. Set those fields explicitly to suit the
deployment, or select a profile without rate reservations. A custom
`IServerRateLimiterProvider` is not replaced or wrapped by this policy.
### Sessions, channels, and reserved capacity
The Session/SecureChannel N+1 relationship means a server configured for
`N = MaxSessionCount` needs room for an additional channel so a client can
replace a connection. **This implementation validates that the shared
Connection capacity itself is at least N+1**, after subtracting all connection
reservations. Protected ingress capacity is not counted toward ordinary
replacement-channel space.
For example, `MaxSessionCount = 100` and `MaxChannelCount = 101` satisfy the
unpartitioned N+1 count but fail Balanced's default runtime plan: its two
connection reserves leave only 99 shared slots. `MaxChannelCount = 103` leaves
101 shared slots and two reserved slots. A trusted owner with the default
one-connection reserve would require another slot. These checks ensure sufficient total capacity. They do not promise the entire
advertised Session maximum to each owner. Per-owner limits and other callers'
usage still apply.
### Reserve sizes and explicit opt-outs
Balanced defaults to one startup and one reconnect operation at slot-based
stages. It also reserves one control operation at decoded-request stages.
For ReassemblyBytes, each startup/reconnect reserve holds the default pool's
conservative maximum retained-message footprint. For RequestQueueBytes, each
reserve holds one `MaxMessageSize` charge.
With a 4 MiB message limit, a 65,536-byte buffer limit, and a 64 MiB reassembly
budget, the default retained-message bound is 16.25 MiB. Bootstrap and reconnect
each reserve 16.25 MiB, leaving 31.5 MiB shared. This bound allows for retained
arrays and pool overhead. It is not the payload size.
For custom buffer managers or transports, the host supplies
`MaxRetainedMessageBytes` if their maximum retained footprint differs from the
default bound. Startup checks its positivity and fit, but cannot prove that
the custom allocator respects it.
To disable a particular stage's protection intentionally, set that stage's
`BootstrapReserved`, `ReconnectReserved`, or `ControlReserved` to `0`.
For a trusted owner, set that stage's `TrustedResourceReservation.Reserved` to
`0`. This deliberately removes that guarantee rather than providing an
automatic fallback.
The top-level `BootstrapReservedBytes` and `ReconnectReservedBytes` instead
require at least one retained-message footprint in Balanced/TrustedReservations.
Use the **ReassemblyBytes stage overrides**, not those top-level properties,
to disable byte reserves. Omitting an override keeps the profile default.
### View effective limits at startup
The default provider writes one Information-level startup log for each resource
stage. Each entry shows total capacity, shared capacity, startup/reconnect/control
reserves, the total trusted-owner reserve, and the ordinary owner's hard limit.
Slot-based resources are logged as counts. Reassembly and request-data resources
are logged in bytes. Enable Information logging for
`Opc.Ua.Server.DefaultServerResourceIsolationProvider` to compare the effective
limits with your deployment settings. The entries contain no owner names,
tokens, or certificates.
### Running in a container
Choose the underlying resource totals to fit inside the container's memory and
CPU limits, then use the startup logs to verify the resolved reservations.
Do not set `ReassemblyBytes` or `RequestQueueBytes` to the entire Kubernetes
memory limit. That memory also holds the address space, subscriptions, responses,
TLS state, the garbage collector's working memory, and application code.
Keep headroom for those allocations and measure the workload under the intended
container limit.
The stack does not derive its quotas from Kubernetes or cgroup limits.
Container memory enforcement remains the runtime's responsibility and can
terminate a process that exceeds its limit. Because .NET uses garbage collection
and dynamic allocation, counted request bytes do not correspond exactly to
process memory use. Collection timing, retained objects and temporary buffers
also affect the peak. CPU limits can inform how many handlers you allow to
execute concurrently, but request slots do not measure CPU time.
Explicit configuration remains the predictable approach.
### Inspect the plan in application code
The server developer or deployment's configuration checker can run this code
before starting a server. Use a .NET 10 console project referencing the server library,
but no running listener, certificates, debugger, or custom classifier:
```csharp
using System;
using Opc.Ua;
using Opc.Ua.Bindings;
using Opc.Ua.Server;
var configuration = new ApplicationConfiguration
{
ServerConfiguration = new ServerConfiguration
{
MaxSessionCount = 100,
MaxChannelCount = 103,
MinRequestThreadCount = 1,
MaxRequestThreadCount = 100,
MaxQueuedRequestCount = 100
},
TransportQuotas = new TransportQuotas
{
MaxMessageSize = 4 * 1024 * 1024,
MaxBufferSize = 65536
}
};
var options = new ServerResourceIsolationOptions();
var rateLimits = new ServerRateLimitOptions
{
MaxConcurrentSessionEstablishment = 64
};
var budget = new ChunkReassemblyBudget(64L * 1024 * 1024);
ServerResourceIsolationPlan plan =
options.CreateRuntimePlan(configuration, rateLimits, budget);
foreach (ResourceIsolationStage stage in Enum.GetValues(typeof(ResourceIsolationStage)))
{
ResourceIsolationStagePlan limits = plan.GetStage(stage);
Console.WriteLine(
$"{stage}: total={limits.Capacity}, shared={limits.SharedCapacity}, " +
$"bootstrap={limits.BootstrapReserved}, reconnect={limits.ReconnectReserved}, " +
$"control={limits.ControlReserved}, trusted={limits.TrustedReserved}, " +
$"ownerLimit={limits.OwnerHardLimit}");
}
```
For example, Connection prints total `103`, shared `101`, and bootstrap and
reconnect `1` each. ReassemblyBytes prints total `67108864`, shared `33030144`,
and bootstrap and reconnect `17039360` each. Use the actual application's
configuration, rate options, and budget in place of these illustrative values.
Creating a plan does not start enforcement, test ingress trust, or validate the
separately constructed connection rate limiter. Even with `Mode = SharedOnly`,
an explicit call to `CreateRuntimePlan` asks for a finite plan and validates it.
Normal SharedOnly startup skips that call. `CreatePlan` is the separate
reassembly-only sizing calculator, not a complete plan for `GetStage`.
For an installed `DefaultServerResourceIsolationProvider`, its `Plan` property
exposes the snapshot actually in use.
## Accounting and lifetime
### Publish requests that wait for notifications
Built-in Publish requests already release their execution worker while waiting
for a notification. `ServerConfiguration.DecoupleHeldPublishRequests` is `true`
by default. Leave it enabled so waiting Publish requests do not occupy workers
needed by reads, writes, and other callers.
While the worker is released, the request still consumes its parked-request
slot and retained-data allowance. Completing or cancelling the request releases
those charges. If you disable `DecoupleHeldPublishRequests`, the waiting request
keeps its execution slot instead.
### Letting a custom handler release its worker while waiting
Register an `IRequestParkingPolicy` to select custom requests whose handlers
can wait without occupying an execution worker. The endpoint checks the policy
before queueing the request and supplies `RequestLifetime.ParkSink` to selected
handlers. Built-in Publish requests remain eligible without a policy.
For example, this policy selects a single call to a method that waits for an
alarm. Other calls continue using an execution worker until they complete:
```csharp
var waitMethodId = new NodeId("WaitForAlarm", 2);
var parkingPolicy = new DelegateRequestParkingPolicy(request =>
{
if (request is not CallRequest call || call.MethodsToCall.Count != 1)
{
return false;
}
return call.MethodsToCall[0].MethodId == waitMethodId;
});
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options => options.ApplicationName = "MyServer")
.WithRequestParking(parkingPolicy);
```
For a directly constructed server, assign
`server.RequestParkingPolicy = parkingPolicy` before startup. You can also
register an `IRequestParkingPolicy` singleton in the hosting container. The
predicate must be quick, thread-safe, and free of authentication side effects.
Selection is not permission to invoke the method. Normal request validation and
authorization still apply.
Inside the handler, finish validation and execution-intensive work, then start
the asynchronous operation that will complete the response. Notify the supplied
sink when the handler reaches its waiting point:
```csharp
private static async ValueTask<CallResponse> WaitForResponseAsync(
Task<CallResponse> pendingResponse,
RequestLifetime lifetime)
{
lifetime.ParkSink?.NotifyParked();
return await pendingResponse.WaitAsync(lifetime.CancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
```
Do not replace the sink or signal a different sink. Do not resume unbounded
CPU work after signaling. Bounded response completion and delivery may still
continue. Repeated notifications are harmless, but the handler must remain
pending until its real result, cancellation, or failure.
With isolation enabled, selected requests reserve a `ParkedRequest` slot before
entering the queue, even if the handler eventually completes without signaling.
Signaling releases execution capacity only. The retained-data charge and parked
slot remain in use until completion. A handler that ignores cancellation retains
those charges through shutdown until it exits. Choose the policy narrowly to
avoid reserving parked slots for ordinary short-running calls.
The global `DecoupleHeldPublishRequests` setting controls this behavior for both
Publish and custom requests. Setting it to `false` keeps the execution worker
attached even when a handler signals its sink.
If you implement `IEndpointIncomingRequest` directly instead of using the normal
endpoint wrapper, implement `IParkableIncomingRequest` and expose one stable
`RequestParkSink` before queueing. Signal that same sink from the handler. The
queue then applies the same parked-capacity, completion and cancellation rules.
| Stage | What stays charged |
| --- | --- |
| `Connection` | A physical connection until actual closure, including reverse-connect handoff. |
| `Handshake` | Initial protocol startup until completion or closure, and OpenSecureChannel renewal work while processing. Initial startup has a fixed deadline. |
| `ReassemblyBytes` | UASC intermediate chunks: actual byte lengths of retained arrays. Common HTTPS body readers: a conservative charge taken before reading. |
| `SessionEstablishment` | Concurrent CreateSession/ActivateSession processing, not the lifetime of the resulting Session. |
| `RequestQueue` | Decoded requests awaiting dispatch. |
| `RequestExecution` | A running request handler. A Publish request releases this slot when it starts waiting for a notification. |
| `RequestQueueBytes` | One `MaxMessageSize` charge per retained decoded request, through queued, executing, and parked processing. |
| `ParkedRequest` | A request that may wait without occupying a worker, such as Publish. Its capacity is reserved before queueing and kept until completion. |
### What happens when a limit is reached
An incomplete message cannot wait indefinitely for another client to free
memory. If the next chunk does not fit, the listener discards that message and
closes its channel with a resource error. This prevents the receive loop from
waiting while holding data that the sender might never complete.
A complete, decoded request can wait in the configured request queue. When a
worker is available, weighted scheduling chooses the next eligible caller.
A higher weight gives that caller more turns. It does not reserve more bytes,
interrupt a running handler, or guarantee a particular response time.
The server releases resource charges when the work completes or fails.
Cancellation and shutdown also trigger cleanup. If your request handler ignores
cancellation and continues running, its capacity remains in use until it exits.
The server does not take capacity away from an accepted request to make room
for another caller.
### Configuring request and caller limits
`MaxQueuedRequestCount` is the number of decoded requests that established
Sessions can have waiting at once. For the RequestQueue, RequestQueueBytes
and ParkedRequest stages, the default total is the configured limit plus the
bootstrap, reconnect, control and trusted floors, so the shared capacity equals
the configured value. For example, with `MaxQueuedRequestCount = 10000`, ten
clients can each keep 1,000 requests outstanding. Balanced then sizes the
RequestQueue stage at 10,003 entries. RequestExecution keeps its floors inside
the worker limit, so an idle worker remains available for protected requests.
An explicit `Stages[].Capacity` is still an absolute total that includes the
floors, and it cannot exceed the default total.
`RequestQueueBytes` limits the data retained by decoded requests. The default
shared capacity is `MaxMessageSize` multiplied by the combined queued, executing,
and parked request limits. This is deliberately conservative accounting, not a
measurement of CLR heap size. Decoder and operation limits continue to apply.
`MaxTrackedOwners` bounds how many caller groups can have resources charged at
once. The server removes a group's accounting entry when its last resource is
released. It does not discard a live entry to accept another identity. Some
entries are reserved for protected classes and configured trusted owners so
ordinary caller churn cannot use every entry.
### Memory for clients that already have a Session
When an incomplete message arrives, the Session token may be in a later chunk.
The default provider asks the server's `IServerSessionBindingProvider` whether the
channel already carries an activated Session. Such a channel can use the
continuity/reconnect byte reserve without a tenant classifier. A channel
without an activated Session cannot consume that reserve.
This protects memory for messages on session-bound channels. It does not mean
that an anonymous user has become a trusted tenant. The extra eligibility
applies only to `ReassemblyBytes`, not to connection, rate, session-establishment,
or request-execution reservations. It also does not consume the separate
accounting entry kept for a genuine reconnect caller.
The provider keeps this decision for the current partial message. It checks
again when the next message starts. If the Session was closed or moved to
another SecureChannel through `ActivateSession`, the old channel no longer
qualifies unless another activated Session still uses it. Closing the transport
releases all of its partial-message resources.
The continuity reserve has a finite size shared by qualifying session messages
and explicitly classified reconnect work. One maximum-sized message may occupy
the entire default reserve. To allow several large messages concurrently,
increase `ReconnectReservedBytes` or the `ReassemblyBytes` stage's
`ReconnectReserved`, while keeping the total budget large enough for all
reserves and shared work. Use a larger continuity reserve when several
session-bound clients share one recovery allowance and do not require
separation from each other. For example, it can accommodate two simultaneous
large messages instead of one.
Use TrustedReservations when particular application groups need capacity that
other session-bound clients cannot consume. Each configured owner receives a
separate reserve, and your classifier must verify that the caller belongs to
that owner. The [trusted-ingress example](#example-dedicated-trusted-ingress)
shows that setup. Its extra reserves must also fit within the total budget.
An explicit classifier mapping to shared capacity remains shared.
The shared budget's `MaxBytes` remains an overall ceiling. SharedOnly uses
the `MaxBytesWithoutSession` occupancy rule explained in
[Rate limiting](RateLimiting.md#incomplete-messages). A custom provider that
implements `IResourceIsolationReassemblyProvider` can replace that rule with
its own classification policy, independently of `UseFairScheduling`. The
shared budget still enforces its total-byte limit. A provider without that capability keeps the
occupancy rule, even if it enables fair request scheduling.
### Requests without a Session
A request that names no Session ([Session-less invocation](SessionlessInvocation.md),
OPC 10000-4 §6.3) is not charged to a Session. It uses the same queue and
execution stages as other requests, and `AddSessionlessInvocation` adds a
budget of its own: the number of such requests that run at the same time on the
server and on one channel. A request over the budget receives
`BadServerTooBusy`. See
[Limiting concurrent requests](SessionlessInvocation.md#limiting-concurrent-requests).
## Trust, anonymous clients and NAT
### Before a caller is authenticated
The provider groups ordinary incoming connections by their observed address.
IPv4 and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 representation belong to the same group. This
lets you limit a busy source, but does not authenticate it. NAT can make many
clients appear to share one address. A previous successful client at that
address does not prove that the next connection is trustworthy.
`IResourceIsolationClassifier.TryClassifyIngress` is the host's way to map
protected traffic before OPC UA authentication. The deployment operator
establishes access restrictions on a network, proxy, or transport entry point.
Your classifier uses that evidence to return the configured group. The provider
checks the returned key and class, but cannot verify your firewall or proxy
configuration for you.
### After application or Session authentication
After authentication, validated application certificates and verified live
Session bindings allow stronger grouping. Certificates supplied under
SecurityPolicy None are removed from the context passed to the classifier.
A secure application certificate does not, by itself, grant a provisioned
trusted-owner reserve. An activated anonymous Session is not automatically a
trusted owner either.
Decoded-request classification uses `IServerSessionBindingProvider` and is checked
again before execution. Stale, transferred, expired, or unknown Session tokens
cannot preserve an earlier protected classification. Normal service
authentication and authorization still execute. HTTPS logical channels may
represent multiple clients. The classifier cannot treat one logical channel as
proof of a permanent client identity.
### Repeated requests and cached information
To reduce allocations, the provider can reuse a previously calculated caller
group and a copy of its certificate information. It still checks the current
Session binding, channel evidence, and your classifier before reusing that
result. Changed certificates or mappings, a different Session, or Session
reactivation prevent an outdated result from being used.
Checking for a reusable entry does not acquire the cache's write lock. Up to
eight entries are kept for each live logical channel so several HTTP peers can
reuse their entries without replacing one another immediately. The entries can
be collected when the channel identifier is no longer used. You do not need to
configure this cache, and it does not make authorization decisions.
### Example: dedicated trusted ingress
This illustrative classifier is appropriate **only** for a gateway dedicated to
one provisioned group. Before forwarding traffic, that gateway authenticates
membership in the group. Network controls ensure no other sender can reach the
server using the gateway's observed source address, and untrusted traffic is
never forwarded through it. The example maps that already-protected path. The
address comparison does not supply those protections.
Configure `ProtectedIngress:GatewayAddress` in the host's `IConfiguration` with
the gateway address actually observed by the server. It is operator
configuration, not a request header or a client-supplied owner name.
```csharp
using System;
using System.Net;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
using Opc.Ua;
using Opc.Ua.Server;
public sealed class DedicatedIngressClassifier : IResourceIsolationClassifier
{
public DedicatedIngressClassifier(IConfiguration configuration)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(configuration);
string address = configuration["ProtectedIngress:GatewayAddress"] ??
throw new InvalidOperationException("Configure ProtectedIngress:GatewayAddress.");
m_gatewayAddress = Normalize(IPAddress.Parse(address));
}
public bool TryClassifyIngress(
IPEndPoint? remoteEndpoint,
out ResourceIsolationIdentity identity)
{
if (remoteEndpoint != null &&
Normalize(remoteEndpoint.Address).Equals(m_gatewayAddress))
{
identity = new ResourceIsolationIdentity("plant-control", ResourceIsolationClass.Trusted);
return true;
}
identity = default;
return false;
}
public bool TryClassify(
SecureChannelContext channelContext,
SessionBindingContext? sessionBinding,
out ResourceIsolationIdentity identity)
{
identity = default;
return false;
}
private static IPAddress Normalize(IPAddress address)
{
return address.IsIPv4MappedToIPv6 ? address.MapToIPv4() : address;
}
private readonly IPAddress m_gatewayAddress;
}
```
Returning `false` from `TryClassify` leaves the provider to apply the ingress
mapping or its ordinary verified-Session/application/address classification.
The code never trusts a caller's claimed group. All clients through this
gateway share **one** owner's limits. It is not an example of distinguishing
individual clients behind an arbitrary proxy or NAT.
Register the classifier and matching owner in a Generic Host (which supplies
`IConfiguration`), with room for the extra reserves:
```csharp
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options =>
{
options.ApplicationName = "MyServer";
options.MaxMessageSize = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
options.ConfigureBuilder = configuration => configuration
.SetMaxSessionCount(100)
.SetMaxChannelCount(200);
})
.WithChunkReassemblyBudget(128L * 1024 * 1024)
.ConfigureResourceIsolation(options =>
{
options.Mode = ServerResourceIsolationMode.TrustedReservations;
options.TrustedOwners =
[
new TrustedResourceOwnerOptions
{
Key = "plant-control",
Weight = 4,
Reservations =
[
new TrustedResourceReservation(ResourceIsolationStage.RequestExecution, 2, 8)
]
}
];
})
.AddResourceIsolationClassifier<DedicatedIngressClassifier>();
```
Here the owner has two reserved execution slots, an execution hard limit of
eight, and weight four versus ordinary owners' default weight one. Other stages
use that owner's default reserves. For a direct server, assign the same options
and `server.ResourceIsolationClassifier = new DedicatedIngressClassifier(configuration)`
before startup. To protect Balanced startup/reconnect ingress instead, implement
an equally verified mapping returning `Bootstrap` or `Reconnect`, without
`TrustedOwners`. This Trusted classifier is not interchangeable with that mapping.
## Transport behavior and overload signals
Raw TCP, Kestrel TCP, and OPC UA binary WebSockets share the server policy. They check
connection and handshake capacity before protocol-channel and cryptographic
state allocation. HTTPS checks physical connections before TLS and applies
bounded common request-body processing. Rate limits remain separate checks.
When the default connection rate limiter is enabled, Balanced and
TrustedReservations partition the existing rate and burst totals into shared
and protected tokens. Bootstrap, reconnect, and each trusted owner have one
token of burst and one token per second. Protected traffic
can also use available shared tokens. Shared traffic cannot take protected
tokens. Closing a connection does not refund its token. FairShare and
SharedOnly keep the ordinary shared token bucket.
Initial startup has a fixed deadline independent of renewable channel
lifetimes. Reverse-connect handoff retains the physical connection charge
until actual closure. A configured client accepting a valid ReverseHello can
finish startup and save the connection for later use without releasing its
connection slot.
When a raw TCP connection could be accepted only by reclaiming an unused
channel, the rate limiter must approve the attempt **before** reclamation.
That approval consumes one token even if a concurrent change later prevents
reclamation. The retry does not consume a second token. This limits expensive
reclamation attempts and prevents a caller rejected by the rate limiter from
closing another client's channel. Owner-limit rejection does not consume a
rate token, and a failed attempt never borrows another class's reserved tokens.
At capacity, the raw listener can reclaim an unused established channel without
a Session, but not one with an active handshake, partial message, queued write,
or in-flight decoded request. An owner-limit or rate-limit refusal does not
evict another channel just to make room for that inadmissible caller.
| Condition | Client-visible result |
| --- | --- |
| Physical connection refused before protocol startup | The connection closes. The client sees a transport error because a protocol status cannot always be sent yet. |
| UASC retained-chunk capacity exhausted | The server sends ERR `BadTcpNotEnoughResources` and closes the channel. If the error cannot be sent, the client observes closure alone. |
| Decoded-request or SessionEstablishment capacity exhausted | The server returns `BadServerTooBusy`. The client should back off before retrying. |
| Configured Session maximum reached | `BadTooManySessions`, independently of isolation capacity. |
| Common HTTPS body-processing capacity refused | HTTP 503 (Service Unavailable), including refusal before a WebSocket upgrade. This is distinct from a rate limiter's HTTP 429. |
WebSocket close code 1009 means excessive message size, not arbitrary resource
pressure. See [Rate limiting](RateLimiting.md) for retry behavior and additional
overload signals.
OpenAPI WebSockets can process concurrent messages so a waiting Publish does
not stop other requests. Each pending frame acquires count and retained-byte
capacity before it is copied or scheduled, and holds that capacity through
response sending. A per-connection bound also applies without an isolation
provider. Capacity refusal after upgrade closes with 1013 (Try Again Later),
not the message-size code 1009. Shutdown cancels pending work. A handler that
outlives the shutdown wait keeps its accounting until it actually exits.
The default provider exposes `GetUsage(stage)` and `TrackedOwnerCount`, plus
`opcua.server.isolation.usage`, `opcua.server.isolation.owners`, and
`opcua.server.isolation.rejections` metrics. Rejections use only bounded stage
and reason labels (`Capacity`, `OwnerLimit`, `OwnerTableFull`, `InvalidOwner`).
Application diagnostics should not add owner keys, tokens, or raw addresses as
metric labels.
## Limitations
- Unknown callers receive best-effort shared service. Neither fairness nor idle
reserves guarantee that all unknown clients can connect or make progress,
particularly during a distributed flood. Protected pre-authentication access
requires a deployment-enforced ingress boundary and a classifier.
- Reservations protect only the resources counted here. A full independent
budget, custom limiter, exhausted protected reserve, or blocked handler can
still prevent progress. There is no fixed response-time guarantee.
- This is not a whole-heap cap. Subscription/MonitoredItem storage, PubSub,
custom REST body buffering, response buffers, and unrelated application
allocations need their own limits. Request allocation costs are conservative
accounting units, not measured heap sizes.
- Network bandwidth, connection-backlog attacks, and TLS saturation still need
upstream protection. The server cannot authenticate an IP address by observing
traffic history.
- A provider can be shared within a process, but it is not a quota store across
a fleet. The host remains responsible for aligning every consumer's physical
capacities with a custom shared policy.