Files
UA-.NETStandard/docs/SessionlessInvocation.md
Klaus Landsdorf fa55157ce4 Server: hold anonymous session-less requests to the channel security of CreateSession (#4689)
# Description

`AddSessionlessInvocation(o => o.AllowAnonymous = true)` (#4659) lets a
request without an Access Token run as an anonymous user. OPC 10000-4
§6.3.1 allows that only "if application authentication through the
SecureChannel is sufficient". On HTTPS the channel gave no such
authentication: on an endpoint with mutual TLS and a SignAndEncrypt
policy, a session-less request without a TLS client certificate and
without an Access Token was answered `Good`, over the REST binding and
over the binary POST with `OPCUA-SecurityPolicy: Basic256Sha256`.
`CreateSession` on the same endpoint answers `Bad_SecurityChecksFailed`
without the certificate, and ActivateSession on a new channel does too
(OPC 10000-6 §7.4.1: applications that use HTTPS and require application
authentication check the application certificates during the
CreateSession/ActivateSession handshake).

This PR makes a session-less request without an Access Token meet what
the endpoint demands of a Session. #4659 is merged, in no release tag
and opt-in, so this is a change to a new feature; the default
`AllowAnonymous = false` is not affected.

## Changes

### `SessionManager.ValidateSessionlessRequestAsync`
(`src/Opc.Ua.Server/Session/SessionManager.cs`)

With `AllowAnonymous`, a request without an Access Token now needs:

| Check | Where it applies | Status otherwise | Same as |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The client certificate of the channel
(`SecureChannelContext.ClientChannelCertificate`) | endpoints with a
security mode or policy other than None, and HTTPS endpoints when
`HttpsMutualTls` is set | `Bad_SecurityChecksFailed` | CreateSession on
the HTTPS listener; ActivateSession on a new channel |
| An Anonymous user token policy on the endpoint (an endpoint without
policies does not restrict) | every endpoint |
`Bad_IdentityTokenRejected` | ActivateSession with an anonymous identity
token |
| An endpoint on the channel | every request |
`Bad_SecurityModeInsufficient` | the same request with an Access Token |

- The certificate is the one the transport has validated: the
SecureChannel certificate of opc.tcp and opc.wss, the TLS client
certificate of the HTTPS listener (REST, binary, JSON). So opc.tcp
channels with security keep working as they did, and an HTTPS client
that wants an anonymous session-less call presents its application
certificate in the TLS handshake.
- An HTTPS listener without `HttpsMutualTls` advertises SecurityMode
None without an Anonymous user token policy (`HttpsServiceHost`); an
anonymous session-less request there is now rejected as an anonymous
Session is.
- A request **with an Access Token** is unchanged: the token
authenticates the caller and HTTPS keeps it confidential (HTTPS clients
are not required to present a certificate, OPC 10000-6 §7.4.1). A
`ValidateSessionLessRequest` handler still takes over completely.
- Not changed: the transport credential authentication of the REST
routes (#4674).

`SessionlessInvocationOptions.AllowAnonymous` documents the rule.
`docs/SessionlessInvocation.md` has a new section "Anonymous requests
and the channel" with the table.

### Tests

- `tests/Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests/SessionlessChannelSecurityTests.cs` (new,
net8.0+): a real reference server with an HTTPS listener, twice (mutual
TLS on with a SignAndEncrypt-only endpoint; mutual TLS off), over REST
and the binary POST, with and without a TLS client certificate:
anonymous without a certificate, with a certificate, `AllowAnonymous =
false`, a valid and a bogus Access Token, and CreateSession on the
binary POST without the certificate for comparison. 44 cases.
- `tests/Opc.Ua.Server.Tests/SessionlessInvocationTests.cs`: opc.tcp
with and without a channel certificate (Sign, SignAndEncrypt, None),
HTTPS with and without mutual TLS and with a secured endpoint, user
token policies with and without Anonymous, no endpoint, an Access Token
and a handler without a certificate. The existing tests that use
`AllowAnonymous` set `HttpsMutualTls = false` or give the channel an
endpoint.
- Fail without the change: 7 of the 9 new `SessionlessInvocationTests`
cases fail with the `SessionManager.cs` change removed (the opc.tcp with
security, HTTPS with and without mutual TLS, user token policy and
unknown endpoint tests); the 6 failing `SessionlessChannelSecurityTests`
cases are below.

## Testing

- **Reproduction on master (`c03c12838`)**:
`SessionlessChannelSecurityTests` without the change: 6 of 44 cases
fail, 38 pass. With mutual TLS on and no TLS client certificate the
anonymous request is answered `Good` instead of
`Bad_SecurityChecksFailed` (REST and binary). With mutual TLS off it is
answered `Good` instead of `Bad_IdentityTokenRejected` (REST and binary,
with and without a certificate). All 44 pass with the change; the Access
Token cases pass both ways.
- Results on macOS: `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` full run on net10.0 8197
passed / 9 skipped / 0 failed; the session-less and SessionManager
filters 139 passed / 0 failed on net10.0 and on net8.0.
`Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` with the HTTPS/WebApi/Sessionless filters 125
passed / 0 failed on net10.0 and on net8.0, and with the
Wss/OpenApi/ClientTest filters 320 passed / 241 skipped / 0 failed on
net10.0.
- Builds: `Opc.Ua.Server`, `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` and
`Opc.Ua.Sessions.Tests` for net48, net8.0, net9.0 and net10.0: 0
warnings, 0 errors.
- `dotnet format` (whitespace, style, analyzers `--severity info`, one
`--include` per changed file): no finding on a changed line (CA1849 at
`SessionManager.cs` 235 is on master).
- Coverage (`.azurepipelines/check-coverage.ps1` against master,
session-less and SessionManager tests of `Opc.Ua.Server.Tests` on
net10.0): patch 36/36 changed lines (100 %). The project floor is not
meaningful for this subset.
- CI and CodeQL on the PR branch: [CI run
37529750287](https://github.com/biancode/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/37529750287)
green (158/158 jobs, incl. macOS and Windows net48), [CodeQL run
37529754883](https://github.com/biancode/UA-.NETStandard/actions/runs/37529754883)
green, on `03a8e3d91`.

## Related Issues

- Fixes #4688
- Relates to #4659 (session-less invocation), #4657 (the REST binding's
session-less service set) and #4674 (REST authentication)

## Checklist

- [x] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [x] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed. (Affected
suites on net10.0 and net8.0 locally on macOS; .NET Framework is covered
by the branch CI's Windows net48 legs.)
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.

---------

Co-authored-by: Marc Schier <marcschier@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-07 08:55:53 +00:00

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Markdown

# Session-less Service invocation
OPC 10000-4 [§6.3](https://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part4/v105/docs/6.3)
lets a Client invoke a subset of the Services without CreateSession and
ActivateSession. The request then carries either an Access Token in
`RequestHeader.authenticationToken`, or no token at all. This page shows how
to enable it on a server built with this stack.
## Contents
- [Which Services](#which-services)
- [Enabling it](#enabling-it)
- [Caller identity](#caller-identity)
- [Answers without the feature](#answers-without-the-feature)
- [Limiting concurrent requests](#limiting-concurrent-requests)
- [Taking over completely](#taking-over-completely)
- [Calling the server](#calling-the-server)
## Which Services
Session-less invocation is limited to the Service Sets §6.3.1 names:
| Service Set | Services |
| --- | --- |
| View | Browse, BrowseNext, TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds (not RegisterNodes / UnregisterNodes) |
| Attribute | Read, Write, HistoryRead, HistoryUpdate |
| Method | Call |
| NodeManagement | AddNodes, AddReferences, DeleteNodes, DeleteReferences |
| Query | QueryFirst, QueryNext |
Every other Service, for example CreateSubscription or Publish, needs a
Session and is answered with `Bad_SessionIdInvalid` without one.
`SessionManager.IsSessionlessService(RequestType)` returns the same decision.
A request without a Session has no Session state to keep continuation
points in: Browse returns none, and BrowseNext reports every continuation
point as invalid.
## Enabling it
With dependency injection:
```csharp
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options => { /* … */ })
.AddSessionlessInvocation() // OPC 10000-4 §6.3
.AddJwtIssuer(options => { /* … */ }); // validates the Access Tokens
```
`AddSessionlessInvocation` registers `SessionlessInvocationOptions`. The
hosted server applies them to the session manager it uses, including one
created by `AddSessionManager(...)`, unless that manager was configured
already.
Without dependency injection, set the options on the session manager:
```csharp
var sessionManager = (SessionManager)server.CurrentInstance.SessionManager;
sessionManager.SessionlessInvocation = new SessionlessInvocationOptions();
```
## Caller identity
| Request | Identity | Option |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `authenticationToken` is a String NodeId | The Access Token, validated as an issued JWT token (OPC 10000-6 §7.6.5.2.3) by the server's identity registry, the authenticators ActivateSession uses | `AcceptAccessTokens` (default `true`) |
| no `authenticationToken` | An anonymous user | `AllowAnonymous` (default `false`) |
- The roles of the identity are mapped as ActivateSession maps those of a
Session: the roles granted by the `IRoleManager` identity-mapping rules,
including the configured Access Token claims and the built-in
AuthenticatedUser role, are added to the identity before the request runs.
This also applies to the identity a `ValidateSessionLessRequest` handler sets.
A request without a Session has no client application certificate, so it is
not granted the TrustedApplication role and no application-based mapping.
- §6.3.1 requires encryption for the Access Token. It is only accepted over
a SecureChannel with `SignAndEncrypt`, or over HTTPS. On any other channel
the request is rejected.
- A token no authenticator accepts is answered with the authenticator's
error, or `Bad_IdentityTokenRejected`.
- A request without a token is answered with `Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid`
unless `AllowAnonymous` is set.
- With `AllowAnonymous` the request has to meet what the endpoint demands of
CreateSession and ActivateSession; see
[Anonymous requests and the channel](#anonymous-requests-and-the-channel).
- Session tokens are UInt32 or ByteString NodeIds. A token of that kind that
names no Session stays `Bad_SessionIdInvalid`, which is what a Client
whose Session expired needs to see.
Override `SessionManager.ValidateSessionlessRequestAsync` for different
rules.
### Anonymous requests and the channel
§6.3.1 lets a Server skip the Access Token and assume an anonymous user "if
application authentication through the SecureChannel is sufficient". A request
that `AllowAnonymous` admits therefore runs only if its channel authenticates
the application the way the endpoint demands for CreateSession:
| Endpoint | The request needs | Otherwise |
| --- | --- | --- |
| opc.tcp or opc.wss with a security mode or policy other than None | the client certificate of the SecureChannel, which opc.tcp has validated while it opened the channel | `Bad_SecurityChecksFailed` |
| HTTPS (REST, binary or JSON) with a security mode or policy other than None, or with `HttpsMutualTls` set | the TLS client certificate, which the HTTPS listener has validated during the TLS handshake | `Bad_SecurityChecksFailed` |
| HTTPS without `HttpsMutualTls`, SecurityMode None | nothing | |
| any, with user token policies that include no Anonymous policy | an anonymous user token policy on the endpoint, as ActivateSession requires it | `Bad_IdentityTokenRejected` |
| unknown (no endpoint on the channel) | an endpoint | `Bad_SecurityModeInsufficient` |
The endpoints of an HTTPS listener without `HttpsMutualTls` offer no Anonymous
user token policy, so on them an anonymous Session-less request is rejected
as an anonymous Session is.
HTTPS clients are not required to present a certificate (OPC 10000-6 §7.4.1),
and HTTPS authenticates the application when a Session is created. With
`HttpsMutualTls` set, a Client that wants an anonymous Session-less call
presents its application certificate in the TLS handshake. A request that
carries an Access Token does not need the client certificate: the token
authenticates the caller, and HTTPS keeps it confidential.
## Answers without the feature
Without `AddSessionlessInvocation` and without a
`ValidateSessionLessRequest` handler, a request that carries no
`authenticationToken` is answered with `Bad_ServiceUnsupported`, as §6.3.1
prescribes for a Server that does not support session-less invocation.
Requests with a token that names no Session stay `Bad_SessionIdInvalid`.
## Limiting concurrent requests
A request of a Session is accounted for by its Session. A session-less request
has none, but it still occupies a worker and keeps its channel active. The
[resource isolation](ResourceIsolation.md) of the server limits channels,
queued requests and incomplete messages. Session-less requests share these
queue and execution stages with the requests of Sessions. `AddSessionlessInvocation`
adds a ceiling on the number of Session-less requests that run at the same
time. The ceiling does not reserve any capacity: it neither keeps a share of
the queue or the workers free for Sessions nor gives Session-less requests a
share of their own, so Session-less requests below the ceiling still compete
with the requests of Sessions for the shared stages:
| Option | Default | Limits |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `MaxConcurrentRequests` | 64 | Session-less requests that run at the same time, over all channels |
| `MaxConcurrentRequestsPerChannel` | 16 | The same on one channel |
```csharp
services.AddOpcUa()
.AddServer(options => { /* … */ })
.AddSessionlessInvocation(options =>
{
options.MaxConcurrentRequests = 128;
options.MaxConcurrentRequestsPerChannel = 32;
});
```
- Zero does not limit. A negative value is rejected.
- A request counts from the check of its identity until its Service has
completed, failed or was cancelled. A request that is rejected while its
identity is checked, for example because its Access Token is not accepted,
returns its place at once.
- A request over a limit is answered with `Bad_ServerTooBusy`: "The Server does
not have the resources to process the request at this time." The client can
retry the same request later. Nothing was executed.
- The channel of an opc.tcp request is its SecureChannel. The HTTPS bindings
have no SecureChannel per connection, so their requests are grouped by the
network address of the peer. Callers behind one address, such as a proxy,
share the limit.
- Requests that carry a Session token, and requests the feature does not
accept (see [Which Services](#which-services)), are not counted.
- The limits are read for every request, so changing the options applies to the
next request. Requests that run keep their place.
## Taking over completely
A handler on `ISessionManager.ValidateSessionLessRequest` decides before the
built-in handling. It receives the token and the request type and sets the
identity or an error. The Service Set limit above applies before the
handler is called. When `AddSessionlessInvocation` is used as well, the
request limits above apply before the handler too. A handler without
`AddSessionlessInvocation` runs without a request limit.
## Calling the server
Over opc.tcp, any client channel without a Session works, for example a
`SessionClient` on a channel from `ClientChannelManager`:
```csharp
var client = new SessionClient(channel, telemetry);
ReadResponse response = await client.ReadAsync(
new RequestHeader { AuthenticationToken = new NodeId(accessToken, 0) },
0,
TimestampsToReturn.Neither,
[new ReadValueId { NodeId = VariableIds.Server_ServerStatus_State, AttributeId = Attributes.Value }],
ct);
```
Over the [REST binding](WebApi.md) the token is a String NodeId in the JSON
request header:
```json
{
"RequestHeader": { "AuthenticationToken": "s=<access-token>" },
"NodesToRead": [ { "NodeId": "i=2259", "AttributeId": 13 } ]
}
```