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romanett a0d569d756 Fix Server and GDS audit findings, review findings and spec-conformance gaps (#4571)
## Summary

Fixes the findings of a bug audit of `Opc.Ua.Server`,
`Opc.Ua.Gds.Server` and `Opc.Ua.Gds.Client`. Rebased on master after
#4516.

What went in:
- **Audit:** 93 findings, each checked against the OPC UA specification.
- **Code review of those fixes:** 35 further findings.
- **Spec grounding of every fix commit:** 18 conformance gaps, now
closed.

Commits are one per finding, named `Fix <ID>`, `Fix review <ID>` or `Fix
spec gap <name>`. The IDs refer to the audit report (S = Server areas,
G1 = GDS server, G2 = GDS client).

Validation:
- Each finding was traced in code and checked against OPC 10000 (parts
3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 20).
- Every fix commit was checked against the spec text again afterwards: 0
non-conformant, remaining gaps fixed.
- Regression tests were added for most fixes.
- Suites run on net10.0 before the rebase: Server, GDS, History,
Configuration, Features, Core.Security, DI, Redundancy, LDS,
InformationModel, PubSub.Server, Client, Sessions and the three
Subscriptions suites, all green. The same suites on the rebased branch
are still running; results will be posted as a comment.

## Behaviour and user-facing changes

### Secure defaults
- **`Historize()` / `HistorianBuilder`** grant HistoryRead only. History
writes need an explicit `historyAccessLevel: HistoryRead |
HistoryWrite`.
- **File-system mount:**
- Anonymous sessions can no longer create, delete, move or open files
for writing (`Bad_UserAccessDenied`).
  - UserWritable and UserExecutable now reflect the user.
- `AllowAnonymousWrite` restores the old behaviour; the ReferenceServer
sample turns it on.
- **Default PKI root** for the hosted server, hosted GDS, hosted LDS and
`OpcUaApplicationConfigurationProvider`:
- Moved from the shared temp directory to `{LocalApplicationData}/OPC
Foundation/{ApplicationName}/pki`, and startup fails if no per-user
directory exists.
- When certificate stores of an earlier version still exist under temp,
a warning names both paths. Existing deployments that relied on the
default get a new application certificate (and the hosted GDS a new CA)
unless `PkiRoot` is set to the old path.
- **GDS:**
  - `GdsServerOptions.AutoApprove` defaults to `false`.
- The default KeyCredential store grants no roles unless
`AuthorizeRoles` allows them.
- Certificate requests (StartSigningRequest, StartNewKeyPairRequest,
FinishRequest) need an encrypted channel.
- **Hosted server anonymous logins:**
- Anonymous is rejected (`Bad_IdentityTokenRejected`) when the default
authenticator options disable it.
- A custom `AddIdentityAuthenticator<T>()` on its own no longer disables
anonymous.
- With anonymous disabled and no configured token policies, the endpoint
advertises the authenticators' token types instead of Anonymous.
- **Runtime-added roles:** their properties and methods need
SecurityAdmin over an encrypted channel, like the well-known roles.
- **Disabled users:** users disabled through Part 18 UserManagement can
no longer log in through `RegisterDefaultAuthenticators(IUserDatabase)`.

### GDS server (Part 12)
- **Certificate requests:**
- FinishRequest / ReadRequest with another application's RequestId
returns `Bad_InvalidArgument`.
  - Every Start*Request returns a new RequestId.
- A CSR without the ApplicationUri is rejected
(`Bad_CertificateUriInvalid`).
- An abstract or unsupported certificate type is rejected at Start
(`Bad_InvalidArgument`).
- **Private-key password:** no longer persisted in the JSON applications
database. A password saved by an earlier version is read into memory
once and dropped on the next save.
- **CheckRevocationStatus:** validates offline against the GDS's own
trust lists and CRLs. It returns Good for good GDS-issued certificates
and `Bad_CertificateInvalid` for input that is not a certificate.
- **Certificate-group trust lists:**
- Writes need CertificateAuthorityAdmin; SecurityAdmin and application
admins are read-only.
  - Writes are validated with the Part 4 certificate validation.
- **AuthorizationService:**
- The legacy RequestAccessToken applies `AccessControl` and issues the
token for the session identity.
- StartRequestToken passes the session identity to every identity-aware
provider.
  - Unknown ResourceIds return `Bad_NotFound`.
- Expired token requests and refresh tokens are pruned, with at most 10
000 pending requests (`Bad_TooManyOperations`).
- **KeyCredential:** requests with PublicKey + SecurityPolicyUri are
rejected with `Bad_SecurityPolicyRejected` (secret encryption is not
implemented); a PublicKey without SecurityPolicyUri is rejected with
`Bad_InvalidArgument`.
- **Audit events:** access-token audit events no longer contain the
password or token data.
- **RegisterTickets / UnregisterTickets:** need the RegistrarAdmin role
when called from a session.
- **Managed application nodes:** moved from namespace 0 to their own
namespace (`ManagedApplicationsNamespaceUri`); the NodeId is the
ApplicationUri, and the mandatory child properties exist.
- **Hosted GDS:**
- New `GdsServerOptions.CertificateGroups`
(`GdsCertificateGroupOptions`), bindable from configuration.
  - The mandatory DefaultApplicationGroup is always present.
  - The default CA subject uses the resolved application name.
- **JSON applications database:**
- A corrupt file throws instead of being silently replaced by an empty
database.
- Saves are atomic and write in place on bind mounts; on net8+ builds
they also follow symlinks and keep the Unix file mode.
  - Issued certificates and trust-list links survive a reload.

### GDS client
- **Trust-list download:**
  - Reads until an empty chunk (Part 20 short reads).
- A size-limit rejection of the final end-of-file read, as sent by
released servers, counts as end of file.
- **Default certificate group:** a null group means
DefaultApplicationGroup, and vendor groups in other namespaces are no
longer mistaken for well-known groups.
- **Status codes and errors:**
  - Missing directory proxies report `Bad_ServerNotConnected`.
- Short or wrongly typed method outputs throw `BadUnexpectedError` /
`BadTypeMismatch`.
- **GdsAccessTokenProvider:** no longer caches a failed client task, and
one caller's cancellation no longer fails other callers.

### Trust lists, push and ConfigurationFile (Part 12 / Part 20)
- **AddCertificate:**
  - `IsTrustedCertificate=false` returns `Bad_CertificateInvalid`.
- Added certificates are validated (Part 4), and a certificate revoked
by a current CRL returns `Bad_CertificateRevoked`.
- **CloseAndUpdate:** validates the uploaded list against its own
certificates and CRLs, not the stores it replaces. Validation failures
are no longer recorded in the server's Rejected store.
- **RemoveCertificate:** removing a trusted or issuer CA that other
certificates still need returns `Bad_CertificateChainIncomplete`.
- **Handles:**
  - Several read handles may be open at once.
- Any open while a write handle exists returns `Bad_NotReadable` /
`Bad_NotWritable`.
  - A write open while any handle is open returns `Bad_NotWritable`.
  - Handles of closed sessions are released.
  - Idle handles close after ActivityTimeout (default 60 s).
- **Status codes:**
- Read clamps to the remaining bytes and no longer enforces the size
limit.
  - Oversized Write / AddCertificate returns `Bad_RequestTooLarge`.
  - Unsupported open modes return `Bad_NotSupported`.
- **ConfigurationFile.CloseAndUpdate:**
  - Empty Targets return `Bad_InvalidArgument`.
- The ConfigurationUpdatedAuditEvent is raised with the configuration
owner as source.
- With the new `IApplicationConfigurationFileTargetProvider`, providers
receive the Targets, a bad target returns Uncertain with per-target
results, and session-interrupting updates are applied after
RestartDelayTime.
- **Default namespace permissions:** namespaces registered after the
first permission lookup now get their NamespaceMetadata default
RolePermissions and AccessRestrictions (no stale negative cache).

### Sessions, identity and roles (Part 18)
- **Session timeouts:** a failure closing one timed-out session no
longer stops the session-timeout monitor.
- **ChangePassword:** an empty old password returns
`Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid`.
- **Removing or disabling a user:** closes only that user's
UserName-token sessions.
- **Role configuration changes:** roles granted by an `ImpersonateUser`
mapping are kept.
- **X509Subject rules:** a certificate subject value containing a quote
never matches an X509Subject rule.
- **`ImpersonateUser` callback:** no longer runs under the global
session lock.
- **Session diagnostics:** LocaleIds are kept as the client sent them,
while null LocaleIds are ignored for translation.

### Subscriptions and monitored items (Part 4)
- **Acknowledgements:** a failing acknowledgement returns a per-entry
Bad status instead of failing the whole Publish.
- **`DiscardedMessageCount`:** counts messages dropped from the
retransmission queue and unsent overflow messages.
- **Durable subscriptions:** transferring a restored anonymous
subscription works (no NullReferenceException).
- **Transferred subscriptions:** sampling and permission checks use the
item's current owner session.
- **Access denied:** a monitored item whose user may no longer read the
attribute gets a `Bad_UserAccessDenied` notification instead of going
silent. Non-Value attributes need Browse permission (RolePermissions
needs ReadRolePermissions), and User* attributes are evaluated per
subscriber.
- **ModifyMonitoredItems:** a SamplingInterval of -1 uses the
subscription's publishing interval.
- **AggregateFilter priming:** needs HistoryRead / ReadHistory
permission and is bounded (100 000 values, bounded page size).
- **Resource leak:** event monitored items no longer leak a consumer
task per create/delete cycle.

### Node management services (Part 3 / Part 4)
- **Reference types:** AddNodes, AddReferences, DeleteReferences and
Browse reject ids that are not ReferenceTypes with
`Bad_ReferenceTypeIdInvalid`. AddNodes, AddReferences and
DeleteReferences also reject abstract ReferenceTypes; Browse still
accepts them (e.g. `HierarchicalReferences` with includeSubtypes).
- **Concurrent AddNodes:** duplicate BrowseNames under one parent get
`Bad_BrowseNameDuplicated`.
- **TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds:**
- Requires Browse permission on intermediate nodes and final targets
(RolePermissions and AccessRestrictions).
  - A long RelativePath no longer rejects the whole request.
- **SemanticChangeEvent:**
- Raised once per actual change of a semantic property, whether or not
it is monitored.
  - Also raised for properties with the SemanticChange access-level bit.
  - Reports the owning node's TypeDefinition as AffectedType.
- **Localized diagnostics:** operation-level text is translated when
OperationLocalizedText is requested.

### History and aggregates (Part 11 / Part 13)
- **DeleteRawModified:** an unspecified or reversed range returns
`Bad_InvalidTimestampArgument`, and StartTime == EndTime deletes the
value at StartTime for every provider.
- **ReadAtTime fallback:** reads only the values around each requested
time. A time whose bound is not found within the search limit returns
`Bad_BoundNotSupported` instead of failing the request.
- **ReadProcessed:** a ProcessingInterval shorter than one tick returns
`Bad_AggregateInvalidInputs`.
- **Delta / DeltaBounds:** widen to the next larger signed type when the
result does not fit the source type (e.g. a decreasing unsigned counter,
or an Int16 overflow).
- **Range / Range2:** return the source data type.

### Alarms and fluent API (Part 9)
- **Suppression:** an alarm stays suppressed while any suppression group
is active, and re-evaluation without a state change does not move
TransitionTime.
- **`MonitorVariable(variable)`:** sets SourceNode, SourceName and
InputNode to the variable and makes it a ConditionSource (HasCondition
to the alarm, HasEventSource from the object).
- **Fluent input/output arguments:** InputArguments / OutputArguments
added through the fluent API to a registered method are readable.
- **Root notifiers:** a failed root-notifier registration no longer
leaves an orphaned event worker.
- **State-machine handlers:** exceptions are logged at Error.

### File system (Part 20)
- **Delete / MoveOrCopy:**
  - Only act on direct children of the directory.
- A NodeId whose kind does not match the entry returns `Bad_NotFound` (a
file NodeId can no longer delete a directory).
- Copying a directory into its own subtree returns
`Bad_InvalidArgument`.
- **Locking:**
- An open file, or a directory containing one, cannot be deleted or
moved (`Bad_InvalidState`).
  - The check is atomic with opens.
- While a Delete or Move runs, read opens get `Bad_NotReadable` and
write opens `Bad_InvalidState`.
- **Open:**
- Reserved mode bits or EraseExisting without Write return
`Bad_InvalidArgument`.
  - Read+Write returns `Bad_NotSupported`.
  - Read while a writer is open returns `Bad_NotReadable`.
- **Client `FileSystemErrors`:** maps `Bad_NotReadable` to
`IOException`.
- **RuntimeNodeSet:** well-formed NodeSets with a stray `Model` element,
or two models in one file where one requires the other, now load.

### Server core, hosting and lifecycle
- **`SessionEstablishmentQueueLimit` > 0:**
CreateSession/ActivateSession now queue for a permit. The permit is
acquired before the request is registered, and a waiting handshake
releases its worker through the request-parking policy.
- **Node manager lifecycle:**
  - Add, reload and remove no longer wait for parked Publish requests.
- A Migrate reload racing with CreateMonitoredItems no longer blocks
later lifecycle operations.
  - Late items on retired or removed managers get `Bad_NodeIdUnknown`.
- **HistoryUpdate:** a batch mixing data and event details is bounded by
both limits.
- **Server stop/start:** stopping the server disposes the configuration
watcher and certificate subscription; starting recreates them.
- **Monitored-item queue factory:** a factory supplied by the caller or
the DI container is no longer disposed by the server.
- **Audit events:** each certificate validation error raises its own
AuditCertificate event. A failed OpenSecureChannel without a service
result is audited as failed.

## New public API (additive)
- `IQueuedSessionEstablishmentLimiter`
- `StandardServer.OwnsMonitoredItemQueueFactory` (protected virtual)
- `DefaultPkiRoot.Get` (Opc.Ua.Configuration)
- `TrustList.SetCertificateValidation`
- `NamespaceMetadataRegistry.Invalidate`
- `IApplicationConfigurationFileTargetProvider` and
`ApplicationConfigurationUpdatePlan`
- `GdsServerOptions.CertificateGroups` / `GdsCertificateGroupOptions`
- `InMemoryKeyCredentialRequestStore.AuthorizeRoles`
-
`DefaultManagedApplicationsNodeManager.ManagedApplicationsNamespaceUri`
- `AuthorizationServiceManager.RequestAccessTokenAsync(...,
IUserIdentity?, ...)`
- `AllowAnonymousWrite` on the file-system node manager and its factory
- `IFileSystemHost.TryBeginMutation` / `EndMutation`, replacing
`HasOpenHandles`

## Not fixed / known limitations
- **KeyCredential:** secret encryption with the client's PublicKey
(requests needing it are rejected).
- **CSR SAN restriction:** restricting subject / SAN values copied from
a CSR (CA policy).
- **Ticket signatures:** ticket signature verification (needs a
trusted-signer configuration).
- **FileType Read+Write open:** needs a read/write stream contract in
`IFileSystemProvider`.
- **Custom `IUserDatabase` implementations:** the disabled-user check
still scans all users per login. The built-in stores do a single lookup.
- **64-bit Delta precision:** limited by the calculator's double
arithmetic.

## Tests with changed expectations
Existing tests were updated where they asserted the old behaviour:
- File-system status codes
- Trust-list handle eviction
- `DiscardedMessageCount`
- Localized diagnostics bits
- Delta on unsigned sources
- SourceNode of fluent alarms
- ReferenceServer transfer permission test (now expects
`Bad_UserAccessDenied` notifications)
- `UserDeactivationShutdownReviewTests` (the revoked session is a
UserName login)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 07:26:05 +02:00

511 lines
24 KiB
C#

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using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Moq;
using NUnit.Framework;
using Opc.Ua.Server.FileSystem;
using Opc.Ua.Server.Tests.NodeManager;
using Opc.Ua.Tests;
namespace Opc.Ua.Server.Tests.FileSystem
{
/// <summary>
/// Verifies mount-root protection and canonical path validation before file-system provider mutations.
/// </summary>
[TestFixture]
[Category("FileSystem")]
public sealed class FileSystemMountRegressionTests
{
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that alternative root identifiers cannot delete, move, or copy the mounted root.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task AlternateRootIdsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyMountAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_rootIds))] string identifier)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
var source = new NodeId(identifier, manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.StatusCode.Code, Is.EqualTo(operation == "delete"
? StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied
: StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that noncanonical source paths are rejected before reaching any provider mutation.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task NonCanonicalObjectPathsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_nonCanonicalProviderPaths))] string providerPath,
[Values] bool isDirectory)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = isDirectory
? FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex)
: FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
StatusCode expectedStatus = operation != "delete"
? StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument
: providerPath is "/" or "\\" or "//" or "\\\\" or "/\\/"
? StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied
: StatusCodes.BadNotFound;
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(expectedStatus));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that noncanonical destination paths reject moves and copies without returning a new node.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task NonCanonicalMoveOrCopyTargetsDoNotInvokeProviderAsync(
[Values] bool createCopy,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_invalidNonRootPaths))] string providerPath)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
NodeId target = FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, target,
createCopy, "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
Assert.That(result.NewNodeId.IsNull, Is.True);
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that valid nested paths, including unusual legal names, reach the provider unchanged.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task OrdinaryNestedProviderPathsRemainUnchangedAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[Values("sub/keep.txt", "sub/.hidden", "sub/name..txt", "sub/.../file",
"data dir/nested file.txt", "sub/a&b?c.txt")] string providerPath,
[Values] bool isDirectory)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
// Delete and MoveOrCopy are called on the directory that organizes the source.
string parentPath = providerPath[..providerPath.LastIndexOf('/')];
var parent = new DirectoryObjectState(manager.SystemContext,
FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(parentPath, manager.NamespaceIndex), parentPath, parentPath,
isRoot: false);
NodeId source = isDirectory
? FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex)
: FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
const string TargetPath = "destination/nested/renamed.txt";
if (operation == "delete")
{
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(parent, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
}
else
{
NodeId target = FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory("destination/nested", manager.NamespaceIndex);
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await parent.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, parent.MoveOrCopy, parent.NodeId, source, target,
operation == "copy", "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
NodeId expectedId = isDirectory
? FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(TargetPath, manager.NamespaceIndex)
: FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile(TargetPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(result.NewNodeId, Is.EqualTo(expectedId));
}
VerifySingleMutation(provider, operation, providerPath, TargetPath);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that empty or separator-only destinations resolve to the mount root without a path prefix.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task SeparatorOnlyTargetsResolveToCanonicalMountRootAsync(
[Values] bool createCopy,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_rootPaths))] string providerPath,
[Values(FileSystemNodeId.Root, FileSystemNodeId.Directory)] int rootType)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
var target = new FileSystemNodeId(rootType, providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex).ToNodeId();
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, target,
createCopy, "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(result.NewNodeId,
Is.EqualTo(FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("renamed.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex)));
VerifySingleMutation(provider, createCopy ? "copy" : "move", "keep.txt", "renamed.txt");
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that invalid type prefixes, method identifiers, and foreign namespaces cannot mutate provider
/// entries.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task InvalidObjectIdsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[Values("3:keep.txt", "4294967298:keep.txt", "2147483648:keep.txt",
"0:keep.txt", "2:keep.txt?Open", "2:keep.txt?")] string identifier,
[Values] bool foreignNamespace)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
var source = new NodeId(identifier,
foreignNamespace ? (ushort)(manager.NamespaceIndex + 1) : manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.StatusCode.Code, Is.EqualTo(operation == "delete"
? StatusCodes.BadNotFound
: StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that a valid-looking path in another namespace cannot alias a mounted file.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task ForeignNamespaceCannotAliasAValidFileAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", (ushort)(manager.NamespaceIndex + 1));
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(ServiceResult.IsBad(result), Is.True);
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that invalid destination node kinds or namespaces reject moves and copies before provider access.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task InvalidMoveOrCopyTargetDoesNotInvokeProviderAsync(
[Values] bool createCopy,
[Values("3:target", "2:target", "1:target?CreateFile", "0:target")] string identifier,
[Values] bool foreignNamespace)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
var target = new NodeId(identifier,
foreignNamespace ? (ushort)(manager.NamespaceIndex + 1) : manager.NamespaceIndex);
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, target,
createCopy, "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode.Code, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that parsing rejects unsupported node kinds and numeric prefixes that overflow the type range.
/// </summary>
[TestCase("3:")]
[TestCase("2147483648:")]
[TestCase("4294967296:")]
[TestCase("4294967297:")]
[TestCase("4294967298:")]
[TestCase("999999999999999999999999999999999999:")]
public void ParserRejectsUnsupportedAndOverflowingTypes(string identifier)
{
Assert.That(FileSystemNodeId.TryParse(new NodeId(identifier, 2), out _), Is.False);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that physical-provider root aliases are rejected while existing files and directories remain
/// intact.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task PhysicalProviderRejectsRootMutationsBeforeTouchingContentsAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[Values("", "/", ".", "child/..")] string source)
{
string root = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "fs-root-regression-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(root, "child"));
string sentinel = Path.Combine(root, "keep.txt");
await WriteTextAsync(sentinel, "unchanged").ConfigureAwait(false);
var provider = new PhysicalFileSystemProvider(root, "RootRegression");
try
{
// An existing target also keeps the unfixed recursive copy bounded.
Assert.ThrowsAsync<UnauthorizedAccessException>(async () =>
{
switch (operation)
{
case "delete":
await provider.DeleteAsync(source, CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
case "move":
await provider.MoveAsync(source, "keep.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
default:
await provider.CopyAsync(source, "keep.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
}
});
Assert.That(await ReadTextAsync(sentinel).ConfigureAwait(false), Is.EqualTo("unchanged"));
Assert.That(Directory.Exists(Path.Combine(root, "child")), Is.True);
}
finally
{
if (Directory.Exists(root))
{
Directory.Delete(root, recursive: true);
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that protecting the mount root still permits deleting, moving, and copying ordinary child files.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task OrdinaryChildMutationsRemainSupportedAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation)
{
string rootPath = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "fs-child-regression-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
var provider = new PhysicalFileSystemProvider(rootPath, "ChildRegression");
try
{
await WriteTextAsync(Path.Combine(rootPath, "keep.txt"), "payload").ConfigureAwait(false);
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(ServiceResult.IsGood(result), Is.True);
Assert.That(File.Exists(Path.Combine(rootPath, "keep.txt")), Is.EqualTo(operation == "copy"));
if (operation != "delete")
{
Assert.That(await ReadTextAsync(Path.Combine(rootPath, "renamed.txt"))
.ConfigureAwait(false), Is.EqualTo("payload"));
}
}
finally
{
Directory.Delete(rootPath, recursive: true);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Writes a sentinel payload used to detect unintended provider mutations.
/// </summary>
private static async Task WriteTextAsync(string path, string value)
{
using var writer = new StreamWriter(path);
await writer.WriteAsync(value).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Reads a sentinel or copied payload to verify preserved file contents.
/// </summary>
private static async Task<string> ReadTextAsync(string path)
{
using var reader = new StreamReader(path);
return await reader.ReadToEndAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a writable provider mock whose mutation calls can be checked for admission and exact paths.
/// </summary>
private static Mock<IFileSystemProvider> CreateProvider()
{
var provider = new Mock<IFileSystemProvider>();
provider.SetupGet(p => p.MountName).Returns("MountRegression");
provider.SetupGet(p => p.IsWritable).Returns(true);
provider.Setup(p => p.DeleteAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(default(ValueTask));
provider.Setup(p => p.MoveAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(default(ValueTask));
provider.Setup(p => p.CopyAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(default(ValueTask));
return provider;
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a file-system manager over the supplied provider and deterministic server mock.
/// </summary>
private static FileSystemNodeManager CreateManager(IFileSystemProvider provider)
{
Mock<IServerInternal> server = DeterministicServerMock.Create(out _);
server.SetupGet(s => s.Telemetry).Returns(NUnitTelemetryContext.Create());
return new FileSystemNodeManager(server.Object, new ApplicationConfiguration(), provider);
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates the mounted root node exposing file-system mutation methods.
/// </summary>
private static DirectoryObjectState CreateRoot(FileSystemNodeManager manager)
{
return new DirectoryObjectState(manager.SystemContext,
FileSystemNodeId.BuildRoot(manager.NamespaceIndex), string.Empty, "Root", isRoot: true);
}
/// <summary>
/// Invokes deletion or a move or copy into the root through the mounted directory methods.
/// </summary>
private static async ValueTask<ServiceResult> MutateAsync(
DirectoryObjectState root,
ISystemContext context,
NodeId source,
string operation)
{
if (operation == "delete")
{
DeleteFileMethodStateResult deleted = await root.DeleteFileSystemObject!.OnCallAsync!(
context, root.DeleteFileSystemObject, root.NodeId, source, CancellationToken.None)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
return deleted.ServiceResult;
}
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult moved = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
context, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, root.NodeId,
operation == "copy", "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
return moved.ServiceResult;
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that no delete, move, or copy request reached the provider.
/// </summary>
private static void VerifyNoMutation(Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider)
{
provider.Verify(p => p.DeleteAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
provider.Verify(p => p.MoveAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Never);
provider.Verify(p => p.CopyAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Never);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that only the selected mutation occurred once with the expected source and destination paths.
/// </summary>
private static void VerifySingleMutation(
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider,
string operation,
string source,
string target)
{
provider.Verify(p => p.DeleteAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "delete" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.MoveAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "move" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.CopyAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "copy" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.DeleteAsync(source, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "delete" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.MoveAsync(source, target, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "move" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.CopyAsync(source, target, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "copy" ? 1 : 0));
}
/// <summary>
/// Supplies nonroot paths containing traversal, noncanonical separators, or invalid path components.
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] s_invalidNonRootPaths =
[
".", "..", "sub/..", "sub/../", "../sub", "sub/../leaf", "sub//leaf", "sub/./leaf", "/sub", "sub/",
" ", "sub/ /leaf",
.. Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\'
? [ "sub\\..", "sub\\..\\", "sub\\..\\leaf", "sub\\\\leaf", "sub\\.\\leaf", "\\sub",
"sub\\leaf", "C:/sub", "C:\\sub", "sub/stream:name" ]
: Array.Empty<string>()
];
/// <summary>
/// Combines root aliases and invalid nonroot paths for source-path admission tests.
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] s_nonCanonicalProviderPaths =
[
"/", "//", .. s_invalidNonRootPaths,
.. Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\' ? ["\\", "\\\\", "/\\/"] : Array.Empty<string>()
];
private static readonly string[] s_rootIds = Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\'
? ["0:", "1:", "2:", "0:/", "0:\\", "0://"]
: ["0:", "1:", "2:", "0:/", "0://"];
private static readonly string[] s_rootPaths = Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\'
? [string.Empty, "/", "\\", "//", "\\\\", "/\\/"]
: [string.Empty, "/", "//"];
}
}