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Marc Schier 2836da7ec8 Fix sessionless ResultTransfer ownership bypass and other issues. (#4834)
# Description

Correct ownership, endpoint validation, policy propagation, subscription
delivery, file handling and generated-model behavior across the stack,
tools and samples. Add focused regression tests and update the
corresponding guides and sample documentation.

### Previously included corrections

- Require an active, matching session to generate or access transient
ResultTransfer file handles. Cover both sessionless generation and reads
against a handle owned by an active session, using live session owners
in the Machinery tests.
- Keep physical filesystem operations within their configured mount and
apply the same confinement checks throughout file operations.
- Validate LDS semaphore paths consistently during server registration
and registration-store maintenance.

### Individual issues addressed

| # | Component | Issue and correction |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | AI jobs and transfers | Jobs and transfers did not consistently
retain their creator's identity and session. Apply ownership checks to
descendants, file handles, subscriptions and execution, and recheck
deployment permissions before dispatch. |
| 2 | Password-management client | Password-bearing calls could use
signing-only channels or follow a replacement connection. Capture an
encrypted transport generation and keep dispatch bound to it; preserve
ordinary non-password edits. |
| 3 | GDS and certificate-push clients | Connections omitted hostname
verification. Validate the original configured DNS name or IP address
before session activation. |
| 4 | Certificate push | Private-key uploads could use signing-only
calls. Require an encrypted, generation-bound dispatch while preserving
certificate-only updates and restoring the caller's identity afterward.
|
| 5 | MQTT client | The .NET Framework custom-trust callback could
discard TLS hostname, certificate-availability and usage errors. Retain
those checks while supporting configured issuer trust. |
| 6 | DTLS handshake | Certificate trust was not tied to the configured
peer address. Match the certificate's DNS or IP identity to the intended
endpoint. |
| 7 | Replicated address spaces | Serialized nodes lost per-node and
descendant permission metadata. Preserve role permissions, user-role
permissions and access restrictions, including updates to existing
replica nodes. |
| 8 | MCP PubSub imports | Imports without groups skipped checks on the
effective broker destination. Check the actual endpoint before resolving
credentials or activating the connection. |
| 9 | Reference-server accounts | A disabled username account could
authenticate again with its previous roles. Reject disabled accounts
during fresh authentication. |
| 10 | Console reference client | The sample disabled hostname checks
when connecting to an otherwise trusted peer. Retain the original
requested host and validate it before activation. |
| 11 | Capture replay and export | Replay and raw export could accept
non-capture files or include key material. Require complete PCAP/PCAPNG
containers and exclude key sidecars and decryption-secret blocks. |
| 12 | PubSub adapter fallback | The fallback client configuration
automatically accepted peer certificates. Apply normal trust and
hostname validation before activation or reads. |
| 13 | Kafka transport | Explicit TLS enablement was checked but did not
reach both final Confluent configurations. Use the same effective
protocol for validation, producers and consumers. |
| 14 | PubSub actions | Configuration rebuilds could widen a
connection-local action handler's scope. Preserve its original
connection association and reject mismatched dispatch. |
| 15 | PubSub readers | Reader-level message-protection settings were
accepted but ignored. Apply the effective group and reader settings
before accepting and publishing received values. |
| 16 | PubSub key groups | Different `SecurityGroupId` values could
share one connection-wide key context. Reject mixed groups on a
connection and require separate connections for distinct groups. |
| 17 | MCP session registrations | Session-name replacement or reuse
could retain another registration's credential bindings. Bind access to
the registration, caller and authenticated endpoint, and preserve that
identity when borrowing sessions. |
| 18 | Viewer HTTP host | Requests reached the viewer's OPC UA session
without consistent Host, Origin and port checks. Validate the request
destination and browser origin before using the session, while retaining
supported local MCP clients. |
| 19 | Vision file operations | File operations did not consistently
apply protected-file checks, and remote handles lacked caller and
connection context. Apply the shared checks and use host-side opaque
handles bound to caller, target and generation. |
| 20 | DTLS record integrity | The integrity-only MAC used a truncated
sequence number. Authenticate the full reconstructed sequence number and
epoch so records remain distinct across rollover. |
| 21 | AMB client sample | Connection setup omitted hostname validation.
Preserve the originally requested host and verify the peer identity
before activation. |
| 22 | Robot sample writes | The R2 `SpeedOverride` callback could
target R1 state. Bind each callback to its own robot and apply that
robot's write policy. |
| 23 | AI result properties | Optional result children inherited
remotely writable defaults. Preserve their declaration restrictions and
keep server-produced results read-only. |
| 24 | WSS peer-trust updates | Existing channels did not consistently
respond to peer-trust changes. Revalidate complete chains for forward
and reverse WSS channels and close only those that no longer validate. |
| 25 | GDS revocation checks | Caller-provided certificates could cause
issuer retrieval from embedded URLs. Resolve validation from configured
local trust, issuers and CRLs without fetching caller-provided
locations. |
| 26 | GMS observations | Published correction observations retained
writable model defaults. Reject remote writes while preserving
publisher-side updates. |
| 27 | Production-dataset monitoring | Subscription admission and
delivery could use the reporter's context instead of each subscriber's
permissions. Evaluate the subscriber at admission and on every delivery,
including cancellation and disposal paths. |
| 28 | WoT MQTT destinations | Hostless MQTT forms could imply a
localhost destination before loopback checks. Reject them before
credential lookup or connection attempts and validate the effective
endpoint. |
| 29 | XRegistry opaque reads | Content-ID reads and notifications did
not consistently honor encrypted-read requirements or the currently
accepted transport. Recheck the bound endpoint and reject transport
downgrades before rebinding, including when protected values are already
queued. |
| 30 | PubSub capture dissection | Key loading did not consistently
check the configured capture-root boundary. Check each actual key path
immediately before opening it. |
| 31 | PubSub publication queues | Imported WriterGroup queues were not
fully checked against publish-topic grants. Check the destination
actually used by each group. |
| 32 | MCP PubSub mutations | A caller-supplied mode could select
subscribe grants for an operation that publishes. Derive the required
direction and parent context from the actual mutation. |
| 33 | Generated write masks | Model import and generation could widen
an explicit `UserWriteMask`. Preserve it through import, copy, merge,
inheritance and dependency metadata. |
| 34 | Generated method flags | An explicit `UserExecutable=false` could
be lost. Preserve its specified state and resulting method behavior
through the same model paths. |
| 35 | Generated role identifiers | Unresolved role identifiers could
cause permission entries to be omitted. Preserve namespace-qualified
role IDs and report a diagnostic when a policy cannot be represented. |
| 36 | Aggregation-server defaults | The `localhost` default did not
reliably constrain listener binding. Use numeric loopback for the
default endpoint and command-line fallback. |
| 37 | Certificate-validation cache | Cached results could skip current
leaf or issuer validity checks. Recheck validity windows on cache hits
and keep hostname validation independent of cached chain trust. |
| 38 | Software-update folders | Revision names and marker contents
containing dot segments could select paths outside the software root.
Normalize and check every derived path against that root. |
| 39 | USDA arrays | Array elements were not encoded for their string or
asset context. Escape them as data and preserve valid composition and
round-trip behavior. |
| 40 | Adapter hot reload | A changed dataset definition with the same
name could keep old fields, subscriptions or cached values active.
Compare complete immutable definitions and retire old state before
replacement. |
| 41 | Adapter index ranges | Subscription publication could ignore
`IndexRange` and return the complete value. Preserve the requested
projection and its status and timestamps; reject unsupported range
providers. |
| 42 | PubSub metadata and targets | Metadata from one connection could
change another connection's target mapping. Scope metadata to its
connection and provenance, and resolve targets using actual typed field
IDs rather than field names or unintended positional fallback. |
| 43 | Scales product locks | Product locks were not applied across
every remote mutation path. Apply them consistently to value writes,
filling calculations and related recipe/controller operations while
retaining permitted updates. |
| 44 | Event permission caching | Cached event decisions could outlive
identity, role or node-policy changes. Revalidate the current
subscriber, event type and source permissions instead of reusing a stale
decision. |
| 45 | WoT Modbus destinations | Hostless Modbus forms could imply
localhost before loopback checks. Reject them before connecting and
validate the effective endpoint. |
| 46 | MCP local PKI tools | Peer-trust mutations did not consistently
require the caller's `CertificateAdministration` grant. Check the
capability before trust and untrust operations. |
| 47 | Robot-control HTTP bridge | The bridge lacked consistent Host,
Origin and port validation and caller-specific session grants. Apply
those checks before borrowing the OPC UA session and retain supported
local clients. |
| 48 | Subscription transfers | Transferred subscriptions could retain
cached notifications after the destination's permissions changed.
Require authorization continuity between source and destination
identities and roles, invalidate stale retransmission data when
continuity fails, and preserve retransmission behavior for compatible
transfers. |

### Compatibility notes

- Replication uses the versioned NSRP v1 policy envelope. Upgrade peers
together and re-encode or reseed legacy topology from the authoritative
model; missing permission metadata is not inferred from old records.
- Integrity-only DTLS peers must be upgraded together for the full
sequence/epoch MAC. AEAD behavior is unchanged.
- Distinct PubSub key groups require separate connections.
- Custom sessions that cannot capture the actual encrypted transport,
and subscription providers that cannot honor a requested range, are
rejected rather than silently changing the requested behavior.
- Subscription transfers retain retransmission data only when the
destination authorization remains compatible with the source snapshot;
otherwise the old sequence numbers and cached data are invalidated.

## Related Issues

No separate tracking issue is linked. The individual corrections are
listed above.

## Checklist

_Put an `x` in the boxes that apply. You can complete these step by step
after opening the PR._

- [ ] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [ ] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.
2026-10-21 05:37:29 +02:00

512 lines
24 KiB
C#

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using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Moq;
using NUnit.Framework;
using Opc.Ua.Server.FileSystem;
using Opc.Ua.Server.Tests.NodeManager;
using Opc.Ua.Tests;
namespace Opc.Ua.Server.Tests.FileSystem
{
/// <summary>
/// Verifies mount-root protection and canonical path validation before file-system provider mutations.
/// </summary>
[TestFixture]
[Category("FileSystem")]
public sealed class FileSystemMountRegressionTests
{
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that alternative root identifiers cannot delete, move, or copy the mounted root.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task AlternateRootIdsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyMountAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_rootIds))] string identifier)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
var source = new NodeId(identifier, manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.StatusCode.Code, Is.EqualTo(operation == "delete"
? StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied
: StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that noncanonical source paths are rejected before reaching any provider mutation.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task NonCanonicalObjectPathsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_nonCanonicalProviderPaths))] string providerPath,
[Values] bool isDirectory)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = isDirectory
? FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex)
: FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
StatusCode expectedStatus = operation != "delete"
? StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument
: providerPath is "/" or "\\" or "//" or "\\\\" or "/\\/"
? StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied
: StatusCodes.BadNotFound;
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(expectedStatus));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that noncanonical destination paths reject moves and copies without returning a new node.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task NonCanonicalMoveOrCopyTargetsDoNotInvokeProviderAsync(
[Values] bool createCopy,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_invalidNonRootPaths))] string providerPath)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
NodeId target = FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, target,
createCopy, "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
Assert.That(result.NewNodeId.IsNull, Is.True);
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that valid nested paths, including unusual legal names, reach the provider unchanged.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task OrdinaryNestedProviderPathsRemainUnchangedAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[Values("sub/keep.txt", "sub/.hidden", "sub/name..txt", "sub/.../file",
"data dir/nested file.txt", "sub/a&b?c.txt")] string providerPath,
[Values] bool isDirectory)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
// Delete and MoveOrCopy are called on the directory that organizes the source.
string parentPath = providerPath[..providerPath.LastIndexOf('/')];
var parent = new DirectoryObjectState(manager.SystemContext,
FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(parentPath, manager.NamespaceIndex), parentPath, parentPath,
isRoot: false);
NodeId source = isDirectory
? FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex)
: FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile(providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
const string TargetPath = "destination/nested/renamed.txt";
if (operation == "delete")
{
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(parent, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
}
else
{
NodeId target = FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory("destination/nested", manager.NamespaceIndex);
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await parent.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, parent.MoveOrCopy, parent.NodeId, source, target,
operation == "copy", "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
NodeId expectedId = isDirectory
? FileSystemNodeId.BuildDirectory(TargetPath, manager.NamespaceIndex)
: FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile(TargetPath, manager.NamespaceIndex);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(result.NewNodeId, Is.EqualTo(expectedId));
}
VerifySingleMutation(provider, operation, providerPath, TargetPath);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that empty or separator-only destinations resolve to the mount root without a path prefix.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task SeparatorOnlyTargetsResolveToCanonicalMountRootAsync(
[Values] bool createCopy,
[ValueSource(nameof(s_rootPaths))] string providerPath,
[Values(FileSystemNodeId.Root, FileSystemNodeId.Directory)] int rootType)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
var target = new FileSystemNodeId(rootType, providerPath, manager.NamespaceIndex).ToNodeId();
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, target,
createCopy, "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.Good));
Assert.That(result.NewNodeId,
Is.EqualTo(FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("renamed.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex)));
VerifySingleMutation(provider, createCopy ? "copy" : "move", "keep.txt", "renamed.txt");
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that invalid type prefixes, method identifiers, and foreign namespaces cannot mutate provider
/// entries.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task InvalidObjectIdsCannotDeleteMoveOrCopyAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[Values("3:keep.txt", "4294967298:keep.txt", "2147483648:keep.txt",
"0:keep.txt", "2:keep.txt?Open", "2:keep.txt?")] string identifier,
[Values] bool foreignNamespace)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
var source = new NodeId(identifier,
foreignNamespace ? (ushort)(manager.NamespaceIndex + 1) : manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.StatusCode.Code, Is.EqualTo(operation == "delete"
? StatusCodes.BadNotFound
: StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that a valid-looking path in another namespace cannot alias a mounted file.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task ForeignNamespaceCannotAliasAValidFileAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", (ushort)(manager.NamespaceIndex + 1));
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(ServiceResult.IsBad(result), Is.True);
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that invalid destination node kinds or namespaces reject moves and copies before provider access.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task InvalidMoveOrCopyTargetDoesNotInvokeProviderAsync(
[Values] bool createCopy,
[Values("3:target", "2:target", "1:target?CreateFile", "0:target")] string identifier,
[Values] bool foreignNamespace)
{
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider = CreateProvider();
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider.Object);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
var target = new NodeId(identifier,
foreignNamespace ? (ushort)(manager.NamespaceIndex + 1) : manager.NamespaceIndex);
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult result = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
manager.SystemContext, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, target,
createCopy, "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.Multiple(() =>
{
Assert.That(result.ServiceResult.StatusCode.Code, Is.EqualTo(StatusCodes.BadInvalidArgument));
VerifyNoMutation(provider);
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that parsing rejects unsupported node kinds and numeric prefixes that overflow the type range.
/// </summary>
[TestCase("3:")]
[TestCase("2147483648:")]
[TestCase("4294967296:")]
[TestCase("4294967297:")]
[TestCase("4294967298:")]
[TestCase("999999999999999999999999999999999999:")]
public void ParserRejectsUnsupportedAndOverflowingTypes(string identifier)
{
Assert.That(FileSystemNodeId.TryParse(new NodeId(identifier, 2), out _), Is.False);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that physical-provider root aliases are rejected while existing files and directories remain
/// intact.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task PhysicalProviderRejectsRootMutationsBeforeTouchingContentsAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation,
[Values("", "/", ".", "child/..")] string source)
{
string root = Path.Combine(AppContext.BaseDirectory, "fs-root-regression-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(root, "child"));
string sentinel = Path.Combine(root, "keep.txt");
await WriteTextAsync(sentinel, "unchanged").ConfigureAwait(false);
var provider = new PhysicalFileSystemProvider(root, "RootRegression");
try
{
// An existing target also keeps the unfixed recursive copy bounded.
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<UnauthorizedAccessException>(async () =>
{
switch (operation)
{
case "delete":
await provider.DeleteAsync(source, CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
case "move":
await provider.MoveAsync(source, "keep.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
default:
await provider.CopyAsync(source, "keep.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
}
});
Assert.That(await ReadTextAsync(sentinel).ConfigureAwait(false), Is.EqualTo("unchanged"));
Assert.That(Directory.Exists(Path.Combine(root, "child")), Is.True);
}
finally
{
if (Directory.Exists(root))
{
Directory.Delete(root, recursive: true);
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that protecting the mount root still permits deleting, moving, and copying ordinary child files.
/// </summary>
[Test]
public async Task OrdinaryChildMutationsRemainSupportedAsync(
[Values("delete", "move", "copy")] string operation)
{
string rootPath = Path.Combine(
AppContext.BaseDirectory, "fs-child-regression-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
var provider = new PhysicalFileSystemProvider(rootPath, "ChildRegression");
try
{
await WriteTextAsync(Path.Combine(rootPath, "keep.txt"), "payload").ConfigureAwait(false);
using FileSystemNodeManager manager = CreateManager(provider);
DirectoryObjectState root = CreateRoot(manager);
NodeId source = FileSystemNodeId.BuildFile("keep.txt", manager.NamespaceIndex);
ServiceResult result = await MutateAsync(root, manager.SystemContext, source, operation)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
Assert.That(ServiceResult.IsGood(result), Is.True);
Assert.That(File.Exists(Path.Combine(rootPath, "keep.txt")), Is.EqualTo(operation == "copy"));
if (operation != "delete")
{
Assert.That(await ReadTextAsync(Path.Combine(rootPath, "renamed.txt"))
.ConfigureAwait(false), Is.EqualTo("payload"));
}
}
finally
{
Directory.Delete(rootPath, recursive: true);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Writes a sentinel payload used to detect unintended provider mutations.
/// </summary>
private static async Task WriteTextAsync(string path, string value)
{
using var writer = new StreamWriter(path);
await writer.WriteAsync(value).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Reads a sentinel or copied payload to verify preserved file contents.
/// </summary>
private static async Task<string> ReadTextAsync(string path)
{
using var reader = new StreamReader(path);
return await reader.ReadToEndAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a writable provider mock whose mutation calls can be checked for admission and exact paths.
/// </summary>
private static Mock<IFileSystemProvider> CreateProvider()
{
var provider = new Mock<IFileSystemProvider>();
provider.SetupGet(p => p.MountName).Returns("MountRegression");
provider.SetupGet(p => p.IsWritable).Returns(true);
provider.Setup(p => p.DeleteAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(default(ValueTask));
provider.Setup(p => p.MoveAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(default(ValueTask));
provider.Setup(p => p.CopyAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(default(ValueTask));
return provider;
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a file-system manager over the supplied provider and deterministic server mock.
/// </summary>
private static FileSystemNodeManager CreateManager(IFileSystemProvider provider)
{
Mock<IServerInternal> server = DeterministicServerMock.Create(out _);
server.SetupGet(s => s.Telemetry).Returns(NUnitTelemetryContext.Create());
return new FileSystemNodeManager(server.Object, new ApplicationConfiguration(), provider);
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates the mounted root node exposing file-system mutation methods.
/// </summary>
private static DirectoryObjectState CreateRoot(FileSystemNodeManager manager)
{
return new DirectoryObjectState(manager.SystemContext,
FileSystemNodeId.BuildRoot(manager.NamespaceIndex), string.Empty, "Root", isRoot: true);
}
/// <summary>
/// Invokes deletion or a move or copy into the root through the mounted directory methods.
/// </summary>
private static async ValueTask<ServiceResult> MutateAsync(
DirectoryObjectState root,
ISystemContext context,
NodeId source,
string operation)
{
if (operation == "delete")
{
DeleteFileMethodStateResult deleted = await root.DeleteFileSystemObject!.OnCallAsync!(
context, root.DeleteFileSystemObject, root.NodeId, source, CancellationToken.None)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
return deleted.ServiceResult;
}
MoveOrCopyMethodStateResult moved = await root.MoveOrCopy!.OnCallAsync!(
context, root.MoveOrCopy, root.NodeId, source, root.NodeId,
operation == "copy", "renamed.txt", CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
return moved.ServiceResult;
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that no delete, move, or copy request reached the provider.
/// </summary>
private static void VerifyNoMutation(Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider)
{
provider.Verify(p => p.DeleteAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
provider.Verify(p => p.MoveAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Never);
provider.Verify(p => p.CopyAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Never);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that only the selected mutation occurred once with the expected source and destination paths.
/// </summary>
private static void VerifySingleMutation(
Mock<IFileSystemProvider> provider,
string operation,
string source,
string target)
{
provider.Verify(p => p.DeleteAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "delete" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.MoveAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "move" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.CopyAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "copy" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.DeleteAsync(source, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "delete" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.MoveAsync(source, target, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "move" ? 1 : 0));
provider.Verify(p => p.CopyAsync(source, target, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Exactly(operation == "copy" ? 1 : 0));
}
/// <summary>
/// Supplies nonroot paths containing traversal, noncanonical separators, or invalid path components.
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] s_invalidNonRootPaths =
[
".", "..", "sub/..", "sub/../", "../sub", "sub/../leaf", "sub//leaf", "sub/./leaf", "/sub", "sub/",
" ", "sub/ /leaf",
.. Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\'
? [ "sub\\..", "sub\\..\\", "sub\\..\\leaf", "sub\\\\leaf", "sub\\.\\leaf", "\\sub",
"sub\\leaf", "C:/sub", "C:\\sub", "sub/stream:name" ]
: Array.Empty<string>()
];
/// <summary>
/// Combines root aliases and invalid nonroot paths for source-path admission tests.
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] s_nonCanonicalProviderPaths =
[
"/", "//", .. s_invalidNonRootPaths,
.. Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\' ? ["\\", "\\\\", "/\\/"] : Array.Empty<string>()
];
private static readonly string[] s_rootIds = Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\'
? ["0:", "1:", "2:", "0:/", "0:\\", "0://"]
: ["0:", "1:", "2:", "0:/", "0://"];
private static readonly string[] s_rootPaths = Path.DirectorySeparatorChar == '\\'
? [string.Empty, "/", "\\", "//", "\\\\", "/\\/"]
: [string.Empty, "/", "//"];
}
}