Files
UA-.NETStandard/docs/FileSystemClient.md
T
Marc Schier 2836da7ec8 Fix sessionless ResultTransfer ownership bypass and other issues. (#4834)
# Description

Correct ownership, endpoint validation, policy propagation, subscription
delivery, file handling and generated-model behavior across the stack,
tools and samples. Add focused regression tests and update the
corresponding guides and sample documentation.

### Previously included corrections

- Require an active, matching session to generate or access transient
ResultTransfer file handles. Cover both sessionless generation and reads
against a handle owned by an active session, using live session owners
in the Machinery tests.
- Keep physical filesystem operations within their configured mount and
apply the same confinement checks throughout file operations.
- Validate LDS semaphore paths consistently during server registration
and registration-store maintenance.

### Individual issues addressed

| # | Component | Issue and correction |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | AI jobs and transfers | Jobs and transfers did not consistently
retain their creator's identity and session. Apply ownership checks to
descendants, file handles, subscriptions and execution, and recheck
deployment permissions before dispatch. |
| 2 | Password-management client | Password-bearing calls could use
signing-only channels or follow a replacement connection. Capture an
encrypted transport generation and keep dispatch bound to it; preserve
ordinary non-password edits. |
| 3 | GDS and certificate-push clients | Connections omitted hostname
verification. Validate the original configured DNS name or IP address
before session activation. |
| 4 | Certificate push | Private-key uploads could use signing-only
calls. Require an encrypted, generation-bound dispatch while preserving
certificate-only updates and restoring the caller's identity afterward.
|
| 5 | MQTT client | The .NET Framework custom-trust callback could
discard TLS hostname, certificate-availability and usage errors. Retain
those checks while supporting configured issuer trust. |
| 6 | DTLS handshake | Certificate trust was not tied to the configured
peer address. Match the certificate's DNS or IP identity to the intended
endpoint. |
| 7 | Replicated address spaces | Serialized nodes lost per-node and
descendant permission metadata. Preserve role permissions, user-role
permissions and access restrictions, including updates to existing
replica nodes. |
| 8 | MCP PubSub imports | Imports without groups skipped checks on the
effective broker destination. Check the actual endpoint before resolving
credentials or activating the connection. |
| 9 | Reference-server accounts | A disabled username account could
authenticate again with its previous roles. Reject disabled accounts
during fresh authentication. |
| 10 | Console reference client | The sample disabled hostname checks
when connecting to an otherwise trusted peer. Retain the original
requested host and validate it before activation. |
| 11 | Capture replay and export | Replay and raw export could accept
non-capture files or include key material. Require complete PCAP/PCAPNG
containers and exclude key sidecars and decryption-secret blocks. |
| 12 | PubSub adapter fallback | The fallback client configuration
automatically accepted peer certificates. Apply normal trust and
hostname validation before activation or reads. |
| 13 | Kafka transport | Explicit TLS enablement was checked but did not
reach both final Confluent configurations. Use the same effective
protocol for validation, producers and consumers. |
| 14 | PubSub actions | Configuration rebuilds could widen a
connection-local action handler's scope. Preserve its original
connection association and reject mismatched dispatch. |
| 15 | PubSub readers | Reader-level message-protection settings were
accepted but ignored. Apply the effective group and reader settings
before accepting and publishing received values. |
| 16 | PubSub key groups | Different `SecurityGroupId` values could
share one connection-wide key context. Reject mixed groups on a
connection and require separate connections for distinct groups. |
| 17 | MCP session registrations | Session-name replacement or reuse
could retain another registration's credential bindings. Bind access to
the registration, caller and authenticated endpoint, and preserve that
identity when borrowing sessions. |
| 18 | Viewer HTTP host | Requests reached the viewer's OPC UA session
without consistent Host, Origin and port checks. Validate the request
destination and browser origin before using the session, while retaining
supported local MCP clients. |
| 19 | Vision file operations | File operations did not consistently
apply protected-file checks, and remote handles lacked caller and
connection context. Apply the shared checks and use host-side opaque
handles bound to caller, target and generation. |
| 20 | DTLS record integrity | The integrity-only MAC used a truncated
sequence number. Authenticate the full reconstructed sequence number and
epoch so records remain distinct across rollover. |
| 21 | AMB client sample | Connection setup omitted hostname validation.
Preserve the originally requested host and verify the peer identity
before activation. |
| 22 | Robot sample writes | The R2 `SpeedOverride` callback could
target R1 state. Bind each callback to its own robot and apply that
robot's write policy. |
| 23 | AI result properties | Optional result children inherited
remotely writable defaults. Preserve their declaration restrictions and
keep server-produced results read-only. |
| 24 | WSS peer-trust updates | Existing channels did not consistently
respond to peer-trust changes. Revalidate complete chains for forward
and reverse WSS channels and close only those that no longer validate. |
| 25 | GDS revocation checks | Caller-provided certificates could cause
issuer retrieval from embedded URLs. Resolve validation from configured
local trust, issuers and CRLs without fetching caller-provided
locations. |
| 26 | GMS observations | Published correction observations retained
writable model defaults. Reject remote writes while preserving
publisher-side updates. |
| 27 | Production-dataset monitoring | Subscription admission and
delivery could use the reporter's context instead of each subscriber's
permissions. Evaluate the subscriber at admission and on every delivery,
including cancellation and disposal paths. |
| 28 | WoT MQTT destinations | Hostless MQTT forms could imply a
localhost destination before loopback checks. Reject them before
credential lookup or connection attempts and validate the effective
endpoint. |
| 29 | XRegistry opaque reads | Content-ID reads and notifications did
not consistently honor encrypted-read requirements or the currently
accepted transport. Recheck the bound endpoint and reject transport
downgrades before rebinding, including when protected values are already
queued. |
| 30 | PubSub capture dissection | Key loading did not consistently
check the configured capture-root boundary. Check each actual key path
immediately before opening it. |
| 31 | PubSub publication queues | Imported WriterGroup queues were not
fully checked against publish-topic grants. Check the destination
actually used by each group. |
| 32 | MCP PubSub mutations | A caller-supplied mode could select
subscribe grants for an operation that publishes. Derive the required
direction and parent context from the actual mutation. |
| 33 | Generated write masks | Model import and generation could widen
an explicit `UserWriteMask`. Preserve it through import, copy, merge,
inheritance and dependency metadata. |
| 34 | Generated method flags | An explicit `UserExecutable=false` could
be lost. Preserve its specified state and resulting method behavior
through the same model paths. |
| 35 | Generated role identifiers | Unresolved role identifiers could
cause permission entries to be omitted. Preserve namespace-qualified
role IDs and report a diagnostic when a policy cannot be represented. |
| 36 | Aggregation-server defaults | The `localhost` default did not
reliably constrain listener binding. Use numeric loopback for the
default endpoint and command-line fallback. |
| 37 | Certificate-validation cache | Cached results could skip current
leaf or issuer validity checks. Recheck validity windows on cache hits
and keep hostname validation independent of cached chain trust. |
| 38 | Software-update folders | Revision names and marker contents
containing dot segments could select paths outside the software root.
Normalize and check every derived path against that root. |
| 39 | USDA arrays | Array elements were not encoded for their string or
asset context. Escape them as data and preserve valid composition and
round-trip behavior. |
| 40 | Adapter hot reload | A changed dataset definition with the same
name could keep old fields, subscriptions or cached values active.
Compare complete immutable definitions and retire old state before
replacement. |
| 41 | Adapter index ranges | Subscription publication could ignore
`IndexRange` and return the complete value. Preserve the requested
projection and its status and timestamps; reject unsupported range
providers. |
| 42 | PubSub metadata and targets | Metadata from one connection could
change another connection's target mapping. Scope metadata to its
connection and provenance, and resolve targets using actual typed field
IDs rather than field names or unintended positional fallback. |
| 43 | Scales product locks | Product locks were not applied across
every remote mutation path. Apply them consistently to value writes,
filling calculations and related recipe/controller operations while
retaining permitted updates. |
| 44 | Event permission caching | Cached event decisions could outlive
identity, role or node-policy changes. Revalidate the current
subscriber, event type and source permissions instead of reusing a stale
decision. |
| 45 | WoT Modbus destinations | Hostless Modbus forms could imply
localhost before loopback checks. Reject them before connecting and
validate the effective endpoint. |
| 46 | MCP local PKI tools | Peer-trust mutations did not consistently
require the caller's `CertificateAdministration` grant. Check the
capability before trust and untrust operations. |
| 47 | Robot-control HTTP bridge | The bridge lacked consistent Host,
Origin and port validation and caller-specific session grants. Apply
those checks before borrowing the OPC UA session and retain supported
local clients. |
| 48 | Subscription transfers | Transferred subscriptions could retain
cached notifications after the destination's permissions changed.
Require authorization continuity between source and destination
identities and roles, invalidate stale retransmission data when
continuity fails, and preserve retransmission behavior for compatible
transfers. |

### Compatibility notes

- Replication uses the versioned NSRP v1 policy envelope. Upgrade peers
together and re-encode or reseed legacy topology from the authoritative
model; missing permission metadata is not inferred from old records.
- Integrity-only DTLS peers must be upgraded together for the full
sequence/epoch MAC. AEAD behavior is unchanged.
- Distinct PubSub key groups require separate connections.
- Custom sessions that cannot capture the actual encrypted transport,
and subscription providers that cannot honor a requested range, are
rejected rather than silently changing the requested behavior.
- Subscription transfers retain retransmission data only when the
destination authorization remains compatible with the source snapshot;
otherwise the old sequence numbers and cached data are invalidated.

## Related Issues

No separate tracking issue is linked. The individual corrections are
listed above.

## Checklist

_Put an `x` in the boxes that apply. You can complete these step by step
after opening the PR._

- [ ] I have signed the
[CLA](https://opcfoundation.org/license/cla/ContributorLicenseAgreementv1.0.pdf)
and read the
[CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
doc.
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works and increased code coverage.
- [ ] I have added all necessary documentation.
- [x] I have verified that my changes do not introduce (new) build or
analyzer warnings.
- [ ] I ran **all** tests locally using the **UA.slnx** solution against
at least .net **framework** and .net **10**, and all passed.
- [ ] I fixed **all** failing and flaky tests in the CI pipelines and
**all** CodeQL warnings.
- [ ] I have addressed **all** PR feedback received.
2026-10-21 05:37:29 +02:00

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Markdown

# FileSystemClient — a `System.IO`-style async client for OPC UA file systems
`FileSystemClient` (in `src/Opc.Ua.Client/FileSystem/`, namespace
`Opc.Ua.Client.FileSystem`) is an ergonomic, async-only wrapper around the
OPC UA file-system primitives defined in **Part 5 §C** and **Part 20 §4** —
the `FileType`, `FileDirectoryType`, and `TemporaryFileTransferType`
ObjectTypes. It is layered on top of the source-generated proxies emitted
into `Opc.Ua.Core` (`FileTypeClient`, `FileDirectoryTypeClient`,
`TemporaryFileTransferTypeClient`) and exposes a surface that closely
mirrors `System.IO.{File, Directory, FileInfo, DirectoryInfo, FileStream}`
to make remote file-system navigation feel like working with a local disk.
## Quick reference
| Type | Mirrors | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `FileSystemClient` | `System.IO.Directory` + `System.IO.File` | Top-level entry point. Exposes path-based operations (`GetFileAsync`, `CreateDirectoryAsync`, `DeleteAsync`, `MoveAsync`, `CopyAsync`, `ReadAllBytesAsync`, …). Rooted at any `FileDirectoryType` instance. |
| `UaFileSystemInfo` | `System.IO.FileSystemInfo` | Abstract base for `UaFileInfo` and `UaDirectoryInfo`. Carries the resolved `NodeId`, parent reference, browse name, and canonical path. |
| `UaFileInfo` | `System.IO.FileInfo` | A single file. Lazy-loaded `Size` / `Writable` / `MimeType` / etc. metadata; `OpenAsync` / `OpenReadAsync` / `OpenWriteAsync` returning a `UaFileStream`; bulk `ReadAllBytes` / `WriteAllText` shortcuts. |
| `UaDirectoryInfo` | `System.IO.DirectoryInfo` | A single directory. `EnumerateAsync` / `EnumerateFilesAsync` / `EnumerateDirectoriesAsync` (`IAsyncEnumerable<>`); `CreateSubdirectoryAsync`, `CreateFileAsync`, `DeleteAsync(recursive)`. |
| `UaFileStream` | `System.IO.FileStream` | A `Stream`-derived wrapper around an open server file handle. Async members hit the wire via `FileTypeClient`; sync members forward via `GetAwaiter().GetResult()`. |
| `UaPath` | `System.IO.Path` | Helpers for parsing, formatting, combining, and splitting OPC UA file paths. |
| `FileSystemClientOptions` | n/a | Tuning knobs: `ChunkSize`, `MaxBufferedReadSize`, `PathCacheSize`, type-subtype filters. |
| `TemporaryFileTransferClient` + `UaTemporaryWriteFile` | n/a | Separate surface for Part 5 §C.5 atomic temp-file transfers (`GenerateFileForRead/Write` + `CloseAndCommit`). |
| `SessionFileHandle` | n/a | Opaque, generation-bound handle for bounded transfers that must not follow a replacement session. |
## Contents
- [Quick reference](#quick-reference)
- [Getting started](#getting-started)
- [Open the standard server file system](#open-the-standard-server-file-system)
- [Open any `FileDirectoryType` instance](#open-any-filedirectorytype-instance)
- [Read a file](#read-a-file)
- [Stream a large file](#stream-a-large-file)
- [Create a directory tree and write a file](#create-a-directory-tree-and-write-a-file)
- [Move and delete](#move-and-delete)
- [Use a file known by its NodeId](#use-a-file-known-by-its-nodeid)
- [Path syntax](#path-syntax)
- [Path resolution and caching](#path-resolution-and-caching)
- [Type classification](#type-classification-filetype-vs-filedirectorytype)
- [File metadata](#file-metadata)
- [Streams](#streams)
- [Error mapping](#error-mapping)
- [Move, copy, and delete semantics](#move-copy-and-delete-semantics)
- [Temporary file transfer](#temporary-file-transfer-part-5-c5)
- [Generation-bound transfers](#generation-bound-transfers)
- [What lives where](#what-lives-where)
- [Server-side file bindings](#server-side-file-bindings)
- [See also](#see-also)
## Getting started
### Open the standard server file system
Many OPC UA servers expose the standard `Server.FileSystem` object
(`NodeId i=16314`):
```csharp
using Opc.Ua.Client.FileSystem;
ISession session = /* an active OPC UA client session */;
var fs = FileSystemClient.OpenServerFileSystem(session);
await foreach (UaFileSystemInfo entry in fs.EnumerateAsync("/"))
{
Console.WriteLine($"{(entry.IsDirectory ? "DIR " : "FILE")} {entry.FullPath}");
}
```
### Open any `FileDirectoryType` instance
```csharp
NodeId vendorRoot = /* result of a Browse / TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds */;
var fs = new FileSystemClient(session, vendorRoot);
```
### Read a file
```csharp
string content = await fs.ReadAllTextAsync("/Reports/2024/summary.json");
```
### Stream a large file
```csharp
await using UaFileStream stream = await fs.OpenReadAsync("/Logs/server.log");
using var reader = new System.IO.StreamReader(stream);
string firstLine = await reader.ReadLineAsync();
```
### Create a directory tree and write a file
```csharp
UaDirectoryInfo dir = await fs.CreateDirectoryAsync("/Uploads/2024-05/test", createIntermediate: true);
await fs.WriteAllBytesAsync($"{dir.FullPath}/payload.bin", payload);
```
### Move and delete
```csharp
UaFileInfo file = await fs.GetFileAsync("/Drafts/v1.txt");
await file.MoveToAsync("/Published/v1.txt");
await fs.DeleteAsync("/Drafts", recursive: true);
```
### Use a file known by its NodeId
A `FileType` NodeId can come from somewhere other than a path below the
root, for example from a reference or a method result. Create the
`UaFileInfo` directly instead of falling back to the raw `FileTypeClient`
proxy:
```csharp
// The containing directory is known: every operation is available and
// the path is the directory's path followed by the BrowseName.
UaDirectoryInfo reports = await fs.GetDirectoryAsync("/Reports");
var report = new UaFileInfo(reports, reportNodeId, new QualifiedName("summary.json"));
await report.RefreshAsync();
await report.DeleteAsync();
// Only the NodeId is known: the file is detached. It can be refreshed,
// opened, read and written, but DeleteAsync, MoveToAsync and CopyToAsync
// throw InvalidOperationException, because those are methods of the
// containing FileDirectoryType.
var result = new UaFileInfo(fs, resultFileNodeId, new QualifiedName("result.bin"));
byte[] bytes = await result.ReadAllBytesAsync();
bool detached = result.IsDetached; // true; Parent is null
```
## Path syntax
Paths use the forward slash `'/'` as the segment separator. Each segment
is parsed by `QualifiedName.Parse(...)`, so the standard
`"<ns>:<name>"` form is supported. Examples:
| Path | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `""` or `"/"` | The root directory |
| `"foo"` | The child `foo` (namespace 0) of the root |
| `"/foo/bar"` | Same as `foo/bar`; leading slash is optional |
| `"1:Reports/1:2024/data.csv"` | Qualified path using namespace index 1 for the first two segments and namespace 0 for `data.csv` |
`UaPath.Combine`, `UaPath.GetDirectoryName`, `UaPath.GetFileName`, and
`UaPath.Normalize` mirror the equivalents on `System.IO.Path`. Canonical
paths returned from `UaFileSystemInfo.FullPath` always include the
namespace prefix when it is non-zero, so siblings with the same `Name`
in different namespaces are never collapsed.
## Path resolution and caching
Path → NodeId resolution uses
`TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIdsAsync` segment-by-segment, with each step
following `ReferenceTypeIds.HierarchicalReferences` (with subtypes).
`(parent NodeId, browse name) → child NodeId` mappings are cached in a
small LRU controlled by `FileSystemClientOptions.PathCacheSize` (default
`1024`; set to zero to disable). The cache is **best-effort**: when a
resolved entry stops working (`BadNodeIdUnknown` from the server), the
entry is evicted and the path is re-resolved before the error propagates.
After any successful create/delete/move/copy, the path-cache entries
rooted at the affected parent are invalidated to avoid serving stale
NodeIds.
## Type classification (FileType vs FileDirectoryType)
Each child returned by `EnumerateAsync` is classified by its
`HasTypeDefinition` reference. Subtype-aware classification uses
`Session.TypeTree.IsTypeOf(...)` — by default subtypes count, so
`TrustListType`, `AddressSpaceFileType`, `ConfigurationFileType` etc.
appear as files. To restrict enumeration to the exact `FileType` /
`FileDirectoryType` set:
```csharp
var fs = new FileSystemClient(session, ObjectIds.FileSystem,
new FileSystemClientOptions
{
IncludeFileTypeSubtypes = false,
IncludeFileDirectoryTypeSubtypes = false,
});
```
## File metadata
`UaFileInfo` exposes the seven well-known `FileType` properties (`Size`,
`Writable`, `UserWritable`, `OpenCount`, `MimeType`,
`MaxByteStringLength`, `LastModifiedTime`). They are populated lazily by
`UaFileInfo.RefreshAsync` (a single batched `Read` against the
properties resolved via `TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds`). The optional
properties (`MimeType`, `MaxByteStringLength`, `LastModifiedTime`) are
returned as `null` when the server does not expose them
(`BadNoMatch`, `BadNodeIdUnknown`, or empty target lists are tolerated).
In the stack's `FileSystemNodeManager`, metadata reads and initial
monitored-item values use the asynchronous provider binding. These reads do
not allocate retained file-handle state or open a stream. The first `Size`
notification contains the file's current byte count and status, not a stored
null placeholder.
When the manager reattaches an item or re-enables a disabled item, it also
reads fresh metadata. Initial reads do not add periodic polling for external
file changes. Later notifications still require the node's normal change
notification mechanism.
`Writable` / `UserWritable` are advisory: callers should not pre-check
them before opening a file. Rely on the server's `Open` response for the
authoritative answer.
## Streams
`UaFileStream` derives from `System.IO.Stream` and supports both async
(`ReadAsync`, `WriteAsync`, `DisposeAsync`) and sync (`Read`, `Write`,
`Dispose`) members. The sync members forward to the async ones via
`GetAwaiter().GetResult()` — this means they can deadlock on
single-threaded synchronization contexts (e.g. WPF UI thread). Prefer
the async overrides.
Reads and writes are chunked at `FileSystemClientOptions.ChunkSize`,
clamped down to `FileType.MaxByteStringLength` when the server advertises
a smaller maximum. Empty `ByteString` returns are interpreted as EOF;
zero-length reads/writes never hit the wire.
Path-based `WriteAllBytesAsync` and `WriteAllTextAsync` refresh metadata
for existing and newly created files before opening them, so these helpers
honor the same per-file chunk limit as `OpenWriteAsync`.
`Position` is tracked locally; the server is informed via
`SetPosition` only when the local cursor diverges from the last
successfully transmitted position.
After a failed read or write, the server cursor is treated as unknown:
the next operation sends `SetPosition` to the last locally confirmed
position before transferring more bytes. This prevents a lost response
from causing a retry to skip or duplicate a chunk. Successfully completed
earlier chunks remain reflected in `Position`.
`Length` is tracked locally too —
opened from `FileType.Size` at construction and bumped whenever a write
extends past it. Callers that mutate the underlying file through other
handles (or other clients) should call `UaFileInfo.RefreshAsync()`
before relying on `Length`.
`UaFileStream` is not thread-safe in the sense that multiple threads can
share a single instance: concurrent calls are serialised by an internal
`SemaphoreSlim`, matching `FileStream`'s "not thread-safe but doesn't
corrupt" contract. `DisposeAsync` issues `FileType.Close` exactly once
even when called concurrently.
Server-issued file handles are opaque and bound to the Session that
opened them. They cannot be used by another Session, and the server
automatically closes all remaining handles when their owning Session
closes.
## Error mapping
OPC UA Bad status codes returned by the server are translated into the
familiar `System.IO` exception family at the public boundary:
| StatusCode | Mapped exception |
|---|---|
| `BadNoMatch`, `BadNodeIdUnknown`, `BadNotFound` | `FileNotFoundException` (files) / `DirectoryNotFoundException` (directories) |
| `BadBrowseNameDuplicated` | `IOException("already exists: …")` |
| `BadUserAccessDenied`, `BadNotWritable`, `BadWriteNotSupported`, `BadSecurityChecksFailed` | `UnauthorizedAccessException` |
| `BadInvalidArgument`, `BadOutOfRange`, `BadInvalidState`, `BadResourceUnavailable`, `BadOutOfMemory` | `IOException` |
| Other `Bad…` codes | `ServiceResultException` (preserved unchanged) |
Mapped exceptions wrap the original `ServiceResultException` as
`InnerException`, so callers that need the raw OPC UA status code can
still retrieve it.
`TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds` returning more than one target throws
`IOException("ambiguous path: …")`; the client never silently picks the
first match.
## Move, copy, and delete semantics
These three operations are routed through the **source's parent**
directory (per Part 20 §4.3) — the server's `MoveOrCopy` and `Delete`
methods take a NodeId and operate from the directory's perspective.
`DeleteAsync(recursive: false)` on a directory first enumerates the
directory and throws `IOException("directory not empty: …")` if any
child exists. `DeleteAsync(recursive: true)` invokes the server's
`Delete` exactly once and lets the server perform recursive removal
(per spec). The client never walks the tree itself for a recursive
delete — that would weaken the server's atomicity / locking guarantees
and double-traverse.
`CreateDirectoryAsync` and `CreateFileAsync` accept only a plain
**string** for the leaf name; they reject leaf segments with a namespace
prefix (the server picks the BrowseName namespace). After the server
returns the new NodeId, the client reads its actual `BrowseName` and
uses that for the canonical path / cache entry.
`CreateFileAsync` always passes `requestFileOpen: false` to the server
— we never leak a server-allocated handle out of the create call.
Callers that want an immediate stream should call `UaFileInfo.OpenAsync`
afterwards.
## Temporary file transfer (Part 5 §C.5)
The temporary-file-transfer pattern is exposed on a separate surface
because its lifecycle does not fit the `System.IO` abstraction. The
server allocates a transient file, the client streams data through it,
and a final commit (or rollback) tells the server to either publish or
discard the result.
```csharp
using Opc.Ua.Client.FileSystem;
NodeId transferObject = /* TemporaryFileTransferType instance */;
var temp = new TemporaryFileTransferClient(session, transferObject);
// Read flow
await using UaFileStream readStream = await temp
.GenerateFileForReadAsync(generateOptions: default);
byte[] payload = ReadAll(readStream);
// Write flow
await using UaTemporaryWriteFile write = await temp.GenerateFileForWriteAsync();
await write.Stream.WriteAsync(payload, 0, payload.Length);
NodeId completion = await write.CommitAsync(); // CloseAndCommit
```
`UaTemporaryWriteFile` owns the close lifecycle: exactly one terminal
call — `CommitAsync` (CloseAndCommit) or `DisposeAsync` (Close,
implicit server rollback) — is sent to the server. The wrapped
`Stream` cannot accidentally close the server handle; its `Dispose`
is a no-op.
`FileNodeId` and `Handle` expose the server-allocated identities for companion
methods that exchange metadata for an open transfer, such as OPC 40083
production datasets. They do not transfer lifecycle ownership: still commit
or dispose the wrapper rather than closing the handle separately. Cleanup
after a closed session uses the normal `BadSecureChannelClosed` protocol
failure instead of dereferencing a missing channel.
For a bounded generated-file download, `CopyToAsync` accepts a caller-owned
writable stream and a non-negative byte limit:
```csharp
var temp = new TemporaryFileTransferClient(managedSession, transferObject);
long copied = await temp.CopyToAsync(
generateOptions: default, destination, maxBytes: 64 * 1024 * 1024, ct);
```
With a `ManagedSession`, this operation captures one `SessionRequestContext`
for generation, readiness polling, copying and cleanup. Recovery invalidates
the operation instead of sending the old handle to a replacement session.
An already-dispatched generation response is retained even if the caller
cancels before it returns. A valid returned file node and handle are retained
for cleanup before non-Good statuses or malformed response metadata are rejected.
Close calls the standard `FileType.Close` declaration directly, without method
discovery, using an independent five-second deadline. Transfer and cleanup
failures are both reported when both occur.
The destination remains open and may contain partial data on failure. An
ordinary or custom session remains caller-owned; prevent its replacement during
the transfer. The operation allows at most 1024 file reads of at most 64 KiB
(or a smaller configured chunk size), including the end-of-file probe, and at
most 64 generation-state reads.
## Generation-bound transfers
Use [`SessionRequestContext`](Sessions.md#generation-bound-client-requests) when
retaining a remote file handle across calls. If the owning managed session
recovers, the transfer fails rather than sending the old handle to its
replacement.
```csharp
using Opc.Ua.Client;
using Opc.Ua.Client.FileSystem;
await using SessionRequestContext context =
await SessionRequestContext.CaptureAsync(managedSession, ct);
await using SessionFileHandle file = await context.OpenFileAsync(fileId, mode: 6, ct);
long bytes = await file.WriteFromAsync(source, maxBytes: 64 * 1024 * 1024, ct: ct);
CallMethodResult close = await file.CloseAsync(ct);
```
`SessionFileHandle` has no raw-handle constructor or import method and cannot be
attached to another context. Use it sequentially like a stream and dispose it
before the context. Disposal attempts Close only on the original session;
cleanup failures are logged without replacing the transfer failure.
For whole transfers, `context.UploadFromWithResultAsync` and
`context.DownloadToStreamWithResultAsync` return the byte count and unmodified
Close result, including a refused Close. They enforce chunk and total-byte
bounds, continue after short nonempty reads, and leave the caller's stream open.
Construct `TemporaryFileTransferClient(context.Session, transferId)` for
generation-bound temporary transfers. Its context-taking generation overloads
return `SessionFileHandle`; bounded `UploadFromAsync` and `DownloadToAsync`
preserve the final method result. Upload returns the file ID, the
completion-state-machine ID and the actual `CloseAndCommit` result.
`IsCommitted` remains true if a successful commit has malformed output, so
disposal does not close the consumed handle again.
Ordinary Close is not an atomic commit or rollback. A known committed result
is not replaced by late cancellation. Existing raw-handle helpers remain
compatible, but keep Open/Generate, every chunk and Close/CloseAndUpdate or
CloseAndCommit on the same captured session; do not recreate a proxy from the
newly current connection.
## What lives where
```
src/Opc.Ua.Client/FileSystem/
├── FileSystemClient.cs # entry point
├── FileSystemClientOptions.cs # tuning knobs
├── FileMetadata.cs # internal property snapshot
├── FileSystemErrors.cs # status code → IO exception mapper
├── PathCache.cs # internal LRU
├── UaPath.cs # System.IO.Path mirror
├── UaFileMode.cs # OpenFileMode flags wrapper
├── UaFileSystemInfo.cs # abstract base
├── UaFileInfo.cs # System.IO.FileInfo mirror
├── UaDirectoryInfo.cs # System.IO.DirectoryInfo mirror
├── UaFileStream.cs # System.IO.Stream mirror
├── SessionFileHandle.cs # opaque generation-bound transfer handle
├── TemporaryFileTransferClient.cs # Part 5 §C.5 surface
└── UaTemporaryWriteFile.cs # commit/rollback wrapper
```
Tests live under `tests/Opc.Ua.Client.Tests/FileSystem/`.
## Server-side file bindings
`IFileTypeBinder` / `FileTypeBinder` binds an already-created `FileState` to
bounded in-memory content and an optional asynchronous commit callback, without
a separate file-system node manager. It shares `FileHandle` ownership/mode rules
and the existing response-size calculation. Bindings allow at most 64 open
handles, one writer, and independent reader snapshots. Temporary writers commit
through `CommitAsync`; `commitOnClose` selects the ordinary FileType close lifecycle.
Application commit callbacks run without holding the binding's operation gate, so
publication can refresh other file bindings. Disposal cancels and drains an active
commit before releasing its handles. [Machine Vision](Vision.md) uses this
surface for its specialized transfers and recipe files.
Both lazy `FileSystemNodeManager` nodes and materialized
`FileDirectoryBinder` nodes protect their mounted root from deletion,
move, and copy. A NodeId from another namespace, an invalid encoded type,
or a component identifier cannot alias a file-system object.
Virtual directory browsing uses one provider cursor and preserves provider
order across Browse/BrowseNext pages. It retains only the current entry and a
continuation's lookahead reference. It does not snapshot the directory or
apply the materialized binder's `MaxEntries` limit. Named-child lookup scans
without retaining unrelated entries and stops when it finds a match.
The cursor is disposed exactly once on exhaustion, cancellation, or
continuation release. Cancellation affects only the active page; cancelling
an already completed page does not cancel later pages. Synchronous
continuation release starts and observes asynchronous cursor cleanup without
blocking its caller. The system surfaces provider failures instead of
returning an empty directory.
Before Delete or MoveOrCopy reaches an arbitrary provider, the lazy host
validates the decoded provider path. Separator-only root aliases resolve to
the protected empty root. Nonroot paths use forward slashes and contain no
empty, `.` or `..` segments. On Windows, backslashes and drive/stream
qualifiers are rejected; on Unix, colon and backslash are ordinary name
characters and remain addressable. Valid relative paths are passed unchanged.
The root remains a valid move/copy **destination** for a child, but never
the object being deleted, moved, or copied.
`FileType.Read` requires a positive length and may return fewer bytes than
requested. The server advertises `MaxByteStringLength` and bounds each
read by the file's limit, the server byte-string limit, and the available
single-result binary response budget. If server limits are disabled,
the default encoding byte-string limit still bounds individual read
allocations. At EOF, a valid positive-length read returns an empty byte
string. Service calls use the asynchronous read handler; legacy direct
synchronous delegates remain available.
File opens reserve compatible access before invoking the provider. This
prevents a rejected erase request from truncating a file held by another
opener. Failed or cancelled opens release their reservations. If a provider
returns a stream after session closure or disposal, the system closes it
instead of publishing it.
Materialized `FileDirectoryBinder` bindings supplied with a `ServerSystemContext`
attach to that server's session lifecycle on the first open. Explicit session
closure and expiry release only that session's handles and pending reservations;
other sessions keep their readers and positions. Late opens from a closing,
expired, or removed session return `BadSessionClosed`. No historical session-ID
list is retained. Binding disposal removes the lifecycle subscription, so the
application must dispose the binding when its directory is removed or its node
manager shuts down. A context without a server session manager has no automatic
session lifecycle; such standalone bindings remain owned by their caller.
`Read` and `Write` enforce the requested open mode even if the provider's
stream supports both operations. `SetPosition` clamps positions beyond
EOF to the current file length. `Writable` describes the provider/file
capability and does not become false merely because a handle is open.
Providers with multiple spellings for one file can implement
`IFileSystemPathIdentityProvider`. The physical provider uses Windows
case-insensitive identity and Win32 trailing-dot/space normalization, so
alternate NodeIds share `OpenCount` and writer exclusion. Metadata reads
query the provider asynchronously without allocating retained handle state.
Closed or failed opens release idle handle bags; pending opens remain
protected by their reservations. Extended Windows roots (`\\?\...`) retain
literal trailing-dot names rather than conflating distinct directory entries.
### Physical provider confinement
`PhysicalFileSystemProvider` rejects paths outside its configured root and
rejects symbolic links, Windows junctions, and other reparse points with
`UnauthorizedAccessException`. This no-link policy applies even to links
whose targets are inside the mount, dangling links, and the configured root
and every existing ancestor of that root. Use a physical root path without
linked ancestors (for example, avoid the `/var` alias on systems where it is
a symlink). The checks run before root creation and again on operations.
On .NET 8 and later, the ReferenceServer resolves system temporary-directory
aliases before selecting its default mount; provider-relative links remain rejected.
Enumeration fails on a linked entry rather than exposing its target metadata.
Recursive copy, move, and delete validate the source tree one directory level
at a time, before entering any child directory. Copy validates its source tree
before creating the destination; deletion does not use unchecked recursive
traversal. Ordinary in-root files, directories, and creation of missing paths
remain supported.
These are **path-based checks, not a race-free filesystem sandbox**. An
untrusted local process could replace a checked file or ancestor between
validation and I/O (TOCTOU). Protect the mount and its ancestors with host
permissions so untrusted processes cannot rename, replace, or introduce
entries while provider operations run. Existing open handles are not
revalidated. Hard links and filesystem mount points that are not reported as
reparse points are outside this policy; use a dedicated filesystem or
OS-level isolation when local filesystem attackers are in scope. Recursive
operations are not transactional and concurrent changes or I/O errors can
leave partial results.
Materialized directory bindings serialize capacity admission, provider
mutations, refresh, and teardown. Creates and cross-directory moves/copies
are rejected before touching the provider when the target directory is
already at `MaxEntries`; a rename within the same directory needs no extra
slot. Lookup snapshots are published only after node registration completes.
Teardown retires lookups and handles before provider cleanup and drains
queued operations before disposing its synchronization resources.
`IFileSystemProvider.CreateDirectoryAsync` remains idempotent, including
package-upload retries. The OPC UA `CreateDirectory` method checks the
provider for an existing entry and returns `BadBrowseNameDuplicated`
without creating or replacing it, independently of the provider.
`FileDirectoryBinder.BindAsync` registers the complete pre-existing tree
before returning, including files on read-only mounts. Supply the
`registerNode` and `deregisterNode` callbacks directly on its single
signature. Disposal deregisters materialized nodes from leaves to roots,
closes handles, and detaches file and directory callbacks. The supplied
root remains owned by its original node manager.
If a provider mutation commits but the subsequent refresh fails, the
mutation remains successful and an error identifies the unsynchronized
binding. `RefreshAsync` retries reconciliation, as does the next mutation
before it changes the provider again. A recoverable pre-mutation refresh
failure is also logged, without blocking a corrective mutation such as
deleting an entry after external changes exceeded `MaxEntries`. The error
records whether the current provider mutation has committed. Capacity
admission and provider errors still apply; cancellation before commit
still stops the operation. Reconciliation does not truncate over-limit
directories, and an explicit `RefreshAsync` still reports its failure to
the caller. Failed registration callbacks are retried rather than treating
an unregistered node as complete.
## See also
- [SourceGeneratedDataTypes.md](SourceGeneratedDataTypes.md) — for an
overview of the generated `*TypeClient` proxies the FileSystem client
builds on.
- OPC UA Part 5 Annex C (FileType, TemporaryFileTransferType).
- OPC UA Part 20 §4 (FileSystem object model).